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Abstract 
 






This dissertation confronts a contradiction that has come to define human life over (at least) 
the past quarter millennium: though we have, collectively, become the first species to inscribe 
ourselves into the geological record, we have, individually, diminishing power over the shape of the 
world toward which we blindly work. While imperial expansion and unfettered fossil fuel extraction 
threaten to undermine the material conditions of all human life, there is, I argue, a more fundamental 
problem manifest in anthropogenic climate change, one that poses a representational challenge. Because 
of its own globality, the threat posed by something as diffuse and total as the climate seems to demand 
the articulation of an equally global subject: the human as a species. What does it mean, however, to 
represent the everyday experiences of individuals as unified by such an abstraction? While some 
scholars have argued that this abstracted collectivity poses a challenge to the traditional tools of 
humanistic representation, this dissertation begins with the claim that experiencing ourselves as a 
species is a problem of representation. Climate change, I argue, exposes the inadequacy of a social 
totality emptied of its determinacy and demands that we represent our universality through the 
materiality of our everyday phenomenology. If we are to take a humanistic approach to the ecological 
crises we face, we must begin by developing new figures for the unity of our social world. 
I confront this representational problem through three pivotal moments over the past century 
in which thinkers have turned to the figurative power of language to articulate and address the frailty 
of their social worlds. These moments, I argue, articulate a poetics of emancipatory collectivity 
adequate to our current crisis. 
 
The first chapter turns to the moment when philosophy transformed its static conceptual 
environment (Umwelt) into the lived world (Welt). By following Martin Heidegger’s development of 
“worldliness” during the 1920s, I show that his central figure, ekstasis, dissolves the totalizing threat, 
not of a specific historical form of political life, but of the very methodological approach of all 
metaphysics. More than the individuated unification of selfhood, I argue, ecstasy articulates the spatio-
temporal universalization (“worlding” as he called it) of any given moment of experience. This figure 
of phenomenological worldliness, then, not only placed philosophy back on the firm ground of 
everyday experience, but uncovers, contra Heidegger’s own conservative derailments, the coherence 
of “authenticity” (Eigentlichkeit) in the collective rearrangement of our embodied worldliness 
(Weltlichkeit). 
The second chapter explores the political possibilities of this ecstasy through Hannah Arendt’s 
inversion of Heidegger’s enclosed individualism into a theory of porous collectivity. Arendt subverted 
the Heideggerian antagonism between selfhood and the social world, I suggest, by insisting that our 
entanglement in an endless “web” of the actions of others grounds our own capacity to act. In order 
to explore the inherently poetic character of this narrative web, I turn to a close reading of Hans 
Fallada’s 1947 novel of life in Nazi Berlin, Jeder stirbt für sich allein (Every Man Dies Alone). I read the 
novel as an attempt to poetically weave together the threads of responsibility and complicity that 
National Socialism had so successfully torn apart. It offers, then, a world in which the reified and 
totalizing disfiguration of  collectivity under Nazism becomes legible in its everyday fabrication and, 
therefore, its potential transformation into a world that could once again figure the possibility of  
freedom. 
The third chapter seeks to more directly understand how the material threat of climate change 
challenges our modes of political and poetic representation. I suggest that 10:04, a recent autofictional 
novel by Ben Lerner, offers a helpful starting point by navigating the alienation characteristic of urban 
 
bourgeois consumers. Against the allure of various pseudo-political salves to this alienation, Ben, the 
protagonist, diagnoses his consumptive passivity as a function of the “bad forms of collectivity” that 
the global economy imposes upon him. To illuminate the stakes of this gesture, I return to the key 
Marxian dialectical figure of our “social metabolism” between labor and the world as a whole to argue 
that Lerner’s project exhibits a kind of metabolic poetics. Lerner’s novel, I argue, reactivates 
consumption simply by reconfiguring the universalizing mechanism in which it latently participates, 
revealing the dialectical relation between the individual and the arrangement of its world. 
Through close readings of these figurative re-animations, this dissertation insists that 
humanistic methods are necessary to any approach to our contemporary global crises that hopes to 
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least I can do is to try to acknowledge the nearly unbounded web of others to whom this document 
is indebted.  
 
Though nominally my “advisor,” Rüdiger Campe has really been the midwife to every element of this 
project. He has encouraged my undeveloped intuitions, gently redirected my confusions, read every 
word I’ve written with his rare combination of generosity and honesty, and humbly offered his 
limitless wellspring of knowledge at every turn. It goes without saying that this dissertation would have 
been unthinkable without him. 
 
Paul North has always known what my work is about before I have. He has found coherence in even 
my most disorderly babbling, homing in on buried moments of importance and freeing me to shed 
the superfluous. I have his vision to thank, in particular, for the framework of the introduction. I 
would not have come to Yale had it not been for the passion of Martin Hägglund; he took me seriously 
before I deserved it and engaged with me for hours on the finer points of Heidegger’s theory of 
finitude before I had even decided to join the program. The first chapter is entirely indebted to the 
countless afternoons and tireless commitment to precision that he offered throughout. 
 
At the risk of cliché: my writing would be little without my students. They have deepened and 
complicated my relationship to many of the texts that are key to this project. In particular, I would 
like to thank the students in my class on “Food Politics and Neoliberalism” whose questions, critiques, 
and hypotheses greatly enriched the interpretations underlying the third chapter.  
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but one thread. The workshops, seminars, and conversations within the Environmental Humanities 
program at Yale completely changed my approach to the material world and profoundly expanded the 
methodological and political horizons of my work. At the heart of my academic existence are the 
intellectual friendships that have made all the anxiety and jargon worth it: without Ole, Cecilia, Adrian, 
and Anna, I wouldn’t have found meaning in Germanistik; without Dario, the life of the mind would 
be joyless; and without Zach, I would have no one with whom to look forward to retiring. 
 
Above all, I would have no thoughts at all were it not for my unreasonably giving and brilliant parents, 
and would have no reason to continue to ponder our world without the purpose I draw from my 
comrades in life, Felix and Lorena. 
 
This only indicates a tiny fraction of those whose labor and love have made this possible. You know 
who you are — thank you.
   
  
   
   
Introduction: 
 
Phenomenological, Political, and Poetic World-Making 
 
It was a thrill that only built space produced in me, never the natural world, 
and only when there was an incommensurability of scale — the human 
dimension of the windows tiny from such a distance combining but not 
dissolving into the larger architecture of the skyline that was the expression, 
the material signature, of a collective person who didn’t yet exist, a still-
uninhabited second person plural to whom all the arts, even in their most 
intimate registers, were nevertheless addressed. [...] Bundled debt, trace 
amounts of antidepressants in the municipal water, the vast arterial network of 
traffic, changing weather patterns of increasing severity — whenever I looked 
at Manhattan from Whitman’s side of the river I resolved to become one of 
the artists who momentarily made bad forms of collectivity figures of its 
possibility, a proprioceptive flicker in advance of the communal body. 
Ben Lerner, 10:041 
 
The practical creation of an objective world, the fashioning [Bearbeitung] of inorganic 
nature, is proof that man is a conscious species-being. [Animals] produce only 
their own immediate needs or those of their young; they produce one-sidedly, 
while man produces universally [...] they produce only themselves, while man 
reproduces the whole of nature. [...] 
In tearing away the object of his production from man, estranged labour 
therefore tears away from him his species-life, his true species-objectivity, and 
transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic 
body, nature, is taken from him. 
Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts2 
 
This dissertation confronts a contradiction that has come to define human life over (at least) 
the past quarter millennium: as humanity has attained unprecedented influence over the material face 
 
1 Ben Lerner, 10:04: A Novel (New York: Faber & Faber, 2014), 108–9. 
(I will mark all omissions in quoted text with bracketed ellipses to distinguish them from ellipses in the original.) 
2 Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (1844; repr., New York: Penguin, 
1992), 328–29. 
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of the planet, fewer and fewer individual humans have retained the power to participate in determining 
the future of their world. Though we have, collectively, become the first species to inscribe ourselves 
into the geological record, we have, individually, diminishing power over the shape of the world 
toward which we blindly work. In fact, the tension runs deeper: the very notion that any particular 
person belongs to a “species” — a universally homogenous we — and, furthermore, that this species 
has its home in the “globe” — a universally homogenous world — has only become thinkable as the 
colonial and extractive ambitions of a few European communities have set off irreversible 
globalization and global warming. The emergence of the “Anthropocene” is inextricable from the 
birth of an anthropos sufficiently unified to affect the globe as a whole. 
At one level, then, the problem is that imperial expansion and unfettered fossil fuel extraction 
threaten to undermine the material conditions of all human life. This problem of self-erasure is, 
perhaps, the great technocratic challenge of our times, with virtually every corporation and 
international body investing its hopes for a livable future (and its own continued relevance) in scientific 
and technological alternatives or correctives, hoping that strong enough guardrails will keep us in the 
so-called Goldilocks zone. 
There is, however, another problem manifest in anthropogenic climate change, one that poses 
a representational challenge. Because of its own globality, the threat posed by something as diffuse 
and total as the climate seems to demand the articulation of an equally global subject. What does it 
mean, however, to act as a species? How do we represent the everyday experiences of individuals as 
unified by such an abstraction? The historian Dipesh Chakrabarty notes the friction between this 
abstraction of the natural sciences and the descriptive and analytic tools of the human sciences: 
Who is the we? We humans never experience ourselves as a species. We can 
only intellectually comprehend or infer the existence of the human species but 
never experience it as such. There could be no phenomenology of us as a 
species […] one never experiences being a concept. […] 
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Climate change poses for us a question of a human collectivity, an us, pointing 
to a figure of the universal that escapes our capacity to experience the world.3 
Beneath the technocratic problem of exceeding our natural limits,4 then, lies the 
representational problem of placing the particularities of human history within the abstractions of 
natural history. Responding to climate change as a species posits a universal that overwrites our 
particularity, threatening our very “capacity to experience the world.” Where Chakrabarty seems to 
accept this abstracted collectivity as a challenge to humanistic representation, this project begins with 
the claim that this abstraction is a problem of representation. Our “figure of the universal” is not a 
fixed form but a dynamic process: we continuously make and re-make our universality through the 
particulars of our everyday participation in collectivity: we figure our particularity as universal. Far from 
subsuming human differences by naturalizing the collectivity of humanity, climate change, I argue, 
exposes the inadequacy (and the danger) of a collectivity emptied of its determinacy and demands that 
we figure the universal through the material specificity of our “experience of the world.” If we are to 
take a humanistic approach to the ecological crises we face, we must begin by developing new figures 
for the unity of our social world. Understanding this poetic challenge — and considering strategies for 
overcoming it — is the primary goal of this project. 
By locating the problem in our figuration of collectivity as opposed to our biological 
preservation, we can begin to disambiguate the notion that we act as a “species.” So long as the threat 
we face is to our biological existence, we can only ever hope to respond as a biological agent, fighting 
to preserve our increasingly inhospitable habitat with the blunt instruments of our animality. In a 
critique of Chakrabarty’s rejection of the traditional tools of humanistic analysis, Slavoj Žižek points 
 
3 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009): 220, 222. 
4 This is not to belittle the importance of the fact that our planet is becoming biologically uninhabitable for us. 
To pejoratively call this a “technocratic” issue is simply to point out, as Marx does in the epigraph above, that 
so long as we are occupied with maintaining the material conditions of our self-preservation, our capacity to 
act freely will remain a liability that threatens us instead of an opportunity that liberates us. 
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out that “our growing ability to transform nature around us, up to and including destabilizing the very 
framework for life” is actually a “paradoxical outcome of the very exponential growth of our freedom 
and power.”5 Because we got ourselves into this predicament through the misadventures of our freedom 
to transform our world as we see fit — and not through the brute ascendancy of our animalistic power 
— this naturalized notion of ourselves as a “species” misdiagnoses the problem. Žižek draws upon 
the Marxian distinction between the universally transformative capacity of human production and the 
merely physical reproduction of animal activity. While all other animals “produce only their own 
immediate needs or those of their young,” Marx argued, “man produces universally”; animals 
“produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature.” It is in this “practical creation 
of an objective world, the fashioning [Bearbeitung] of inorganic nature” that the human animal expresses 
itself as a “conscious species-being.” At first, this sounds very much like either a Promethean license 
for humanity to fashion whatever it pleases6 or a Lockean imperative to actualize oneself by working 
the land. This freedom, however, is a fragile thing,7 and can easily turn on itself, becoming more of a 
 
5 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2011), 333. 
6 Indeed, because of this tempting misreading (and the very late publication of certain key texts), Marx was long 
condemned by environmental theorists as a reckless Promethean who advocated for the unbounded 
exploitation of the natural world for human purposes. This reading was enabled by the Western Marxist 
insistence that dialectics could not be extended beyond the social realm to the natural. This one-sided position, 
enshrined by Georg Lukács and repeated by many in the Frankfurt School, led Alfred Schmidt, in his highly 
influential account of nature in the work of Marx, to dismiss Marx’s insistent materialism as a confusion that 
belied his actual conviction that the social world necessarily dominates the natural one (Alfred Schmidt, Der 
Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx (1962; repr., Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1993).) It was only 
with the careful exegetical and historical work of Paul Burkett and John Bellamy Foster that this consequential 
confusion was definitively refuted. For a direct critique of Schmidt, see Paul Burkett, “Nature in Marx 
Reconsidered: A Silver Anniversary Assessment of Alfred Schmidt’s ‘Concept of Nature in Marx,’” Organization 
& Environment 10, no. 2 (1997): 164–83. For a broader disentanglement of Proudhon’s mechanistic naturalism 
from Marx’s dialectic account of the “metabolic” exchange between man and nature, see John Bellamy Foster, 
Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), 126–40. Thanks to their work, 
Marx has been rightfully restored as one of the most radical theorists of social-material co-dependency. 
7 As I will argue, this fragility of freedom is a function both of its inherent sociality (freedom’s universalization 
in figuring collectivity, is, essentially, a matter of collective figuration) and, perhaps more importantly, of its 
appropriative character. Because our freedom is actualized in the transformation of nature, we are forever in 
danger of misdirecting that power to our own self-detriment. Because, in other words, we stand in a “metabolic” 
relation to our (socio-material) world, our power to transform the world is always a matter of externalizing 
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liability than an asset. Indeed, labor under capitalism has “reproduced the whole of nature” more fully 
than ever before, only to have limited our capacity to act freely. This limitation is not to how much we 
are able to transform the material of our world (there, by definition, we excel) but to how we transform 
it. Our freedom has undermined itself, then, not for want of collective material force but by creating 
bad forms of the “whole of nature” in which our individual labor is no longer legible as transformative. 
This is the paradox (or internal tension) of our tendency toward universal transformation: it 
can generate alienating forms of collectivity that obscure the very mechanism through which any 
particular moment of labor could figure itself as participatory in transforming the whole. This was 
Marx’s response to liberal notions of individual freedom: human activity is free because it continuously 
represents itself, in each instance, as universal, as fashioning an entire world. But inscribing freedom 
into the creation of a social and material world also illuminates its vulnerability: if its universality 
disguises or strategically forgets its own contingency, our freedom extinguishes itself. Because we figure 
our universality by continuously arranging and re-arranging the particulars of our lives as unified, 
pursuing freedom is an ongoing collective process in which we can (and must) constantly re-figure 
ourselves as universal, a precarious representational dialectic that is always susceptible to becoming 
dis-figured. This was Marx’s diagnosis of capitalist production: the only world toward which any 
instance of labor can work is the world market, a form of collectivity that strategically severs any 
material instance of labor from its transformative potential (this is why he insisted that the proximate 
alienation of the worker from their product is always also the universal alienation of the worker from 
their “species-being”). 
 
ourselves (Entäußerung as Marx, and Hegel before him, put it), which threatens to collapse into alienation 
(Entfremdung) at any moment. See chapter 1 for an extensive discussion of this tension arising from always being 
outside of ourselves, and see chapter 3 for an exploration of Marx’s notion of metabolism (Stoffwechsel). 
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In this sense, Chakrabarty is right: the abstract concept of “species” postulated as a biological 
category certainly does offer a form of universal collectivity, but one that perpetually escapes 
representation: we “never experience it as such” because it stands above life in the way that a concept 
stands above any particular, obscuring the mechanism of its own figurative construction (and, 
therefore, of its potential transformation). “In tearing away the object of his production from man, 
estranged labour therefore tears away from him his species-life,” reducing the universality of his species-
being to that of a static category, a pre-defined genus like any other. Because of this, the hallmark of 
alienated labor is the reduction of our freedom to the animalistic struggle to simply reproduce 
ourselves without perishing — something at which we are, thanks to our freedom, rather inept. The 
fact that we need to struggle to secure the basic material conditions for our biological survival is a 
symptom of our alienation from the freedom of our figurative universalization. Underneath our 
preoccupation with techniques of survival lies a suffocated struggle for new poetics of emancipatory 
collectivity. 
Far from standing in contradiction, then, the totalizing unification of human activity under the 
pressure of the global market and the threat of global warming is responsible for our individual inability 
to represent our everyday lives as transformative of the world.8 We have achieved “bad forms of 
collectivity” within which everyday activity appears impotent and irrelevant, subservient to the work 
 
8 The political consequences of this are clear and grave. Without the ability to coherently represent our everyday 
lives as participating in a single project of collective transformation, we are left with little more than the “lifestyle 
politics” of ethical consumerism and localistic attempts to carve out a private microcosm of moral purity and 
sovereignty in lieu of a public world in which to negotiate structural differences and inequalities. This is not to 
say that there is anything wrong with composting, supporting local businesses, riding one’s bike, sending one’s 
kid to public schools, boycotting problematic corporations, or going vegan. Without a clear sense of how these 
each belong to the unifying project of universal self-determination, however, they are reduced to siloed actions 
that tend toward self-righteousness, elitism, and further obscuring the structural issues they are meant to 
address. This neoliberal fantasy of replacing the challenge of collective politics with the clarity of individual 
choice is both a symptom of and a contributor to the figures of our social world in which our everyday lives 
are increasingly unrecognizable as anything other than subservient. See chapters 2 and 3 for extended 
discussions of this substitution of individual ethics for collective politics. 
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we leave to the technocratic experts to keep us alive, thereby sacrificing the flourishing of collective 
freedom for the mere self-preservation of “resilience” and “sustainability.”9 Though we have plenty 
of (“global”) figures through which to intuit the totality of our world, the dialectical relation between 
any particular moment of labor and the transformation of the world as a whole has been broken. 
* 
Of course, critiques of globalization have been in no short supply over the past few decades, 
leading scholars, politicians, and activists to propose a raft of alternative geographies to organize 
identity, community, and economy. This concern with the erosion of “place” has been particularly 
influential in theorizations of ecological crisis, where calls to “reterritorialize” our lives have become 
increasingly common. While nostalgic appeals to territorial identity have been thoroughly critiqued by 
political and cultural theorists, who instead celebrate “hybridity,” “diaspora,” “cosmopolitanism,” and 
other forms of border-crossing, (re)establishing attachments to particular locales has nevertheless 
become central to environmental discourse today.10 Partly because the political focus of 
environmentalism has, from its outset, been the conservation of specific landscapes under threat from 
industrial pollution, urban expansion, and the enclosure of public lands for corporate exploitation, it 
has tended to respond to the many faces of globalization by reifying and celebrating the local as a 
more natural scale of organization. That “the environment” tends to refer to our physical surroundings 
already suggests that the concept is, quite literally, grounded in the organization of space by 
 
9 It is no surprise that these terms are most often used by corporate or state bodies to garner public praise for 
minor adjustments to business as usual. “Resilience,” in particular, has come under fire for normalizing our 
material peril and advocating a regressive attempt to simply maintain systems as they are, replicating the 
vulnerability of those already marginalized. See, for example, Danny MacKinnon and Kate Driscoll Derickson, 
“From Resilience to Resourcefulness: A Critique of Resilience Policy and Activism,” Progress in Human Geography 
37, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 253–70. 
10 For an excellent overview and critique of this environmentalist tendency toward localization, see Ursula K. 
Heise, Sense of Place and Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagination of the Global (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008). 
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purportedly natural (in the sense of pre-political) categories: biome, ecosystem, watershed, landscape, 
etc.11 In the American context in particular, contemporary debates over conservation, land use, and 
planning continue to obscure the brutal history of indigenous genocide and land dispossession. The 
enduring legacy of figures such as John Muir and Aldo Leopold ties environmentalism to a fetish of 
wilderness that is strategically apolitical, rejecting the contestation of boundaries and sovereignty and 
instead retrenching in a stubborn “land ethic.”12 Though these defensive maneuvers clearly recognize 
that reductive and ahistorical forms of collectivity fuel corporate and cultural imperialism, they 
respond by retreating into a localist, moralist, even tribalistic ethos of autonomy, sacrificing the project 
of universal freedom for a sense of immediate coherence. 
The other side of environmentalism’s growing skepticism of universality is its indictment of 
our transformation of nature as such. These critiques of “anthropocentrism” and human hubris are 
often buttressed by a nostalgic appeal to nature’s originary holism.13 This ecological sensibility only 
intensified after the release of the first satellite images taken of the earth from space in the late 1960s, 
offering a deceptively plain view of the smooth spherical unity of the globe. The iconic Blue Marble 
 
11 For an extended exploration of the reliance on “bioregionalism” within the larger context of environmental 
attachments to place, see Lawrence Buell, The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and Literary 
Imagination (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 62–96. See also chapter 1 for a more detailed examination of the spatial 
limitations of “the environment.” 
12 For a succinct history of the peculiarly American strain of environmental imagination and policy as an 
expression of a chauvinistic frontiersmanship and mythic agrarian yeomanship, see Jedediah Purdy, After Nature: 
A Politics for the Anthropocene (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015). He provides a particularly 
clear account of how Muir, Leopold, and other turn of the century faces of the conservation movement coopted 
and simplified nineteenth-century American transcendentalism to maintain imaginative control over American 
land in a post-frontier era. (Purdy, 116–52, 188–227.) 
13 The emergence of this view in the latter half of the twentieth century is generally traced to the philosopher 
Arne Naess, whose influential “deep ecology” has ensured that virtually all strains of environmental imagination 
and politics are marked by some tendency toward conservation. It comes as no surprise that Naess’s thought 
emerged from a group of thinkers in the 1960s concerned primarily with pollution, overpopulation, 
overconsumption, the destruction of “wilderness,” and the general encroachment of humanity into every corner 
of the natural world (Rachel Carson, Paul Ehrlich, and leaders of the Sierra Club, to name a few). For a brief 
history of this movement by one of its own proponents, see George Sessions, “Deep Ecology, New 
Conservation, and the Anthropocene Worldview,” The Trumpeter 30, no. 2 (2014): 106–14. 
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image from 1972 became the visual backdrop for the environmental movement, representing the 
beauty and magnitude of “Mother Earth” as much as its fragility. The absurdity of using an image 
whose scale entirely (and perhaps strategically) obfuscates human inhabitation to advance a movement 
decrying human-induced catastrophe reflects the elitist and ineffectual naiveté of simply overwriting 
our uneven political geography with the smooth natural topography of the planet.14 Replacing 
globalization’s destructive totality with a harmonious, if fragile, natural whole — further popularized 
by Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis and other appeals to global connectivity — undermines the critique of 
human overreach by insisting on our relative insignificance from a “deep ecological” perspective. 
The problem with these modes of environmental imagination, then, lies in their 
presupposition of the very universal equality that they seek to achieve, thereby obscuring the actual 
difference and inequality on which globalization feeds; they foreground our exploitation of nature 
over our self-exploitation, failing to see them as one and the same process. In doing so, the politics of 
environmental concern is redirected from the question of how we collectively transform our world to 
how much we transform it, offering little more than the self-abnegation of reducing our “footprint” and 
cultivating a sense of humility as simply one animal among others. Because this brand of 
 
14 For a survey of the history of these “allegories of connectedness” and their ambiguous, if not outright 
contradictory, politics, see Heise, Sense of Place, 22–28. I also treat this ideology of aerially constructed unity (and 
its relation to gridded infrastructure) at greater length in chapter 3. 
The easy assimilation of The Blue Marble to liberal fantasies of a global harmony achieved by sufficiently 
abstracted coordinates is wonderfully encapsulated in the musings of the economist Barbara Ward, who 
speculated, soon after the release of the satellite images, that the natural holism they offered could override 
even the most bitter political divides of the Cold War: 
When the astronauts spin through more than a dozen sunrises and sunsets in a single 
day and night; when the whole globe lies below them with California one minute and 
Japan the next; when, as they return from space, they feel spontaneously, with the 
first Soviet spaceman: “How beautiful it is, our Earth”; it is inconceivable that no 
modification of consciousness or imagination occurs, no sense that quarrels are 
meaningless before the majestic yet vulnerable reality of a single planet carrying a 
single species through infinite space. (Barbara Ward, Spaceship Earth (Columbia 
University Press, 1966), 146.) 
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environmentalism does not propose alternative forms of universal collectivity, it is left with the same 
replacement of (social) emancipation with (natural) self-preservation. 
This dissertation sets out from the premise that responding to our global ecological crises 
demands that we begin to create new figures of our universality that do not obscure our uneven social 
geography but, instead, actively negotiate it. If, that is, we hope to move beyond mere biological 
sustainability and work toward a more just form of collectivity, one in which we can all participate as 
self-determining beings, then the work we face is less a refinement of our technical tinkering than a 
reclamation of our poetic creativity. 
Two questions emerge here that will guide this dissertation. First: how does anthropogenic 
climate change challenge epistemological, liberal, and mimetic notions of political and poetic 
representation, casting the fragile reciprocity of individual and totality into starker relief? And second 
(which simply poses the question from the other direction): how might philosophical and literary 
figurations of the world as a totality help illuminate ways in which our ability to reproduce the whole 
of nature can lead, not to increased inequality or even self-destruction, but to the universal freedom 
of collective self-determination? 
In order to address these questions, this project turns to three pivotal moments over the past 
century in which thinkers sought to articulate the political and conceptual alienation of modern life as 
a fundamentally poetic problem: as a problem of the linguistic figuration of a collective world out of 
the material particularity of everyday life. Each captures a kind of environmental poetics, I argue, not 
by representing ecological crises per se, but by articulating the challenges to representation itself that 
these crises raise. 
* 
The first chapter turns to early-twentieth-century phenomenology in order to revisit the 
moment when philosophy transformed the conceptual environment (Umwelt), which it had posited 
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for epistemological assurance, into the lived world (Welt). Beginning with the neo-Kantian metaphors 
of conceptuality “enveloping,” “surrounding,” or “enclosing” particularity, I suggest that the 
philosophical Umwelt played a largely figurative role in bridging the chasm between lived thisness and 
ordered conceptuality, between matter and form. Already in this rather stilted hylomorphism, 
“environment” named a methodological strategy for linking the materially particular and the 
discursively universal. I undertake a sustained close reading of Martin Heidegger’s inheritance and 
redeployment of this problem, arguing that he turned to phenomenology to reground philosophical 
inquiry in the fullness of everyday activity. Phenomena, he argued, already contain their own 
structuring logos, and the study of those phenomena could be read directly off of the appearances 
themselves. This methodological short-circuiting of the epistemological concerns of the entire Kantian 
tradition not only gave philosophy a new footing but also offered a vocabulary in which the relation 
between lived particularity and organized conceptuality was transformed into the reciprocal 
constitution of self and world. 
By following Heidegger’s development of “worldliness” during the 1920s, I show that his 
notion of ekstasis offers more than a temporal unification of selfhood and is, in fact, a key figure for 
establishing the spatio-temporal universalization (“worlding” as he called it) of any given moment of 
experience. Worldliness (Weltlichkeit), therefore, is a mode of collectivity in no way opposed to the 
organization of life around selfhood (Jemeinigkeit); because we are “always outside of ourselves” as 
ecstatic beings, the intelligibility of any experience, however small or particular, rides on its ability to 
understand itself as participating in the world as such. The chapter concludes by exploring the 
undeveloped potentialities of  ecstatic selfhood, suggesting that for all of  his resistance to the idea, 
Heidegger actually opened the door to a radically embodied account of  action: one in which we are 
delimited not by the scope of  our flesh, our immediate influence, nor our sensory boundaries, but by 
the worldly horizons posited by our capacity (and need) to raise the question of  the whole of  our lives. 
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Moreover, contra Heidegger’s own conservative derailments, this ecstatic embodiment points 
philosophy toward the project of  navigating a world in which we do not live alone and over which we 
are anything but sovereign. If  we are to speak of  “authenticity” (Eigentlichkeit), it can only emerge from 
the collective rearrangement of  our world, a task from which Heidegger hid but that many others took 
up in the years that followed. 
The second chapter explores the work of one such inheritor of both the Heideggerian 
promise and its ugly lapse into a fetish of tribal autonomy: Hannah Arendt. Arendt’s transformation 
of Heidegger’s enclosed individualism into a theory of porous collectivity, I argue, is condensed in her 
inversion of existential guilt into political responsibility. While Heidegger traced our radical 
dependency on people and matter outside of ourselves to an originary indebtedness (Schuld) to our 
future selves (emergent from our orientation toward our own death), Arendt insisted that our 
entanglement in an endless “web” of the actions of others grounds our own capacity to act (our 
“natality”). This web, constantly made and remade as a fabric of stories through which we motivate, 
justify, and position ourselves, allows any given instance of human activity to place itself within the 
realm of the public sphere, a space whose mediation of all action enables us to act as potentially equal, 
and therefore free, beings. By subverting the Heideggerian antagonism between selfhood and the 
social world, Arendt also re-describes our propensity toward alienation as the substitution of the 
private for the public sphere. In place of his existential concern over confusing the contingent stuff 
of the world for our self, Arendt illuminates the grave danger of trading the difficult, but emancipatory, 
negotiation of political life for the easy but tyrannical economy of domesticity. The struggle for better 
forms of universal collectivity, in other words, must always override the allure of tribalistic factions 
that replicate the totalitarianism of the family. 
In order to explore the inherently poetic character of this “web of stories,” I turn to a close 
reading of Hans Fallada’s 1947 novel, Jeder stirbt für sich allein (Every Man Dies Alone). I read the novel 
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as an attempt to poetically weave together the threads of responsibility and complicity that Nazism 
had so successfully torn apart. This narrative fabrication of Berlin as a coherent and navigable 
collective — legible in the lives of even the smallest and most disempowered of its residents — offers, 
I suggest, a glimpse of the Arendtian web of political action: a single public world in which everyday 
life can be successfully inscribed into the larger tangle of interdependencies that conditions it (and that 
it always seeks to produce anew). Though, diegetically, the novel tells the story of  a failed resistance 
to the Nazi party, I show that, formally, it offers a powerful recuperation of  the democratic 
mechanisms of  collective reproduction at a time when that power seemed to have been monopolized 
by a select few. By opening up the quiet drama of  life garrisoned within one townhouse to show its 
implications for lives across the city, Fallada reveals the highly political domesticity buried in the 
domesticated politics of  Nazi Berlin. In this sense, he reassembles the city such that its relations of  
trust, fear, and vulnerability are visible in their contingency and plasticity. At its best, the novel offers 
a world in which the reified and totalizing disfiguration of  collectivity under Nazism becomes legible 
in its everyday reproduction and, therefore, in its potential transformation into a different political 
world that could once again figure the possibility of  freedom. 
The third chapter builds on this ecstatic re-figuration of those aspects of our material 
existence that we most often coopt in attempts to localize and enclose our individuality — our bodies 
and our homes — in order to more directly understand how the material threat of climate change 
challenges our modes of political and poetic representation. I suggest that 10:04, a recent autofictional 
novel by Ben Lerner, offers a helpful starting point by navigating the alienation characteristic of urban 
bourgeois consumers. Though the novel is bookended by Hurricanes Irene and Sandy and littered 
with scenes that take place against the backdrop of the “sinking city” of New York, I argue that if this 
work of literature is environmental, it is not because it represents severe weather events but because 
it takes on the challenges that those phenomena pose to representation. Lerner’s protagonist, Ben, an 
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explicit and playful fictionalization of the author, finds himself trapped in the isolation and passivity 
of urban consumption. Against the allure of various pseudo-political salves to this alienation, however, 
— which offer a superficial unification of production and consumption through localized economies 
and informed shopping — Ben diagnoses his consumptive passivity as a function of the “bad forms 
of collectivity” that the global economy offers him. His consumptive alienation lies in his very inability 
to arrange the fiction of his life into a coherent world. Thus, it is his poetic activity that offers the 
possibility of his participation in rearranging the world differently. Fiction, as evidenced by Lerner’s 
place in the recent revival of realism in American “New Sincerity,” does not make its world simply by 
imagining possible futures and inhabiting alternate realities: it performs, in a more active and flexible 
manner, the arrangement of daily life into figures of worldly totality that characterizes all language. The 
poetic (re)constitution of our world is not, therefore, secondary to some external reality, but is the 
very process of universalization that undergirds all human activity. 
Consumption, then, is inherently alienated because the world to which it belongs obscures its 
own poetic constitution; globalization neuters Ben by hiding the figurative mechanisms by which it 
continues to reproduce itself and thereby naturalizing a mode of collectivity that is, in fact, entirely 
contingent and constructed. Lerner’s novel reactivates consumption simply by exposing the figurative 
mechanism in which it latently participates, revealing the dialectical relation between the individual 
and the arrangement of its world. To illuminate the stakes of this gesture, I return to the Marxian 
notion of our “social metabolism” between local and global, the organic and inorganic body, political 
and natural, to argue that Lerner’s project exhibits a kind of metabolic poetics. Such a poetics resolves, 
as Lerner does through Ben, to make “bad forms of collectivity figures of its possibility, a 
proprioceptive flicker in advance of the communal body.” 
* 
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At the heart of this project lies the conviction that humanistic methods are necessary to any 
approach to our contemporary global crises that hopes to remake our world with an eye toward justice, 
joy, and collective freedom. This, as I understand it, is the great promise of the “environmental 
humanities,” a burgeoning field that takes ecological crises to be the most important current challenge 
to humanistic practice while insisting on those very practices as the key to successfully navigating those 
crises. Though I often define this project in opposition to the thinkers who have helped shape this 
field of inquiry, I only do so in hopes that such local skirmishes will help to keep the field, taken as a 
coherent whole, open to its own continuous reconfiguration.
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I. Introduction: Disembodied Phenomenology 
 
This chapter begins with a rather simple, and by no means original,1 observation: Dasein, the 
Heideggerian characterization of  the human condition, lacks a body. Perhaps better: Dasein is “in the 
world” but not embodied. There is, in fact, a cluster of  omissions related to this: Dasein isn’t born 
despite being “thrown” into the world, doesn’t fall in love despite being defined by “care,” doesn’t 
have a hand though it famously hammers away,2 doesn’t have a childhood and doesn’t age though it is 
essentially temporal, and, most markedly for our purposes, though Dasein is clearly employed (or at 
least hard at work) and part of  a community, it is only tenuously, at best, part of  a social world. It is 
never fully clear whether Dasein is human, whether it (he? she? I? we?3) is even alive.4 
 
1 Heidegger was the first to note this, already within Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), in his oft-cited remark: “The 
spatialization [Verräumlichung] of Dasein in its “corporeality” [“Leiblichkeit”], [...] contains a problematic of its 
own not be discussed here.” (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (1927; repr., Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2010), 106; Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927; repr., Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2006), 108. 
Many either anticipated or noted this absence and have taken it up in various ways, some as a critique, some as 
a justification of formalizing Dasein entirely, and some as a point at which to pick up the Heideggerian baton 
and fill in the unexplored problematic. To name but a few notable examples: Edmund Husserl, Ideen Zu Einer 
Reinen Phänomenologie Und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen Zur 
Konstitution., Husserliana, Band IV (1912; repr., Marly Biemel, 1991); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, trans. Donald Landes (1945; repr., New York: Routledge, 2012); Helmut Plessner, Die Stufen des 
Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie (1928; repr., De Gruyter, 2019); Emannuel 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (1961; repr., Springer, 2012); Jean-
Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel Estella Barnes (1943; repr., 
Routledge, 2003). For an excellent overview of the extensive recent scholarship on this issue, see Kevin Aho, 
Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009). 
2 This omission is noted with particular frequency in the literature on Heidegger’s larger failure to make 
zoological sense of our being, exorcizing our animality and our bodies with it. See, for example, David Farrell 
Krell, Daimon Life : Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 1992), 152. For a 
complete bibliography of the literature on Heidegger and animality as a failure to theorize embodiment, see 
Aho, Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body, 2–3. 
3 The neutered subject of Heidegger’s ontology came under particular scrutiny after Jacques Derrida critiqued 
the absence of ontological difference as manifest in “sex, race, family, generation, lineage, species, 
genre/genus.” See Jacques Derrida, “Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference,” Research in 
Phenomenology 13 (1983): 65–83.  
4 The fragile balance between a structural elucidation of the conditions for the possibility of meaning and the 
fact that that structure is “in each case mine” opens Heidegger to frequent misinterpretation, or co-opting. As 
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To call these omissions, any good Heideggerian would immediately say, is to confuse the 
project of fundamental ontology with psychology, sociology, biology, or philosophical anthropology.5 
Dasein is a structure that explains the conditions that allow for the determinations I have accused 
Heidegger of neglecting: loving, having children, aging, being marked by race, class, or (dis)ability, in 
short, belonging to a particular socio-historical world.6 Dasein, the Heideggerian insists, is neutered 
because the ontological project it enables is meant to ground these situated particularities — what 
Heidegger calls “ontic” facts. The simple answer from within the Heideggerian ontological project to 
the misguided observation above is that, far from omissions which would leave Dasein disembodied, 
extra-social, ageless, genderless, emotionally indeterminate, let alone dead, these attributes are simply 
inappropriate to it; the term “Dasein” is designed to avoid precisely these determinations of biology, 
psychology, anthropology, and sociology from seeping into the project of phenomenological 
ontology.7 To maintain that something has been omitted is thus to demand something that Heidegger 
 
John Haugeland sees it for example, Dasein is simply “the grand pattern” of normativity which is instantiated 
in any given “subpattern”: not only am I Dasein, but “chemistry is Dasein — and so are philately, Christmas, 
and Cincinnati.” (John Haugeland, Dasein Disclosed (Harvard University Press, 2013), 9.) Though he later amends 
his position to include fewer “subpatterns,” the interpretive pressure is clear: the ontological foundationalism 
of Heidegger’s project runs the risk of severing ontology from phenomenology, leaving us with an analysis of 
patterns rather than of meaningful human experience. 
5 A number of recent interpretations take precisely this position. See, for example, Aho, Heidegger’s Neglect of the 
Body; David R. Cerbone, “Heidegger and Dasein’s ‘Bodily Nature’: What Is the Hidden Problematic?,” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8, no. 2 (January 2000): 209–30; Søren Overgaard, “Heidegger on 
Embodiment,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 35, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 116–31. 
6 Belonging to such a world (or being such a world) is, I will argue, precisely what it means to be embodied. 
Dasein’s bodily indeterminacy thus encapsulates and precipitates all of the others. 
7 And indeed, the moment Heidegger speaks most openly about “the body” is in his Zollikoner Seminare, which 
were given to a group of psychologists between 1959 and 1969 (published 1987) and were prompted by 
psychiatrist Medard Boss’ desire to ground psychology in the Daseinsanalytik. It would seem that the missing 
analysis of Leiblichkeit comes, to put it bluntly, with the application of ontology to the concerns of a particular 
field: in this case, psychology’s worries about the rootedness of consciousness in matter. Some recent 
discussions about embodiment in Heidegger hold onto these seminars as some kind of lost trove of insights 
that finally expose what Heidegger really had to say on the matter (Oliver Cosmus, “Die Leiblichkeit im Denken 
Heideggers,” in Die erscheinende Welt: Festschrift fiir Klaus Held, ed. Heinrich Hüni and Peter Trawny (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2002), 71–86; Cristian Ciocan, “Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Embodiment in the 
Zollikon Seminars,” Continental Philosophy Review 48, no. 4 (2015): 463–78; Cathrin Nielsen, “Pathos Und 
Leiblichkeit. Heidegger in Den ‘Zollikoner Seminaren,’” Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2003, 149–69.). Needless 
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diligently withholds: in a certain sense, it necessarily places us outside or beyond the methodological 
parameters of Heideggerian ontology. This chapter will therefore be equally concerned with its 
departure from the Heideggerian framework as with what that framework makes possible in our 
understanding of the slippery and overdetermined term “embodiment.” 
* 
But why be concerned with embodiment to begin with? And why turn to Heidegger of all 
theorists? Perhaps most importantly, why question the absence of the former in the latter? To 
adequately pose this last question, it may help to clarify what I do not want to make of these omissions, 
or indeterminacies. While this intervention is not, in the end, exegetically motivated, I will be thinking 
with conceptual tools developed by Heidegger, and so will be thinking with and out of him for the 
most part. The early Heidegger will provide the majority of my textual and conceptual material, though 
the questions I bring to his texts pick out the basic methodological tensions that shape Being and Time 
(Sein und Zeit; subsequently referred to as “SZ”) as well as the seminars of his that lead up to it. Thus, 
my aim is not to fill in his gaps or to find unexplored answers to them — to get Heidegger “right” — 
nor to expose some hidden insight of his and prove that he was indeed a (let alone the) philosopher of 
embodiment. These omissions instead provide openings onto new lines of thought, ways out of and 
against the Heideggerian grain using his own insights and methodological radicality. My aim, therefore, 
is also not to augment the Heideggerian project or to apply it to a new domain. I do not wish to ask 
the questions Heidegger did not think to ask, but those which he was unable to. The omission of 
Dasein’s embodiment (and with it, the entire spread of worldly indeterminacies) is, as I have already 
 
to say, this frantic search misses the structural reason for Heidegger’s omission, as though he simply hadn’t had 
the space or opportunity to treat Leiblichkeit any earlier or more centrally, but luckily left his thoughts in an 
extensive footnote to a group of psychologists. This analysis will take a different tack, identifying the point at 
which Leiblichkeit is structurally excluded from ontology and tracing the consequences of this in Being and Time 
itself. 
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noted, far from an oversight: the terms of his ontological phenomenology render all “ontic” questions 
(those which objectify our Being by specifying and situating it) derivative and distracting. In some 
sense, then, I turn to this absence to understand why SZ refuses to further determine Dasein as human 
Being in its situated life, in its “facticity” as he puts it. 
In this interpretive prodding, however, a strange irony will come to reveal itself and provide 
the clue, immanently, to the methodological friction between his phenomenology and his ontology. 
Heidegger, infamous for his neologisms and strained vocabulary, bent his language toward the 
coincidence of experience’s particularity and Being’s absolute structure. And yet, out of fear of reifying 
or reducing the structure of Being to any given instance of it, his phenomenology, fully trained on 
taking a “leap into the world at all,” jumps right through it. Just as Heidegger found a vocabulary to 
describe the reciprocal determination of the philosophical self and the particularity of its world, just 
as he articulated the possible poetic universalization of factical experience as the organization of world 
as such, he emptied it by prioritizing ontological form over phenomenological matter. 
And yet, buried in this tension, I suggest, is a methodological key to describing the immanent 
universality of the phenomenological world. Though Heidegger uses the figure of “ekstasis” to 
articulate the temporal unity of Dasein, I argue that it is just as much as figure of spatial unity, a way of 
describing our material particularity (our embodiment) as inherently universalizing (worldly). By 
uncovering an ecstatic description of our embodiment, this chapter seeks to develop a spatio-temporal 
figure that brings the factical and the formal, the first-personal and the universal, into a dialectical 
relation of reciprocal constitution and coherence. As I will show, this gesture is key to grounding the 
universal geography of ecological crisis in everyday practice: Heidegger was, at heart, overcoming the 
regnant hylomorphism of the philosophical environment (Umwelt) — whose form enclosed the factical 
matter of lived life—, thereby leaping into the world (Welt) as such. 
* 
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This friction between his phenomenological attention to particularity and ontological 
insistence on formal structure is apparent already in the observation with which Heidegger begins SZ: 
“Dasein is ontically ‘nearest’ to itself, ontologically farthest away; but pre-ontologically certainly not 
foreign to itself.”8 This observation both opens the way to ontology and sets the terms of its task: 
while we do not walk around the world with an articulated ontology, we do relate to our world 
ontologically; the structure of those relations is precisely the aim of an explicit ontology. The starting 
point for Heidegger’s project is thus precisely this pre-ontological familiarity with the world: a 
phenomenology of the “everyday.” As he puts it, the “roots” of ontological analysis are ontic, meaning 
that “the question of Being [Seinsfrage] is nothing else than the radicalization of an essential tendency 
of Being [Seinstendenz] that belongs to Dasein itself, namely, of the pre-ontological understanding of 
Being [Seinsverständnis].”9 But this pre-ontological character of ours is a mixed bag: while our ontic 
immersion in the world gives us this pre-ontological predilection, this absorption actually tends to 
obstruct our ontological self-understanding. Why? Because “Dasein tends to understand its own Being 
in terms of the being to which it is essentially, continually, and most closely related—the ‘world.’”10 
Thus, the peculiar situation we find ourselves in is a total (pre-ontological) familiarity with the world, 
a familiarity that furnishes the “roots” for the development, through radicalization, of an answer to 
the Seinsfrage, and yet it is precisely these familiar relations with things that also cause us to mistake the 
things for the relations, beings for Being. That is, our relation to the Being of the things in our world, 
which marks us as pre-ontological, is also that which has precipitated a deep confusion about our own 
 
8 Heidegger, Being and Time, 16/16. I will be citing Joan Stambaugh’s translation, which, though much more 
readable and accurate than the more standard one by McQuarrie & Robinson, mysteriously fails to consistently 
distinguish between the most important pair of terms: Sein (Being) and Seiendes (being). Luckily, this is easy to 
amend through capitalization, which I will do even when her translation does not. Pagination will refer to the 
Stambaugh edition followed by the standard German Niemayer edition (e.g. “106/108”), and all other 
references to Heidegger will refer to the German pagination of Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe (GA). 
9 Heidegger, 12/13, 13/15. 
10 Heidegger, 15-16/15. 
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Being for as long as we have tried to develop an explicit self-understanding in terms of our Being, an 
ontology. Our pre-ontological familiarity with the world both allows for and obscures ontology itself. 
This is a rather ingenious methodological opening for Heidegger’s purposes. It explains both 
why ontology is so much as possible (because of our pre-ontological understanding), and why it has 
always been misunderstood (for the very same reason). Fundamental ontology must therefore make 
the peculiar movement, first, into and through the ontic details of our absorption in the world 
(“world,” again, here naming that which we most often mistake ourselves for: those things objectively 
present: beings) and only then into a second stage of radicalization, which lifts the veil of self-
misunderstanding and “discloses,” not just that absorption in the world, but the meaning of that 
absorption. To get at that meaning — the task of the second half of SZ — therefore requires a careful 
extraction of ourselves from the world, a distinction between the world and its meaning (Welt from 
“Weltlichkeit,” as will become clear). The first “division,” the pre-ontological roots of the text, is, 
therefore, a thorough phenomenology of this “world,” though one that is always trying to avoid 
objectification and preparing the ontological radicalization of the second division, which turns to an 
analysis of “the worldliness of the world.” 
But, as Heidegger is well aware, his ontological analysis is itself a mode of relating to the world 
and is thus not simply a philosophical project, but a mode of Being (“Seinsmodus”). He names it 
“Eigentlichkeit,” which is alternately translated as “authenticity” or “ownedness”; it is both a first-
personal mode and an evaluation of genuineness or actuality, grounded in the “Jemeinigkeit,” or mine-
ness, of our Being. Heidegger famously insists that its counterpart, “inauthenticity,” “does not signify 
a ‘lesser’ Being or a ‘lower’ degree of Being. Rather inauthenticity can determine Dasein even in its 
fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure.”11 Authenticity does, 
 
11 Heidegger, 42/43. 
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however, have a modal priority: “inauthenticity has possible authenticity as its basis.”12 And this modal 
priority, that one could understand oneself authentically — truly, ownedly, in terms of oneself, jemeinig 
— is also its ontological priority. Authenticity’s ontological priority is also the priority of ontology: the 
Seinsfrage comes before, makes possible, the Daseinsfrage. 
* 
I can now restate my earlier observation that Dasein is dis-embodied in terms of the axis of 
in/authenticity. Dasein cannot be bodily because it serves as an analysis of human Being predicated on 
the separation of authenticity from inauthenticity, Jemeinigkeit (mine-ness) from Weltlichkeit 
(worldliness), ontological from ontic self-understanding. The claim of this chapter, however, is that 
embodiment is exactly that spatiality (“Being-in,” as Heidegger calls it) that allows for the distinction 
(though not the separation) of mine-ness and worldliness to begin with. Following on this point, I 
show that Heidegger’s phenomenology obliquely makes possible a notion of embodiment (namely 
“ecstatic” embodiment) that alleviates the fear of lapsing into ontic banalities, the very fear that 
animates Heidegger’s desire to cast phenomenology as “fundamental” ontology to begin with and 
pulls the poles of in/authenticity apart to the point of rupture. Ecstatic embodiment, then, names the 
spatial co-constitution of self and world and the derivative possibility of alienating them from one 
another.13 
This also begins to answer the dual questions of, on the one hand, why embodiment is the 
necessary starting point for a reevaluation of the relation between ourselves and our world and, on 
the other, why Heidegger is a fruitful place to go for this. To frame this project as an attempt to unify 
 
12 Heidegger, 249/259. 
13 As I suggest elsewhere, this is what places Heidegger’s project in such surprising proximity to Marx’s theory 
of alienation: it is our propensity to define ourselves by the way that we reproduce the “whole of nature” that 
is both the condition for our freedom and the fragility that so often leads to alienation. See note below on the 
proximity of ek-stasis to Ent-äußerung and Ent-fremdung as well as the introduction and chapter 3 for more 
extensive discussions of this in Marx. 
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two sets of distinct entities, individuals and their material environments, produces the very problem it 
seeks to overcome. Heidegger’s phenomenology, beginning with everyday experience of the world 
and not with a pre-given subject (or object), circumvents these objectified terms and the unnecessary 
gulf between them. 
The first part of this chapter will follow the Heideggerian phenomenological starting point to 
track its evasion of the paralyzing dualism generated by the insurmountable gap between a subject and 
its objectified world (its environment). Though this fear of objectification is responsible for 
Heidegger’s neutered terminology, it also allows him to replace the originary moment of 
phenomenology, understood as the cognitive relation between a subject and an object, with the rich 
experiential relations of our world. 
Doing away with the transcendental subject does not, however, erase the first-personality of 
Heidegger’s methodology. Quite the contrary, to say that ontology is possible only as phenomenology 
is to root the former in the one for whom things show themselves, in the disclosive being: in me. The 
Seinsfrage may ontologically precede the Daseinsfrage, but the former can only ever be articulated through 
the phenomenology of the latter. The possibility of explicit ontology is, therefore, pent up in our 
everyday pre-ontological worldliness, the starting point for Heidegger’s circuitous route back to 
subjectivity. His is not a psychologized or objectified subject, but a thoroughly ontological one: Dasein 
comes to show itself as my Being as I come to understand myself ontologically. 
Thus, Heidegger’s opposition between mine-ness and worldliness is not between self-
understandings differentiated by their reference to different sets of entities. Authenticity does not (or 
is at least not meant to) name the object (the “what” as he puts it) of our self-understanding, a shift 
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from the things out there to the one right here.14 It names a mode (the “how”) of relating to the very 
same things. But this, too, even if not yet reified into something like “an individual” and “its 
environment,” sets the ground for a modal distinction between a self-understanding that is eigentlich 
and one that is weltlich, a distinction whose ontological consequences are not easily kept from lapsing 
into ontic ones. Heidegger’s remarkable phenomenology of the everyday (of Being-in-the-world) 
therefore sets two countervailing processes in motion at once. Descriptively, it uncovers our essential 
entanglement in the world, what Heidegger calls our “ecstatic” Being-in-the-world, which offers an 
understanding of self and world as co-constitutive aspects of a single existential process. Because of 
the strength of this entwinement of ecstatic Being, however, this phenomenology initiates an equally 
powerful normative analysis of our need to extricate, isolate, and individuate ourselves from this world. 
The possibility of this first-personal extrication becomes the possibility motivating our entire Being. 
Critic Stephen Crowell describes this quite clearly: 
Because features of Dasein’s being – including selfhood as Being-with-others – are 
existential possibilities [...] a Kierkegaardian reversal of the traditional solipsistic 
problem emerges: The question is not how an individual subject transcends its 
solipsistic condition toward genuine encounter with the other; rather it is how an 
initially undifferentiated anonymous “they-self” can become individuated. [...] 
Individuation begins with the collapse, in anxiety, of the they-self and the 
intelligibility of its taken-for-granted way of doing things.15 
Without necessarily subscribing to the existentialized reading of Heidegger that this passage suggests, 
the irony, or at least the tension, in Heidegger’s method remains quite clear: the thick fabric of Being-
in-the-world (being “busy, excited, interested”) is marked from the beginning by a fragility, a loose 
thread (“anxiety”), which, if tugged upon, quickly unravels the whole thing. The axis of in/authenticity 
 
14 This is what sets him apart from the tone of the “existentialists,” though is also his point of proximity. I will 
leave the success of Heidegger’s departure from Kierkegaard an open question that I will address from one side 
only. 
15 Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology 
(Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 212. 
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is predicated on this latent fragility of our involvement in the “average everydayness” of our life in the 
world: a rich Welt reduced to an objectified Umwelt. 
The second part of this chapter will follow these latent cracks in Weltlichkeit that seem to so 
totally account for our lives but, in Heidegger’s ontology, instead open onto this new dualism: the 
polarity of in/authenticity. Reinstating, though in an entirely new form, the old Kantian claim that 
time is the form of interiority and space that of exteriority, Heidegger reopens the chasm between self 
and world. Despite the explicit spatiality of the figure, “ecstasy” remains an exclusively temporal 
matter in SZ, grounding our (ontic) spatial dispersal in the world. Where Heidegger sees our 
temporality emerge from an ontological crack in the spatiality of our worldliness, I will ask whether 
there is not a pre-ontological co-dependency not only of spatiality and temporality, but of Weltlichkeit 
and Jemeinigkeit. Methodologically speaking, the question is whether the neutrality of his analysis of the 
everyday, in fact, lasts too long, forcing a false polarity because of his insistence on the priority of 
ontology. In short, I ask whether Heidegger’s pervasive fear of objectifying and psychologizing our 
Being and the resultant priority of Sein over Dasein is necessary for the phenomenological project that 
he unfolds. More specifically: does the worldliness of the first division not already contain the (spatio-
temporal) ecstatic structure that is purportedly only introduced in the second division? If so, an entirely 
new way of understanding the junction between self and world offers itself. This junction, which I will 
suggest is better described as a unified fabric in which self and world are inextricably woven together 
in first-personal experience, is precisely what “ecstatic embodiment” makes intelligible. The 
“condensation,” as Heidegger puts it, of life in the unity of (first)-personhood is, then, a process 
animated and constituted by worldly particularities, and in no way at odds with or separable from 
them. To say that phenomena achieve a possible unity under the umbrella of Jemeinigkeit does not, in 
other words, place the coherence of selfhood and the material plurality of the world at odds, but 
underscores the reciprocal dependency of unifying the world and unifying the self. Our material self-
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organization (our embodiment) arranges itself against the furthest horizons of our world (ecstatically). 
Because our embodiment is ecstatic, in other words, we figure the coherence of ourselves through the 
coherence of our world — and project the horizonal contours of our world in every moment of our 
everyday experience. If ecstasy, as Heidegger argues, is to be a figure for the wholeness of the self, it 
must, as I will argue, be a figure of the Weltlichkeit of the self and the Jemeinigkeit of the world. 
* 
Here, the political stakes start to become clear. Contrary to the self-reliance characteristic of 
existential retreats into selfhood, this integration of the constitution of self and the constitution of 
world reveals the essential sociality of this project. As Heidegger is keen to point out, the project of 
establishing coherence is ongoing, inherited, forever unfinished. Our everyday lives contain the seeds 
for their universal significance — and are continuously thwarted in that process — because they 
intervene in an already established flow of poetic infrastructure, a durable yet malleable structure of 
collective figuration. 
Yet Heidegger builds up worldliness in SZ through isolated spaces of work: the craftsman in 
his shed privately hammering away, the self-sufficient farmer pulling at his beets in the field. Out of 
this pastoral fantasy of a world defined by extra-social utility (“Zuhandenheit”), however, no ontological 
crack emerges.16 It is only because these isolated scraps of meaning, these small private spheres of 
experience, are, in fact, suspended within the shared social fabric of worldliness that fragilities emerge. 
According to Heidegger, it is the “anonymity” of social norms, described in his infamous exposition 
on “das Man,” that exposes the social fragility described by Crowell. If that were the case, the tendency 
for my understanding of worldliness to collapse into an objectified understanding of world would not 
 
16 Other than the infamous broken hammer, that is. As I argue below, unless the broken hammer somehow 
evinces the fragility of the shared configuration of meaning, the anxiety behind a tool coming apart remains 
dependent upon the fluid and fragile social fabric in which its functionality is inscribed. 
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rise out of a tension between mine-ness and worldliness as such, but between mine-ness and “they-
ness.” Worldliness would be alienating simply because it is structured by figures that I did not choose 
for myself. In that case, the polarity of self and world would be a problem of what contemporary 
philosophers would call practical reason: a matter of the source of normativity and the grounds for 
justifying our actions. Philosophy would be less concerned with articulating the poetic fabric of the 
world and more interested in establishing the basis upon which we could build a sense of self not 
susceptible to the fragility of the “anonymous” norms handed down from the “they,” norms rooted 
in nothing other than their own pre-existence. To use the terms that Heidegger himself suggests, to 
separate the world into the first-personal “Ich-Welt” and the enclosing objectivity of the “Umwelt” 
necessarily also severs the former from the social “Mit-Welt,” a position as conceptually unclear as it 
is socially problematic. 
This is, however, the language with which one is left if personhood is severed from its social 
world, if one tries to read the coherence of meaning off of a formal structure that stands outside of 
our particular figures of collectivity (outside of history). Though this may remain somewhat nebulous, 
it should already be clear that the apparent insufficiency of Weltlichkeit to account for itself must be 
the analytic focal point for understanding the sociality of selfhood. It is at this point that thinking of 
the possibility of meaning in terms of embodiment becomes useful, if not imperative. If we are to find 
mine-ness already within everyday worldliness (the material Umwelt as much as the social Mitwelt), their 
coherence must arise from the same process of phenomenological figuration. To be embodied is 
precisely to see the reciprocity not as a contingent coincidence but as a constitutive co-constitution.  
* 
Though this will become abundantly clear in what follows, a quick word is in order on what I 
do not mean to indicate by the spatiality of embodiment (and of which the qualifier “ecstatic” is meant 
to steer us clear). The first obvious, though necessary, point is that the ecstatic body does not point 
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toward objectification. Of course, so long as one has a psychologized or interiorized sense of subjectivity, 
“the body” will always serve as a reification of some intangible mind/spirit/soul and will be eschewed 
as a vehicle for letting the ontic bleed back into the ontological.17 Heidegger’s phenomenology allows 
us to avoid precisely this starting point and therefore to return to an understanding of embodiment 
which is freed of this spatial dualism. “Ecstatic” is a way of characterizing our spatiality, our Being-in-
the-world, which does not proceed outward from a (definitionally immaterial) kernel to circumscribe 
an objective realm of selfhood or sovereignty, thereby delimiting ourselves from the world (whether 
through flesh, private property, or extensive sovereignty of any kind). A preliminary claim is, therefore, 
that ecstatic embodiment has nothing to do with spatial extension or bridging distance, but with a 
practical entanglement in a socio-material world whose unevenness and plasticity grounds any sense 
of proximity and distance. 
Embodiment, this chapter suggests, is the medium,18 or spatial fabric, within which self and 
world can be placed in opposition or be left to operate in tandem. To be the medium in which and 
 
17 For this reason, “embodiment,” finally no different than the Latinate “incarnation,” is rather misleading: the 
prefix suggests that something disembodied is given a bodily form. The German “Leiblichkeit” is much better 
(also bringing out its parallel to “Zeitlichkeit”), but “bodiliness,” “bodiedness” or any other nominalization which 
avoids the prefix is no more a part of the English lexicon than the German term itself. As I note below, there 
is no particular need for this process of embodying or incarnating to mediate between the spiritual and the 
material; it can, just as well, name the process of rearranging materiality around a particular principle of self (a 
discrete body). 
18  If this mediality is not again to lapse into objectification, it must be distinguished from a seemingly related 
role embodiment plays for other phenomenologists, but which has an entirely different ontology (spatiality) as 
its basis: the body as mediator between two worlds (e.g. the will and representation, the spiritual and the physical, 
the inner and the outer, consciousness and reality, organism and environment). The body as mediator is a kind 
of liaison between two otherwise unrelatable worlds, a fortuitous hybrid thing which is both objective and 
subjective, perceptive and understanding. Merleau-Ponty may come the closest to thinking of the body medially, 
but because the worldliness he establishes is perceptual, the resultant medial body remains fleshy, and thus still 
acts as a kind of condensed “schema” of the successful rapport between my intentionality and my world. (He 
in fact uses “medium” himself, though in the context of claiming that “my body is the pivot of the world: I know 
that objects have several facts because I could make a tour of inspection of them, and in that sense I am conscious 
of world through the medium [moyen] of my body” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 94–95 my emphasis.). 
Here, the body still functions as a portal between worlds). The Heideggerian phenomenology points to the 
unified substrate upon which such dualisms can be entertained. Bodily mediality as a grounding substrate is 
thus essentially different from, and even the condition for, the possibility of any idea of mediation. 
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through which the multiplicity of worldly particularities is experienced is to take up the collective 
fabric within which the vicissitudes of history, the unevenness of power, the possibilities of change 
and determination are woven and given form. While we are not sovereign, not cleanly discernable 
agents, we are also the only ones who can take responsibility for and partial ownership of what our 
world can and will look like. If there is a project of selfhood, of working toward the coherence of lived 
experience, it lies in navigating and re-figuring the modes of collectivity that my particular embodiment 
affords me and demands of me, a project of participating in the reproduction of a shared world as 
opposed to solidifying the conditions for individual autonomy. We must arrange the world such that 
we can place ourselves in it; “the world” is a figure for describing matter in terms of ourselves. 
Embodiment, far from a fixed object, is a process through which we discern ourselves in the material 
particularities of the world, of em-bodying (or in-carnating) the world as our own.19 The project is, in 
other words, not so much existential as it is poetic. 
If our moment is marked by a crisis of worldliness, manifest in ecological crises that reduce 
our capacity for collective self-legislation to the struggle for self-preservation, we must re-describe the 
apparently “natural” fragilities of our environs as the fragility of our world — the fragility, in fact, of 
our capacity to discern the world as our own and, therefore, ours to (re)make anew. We don’t need to 
cultivate an ethic of stewardship over the natural world, nor to press for a politics of liberal equality 
 
19 “Ecstatic embodiment” is, in this sense, a redundant phrase. To say that we are always outside of ourselves 
is nothing more than a description of the fact that we shape ourselves by appropriating the world as our own. 
We are the occasion, the medium, through which the material of the world takes shape as a world at all (as my 
world). Heidegger calls this material appropriation Ereignis (which I will discuss below), reminding us that this 
material appropriation is itself already a matter of self-formation (it is somewhat more buried in the English: 
the stem “proper” reflecting the eigen of selfhood). This is, as I noted above, Heidegger’s unexplored point of 
contact with Marx, for whom the freedom of the self was only possible by making the “inorganic body” of the 
material world one’s own “organic body.” 
To reiterate, because the internal coherence of our self (Er-eignis) is achieved through the arrangement of 
externality (ek-stasis — what Marx, following Hegel, called Entaüßerung), we are also always vulnerable to 
disturbing this fragile dialectic of self and world. Entaüßerung always threatens to become Entfremdung. Though 
this particular constellation of terms demands a rigorous investigation of its own, I will touch upon it when 
returning to this embodied dialectic in Marx’s figure of “metabolism” in chapter 3.  
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or freedom from the vicissitudes of the world. The fissure in our geography is not between the human 
and the material, but in our capacity to figure them as reciprocally constitutive. A phenomenology of 
ecstatic embodiment does not yet offer a determinate politics for averting climate change, but it does 
allow us to re-articulate fear over the quality of our natural world as concern with the inequality of our 
social world. The tools for addressing resource extraction, pollution, soil degradation, and rising sea 
levels are no different than those for negotiating trade deals, corporate regulation, land rights, and 
labor conditions. An ecstatic phenomenology reclaims environmental issues from the technocratic 
hands of the objective sciences and reminds us that they are a political matter of our inability to 
collectively, and therefore freely, remake ourselves through our world. 
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II. Heidegger’s Discovery of the World 
 
1. Beyond Erkenntnis: Phenomenology in the Middle Voice 
The great achievement of — and challenge for — Heidegger’s early philosophy was almost 
entirely methodological. Unlike the other progenitor of twentieth-century phenomenology, Edmund 
Husserl, Heidegger was uninterested in establishing a new body of knowledge. Indeed, Heidegger 
went far out of his way to avoid any confusion between his study of phenomena and any empirical or 
metaphysical doctrine. Phenomenality no longer served as an epistemological assurance as it had since 
Kant, bridging the distinct ontological realms of “self” and “world” through a successful harmony of 
heterogeneous domains (paradigmatically, inner and outer). 20 Instead, Heidegger worked to re-inscribe 
the act of appearing into the articulation of that appearance: phenomenality was to be inseparable 
from phenomenology. While the prominent neo-Kantians contemporary to Heidegger grappled with 
the disruption and displacement of experience in the moment of its philosophical articulation, 
Heidegger worked to develop a language for phenomenality that was already ordered: one which 
contained its own logos. This methodological reorientation, I argue, allowed Heidegger to “leap back 
into the world,” as he went on to put it, placing philosophy back into the practice of everyday life. I 
will begin, then, with a brief word on the basic problem Heidegger faced in his phenomenological 
method and his use of an arcane grammatical form — the Greek middle voice — to try to chart his 
proposed new path forward.  
 
20 Phenomenology’s inheritance of classical transcendental philosophy is a long and intricate story. By focusing 
on Heidegger’s transformation of (the spatiality of) appearance, I am, inevitably, leaving out many facets and 
important figures. For an excellent overview of the afterlife of Kantianism in early phenomenology, especially 
in the work of Edmund Husserl, see the recent collection: Faustino Fabbianelli and Sebastian Luft, eds., Husserl 
Und Die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie: Husserl and Classical German Philosophy (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2014). 
For a classic analysis of the Husserlian relation to Kant and Kantianism, see Iso Kern, Husserl und Kant: eine 
Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus (1964; repr., Heidelberg: Springer, 2011). 
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In his well-known etymological interpretation of phenomenology at the outset of SZ, 
Heidegger traces a plurality of meanings carried by the word “phenomenon” back to that of “self-
showing” (selbst zeigen). Both Erscheinung (appearance), the “announcing” of something that does not 
show itself, and Schein (semblance), the way something shows itself falsely, are possible “only because 
something claims to show itself in accordance with its meaning at all, that is, claims to be a 
phenomenon. [...] The original meaning (phenomenon: what is manifest [das Offenbare]) already 
contains and is the basis of phainomenon (“semblance”).”21 In addition, Erscheinung (as well as “bloße 
Erscheinung,” mere appearance) has yet another valence, indicating not simply a false self-showing but 
something which does not show itself at all:22 the noumenal. Here, too, the idea that the phenomenon 
indicates (that is, connects two separate things) relies on a notion of self-showing inherent to the one 
thing that shows itself. 
To add to this tangle, the sense in which phenomenology is a science of phenomena turns the 
screw of self-showing yet again. Heidegger insists that if we are to understand logos as discourse, it 
must be understood as “apophantic speech” (apophainesthai, from the same verb out of which 
“phenomenon” arises): “discourse ‘lets us see,’ apo … from itself, what is being talked about. In 
discourse (apophansis), insofar as it is genuine, what is said should be derived from what is being talked 
about.”23 In this reinterpretation, logos, far from the imposition of the form of our experience on the 
matter of the world, lets things show themselves as they are; logos is, to use one of Heidegger’s favorite 
terms, disclosure. Phenomenology, translated literally as apophainesthai ta phainomenonai, is, then, a 
 
21 Heidegger, Being and Time, 27/29. 
22 “Appearance, as the appearance ‘of something,’ thus precisely does not mean that something shows itself; 
rather, it means that something which does not show itself announces itself through something that does show 
itself. Appearing is a not showing itself.” (Heidegger, 28/29.) This echoes the Kantian notion that phenomena 
carry a negative within them: not falseness but something that could never show itself, something that can only 
ever be apprehended through its mediation in another thing: its appearance. 
23 Heidegger, 31/32. 
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method of description that is disclosive of the way things are in themselves. Or, as Heidegger puts it 
in his hopelessly obscured attempt to read off of the Greek, “das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von 
ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen” (“to let that which shows itself as it shows itself 
from itself be seen from itself”).24 
Beneath the surface of Heidegger’s unpalatable hyper-reflexive formulation lies the difficulty 
of translating the verb phainesthai into German (or any other contemporary Indo-European language). 
It is not that we moderns have lost the notion of manifestation or coming to light, which “to show 
itself” seems to capture well enough. The problem makes itself clearer in the derivative senses of 
phenomenality, which require the separation of the thing from its coming to light (that which appears 
from appearance, that which really is from semblance). There is a tension between the part or aspect 
of the object that finds its determination in a foreign light, as a mediated heteronomous thing, and the 
aspect that remains in total darkness as autonomous, immediate, indeterminate. This was the core 
problem that Kant’s critical epistemology sought to navigate: these two are not simply divergent or 
contrary but are, despite their schism, meant to refer to one and the same thing and thus must stand 
in some kind of relation. We can think of an object either in its noumenal or its phenomenal aspect, 
but never both at the same time. In its phenomenality, we speak of it in relation to a subject (us): we 
think of, see, experience, or misunderstand something, and always in relation to a web of other entities 
that are similarly determined by their relation both to the experiencing subject and to each other. To 
speak of the thing in its noumenality, however, we must refrain from invoking any subjectivity or 
other entity external to the object in question: the thing in itself can, in fact, not be spoken of beyond 
its formal possibility because any predicative determination would attach it to some external context 
 
24 Heidegger, 34, my translation. 
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(cause it to appear under some foreign light). It is, properly speaking, not even an object, entity, being, 
or anything that could belong to a typology, but simply a bare thing (Ding, as Kant insisted). 
But, as Heidegger points out, if the thing as withheld from the light, as non-appearing thing, 
is to have any relation to the appearance, both must rest upon a common ground of things that do in 
fact appear, and not in any mediated sense but in themselves. Thus, before the complete independence of 
the Ding-an-sich and the total dependence of the Erscheinung lies a third modality of coming to light 
within a context that is nevertheless immediate. It is this mode, neither active nor passive, neither 
autonomous nor fully heteronomous, which Heidegger tries to capture with the fullness of reflexive 
objectivity (sich zeigen so wie es von ihm selbst her zeigt). This reflexive objectivity is, therefore, simply 
“allowed” (gelassen) to come to light by a merely facilitating subjectivity. This facilitation of reflexivity 
is Heidegger’s approximation of the grammatically untranslatable form of the Greek phainesthai: the 
middle voice.25 
Heidegger does not make much of his appeal to the middle voice, at least not explicitly,26 but 
it is worth taking a slight detour to consider what exactly it means for phenomenology to speak in the 
middle voice. Though Heidegger does not himself take on the full import of this methodological 
gesture, the mediality of the middle voice, I will argue, establishes a discursive space in which 
phenomenality is the disclosure of the world as such. Our embodiment of this (poetic) disclosure 




25 The relation between the fantasy of “(im)mediacy” and the “mediality” of the middle voice is neither 
incidental nor direct. I return to this below when discussing Emil Lask, for whom this was a very explicit issue. 
26 Heidegger, Being and Time, 27/28, 31/32 are the only two instances in which he refers to the grammatical 
form directly. “Mediality” is not an operative term in Being and Time; to the degree that it is present, it is buried 
underneath the question of Being. 
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Voice indicates the focus, or priority, of an action, relating the verb to the effective agent(s) 
and the affected object(s). The active and passive voices are distinguished by the semantic focus they 
place, through syntax, on the subject or object, respectively: 
Active: Felix broke the computer. 
Passive: The computer was broken [by Felix]. 
Though these ostensibly describe the exact same process, in the former case Felix is the clear focal 
point, while in the latter he is merely incidental to the focus on the computer. Though the “middle” 
voice sounds as though it should strike a balance between the two, it really functions as a different 
kind of alternative to the active than the passive, one that doesn’t simply invert subject and object (by 
making the semantically active subject the grammatical object and vice versa), but by turning away 
from the question of agency altogether toward the fact of the process itself: 
(Semantic approximation of the) Middle: The computer broke.27 
While we can always ask who broke it, the priority of the statement is simply to indicate the fact of its 
breaking: it points to or uncovers the process itself. 
As indologist Jan Gonda explains, the medial28 in both Greek and Sanskrit was essentially a 
grammatical turn toward the person or thing in which something happens and away from the source or 
 
27 Grammatically, this is a plain old active sentence, though the verb is a so-called “ergative” verb, one which 
can be used transitively or intransitively to refer to the same action: in this case, the computer breaking. “To 
open,” “to cook,” “to shave,” “to reflect,” and many other verbs can be used in this way. When English still 
had the “passival” form, many verbs were expressed in this fashion: “the house is building,” “the food is eating” 
etc. Though these are by no means middle constructions, they do steer the verb away from the source or cause 
of the action and to the fact of the action itself. 
28 The adjectival form of “the middle” already points away from the idea of standing between or being an 
“intermediary” and towards that of the more radical mediality (in German: “medial” from “das Medium”) of an 
action understood as an event. 
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actor responsible for setting that event into motion.29 Gonda calls this an “eventive” formulation, in 
which 
something comes or happens to a person (or object), befalls him, takes place in the 
person of the subject so as to affect him etc., without any agens being mentioned, 
implied, or even known. Very often the subject is a person or living being and the 
process may take place even contrary to his wishes, unintentionally, more or less 
automatically.30 
Common examples in Greek of being befallen in this way include a number of bodily events 
(ptárnumai (to sneeze), ereúgomai (to belch), egeírōmai (to awake), gígnomai (to be born), óllūmai (to die)) or 
moments of pathos (maínomai (to be furious), aidoúmai (to be ashamed), élpōmai (to hope), éramai (to 
love)).31 It is not that I generate fury or am the cause of it in any direct sense. Nor am I overcome by 
some unnamed foreign power, Fury, who courses through me and causes me to become furious. It is, 
of course, perfectly reasonable and ordinary to ask about the source of my fury, about who is originally 
responsible for producing it, and one could likely establish some pretty concrete answers. But when I 
speak of myself as being furious in this eventive voice, I am precisely not speaking in terms of etiology: 
I am already furious and it is this fact that I am a furious person, a furious thing, a locus of fury, that is 
expressed. 
 
29 Jan Gonda, “Reflections on the Indo-European Medium I,” Lingua 9 (1961): 30–67. and Jan Gonda, 
“Reflections on the Indo-European Medium II,” Lingua 9 (1961): 175–93. 
The middle continues to be used in a number of contemporary non-Indo-European languages (Malay, Marind 
of Papua, and Toba Batak of north Sumatra, to name a few). See Gonda, 182–83. 
I owe my awareness of Gonda’s piece to Benjamin D. Crowe, “Resoluteness in the Middle Voice: On the 
Ethical Dimensions of Heidegger’s Being and Time,” Philosophy Today 45, no. 3 (2001): 225–41. 
30 Gonda, “Reflections on the Indo-European Medium I,” 49. Note that because the agent is not even implied, 
this is not to be confused with a passive formulation that simply displaces the subject out of the sentence in a 
moment of mystery or incomplete information. In saying “The computer was broken” we are still invoking an 
(unnamed) agent who broke it, who is, in some sense, the (semantic) focal point of the sentence despite being 
absent grammatically. 
31 Gonda, 50; Gonda, “Reflections on the Indo-European Medium II,” 177. 
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There is, then, nothing exclusively medial about any of these verbs: it would be strange to deny 
that mothers give birth, that a sound awakens me, or that a sneeze always comes as a reaction to some 
irritant. But no matter how indebted birth is to a mother’s birthing, there is an important sense in 
which she is not the agent in question when we speak of someone being born. The baby is certainly 
not the subject, but also not the object. That is what is so magical about birth: chemical-physical 
origins and even the most complex causal explanations can never fully account for the moment in 
which something entirely new comes to be: a life begins, a fact that can be explained in terms of all 
sorts of prior conditions but that is, in a deeper sense, an event of its own, comprehensible only in 
terms of that life itself. 
But this is not to say that the event is brought about internally, either: it would be equally 
misguided to try to speak reflexively of a child bearing itself or bringing itself into the world. Though 
the passive formulation of “being born” might suggest this, it is really only the inversion of the active 
“the mother bore the child” with the mother the unnamed but implied agent standing just outside of 
the utterance. The middle voice steers clear of any such ascription and simply names the birth as an 
event of its own. It takes place, we might say, in the baby; the baby is the medium (or “site,” as Heidegger 
calls it in his later works) of birth but not its perpetrator or recipient. The intentions of an agent or 
any other such external cause, the middle voice insists, are not the appropriate explanatory tools for 
understanding the emergence of life.  
Does the middle voice then simply bracket what came before, ignoring what lies outside, and 
in this sense reduce the verb to a pure here and now, cut off from any spatio-temporal embeddedness? 
If so, the middle voice would not seem particularly helpful in avoiding Kant’s epistemological isolation 
and reification of phenomenality. But the middle voice speaks of a phenomenon not as an object but 
as an event, and thus doesn’t properly speak of a thing at all. (Again, this is why reflexive formulations 
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are a misleading translation of the middle voice: they not only re-introduce an efficient cause, but, in 
so doing, must also revive a robust object for that agent to act upon.) 
This becomes clearer when we consider the relation between these different voices. It would 
be misleading to say that the computer, or even the broken computer, is the thing common to all 
statements, simply spoken of in different modalities. But even if not a thing, there does still seem to 
be some kind of commonality between the expressions “Felix broke the computer,” “the computer 
was broken,” and “the computer broke:” the breaking of the computer. The act, the event — the 
phenomenon — of the computer breaking. But this verbal phrase, too, could be taken either as a way of 
further determining the object “computer” (now with the predicate “being broken”), or as the 
encounter of brokenness in an entity that is only determinable as a computer because it is something 
that usually functions. But this ambiguity is actually clarifying: the object underlying the former 
(“computer”) itself emerges as a product of the latter (the brokenness of something that we expect to 
be useful). How would we be able to speak about a computer if we did not already have the more 
fundamental experience that the computer works, breaks, is expensive, etc.? The very idea that those 
determinations are categories we apply to some naked noumenon to build up the concept “computer” 
is predicated on an experience of the computer being in some kind of relation to me. 
* 
This begins to make better sense of Heidegger’s distinction between phenomenon and (mere) 
appearance ((bloße) Erscheinung). The active sense of a thing appearing in some way — a sense whose 
tenuous epistemology relies on the division of the hidden agent (noumenon) and the visible product 
(appearance) — is derivative of the medial and single sense of a phenomenon as event. Thus, the very 
possibility of active descriptions of things is predicated on the actuality of medial facts or events. This 
is, to use another term of some importance to Heidegger’s inheritance of the Kantian problem, the 
“facticity” of the world. 
Ecstasy  Chaoulideer  42
  
Insisting on this facticity of birth — to stay with this example for a moment — as the essential 
focal point of the event (and not something prior or external, caused or intended) does not, however, 
cut the event off from the particular set of limitations and possibilities formed by the socio-historical 
world in which it occurs. The eventiveness of birth does not question the fact that a baby is born into 
a specific world whose particularities are co-constituted by endless others in a complex web of 
interrelated events. Moreover, because the mediality of the middle voice articulates the basic relational 
experience of the world upon which specific active (or passive) statements are founded, the eventive 
needn’t be augmented by the active to account for the historicity, contingency, and embeddedness of 
a phenomenon. The mediality of the middle voice already contains, immanently, a much stronger kind 
of interrelation and interdependence than any chain of causal or intentional links could establish. 
If phenomenality already contains the logic of its own appearing, what work does 
phenomenology do? What kind of relation between speaker and phenomenon does medial speech 
exhibit? What kind of logos does “disclosure” make possible over and above the phenomenon’s own 
eventiveness? If we follow Heidegger’s translation of the middle voice into the language of 
facilitation32 — logos as “allowing” something to “show itself” — speaking in the middle voice would 
seem to impose its own kind of distance, perhaps even greater than in the active. The speaker, no 
longer integral to the process of appearing, would be marginal and detached, merely pointing to a 
thing in its eventiveness — a midwife, so to speak. 
 
32 Recall his painstaking elucidation of phainesthai into a knot of reflexives: “das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von 
ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen.” This isn’t just unwieldy, it obscures the radicality of his own 
method: reflexivity works not by backing away from the question of agency but by making the agent the object 
of its own action; it is a thoroughly active voice in which the object just happens to also be the subject. By 
reinterpreting phenomenality reflexively, Heidegger seems to have undercut the power of the middle voice and 
obfuscated its mediality. The problem becomes clearer when we turn from the middle voice as a grammar of 
phenomenality towards the middle voice as the voice of phenomenology. That is, to think of mediality not as a 
characteristic of a phenomenon but as the structure of phenomenology itself. I will return to this at length 
below. 
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This is the challenge Heidegger grapples with in the methodological opening of SZ. Though 
the grammatical move from object to event carries the seed of a radical phenomenology, it is by no 
means sufficient. The seemingly straightforward grammatical gesture raises questions it is not fully 
equipped to answer: are events entirely isolated moments, nodes of relation, or a medium of 
appearances? What, in other words, is the experiential medium in which certain relations appear and 
others do not? If the simple Kantian answer (the a priori forms of cognition common to all creatures 
of rationality) is no longer adequate, the question remains critically unclear: whose phenomenological 
medium this is? This “who?” is the essential methodological concern (and discovery) of Heidegger’s 
project. It is, I argue below, also the question his ontology almost entirely smothers. 
This challenge of articulating the medium of experience through which philosophy could 
describe particular phenomena in the world as immanently organized is, in fact, a recapitulation of a 
methodological problem with which Heidegger’s neo-Kantian contemporaries were grappling. To 
understand how Heidegger’s ostensibly ontological project came to develop a worldly 
phenomenology, we must go back more than a decade to his early encounter with this problem: how 
to develop a philosophical vocabulary with which to accommodate facticity and logicity. 
 
 
2. Erlebnis: Emil Lask’s Categorial Environmentality 
Heidegger inherited the term “facticity” from the neo-Kantian attempt to account for those 
shards of  irrationality that escape clean subsumption under the Kantian apparatus. Beginning with 
Fichte, the question of  what to make of  the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the empirical and 
the a priori seemed a fundamental challenge to the smooth operation of  Kantian epistemology. 
Faktizität was the word Fichte used to describe the raw “thisness” of  the empirical that could not be 
brought under the a priori predictability of  cognition. Facticity was needed to allow for novelty, 
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creativity, unpredictability: for the caprice of  history. The basic shape of  the problem hadn’t changed 
a century later in the hands of  the prominent neo-Kantians contemporary to the young Heidegger. 
His mentor, Heinrich Rickert, and a fellow student of  Rickert’s, Emil Lask, made a particular 
impression on him. While Fichte had introduced the term to name the totally irrational — the 
mysterious remainder outside of  everything ordered and cognizable — it had already undergone a 
partial revolution in the writings of  the young Lask.33 To put it simply, Lask saw in bare facticity not 
something outside the categories of  knowledge, but something beneath them. Facticity, Lask suggested, 
may have referred to raw empirical intuition, the unanticipated “thisness” of  the particular, but that 
did not mean it lacked categorial order.34  
With this observation, the neo-Kantian problematic began to bleed into the 
phenomenological. It was Husserl who, in 1900, first introduced the notion of  a “categorial intuition” 
to make sense of  the experience of  what we might call the syntax of  things: the ands, ors, manys, thiss, 
iss and other grammatically connective but experientially fundamental aspects of  any intuition.35 
Categorial intuitions accounted for the fact that we do not experience the world as an assemblage of  
nouns but as a network of  facts. Lask adopted this idea of  a categorial intuition to suggest that the 
brute facticity that Fichte had taken to be merely empirical was itself  already categorial. The thisness 
— the pre-cognitive particularity — of  a thing was not to be understood as empirical barrenness 
beyond the realm of  experience, but as furnishing the basic moment of  anything being present to us 
 
33 This short history of the term as appropriated by Heidegger is indebted to the marvelous work of Theodore 
Kisiel. See Theodore Kisiel, “Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask,” Man and World 28, 
no. 3 (1995): 197–240 (especially 200-203). Also helpful is Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and 
Time (University of California Press, 1995), particularly 26-34. 
34 Note the early glimmer of worldhood here, with the spatial problem of relating facticity and logicity: Where 
does particularity come from? In what context is eventiveness possible? In place of Kantian logical space, a more 
developed topography of experience sprouts out of this relation between the factical and logical, a relation that 
shows itself to be — even if only metaphorically — environmental. 
35 See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (1900; repr., Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2009) Band VI, §§40-46. 
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at all (as he put it, the “es gibt” that must be in place for any further objective determination). This 
placed facticity not outside of  knowledge but squarely underneath it as the “pretheoretical something 
[vortheoretisches Etwas]”36 that grounds our cognition and provides us with the most fundamental 
moment of  experience. 
Lask saw in facticity the unmediated ground of  cognition: not the irrational, but the 
immediate. While our sensory intuition of  objects, Lask suggested, is mediated by the form of  our 
experience (the categories under which objects become objects), our pretheoretical experience is of  
the form itself, of  the syntax of  experience, and is thus mediated by nothing at all: “the immediate 
experience [Erleben] is a sheer ‘living’ [‘Leben’]” in which we lose ourselves in the pretheoretical 
something, and is therefore a “not knowing [Nichterkennen], an unknowing [unwissendes], an unreflective, 
in this regard naive [...] comportment, an experience [Erleben], which doesn’t ‘know’ what it ‘does’ or 
‘lives’.”37 In a more mystical expression, which Heidegger himself  took up, Lask described this 
moment of  sheer living as “pure absorption in the specific [reines Aufgehen im Spezifischen]” and 
compared it to “ethical, aesthetic, religious devotion [Hingabe].”38 In Hingabe, we literally give ourselves 
over, find ourselves fully dissolved and immersed in the matter at hand. We are absorbed in the 
meaning or value of  the form in which our knowledge of  objects can be successfully mediated. 
It is worth noting how peculiar this gesture is: by following the trail of  sheer thingness, of  
brute facticity whose thorniness seemed to preclude its ever having a relation to our conceptual 
subjectivity, Lask unearthed a level of  objectivity (a level, it turns out, before objectivity) saturated with 
value, the form “in” which we “live” and through which we know things. The similarity to Heidegger’s 
 
36 Emil Lask, Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre: eine Studie über den Herrschaftsbereich der logischen Form, 
ed. Friedrich Kaulbach (1911; repr., Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993), 191. Only small portions of his work have 
been translated into English, so all translations here are mine. 
37 Lask, 191. 
38 Lask, 191. 
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methodological approach is already clear: Lask, burrowing through the layers of  objectivity mediated 
by conceptuality in search of  a bedrock that would require no mediation at all, formulated a primordial 
experience that bears a striking resemblance to the grammatical explication of  the middle voice. Our 
“dissolution” in the particular reserves the “Etwas” for a moment before conceptual determination 
and theoretical ordering, a pure event in which we are immersed.  
Is there not, however, a terminological opposition here? The middle voice showed itself, after 
all, to be essentially medial while Lask pursued the experience of  total immediacy. Only somewhat. 
Immediacy (Unmittelbarkeit) was desirable to Lask because mediation (the bridging of  heterogeneous 
realms through the forms of  cognition) posed a problematic moment of  reflective distance and 
therefore could not ground itself. Because of  this, immediacy seemed to promise the final closure of  
the gap between the empirical and the a priori. Immediacy, we might say, was simply Lask’s 
counterpoint to the active voice of  cognition, providing the connective tissue between disparate 
phenomena without changing the register or structure of  those phenomena themselves. 
The way Lask described this union isn’t, however, what we might expect of  an “unknowning, 
unreflective” experience of  total dissolution. Recall the idea of  a categorial intuition and the thought 
that facticity grounds logicity precisely because it is the experience, not of  an object, but of  the form 
itself  through which objects can come to be known. This experience is, crucially, not Erkenntnis but 
Erlebnis: facticity’s categorial form is that with which objects are determined but also that in which we live. 
If  the problem Lask faced was validating39 our application of  the categories to things (knowledge’s 
object formation), immediacy succeeds not by eliminating or circumventing categorial forms 
 
39 As Kisiel points out, Lask is directly drawing upon the important neo-Kantian notion of Geltung: when we 
say “the ball is round” the truth of the “is” (like all other categorial forms through which our knowledge of the 
world is possible) is not that of existence but that of the validity or successful relation of formal context and 
objective matter. (Kisiel, “Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask,” 206.) It is in this sense 
that we live “in” truth, in the context of validity through which objects are successfully mediated. 
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altogether, but by validating those very forms.40 If  there is any immediacy, it is the validity given to all 
categorial attribution by the fact that I “live in” those categorial forms. In that case, however, the 
immediacy of  our categorial intuition is simply the experience of the mediacy of  life. This comes rather 
close to saying that facticity is medial.41 The question remains: what does it mean to “live in the 
validating element” and what is the relation of  this living in to knowing of? This revolves, yet again, 
around the question of  who experiences (and articulates) the factical. The answer, it turns out, has 
everything to do with the spatial metaphors through which the factical and logical are figuratively 
related. 
* 
Lask described the relation between the forms we inhabit and the objects of  knowledge 
hylomorphically. Readers of  Lask are faced with a prepositional jumble when trying to capture this 
relation. Does one come before, is the other inside, above, peripheral? Playing upon the famous Kantian 
adage that concepts without intuitions are empty and intuitions without concepts blind, Lask suggests 
that intuitions without concepts are “naked” and lacking the usual logical shell or enclosure with which 
they are usually clothed. His metaphors for the form-matter relation build on this: the forms of  
cognition “surround,” “envelop,” “encompass,” “environ,” “en-clothe” their lived material (he 
 
40 Kisiel captures this Laskian thought quite clearly: “This immediate experience of living through the forms in 
order to mediately know the cognitive object, the matter, is the moment of categorial intuition in every 
cognition. Thus, the nonsensory form is at first not known but only experienced or lived (erlebt).”(Kisiel, The 
Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 27.) 
41 Lask’s fixation on immediacy is a reminder that, for all his radicality, he was still firmly rooted in the Kantian 
epistemological problematic. Lask was operating in a Kantian space in which experience could only be grounded 
by closing the gap between the formal subject and the material world. The young Heidegger, immersed in this 
same impersonal language, began with the same concern with discovering the pre-theoretical that had not yet 
bloomed into (and been distorted by) the relationality and mediation of worldliness. 
Though the Heidegger of SZ was, in many ways, freed of this quest for epistemological immediacy and 
generated a philosophy ostensibly built upon the navigation of distance (“Dasein”), I will argue that his own 
notion of mediality (threatened, as I suggested above, by lapsing into mere reflexivity) was re-condensed into 
the immediacy of a self-relation.  
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experiments with virtually every um– figure: umkleidet, umlagert, umfängt, umfasst, umgibt, umgilt, umgreifft, 
umschliesst, umzieht, umhüllt to name but a few).42 Only because we live in (are in an immediate relation 
to) this categorial frame or context, this already meaningful Um-world, can we take up a mediate 
relation of  knowledge to any object by determining it formally.43 It is no coincidence, then, that Hingabe 
played a key role for Lask and that he needed such a tangle of  prepositions and spatial configurations 
to flesh out this pretheoretical moment. Lask’s dive into facticity had the entirely unexpected effect of  
opening the door to a new primordial realm of  experience that didn’t work through the isolation of  a 
thing but through the immersion in relations of  validity and meaning: what we might call categorial 
environmentality. 
Lask’s deflection of  the locus of  experience from the reified object of  knowledge to the 
categorial environment in which such objectification could so much as take place makes it clear that 
his search for the immediate was, in fact, a first step toward the mediality of  the eventive voice. 
Mediality, the site of  an event, appears here in the um- structure: environmentality expands the dyadic 
subject-object axis of  Kantian logical space, opening the door to describing experience as a medium 
with its own spatial organization. Still, Lask’s philosophy faced a problem. Despite this immanent 
fullness of  lived experience, it remained unclear how to talk about this unreflective, unknowing 
immersion in form; the sharp distinction of  the pre-theoretical Erlebnis and the theoretical Erkenntnis 
may have solved an epistemological problem but reproduced a methodological one. His project of  
 
42 E.g. Lask, Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre, 2, 69–76. 
43 As Heidegger put it several years later in his habilitation, “It is only because I live in the validating element [im 
Geltenden] that I know about the existing element [um Existierendes]," Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe I: Frühe Schriften 
(V. Klostermann, 1976), 280. 
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characterizing the pre-theoretical environmental moment was itself  a theoretical undertaking, which 
revived the fear of  reifying and mediating the raw immediacy of  Erlebnis that he sought to capture.44 
* 
Lask’s linguistic formulations for getting at this most basic moment of  contextual validity — 
“es gibt” and the common “es gilt” — expose the theoretical impersonality of  his project. Though Lask 
hoped to capture the fundamental fabric of  living, he was left with an emptied, impersonal, and entirely 
formal philosophical language. In fact, despite his relative radicality this was a problem he had set 
himself  at the very outset and was never going to overcome: his search for immediacy and the self-
validation of  sheer living or blind immersion was always a fantasy of  epistemological assurance 
projected from a philosophical position removed from that space; it was the last hope for a subject 
already alienated from Erlebnis and thus always in the strange position of  craning its theoretical neck 
back on an imagined moment before finding itself  on one side of  the cognitive schism between self  
and world, a moment before the flow of  life was irrevocably hardened into objective matter. 
To put the problem somewhat differently: Lask successfully imagined a way of  living in the 
world that seemed free of  the gap between subjective form and objective matter, and yet only as a 
prior moment postulated by the subject of  cognition. Lask may have broken the opposition between 
facticity and logicity, but far from folding them into one another he simply placed facticity before, or 
around, logicity. The rigid temporal divide between the theoretical and the pre-theoretical would always 
be at odds with his fluid and co-dependent spatial model of  the hylomorphic environment. He 
transformed phenomenality by steeping it in environmental facticity, but only to have stranded logos 
on the far shores of  theoretical, impersonal generality. Phenomenology remained out of  reach for 
 
44 This was Paul Natorp’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology and remains a crippling problem so long as the 
descriptive vantage point of phenomenology is considered external to the flow of life. 
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Lask because he did not allow environmentality — life — to permeate the logos with which to 
investigate it. 
In Lask’s writings, mediality makes a flashing appearance as the ur-experience we must hearken 
back to, but it does not step in as the methodological structure of  philosophy itself. This chapter asks: 
how can the subject of  philosophical description be understood as constitutively worldly? Lask could 
not answer this because his environmental figuration of  life remained entirely impersonal and fully 
separated from the discursive space from which the theoretical “I” speaks. 
What seemed like the seeds of  a phenomenology growing out of  the attention to factic 
environmentality in fact reinstated the gap between philosophy and life, between knowledge and 
experience, between the subject and its Umwelt. Does eventiveness then really characterize the highest 
peak of  objectivity, the purest form of  a thing showing itself  on its own terms, undisturbed by 
reflection precisely because it justifies and enables such objectifying reflection? Or does it somehow 
open us to the surroundings in which we live “in” meaning, the medium in which the event is able to 
form itself ? Heidegger, himself  grappling with the fate of  these neo-Kantian terms, put this fork in 
the phenomenological road quite clearly. In his 1919 “Kriegsnotsemester” (KNS) course in which he both 
experimented with and critiqued these Laskian terms, he remarked: 
Already in the opening of the question ‘Is there…?’ there is something. Our 
entire problematic has arrived at a crucial point […] We are standing at the 
methodological crossroad which will decide on the very life or death of 
philosophy. We stand at an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute 
reification, or we somehow leap into another world, more precisely: for the first 
time into the world at all [überhaupt erst in die Welt].45 
 
45 Martin Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2008); Martin 
Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 56/57: Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie: frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen Kriegsnotsemester 1919 
und Sommersemester 1919 (V. Klostermann, 1987), 63. (Translation amended for accuracy.) 
Future citations will reference the German pagination from Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe. E.g. “Heidegger, 
KNS, 63.” 
Ecstasy  Chaoulideer  51
  
With this portentous announcement, the choice and its stakes were clear: though in his 
habilitation he had comfortably traded in the Laskian impersonal “es gilt,” at this point he called upon 
philosophy itself  to make the leap into the world, for it to embed itself  methodologically into the 
worldliness that had hitherto only been bestowed upon the phenomena it attempted to know. If  
philosophy was itself  to become worldly, its logos had to discover its own material situation, and, with 
it, the problem of  the pre- and post-theoretical dissolved. The Laskian metaphors of  environmentality 
had to be taken literally and the purported hylomorphism of  life and knowledge allowed to develop 
into the worldly medium of  immersed experience. 
 
3. Ereignis: Heidegger’s Eventive Worldliness 
At this pivotal moment in his 1919 seminar, Heidegger made what might seem a rather simple 
observation, but which was to save the Laskian question (“Is there…?”) from itself  and steer 
philosophy toward solid ground. Already in posing the question, Heidegger suggested in the passage 
above, there is something. We, the ones who pose the question, are there: “If  we were not at all first 
here, then there would be no such question.”46 Lask’s pursuit of  the Etwas entirely neglected the one 
engaged in that pursuit. What kind of  “we” is Heidegger pointing to here? Who, as we began to ask 
before, poses the Laskian question? In a basic sense, it is simply “I” who poses the question: I am the 
one for whom this can become an issue to pursue. As Heidegger was quick to point out, however, this 
kind of  account of  the question threatened to be misunderstood as a psychologized “I” or else an 
emptied transcendental “I.” This is why there was no “I” in Lask’s account of  the primordial realm 
of  Erlebnis but, in its place, an “Etwas.” But, continued Heidegger, does not the very notion of  
Fraglichkeit (questionability) already carry an “I” with it? When we ask “Is there…?” isn’t that always 
 
46 Heidegger, KNS, 63–64. 
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“Is there … for me?”; “The question is experienced [erlebt]. I experience. I experience something.”47 
Erlebnis, far from being the elusive object of  philosophy’s questioning, would be the very form of  the 
questioning: not die Frage des Erlebnis but das Frageerlebnis. 
Here, the methodological tension in Lask between the theoretical philosopher and 
pretheoretical lived experience, the tension between the complete abstraction of  the Etwas and its 
indication of  pure facticity, emerged as a problem in the very nature of  the question. “I ask: ‘Is there 
something?’ The ‘is there’ is a ‘there is’ for an ‘I’, and yet it is not I to and for whom the question has 
relation [auf  den der Fragesinn Bezug hat].”48 Immersed life, however immediately absorbed in the forms 
of  its experience, remains fully impersonal: it is not I, you, we, or anyone else whose lived experience 
is captured. Just as the Etwas didn’t name this or that particular thing (in this sense, it is nothing49), so 
is the pretheoretical life to which we make appeal not our particular life. If  we are to pursue philosophy 
along the thread of  facticity, the decontextualized abstraction of  Lask’s formalized question is a dead 
end. 
It is not only the Etwas whose facticity must be uncovered: the life (the person) for whom that 
Etwas so much as matters must be understood medially as well. To be more precise, it is not a matter 
of  completing or balancing the analysis, performing the operation Lask had carried out on the thing 
now on oneself: facticity understood medially is precisely a matter of  exploring the context in which 
 
47 Heidegger, 65. 
48 Heidegger, 69. 
49 As I have already shown, the fatal contradiction of the Etwas is that, by pursuing thisness to the point of 
formalization, one entirely empties it of any this or that. One wants to say that it is the most general, the bare 
minimum of what one can say about a thing, but, as Heidegger puts it, the meaning of the Etwas arises out of 
a “whole process of motivations” that set this generalization into motion. “This is already suggested by the fact 
that, in attempting to grasp the meaning of ‘something in general’ [den Sinn des Etwas überhaupt zu erfassen], we 
return to individual objects with particular concrete content.” (Heidegger, 68.) 
Though Heidegger was acutely aware of this danger, it didn’t prevent something similar from happening to his 
Dasein in SZ. 
Ecstasy  Chaoulideer  53
  
these two “halves” show themselves to be originally unified in my experience of  the world. Lask’s 
environmental metaphors, which suggested that categorial forms are a medium for the matter of  
knowledge, are therefore mere metaphors offering a mythic experiential a priori that is postulated to 
ground philosophical knowledge. Lask, though radical, was not yet thinking phenomenologically. And 
it was phenomenology, the medium in which experience and discourse, phenomenon and logos, are 
unified, that allowed Heidegger to steer philosophy toward “the world at all.” 
* 
To provide an alternative to the strangely self-defeating Laskian Frageerlebnis, Heidegger simply 
asked his audience to consider any everyday experience of  theirs. Walking, for example, into the lecture 
hall as a student, I find “my usual seat.” As the lecturer, walking into the same room, I may first see 
the lectern from which I will speak, while the seats are simply the general place from which the 
audience will listen. The very same lectern that may serve as a support for my bad knee, an elevated 
table for my notes, or maybe the culprit of  a splinter I haven’t been able to remove from my palm, 
may, for a student of  mine, be an imposing marker of  authority or the angular piece of  wood on 
which they inadvertently zone out when I bore them. If  a building inspector walks into the room, my 
lectern or the student’s chairs may immediately be visible as potential fire hazards or violations of  
other codes. 
These differences are, Heidegger emphasized, not a matter of  differing interpretations or 
perspectives, but of  differing arrangements of  significance in which the lectern appears. To illustrate this, 
Heidegger pointed out that I do not first intuit brown surfaces, wood, a box conjoined with another, 
the academic context, etc. and out of  that build a lectern, as though “I attach lecternhood to the box 
like a label.” Instead, “I see the lectern in one fell swoop, so to speak, and not in isolation, but as 
adjusted a bit too high for me. I see — and immediately so — a book lying upon it as annoying to me 
(a book, not a collection of  layered pages with black marks strewn upon them), I see the lectern in an 
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orientation, an illumination [Beleuchtung], a background.”50 All experience, including the contrived 
Frageerlebnis, is therefore inscribed in a particular configuration of  meaning. Heidegger called such a 
configuration an “environment” (“Umwelt”), and the accompanying experience of  it the 
“Umwelterlebnis”: 
In the experience of seeing the lectern, something is given to me from out of 
an immediate environment [Umwelt]. This environmental milieu [Umweltliche] 
(lectern, book, blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student 
fraternity, tram, automobile, etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which 
are then conceived as meaning this and this; rather the meaningful is primary 
and immediately [unmittelbar] given to me without any mental detours across 
thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an environment, it signifies to me 
everywhere and always, everything has the character of world [welthaft]. It is 
everywhere the case that “it worlds” [“es weltet”], which is something different 
from “it values” [“es gilt”].51 
In place of  Lask’s esoteric metaphorical hylomorphism of  form enveloping matter, Heidegger 
turned to the familiar world in which we live, the meaningful surroundings out of  which our 
experience of  the world is fashioned. Phenomenality within an Umwelt is no longer the cognitively 
structured appearance of  objects, but the worldliness of  the surroundings in which I live, a world 
structured by relations of  meaning. To say that the lectern is something I encounter in terms of  its 
meaning is simply to say that I encounter it within a context of  history, practice, investment, and 
everything else that has arranged things as they are for me (the lectern in all of  its facticity). 
Phenomenality understood as an Umwelterlebnis is simply the appearance of  something as belonging to 
a structure of  meaning. 
* 
With facticity redirected toward the world in which we each live, the mediality of  
phenomenality begins to take shape. The “world,” no longer referring to a universal container in which 
 
50 Heidegger, 71. 
51 Heidegger, 72–73. 
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bare things appear and take on determinacy, comes into focus as the structure in which things are 
meaningful for me. The world of  life,52 to risk sounding gnomic, is the worldliness of  life. This might 
sound rather empty or nebulous if  it were not a precise restatement of  the eventive mediality of  the 
middle voice. To say that the world is the medium of  my life is precisely to say that, far from detached 
observation of  the events happening around me, my experience is the event. For something to mean 
this or that is for it to enter the world of  meaning through which I live, for it to be configured by my 
world, by me. Phenomenality is, then, the coming into meaningful relation of  something and myself. 
Hence Heidegger’s strange locution, “es weltet”: it is the discovery of  the meaningful configuration of  
something for me. “Only through the accord [Mitanklingen] of  this particular I [jeweiligen eigenen] does 
it experience something environmental, does it world, and wherever and whenever it worlds for me, I 
am somehow completely there [dabei].”53 
Though Heidegger had not yet invoked the grammatical middle voice in this early lecture, it 
comes as no surprise that it is precisely at this moment that he introduced his understanding of  an 
“event” as distinguishable from a mere process or action. The term, arguably the conceptual through-
 
52 Heidegger did not use the term “Lebenswelt” in this lecture series, nor was it an operative term in his writings 
later on (as it was to be for Husserl). Later in 1919, Heidegger held a series of lectures on “life as the originary 
realm of philosophy” in which he used “Lebenswelt” a number of times, but it never achieved any greater 
significance. Heidegger’s proximity to Dilthey and his philosophy of life despite his abrupt abandonment of the 
term or position of “life” in his writings in the 20s cannot be treated at greater length here. Heidegger’s overt 
departure from a philosophy of life didn’t prevent others from trying to show the essential linkage. Perhaps the 
most notable effort at the time was Georg Misch’s Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. (Georg Misch, 
Lebensphilosophie Und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung Der Diltheyschen Richtung Mit Heidegger Und Husserl 
(Bonn: F. Cohen Verlag, 1930).) Though largely unacknowledged by Heidegger, the work of Georg Simmel 
was of enormous consequence at this juncture of method and life; for a thorough analysis of this fraught 
inheritance, see Michael Großheim, Von Georg Simmel zu Martin Heidegger: Philosophie zwischen Leben und Existenz 
(Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991). I will implicitly be excavating the reasons why Heidegger became averse to the 
term and all of its baggage when returning to embodiment towards the end of this chapter, but for a more 
direct and lengthy treatment of this, see Scott M. Campbell, The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, 
and Language (Fordham University Press, 2012). 
53 Heidegger, KNS, 73, translation amended for accuracy. 
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line of  his entire philosophical career, is “Ereignis.” Though notoriously difficult to translate,54 it is 
nothing other than a name for a phenomenon understood medially. A phenomenon, in other words, 
in its worldly lived experience (Umwelterlebnis). Heidegger continues: 
In seeing the lectern I am fully present in my I; it resonates with the experience, 
as we said. It is an experience proper to me and so do I see it. However, it is 
not a process but rather an event [Ereignis] […] Lived experience does not pass 
in front of me like a thing, but I appropriate [er-eigne] it to myself, and it 
appropriates [er-eignet] itself according to its essence [Wesen]. If I understand it 
in this way, then I understand it not as process, as thing, as object, but as 
something quite new, an event [Ereignis].55 
A (medial) event is the experiential process of  incorporating56 something into my life, which 
also means incorporating myself  into my world. The novelty (facticity) of  the event is not a mark of  
its standing outside of  some pre-given structure, resisting the determination with which it could have 
been constructed a priori. Quite the contrary, the event is novel because it is the emergence of  
something meaningful from the structure of  my life, a moment in which my worldliness becomes 
apparent in the mine-ness of  my world. This is what it means for Erlebnis to take the form of  Ereignis. 
By closing any possibility of  circumscribing the “I” and its “object” in distinct domains, Heidegger’s 
eventive characterization of  facticity anticipates a term that, I argue below, is the key figure of  SZ: 
“ekstasis.” As Heidegger notes already in this early lecture, “Event [Er-eignis] is also not to be taken as 
if  I appropriate [an-eignen] the lived experience [Er-lebnis] to myself  from outside or from anywhere 
else; ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ have as little meaning here as ‘physical’ and ‘psychological.’ The experiences 
 
54 In everyday German, the term is no different than the English “event”: an incident, something which occurs 
or takes place. But, as with so many of Heidegger’s key terms, one must remain attentive to the fact that it is a 
composite noun, literally meaning “to make one’s own,” sharing the all-important “eigen” stem with terms like 
“Eigentlichkeit” and, somewhat obliquely, “Jemeinigkeit.” While some stick with “event,” others have tried 
neologisms as ugly and/or unhelpful as “enowning,” “properizing event,” “appropriating event”, or “e-vent.” 
There is no easy way around the translation other than explicating what an event in this sense must be. 
55 Heidegger, KNS, 75, translation amended for accuracy. 
56 Quite literally, as I argue below, this is a matter of the material embodiment through which the coherence 
and self and world both emerge as figures of one another. 
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are events in so far as they live out of  one’s own-ness, and live only in this way [Erlebnisse sind Ereignisse 
insofern sie aus dem Eigenen leben und Leben nur so lebt].”57 This radical reinterpretation of  phenomenology’s 
facticity as Ereignis turns lived experience into the medium of  meaning in which I, and the things in 
my world, do not stand in a relation of  here to there, inside to outside, or primary to secondary. 
With this, the Umwelterlebnis undoes the “Um-” with which it began. To speak of  the world in 
terms of  surroundings or en-virons preserves the spatiality of  inside and outside, center and periphery, 
obfuscating the spatial reciprocity of  myself  and phenomenon, Erlebnis and Ereignis, I and world. 
With this successful first “leap into the world,” Heidegger had more or less set out the 
structure of  “being-in-the-World” (“in-der-Welt-sein”) that would underpin the first Division of  SZ. 
There is, however, one final stop to make in the early Heidegger’s lecture courses to prepare the 
radicality as well as the points of  failure in the “ecstatic” relation between self  and world in SZ. This 
lecture course, given just a few months after the initial development of  Welt and Ereignis in the 
Kriegsnotsemester’s treatment of  neo-Kantianism, was Heidegger’s most direct confrontation with the 
methodological place of  the notion of  “life” in phenomenology. 
Just as the closure and self-sufficiency of  the immediacy of  Erlebnis posed a methodological 
problem of  discursive access for Lask, so, too, did Heidegger’s phenomenology run the risk of  
shutting itself  out if  the world and self  were too perfectly melded together. If  phenomenality is 
understood in terms of  Ereignis, what does phenomenology look like? Does Ereignis contain its own 
logic? If  so, who is it who speaks through Ereignis? Though eventive Erlebnis involves making the world 
my own, Heidegger’s formulation remained strangely impersonal and nebulous at its core: “es weltet.” 
This “es” attests to Heidegger’s inability to answer the very question he critiqued Lask for de-
 
57 Heidegger, KNS, 75. 
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contextualizing. For Heidegger, the question was: who speaks in the middle voice (of/in/through Ereignis)?58 
In the winter lectures of  1919-20 we find clues, not only to what a phenomenology of  life could have 
looked like for the young Heidegger, but to addressing this methodological problem of  
phenomenology through the first-personality of  life. This introduces the problematic balance between 
everyday immersion in the world, on the one hand, (in which the “I” and the “Ereignis” are co-
dependent (the basis for “everyday inauthenticity” in SZ) and, on the other, the (philosophical) 
possibility of  life grounding itself  (authenticity). 
* 
If, as Heidegger announced in the opening words of  his 1919-20 winter semester lecture 
course (WS), The Basic Problems of  Phenomenology,59 phenomenology is the science of  “the absolute 
origin” of  “‘life in and for itself ’,”60 two questions demand immediate attention. First, the question 
which lurked in the background of  both Lask and Heidegger in his KNS lectures: What is life in itself ? 
And second, the methodological question now quite familiar to us: How can we access this original realm? 
These questions turn out to be bound together. 
 
58 Recall the language of facilitation from the reflexive interpretation of mediality, echoed here in the notion that 
Ereignis is not only the process in which “I appropriate it to myself” but also (and perhaps according to) the 
way, “it appropriates itself according to its essence.” (KNS 75 my emphasis) 
This anticipates the key problem with SZ’s spatiality. That the logic of Ereignis is somehow split between myself 
and the “es” (and that in this experience I am merely (passively!) allowing the essence of the thing to come into 
Being) foreshadows Heidegger’s later notion that the phenomena of the world do not contain a coherent logic 
of their own and therefore cannot furnish the unity of life that authenticity (and therefore fundamental ontology) 
requires. The inadequacy of everyday experience thus already emerged here in the assimilation of myself to the 
es. 
59 I will be citing from the only published translation of this course: Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology: Winter Semester 1919/1920, trans. Scott M. Campbell (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013). Though a 
helpful beginning, it has some strange syntax and some errors, which I will emend. Pagination refers to that of 
Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe volume 58: Martin Heidegger, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20) (V. 
Klostermann, 1993). 
60 Heidegger, WS, 1. 
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Heidegger began with the first. In words highly anticipatory of  the way he characterizes Dasein 
in the opening of  SZ — and echoing the “immediacy” of  the “Umwelt” in the passages from the KNS 
— he suggested that, to begin with, one can say that “Life—my life, your life, their life, our life”61 
designates “something that lies so near to us that we mostly do not even expressly concern [kümmern] 
ourselves with it; something from which we have no distance to see it in its ‘at all’; and the distance to 
it is lacking, because we are it itself  and we only see ourselves from out of  life itself.”62 We are not 
only close to life, or even caught up in life, we are life. Lask erected the living self  in opposition to the 
cognitive self  and upon the formalized Erlebnis of  the categories; his notion of  life was, as I suggested 
above, entirely impersonal. The phenomenological “Ursprungsgebiet” (the original region) of  life, on the 
other hand, is simply what we, each (“je”),63 are. 
Furthermore, when we say that we live, “we always live in a direction” which “engrosses us, 
addresses us.”64 I look forward to breakfast; today I’m very low energy; being around some friends 
opens me to reminiscing while with others I feel mildly competitive and on edge; lying in bed I’m 
sometimes taken over by exhaustion but other times the lull in activity sets off  a flurry of  ideas, plans, 
worries, or memories. These eventive formulations remind us that every moment of  life moves in a 
certain direction: it “tends” (“tendiert”) towards this or that, “motivated” (“motiviert”) by certain goals 
or projects. What had been isolated and intense moments of  religious, ethical, or aesthetic devotion 
(Hingabe) for Lask, unreflective plunges into the immediate stream of  absorbed life, become the matter 
of  everyday life in all of  its manifestations, no matter how mundane. Metaphorical immersion had 
become literal in the worldly facticity of  motivated tendency (or tending motivations). Not only is the 
 
61 Heidegger, 30. 
62 Heidegger, 29. 
63 The notion that (first)-personality can be secured through the distribution of something to “each” of us 
should seem a tenuous one. I will return to this at length below. 
64 Heidegger, WS, 32. 
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world spatially arranged in terms of  meaningful involvement, but the temporal character of  this “being 
one’s world” took form too, hinted at in the terms “tendency” and “motivation.”65 
The radicalization of  the Umwelterlebnis into the worldliness of  life, something foreshadowed 
in the “es weltet” of  the KNS, was fully developed in these lectures. Phenomenality had, by this point, 
left the realm of  cognition so fully that any concern leading to the impersonal formality of  an “Etwas” 
had disappeared66 and the inside/outside separation of  the Umwelt had evaporated as well. Heidegger 
had leapt back into the world by grounding phenomenology in the mediality of  life. Without yet naming 
the grammatical form, he had taken the eventive voice to its phenomenological conclusion:  
Our life is the world in which we live, into which and in each case [je] within 
which the tendencies of life flow. And our life is only lived as life insofar as it 
lives in a world.”67 
In language highly anticipatory of  the ontological definition of  “world” in SZ,68 Heidegger called this 
the “world-character of  life” (“Weltcharakter des Lebens”). Already in these lectures, however, are the 
first signs that in leaping headlong into the world, Heidegger had gone right through it. 
Heidegger’s answer to the question of what life (“in itself”) is, didn’t end here. Heidegger 
continued with what might seem an innocuous, perhaps even suspiciously naive and uncritical, 
division of this world of life into three spheres (“Umkreise”): 
[our] Umwelt—landscapes, regions, cities and coasts; our Mitwelt—parents, 
siblings, acquaintances, superiors, teachers, students, officials, strangers, the 
man there with the crutch, the woman over there with the elegant hat, the little 
girl here with the doll; our Selbstwelt—insofar as that directly encounters me in 
 
65 Which are the clear precursors to the ecstatic temporal horizons of past and future: “geworfener Entwurf” (as it 
is generally translated, “thrown projection”) in SZ. 
66 For a direct discussion of the impossibility of encountering a formal-logical “something,” see Heidegger, WS, 
106–7. 
67 Heidegger, 34. 
68 In, for example, his assertion that the world is, ontologically, “not a determination of those beings which Dasein 
essentially is not, but rather a characteristic of Dasein itself.” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 64/64.) 
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such and such a way and directly imparts upon my life this, my personal 
rhythm.69 
This is a rather peculiar division. Why these three spheres? Why divide the “world-character” of life, 
— which, just a moment earlier, had established the total unity of my “I” and the meaningful relations 
I have with my world — at all? Does it not contravene the basic idea of life as the originary realm of 
phenomenology to divide it further? Moreover, one of these spheres is not like the others: his 
characterization of the Umwelt (“environing-world”) and Mitwelt (“with-world”, though I will use the 
German terms to avoid these unfortunate hyphenations) is, to use Heidegger’s later term, ontic, while 
that of the Selbstwelt (“self-world”) is decidedly ontological. The Um- and Mit-welten are described in terms 
of the collection of things that make them up, the objects that constitute that sphere of our world, 
while the Selbstwelt refers to the “way,” the “rhythm,” the form of my life.70 The Um- and Mit-welten 
seem like strange strawmen, objectifications of the world pitted against the clearly privileged, and 
originary, first-personality of my life that makes the phenomena of my world meaningful (and allows 
me to go on to objectify them as “landscapes,” “strangers” etc.). Had his Umwelterlebnis from the KNS 
not released him from this very reification of worldliness? Had he not established that all world is self-
world, and that this neither refers to some delimited entity, “self,” nor excludes any other entities that 
are part of my life? 
 
69 Heidegger, WS, 33. 
70 Though Heidegger was not yet in the throes of his Seinsfrage and was therefore not yet employing the term 
“ontological” (nor its counterpart, “ontic”), he expressed a functionally equivalent distinction later in the lecture 
with the modal difference between life’s “what-content” (“Wasgehalt”) and how-content” (“Wiegehalt”). E.g.: 
Life shows and gives experienceable contents, which we describe as specific how-contents, because, as in 
intensifying-concentration [Zugespitztheit], they are not bound to a particular what-content. Rather the latter 
stands in the former, it gives itself in the form of the “how,” a factical mode in which experiences factically run 
off: a functional rhythm, which expresses factical life itself, which presses out of itself. This how-content is 
such that content-wise an “indicating toward” lies in it. We are talking about intensification “to” (-toward) the 
factical self-worlds and their factical constitution (aptitude, talent, moodiness, etc.) (Heidegger, 85.) 
I will return to this distinction in greater detail below. 
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Later in the lecture, he sharpened this triad somewhat, backtracking from the bald 
objectification above. He acknowledged: “even the Mitwelt gives itself in such a way that the relevant 
people live together with me, insofar as they display themselves to me in individual actions.”71 Even 
stronger: the Mitwelt and the Umwelt “live in a remarkable context of permeation [merkwürdigen 
Durchdringungszusammenhang] with my Selbstwelt, whose circumstantiality [Zuständlichkeit] in this context 
almost opens up as a living and flowing context, so that one has even thought that the Mitwelt and 
society in general are nothing real, but rather exist only in the sum and composition of the 
individual.”72 
* 
And so, it was precisely the worldliness of life that also first opened the (re)polarization of the 
structure of my life and the material of my world, providing the resistance against which the 
ontological privilege of the Selbstwelt could break through. Although Heidegger was clearly dismissive 
of collapsing the Mitwelt into the Selbstwelt entirely, he went on to state as self-evident that the very 
same “changeable circumstantiality [labile Zuständlichkeit]” of life “explicitly and emphatically shifts the 
focus [Schwergewicht] onto the self,” and that “factical life can be lived, experienced, and, correspondingly, even 
historically understood in a peculiar intensifying-concentration [Zugespitztheit] on the Selbstwelt.”73  
Indeed, this “Zugespitztheit” on the Selbstwelt is not only a possibility, a priority given over in a 
particular sphere of life or in a particular mode (autobiography, for example) but “is always there in 
factical life.” Moreover, in an observation that will be very familiar to readers of SZ, he suggests that 
“this accentuation [Betontheit] of the Selbstwelt, the indexing of tendencies and world-characters from out of it, 
does not need to be made prominent. Rather, it is, and even for the most part is, vitally improminent, 
 
71 Heidegger, 45. 
72 Heidegger, 56. 
73 Heidegger, 57, 59. 
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so much so that life can give itself as if all Selbstwelt were determined and directed by the Umwelt.”74 
This priority, in other words, of the Selbstwelt in the overall organization of the tendencies and 
motivations of our lives is so pervasive that it generally goes entirely forgotten. The Selbstwelt is, as 
Heidegger says of our understanding of Being in SZ, ontically nearest and ontologically furthest. 
So why this division of our world and the division of our life into its “what” and “how”? The 
answer comes with the lectures’ second question: how can we access life in itself? Now that it has leapt into 
the world, phenomenology cannot be the Laskian theorization of pre-theoretical factical life, so it 
must “not reflect on the beginning, but rather factically begin! But how?”75 If Heidegger is to conduct 
a phenomenology of life, life must itself begin to provide the clue to this question. However, if 
phenomenology is to be a science, it cannot simply be descriptive or imitative of factical life. What, after 
all, would be the point? Heidegger thus needs to find the point at which the phenomena of life 
themselves spill into the logos of their organization and understanding. 
In any given description of going to the store, reading a novel, throwing a dinner party, etc., 
we may well move within the factical stream of life, but we have not come to see life “in itself.” Why 
not? Because if phenomenology uses these narrative or descriptive experiences as leads towards an 
understanding of life more generally, whether as paradigmatic experiences to be inductively 
extrapolated or as scraps to be additively stitched together into a whole, it will either have gained 
nothing philosophical at all and will just be left with a series of banal anecdotes, or will rely on a pre-
given (biological, psychological, anthropological, religious, or other) notion of “life” into which those 
experiences are inserted. In the former case, phenomenology is stuck in the realm of banality, in the 
latter, it lapses into dogmatism. As he noted, “Experience [Erfahrung] has a peculiar character of 
patchwork, of variety, of being spotty [des Gemischten, des Vielerei, des Gesprenkelten], yet not under the 
 
74 Heidegger, 60. 
75 Heidegger, 4. 
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emergence of a pattern that is more or less clear”; experiences are woven together in “The Carpet 
[Teppich] of Life.” And yet, in order to get to the 
ground of experience [Erfahrungsboden] [...] in its naked homogeneity [Gleichartigkeit], 
the carpet must be pulled away, so to speak— to stick with the image — i.e. a 
context [Zusammenhang] must be prepared [muss sich bereiten], which defines itself 
out of a contentful belonging together of what has been experienced as such, 
so that from out of this ground of experience a unified character-of-subject-
matter [einheitlicher Sachcharakter] can be lifted out, through which a subject-area 
[Sachgebiet] for a science allows itself to be determined.76 
The problem with our experiences, as Heidegger saw it, is that they don’t wear the logic of their 
coherence on their sleeve.77 The fullness of their meaning — their interwoven relationality as tending 
motivation — is not, Heidegger suggests, to be confused with their immanent figuration of the 
grounding context — the unity — of life. 
For the science of life in itself, phenomenology, to get off the ground, a context of coherence 
must offer itself in which the “unity” of our experiences comes to show itself through itself 
(immanently). Heidegger is thus turning to “life” not to pick up the baton from the Lebensphilosophen 
or to come into dialogue with his contemporary philosophical anthropologists but is simply using it 
as the name for the unified ground of all experience: “life” names the fact that any given experience 
occurs within a context of unity; life indicates that within the patchwork of everyday experience there 
is a pattern, a “rhythm” of unity that can be read off of it and which can ground itself. This, Heidegger 
claimed, was life’s “self-sufficiency [Selbstgenügsamkeit]”: 
Self-sufficient – the form of fulfillment – its intentional structure a basic 
directedness in each case and always into a world (also the Selbstwelt) [...] This 
‘form’ is the mode of life’s own direction, which it even takes right there where 
it wants to fulfill and satisfy itself. Structurally, it does not need to come out 
 
76 Heidegger, 69, translation altered for accuracy. 
77 This both recalls the isolation of Ereignis (it follows its own logic, that of the “es”) (and therefore the lack of 
unity of a world of Erignisse (note that “Ereignis” is rarely used in the plural)) and anticipates the philosophical 
inadequacy of the everyday. The notion that the heterogeneity of everyday experience does not contain its own 
potential unity is absolutely fatal to the harmony of Jemeinigkeit and Weltlichkeit in SZ. This seemingly innocuous 
metaphor of the heterogeneous carpet and homogenous ground, I will argue, is highly consequential. 
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of itself (it does not untwist itself out of itself), in order to bring its genuine tendencies 
to fulfillment. [Life] itself always addresses itself only in its own “language.” It 
itself poses tasks and demands to itself that always remain solely in its own 
sphere, so that it seeks to overcome its limitations, its imperfections, to fill out 
the perspectives arising within it, again and again and only “in” the basic 
character that is prefigured by its ownmost self-sufficiency and its forms and 
the means derived from them [...] Self-sufficiency is a characterized 
motivational direction of life in itself, indeed, that [direction] of life which has its 
motivation from its own factical flow [Ablauf].78 
Here, the two main questions of the lecture come together. Life understood “in itself” is the 
key to the methodological problem of what kind of access phenomenology as a science could possibly 
have to the flow of experience. The logos of life is contained within itself: its “direction,” “flow,” 
“form,” “tending motivation”— its internal unity, in short — is contained within itself. The Selbstwelt 
provides just this factical point of phenomenological entry by characterizing the constitutive (though 
often hidden) arrangement of the “multiplicity of the tendencies of life” around one thing: itself. The 
project of phenomenology thus raises itself out of the banality of merely describing or relaying snippets 
of experience and is kept from being raised out of the stream of life toward a position of reflective 
distance. Instead, phenomenology finds within the stream of life the threads of experience through 
which it can be philosophically figured as unified. Bringing the logic (the arrangement, the figure) of 
the unifying “tending motivation” (thrown projection) into view is, then, the science of 
phenomenology. 
With this, the entire methodological framework of SZ had been established. Though over the 
seven years leading up to it, Heidegger transposed most of the terms used in these lectures into another 
idiom (under the command of the question of Being),79 the Dasein problematic, though by no means 
 
78 Heidegger, WS, 31, translation altered for accuracy. 
79 The most obvious transpositions being: Life in itself → Dasein*; what-content/how-content → 
Ontic/Ontological; Selbstwelt → Jemeinigkeit (though this transposition is slippery and will need some more 
attention); tending motivation → thrown projection; unified context → wholeness; relief-characteristics → 
existentials. 
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solved, was fully set up in this early phenomenology of life: how are we to make sense of Weltlichkeit in terms 
of Jemeinigkeit? This “making sense,” is, as these lectures make abundantly clear, a matter of making 
unified; rearranging, reconfiguring, and regrounding the seemingly disparate and chaotic facticity of 
life’s eventful fullness around the singular coherence of the first-personality of life (its potentiality to 
be a Selbstwelt). 
With the further development of this phenomenological framework and its existential 
explication, however, some decisions of Heidegger’s became calcified and made to seem inevitable. 
While in WS, the turn away from medial entwinement (the “carpet of life”) toward the distinction of 
the modalities of self and world (the homogenous unifying ground) seemed to contain an alternative 
route inscribed into it (a prospect to which I will return), I will argue that the factical worldliness of 




* Though the first uses of Dasein to refer to the existential structure of “my life” surface in this lecture already: 
Heidegger, 59, 66. 
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III. Heidegger’s Disfiguration of the World 
 
1. Teppich and Boden 
We have followed Heidegger in his attempt to recuperate a world from the (neo-)Kantian void 
of abstract cognition, picking up Lask’s turn toward factical life and developing an eventive structure 
of phenomenology to better describe the worldliness of everyday experience. And yet, he has left us 
with a rather peculiar term, one which seems to mark his radical departure from the Kantian project 
and his slide back toward the worldless subject threatened by reactionary existentialism: the Selbstwelt.80 
On the face of it, this compound noun would seem to encapsulate the essential union of self 
and world into a single entity or structure (and, so, isn’t really a compound noun at all), the arena for 
a phenomenology which has indeed succeeded in leaping into the world as such. And in a certain 
sense, this is right. As I demonstrated above, the very notion of “Selbst” that here modifies “Welt” is 
derived from everyday Erlebnis understood medially as Ereignis. Whatever this hybrid term is, it cannot 
be an amalgam of heterogeneous halves (“self” and “world”) but a term that allows for the mine-ness 
of world and the worldliness of myself to become visible in the first place. And as Heidegger’s early 
lectures made abundantly clear, the Selbstwelt, understood as the “self-sufficiency” of life, was meant 
to address the methodological problem of philosophical access to phenomena understood eventively 
(in their fullness of meaning). With Selbstwelt, phenomenology moves from “es weltet” to ich welte; the 
who of phenomenology gives itself from within the phenomenon itself. This is precisely, it would seem, 
the elusive self-organization of facticity that Heidegger was after: life arranges itself nicely for us as my 
 
80 Here, too, competing forefathers of his philosophical approach pull him in different directions. “Life,” as 
mentioned above, had been given affective and material fullness by the likes of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 
but had been evacuated of any determinacy in the work of Kierkegaard (and Lask). Though Heidegger claimed 
to be starting anew, these competing methods, interests, and factical contingencies of philosophy’s relation to 
life throughout the nineteenth century left his phenomenology with a series of fateful ambiguities. 
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life, uncovering the immanent logic of its own experiences, the “rhythm” out of which things take on 
meaning for me. 
On the one hand, then, my life is made up of the myriad experiential events in which meaning 
is constituted for me (our everyday “Being-in-the-world” as Heidegger calls it in SZ), and, on the other 
hand, my life gives itself its own direction, unity, and form. Does Selbstwelt describe the unity of these 
two aspects of life? Or the transition from the first to the second? Our worldliness is constituted by 
the things and people around us, and by ourselves. The content of my life can be understood in terms 
of what it is and in terms of how it is. A lot rides on this “and”: are these two modes competing 
possibilities or mutually dependent actualities? Are they ways of living life or theorizing it? Are they 
distinctions germane to Erlebnis or only to its study as phenomenology? At stake here is the relation 
between life’s dispersion in the world and its immanent unity around the “self.” The relation, as it will 
be called in SZ, between mine-ness and worldliness. Selbstwelt is an early harbinger of this ambiguous 
relation. 
From the (ontic) point of view of what I experience in my life, I am entirely constituted by the 
events of my world: in the language of the WS lectures, my Selbstwelt is made up of my Um- and Mit-
welten. From the (ontological) vantage point of how we experience those very same things, all the events 
that form the structure we called “world” are rearranged around the logic internal to my life: my Um- 
and Mit-welten are “indexed” by the rhythm of my Selbstwelt. Taken together, these two vantage points 
seem to suggest a kind of reciprocal co-dependence, or even an identity of sorts; one is entirely 
unintelligible without the other and both, after all, describe one thing (my experience of life). But do 
they really refer to the very same experiential world? Do they focalize, arrange, figure, the very same 
material?  The image Heidegger used to characterize them certainly does not suggest as much. 
Recall his invocation of the “carpet of life.” Our worldly experience (the “what”) “has a 
peculiar character of patchwork, of variety, of being spotty” and so must be woven together into the 
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carpet of lived experience. Heidegger insisted, however, that from these patches, the tangled and 
motley threads of experience, “a pattern that is more or less clear” does not emerge on its own. The 
carpet does not weave itself and thus cannot be the originary “ground of experience [Erfahrungsboden]” 
phenomenology needs. Because of this lack of internal logic in the carpet of life, something else must 
support it, and the self-sufficiency of life must, in fact, be sought elsewhere. “The carpet must be 
pulled away” in order to get to a layer of experience that can be called the “ground” because, contrary 
to the patchwork of the carpet, it exhibits a “naked homogeneity” that “defines itself out of a 
contentful belonging together [Zusammengehörigkeit] of what has been experienced as such [des 
Erfahrenen als solchen].”81 While the experiences of the everyday carpet merely “hang together” (they have 
a Zusammenhang), the experiences of the ground (which, it must be noted, are not the same experiences 
but those experiences as such) “belong together” (they form a Zusammengehörigkeit). Far from an 
infelicitous image82 for this ground of experience, Heidegger made it abundantly clear that it is the 
homogeneity of this ground that allows the science of phenomenology to lift out a “unified character-of-
subject-matter [einheitlicher Sachcharakter]”; any such homogeneity is, of course, directly at odds with the 
medial facticity of experience. The notion that there could be something beneath or prior to the carpet, 
and that this primordial ground could be accessed simply by pulling up the carpet and getting past the 
 
81 Heidegger, WS, 69. 
82 In fact, the image of the carpet is not poor at all. There is, in fact, another way to take it. One could imagine 
that the unity inherent to life emerges precisely out of the fact that the plurality of our experiences is a carpet 
and not just a pile of scraps or threads. That our experiences are woven together at all would seem a much 
stronger discovery of the unity of meaning in our lives than a hidden homogenous ground. In this case the 
weaver of the carpet — or simply its wovenness — would attest to the fact that all everyday involvement in the 
world is possible within the context of a certain kind of meaningful organization, and that the motley scraps themselves 
contain a logic for their being pieced together. This latter point would prevent the ontic schism between world and self 
and would truly allow phenomenology to glean the logos of phenomena from the immanent structure of the 
phenomena themselves. 
The carpet (my life) would be the medium in which the plurality of relations of meaning to my world could form 
themselves, arrange themselves, take on different kinds of meaning depending on their proximity to and 
compatibility with other experiential patches, and so on. We will call the carpet taken in this sense our “ecstatic 
body.” 
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confusing tapestry of everyday worldly experience, seems to undermine the entire phenomenological 
project of finding the logos of experience within the phenomena that constitute it. It undermines 
facticity’s promise to meld the form and matter of life in the medium of experience. 
Indeed, the leap into the world seems to have fallen right through it into a formal plane entirely 
distinct from our everyday navigation of the world. Far from mere aspect-views of the same 
experiences of life, the “what” and the “how” of life refer to entirely different layers of experience 
that not only do not permeate one another but don’t stand in a relation any more complex than the 
former lying on top of the latter. The two may be co-extensive, but they are made of entirely different 
materials; it isn’t clear in what way the homogeneous ground is furnished out of the heterogeneous 
carpet other than as its formal “as such.” To say that everyday experience leads us in some way to its 
ground is true only in the shallow and negative sense that coming to see the lack of coherence of our 
experiential carpet allows us to see it as such and pull it up, uncovering the previously hidden ground. 
For the “what” and “how” to offer merely aspectual differences in relation to the very same world83 
would require that their difference be purely ontological. What the image of the carpet exposes is the 
inadvertent importation of a strong ontic divide between the Um- and Mit-welten and the Selbstwelt, a 
divide that threatens to impose itself between “Selbst” and “Welt.” 
This leaves us with the rather simple question: in what sense is the Selbstwelt worldly? How is 
the unity of my life constituted by the particularities of my world? The answer, it would seem, is in no way. 
Whatever world the Zugespitztheit of the Selbstwelt might contain is simply the nondescript unifying 
“ground” that organizes experiences in their most general form (which is not a world in Heidegger’s 
sense at all). Though he entered this line of thought through the total facticity of the Umwelterlebnis in 
all of its fullness of structured meaning, the phenomenological science of this life seems to eradicate 
 
83 Which, of course, the terms Um-, Mit-, and Selbst-welt are supposed to bring out: whether they are circles, 
slices, aspects or whatever else, they are all of the very same world: my world. 
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any trace of such facticity. That this is not an unintended consequence but the explicit aim of his 
phenomenology is clear later in the lecture: “can the Selbstwelt be apprehended scientifically and, indeed 
not as this one or that one, but rather in regard to its universal determinations, in regard to the 
lawfulness [Gesetzlichkeiten] of the Selbstwelt? The idea is of such an absolute science of life, not of this or 
that factical, individual life.”84 The irony is that the selfhood of the Selbstwelt actually takes 
phenomenology further afield from any kind of factic first-personal world (which is always the patchy 
and contingent carpet) than the original characterization of everyday life, reducing phenomenology to 
an abstraction of life “in itself,” of experience “as such.” 
This irony reappears in full force in SZ with its protagonist, Dasein, the definitionally first-
personal being-in-the-world, which we “in each case are,” and yet which is entirely abstracted, 
generalized, sterilized of any ontic determinacy.85 Dasein, who is constitutively in-the-world, and yet 
cannot be said to have any worldly determinacy. Dasein, though in each instance (je) first-personal, 
historical, gendered, worldly in this way or that — embodied —, is, qua Dasein, none of those things. 
We return to our original observation and the problems that emerge from this attempt to philosophize 
facticity: in the name of methodological necessity, Heidegger jumped right through the fabric of the 
world that he had so doggedly pursued. 
 
 
84 Heidegger, WS, 86–87. 
85 Indeed, Heidegger is already toeing a fine line by asserting that Dasein is not a genus which could have 
instantiations in me, or in you (SZ 42) while also asserting first-personality (Jemeinigkeit) as a structure with no 
factical determinacy (Heidegger, Being and Time, 42/42-43.). That is, from an ontological (and not psychological) 
point of view, I am me in the same way you are you: first-personality, while not an attribute of objects, is a 
formal structure of meaning we share with others. (Hence Heidegger’s slide into something very close to the 
alter ego model of sociality with his “Mit-dasein”). In any case, for Heidegger to strike this balance, he must lean 
very heavily on this distributive “je,” which is meant to imbue the ontological structure with the full facticity of 
my life. But because Dasein, like the Selbstwelt before it, is a structure defined by being factical and thus worldly, it 
is not defined through any particular facticity or situatedness. Hence the peculiar abstract facticity, impersonal 
first-personality, disembodied Being-in-the-world, etc. which marks the Dasein analysis. 
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2. Dasein: Ontology’s Distributive First-person 
With this, we return to the idea that phenomenology speaks in the middle voice: the 
methodological introduction to SZ. Behind the explication of phenomenology at this later point stands 
the analogous methodological problem of the immediacy of meaningful experience and the mediation 
of the philosophical discourse in which these phenomena take shape as phenomena. Heidegger’s 
attempt to unify phainesthai and logos in the practice of phenomenology, in other words, recapitulates 
his earlier attempt to read the logic of the Selbstwelt off of the factical material of the Um- and Mit-
welten. If anything, his major terminological shifts over the 1920s attest to the calcification of his 
perceived tension between the phenomena of experience and their immanent figuration of the world 
as a whole. Most markedly, Heidegger had abandoned “life” (even taken “in itself”) as the basic realm 
of phenomenological analysis in favor of the existentially charged and formalized “Dasein.” This new 
phenomenological subject no longer hid its instrumental role in posing phenomenology’s new 
foundational question; Dasein poses the Seinsfrage: what does it mean to be? 
While the split between selfhood and worldhood in the WS lectures had not been inscribed 
into its very starting point (though I suggested above that Erlebnis understood as a formalized Ereignis 
is doomed to collapse into the Selbstwelt), SZ is not shy about the instrumental relation between Sein 
and Dasein. Whatever analysis of factical everyday experience emerges is, from the start, clearly 
motivated by a tactical approach to the theoretical question of Being.86 
 
86 Of course, one can say with confidence that Heidegger was, at root, still in search of an understanding of 
everyday experience that contained the figure of its own unity, and that the ontological scaffolding of his project 
simply offered the philosophical inroad to this territory with the least ontic baggage. This seems undeniable, 
and it is no coincidence that SZ breaks off where it does. The strange fact that Heidegger has said all he needed 
to (and could say) in the propaedeutic to his planned second part is, in fact, not strange at all: ontology is only 
interesting or relevant to phenomenology and human thought more generally, insofar as it manifests itself in 
our Being, Dasein. 
The fact still stands, however, that his analysis of our Being as a worldly one is shot through with this 
architectonic in which phenomenology serves ontology, and not the other way around. My task in what follows 
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Dasein in its everyday worldly life is the loose thread upon which phenomenology tugs to 
expose the primordial logic of unity that undergirds this world. A logic that is, from the start, defined 
as ontological. So, under the dictates of the Seinsfrage, Heidegger launches an analysis of everydayness 
that is designed to move past or beneath this structure and to expose a different kind of meaningful 
structure that, in fact, is not factically embedded. The ontological road thus begins in total facticity, 
but only in order to move beyond it. Far from an imposed and unnecessary architectonic, however, 
the factical analysis of “Being-in-the-world” Heidegger develops in the first division of the text is itself 
already clearly permeated by its preparation of the existential sublimation (better yet, “Zugespitztheit”) 
of the second division.87 Though the two divisions of the text are clearly meant to move through, 
respectively, inauthentic and authentic interpretations of our worldly Being, the axis between these 
modal poles appears as a possibility already within the fragility of the first division’s analysis of Dasein 
as worldly. 
Indeed, Heidegger’s grip on facticity was already slipping in his initial gloss of the middle voice 
as reflexive. With phenomenality animated by the self-containment and self-sufficiency of reflexivity 
(how it shows itself from itself, as opposed to from anything else), phenomenology becomes a project 
of discovering that particular mode of autonomous self-showing and sharply distinguishing it from 
the myriad other ways a phenomenon might appear. Every phenomenon contains its own logic, 
 
will, in part, be to identify the reasons for Heidegger’s fixation on ontology as the way to approach the logic of 
life. 
87 This is contrary to the large (primarily Anglophone) reception of SZ, which largely ignores the second division 
and the ontological pressure behind the analysis of everydayness (most famously in Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-
in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (MIT Press, 1991).). Though this may seem 
like an act of salvaging a robust analysis of world from the ontological existentialism of the project as whole, it 
generally results in a radical misunderstanding of Dasein and its worldliness, missing the fact that Heidegger is 
at least attempting a first-person phenomenology. It comes as no surprise that these are generally the readers 
who try to position Heidegger within discourses of the philosophy of mind and “analytic” concerns about the 
possibility of agency. I hope to show here that if one does wish to rescue worldliness from SZ, one must do so 
through a direct engagement with the purported mine-ness of authenticity brought by the second division. 
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however coded or hidden, which phenomenology seeks to tap into and explicate. Heidegger’s name 
for this logic is, of course, Being. Phenomenology is, therefore, the descriptive project of explicating 
the Being of phenomena. Because Being is not a matter of essence or any kind of lapse back into the 
noumenal and non-relational, it is a matter of the meaning of something for the one who is so much as 
able to take up phenomenology to begin with: me. 
The reflexive formulation of phenomenality thus produces a strange ontological circle: I try to 
allow something to show itself in itself; this internal logic is its Being; and its Being is its meaningful 
relation to me, who is the one setting off on the explication to begin with. But far from getting lost in 
a circular definition of phenomenon and self, each moving through Being to define the other, our pre-
ontological relation to phenomenality comes to the rescue, pulling the circle into a spiral towards the 
foundational. This pre-ontological immersion in phenomena does not operate with an explicit 
understanding of Being and so does not face this problem at all: Heidegger calls this our “average 
understanding of Being [durchschnittlichen Seinsverständnis],” which, though still a meaningful relation to 
phenomena and therefore built upon a logic of their Being, is not conceptualized or explicitly articulated. 
Because of the multiplicity of “average” logics under which something can show itself to us — and 
this is crucial —, we generally do not relate to a phenomenon according to its inherent mode or logic. 
Phenomenology’s task is, therefore, to extricate from this average pre-ontological relation to things 
the ontologically explicit Being upon which that relation can be formed. By discovering the single 
ground of all everyday patchworks, ontology articulates the single authentic logos from the plurality of 
logics of average everydayness. With this, phenomenology as ontology is pitted, from the start, against 
our average, everyday relation to phenomena: 
What is it that phenomenology is to “let be seen”? What is it that is to be called 
“phenomenon” in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence 
becomes the necessary theme when we indicate something explicitly? Manifestly 
it is something that does not show itself initially and for the most part, 
something that is concealed [verborgen] in contrast to what initially and for the 
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most part shows itself, indeed in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and 
ground.88 
Heidegger has returned to the figurative differentiation between the carpet of everyday experience and 
its hidden ground. In fact, the relation runs deeper than a recycled image: as I will argue, the concealed 
ground here is meant to furnish exactly the same kind of immanent logical foundation as that of “life 
in itself” in the WS: a self-sufficient phenomenon that figures its own worldly unity. Though the 
argument is substantially more developed and nuanced in SZ, the phenomenological structure is the 
same. 
* 
In SZ, the phenomenological relation to the way something shows itself to me is, just as in 
WS, as much a matter of my Being as that of the phenomenon in question. More precisely, Being 
simply names the manner in which something shows itself in relation to me; the phenomenon is 
inseparable from me from the start (which is why the question of Being is always the question of some 
being’s Being, of the meaning of the being’s Being, the meaning of the being’s Being for me). We generally 
remain content with simply encountering phenomena as we do in everyday experience, Heidegger 
claims, not worrying about the structure within which they are organized and manifest. But, for the 
phenomenologist who wishes to make the conditions of the relation with a phenomenon explicit, the 
question put to any particular phenomenon is always: why does it show itself to me in this way and 
not that? What is the logic governing my phenomenal world? How, in other words, does this particular 
moment of my experience figure itself as a coherently inscribed within the entirety of my experience 
(i.e. the world)? 
 
88 Heidegger, Being and Time, 33/35. 
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Heidegger answers this precisely the same way in SZ as he had almost a decade earlier in WS: 
the only absolute, unconditioned, self-forming locus of meaning is Dasein taken as a whole.89 
Phenomenology is possible only because of the possibility of this wholeness (that life can be condensed 
upon the self-forming “rhythm” of life), which is nothing other than the possibility of authenticity: 
If the interpretation of the Being of Dasein is to become primordial as a 
foundation for the development of the fundamental question of ontology, it 
will have to bring the Being of Dasein in its possible authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] 
and wholeness [Ganzheit] existentially to light beforehand.90  
Though the term “Ereignis” is conspicuously absent from SZ,91 the “making one’s own” of the 
Selbstwelt lives on in the modality of Eigentlichkeit, the mode of experience in which I do not take the 
way things appear to me as self-evident, but I challenge the phenomenal world to show itself to me as 
an elaborate web of meaningful relations that are anchored in the simple ground of my life. While the 
relation between the condensation of the Selbstwelt and everyday experience remained murky in WS,92 
 
89 This becomes explicit in the opening of the second division with the need pass over the analysis of the first 
division again, but this time more “primordially [urspünglich]”: 
the understanding of Being can only be radically clarified as an essential factor in the Being of Dasein, if the being 
to whose Being it belongs has been primordially interpreted in itself with regard to its Being. 
A primordial ontological interpretation requires not only in general that the hermeneutical situation be secured 
in conformity with the phenomena, but also the explicit assurance that the totality of the beings taken as its theme 
have been brought to a fore-having [Vorhabe]. (Heidegger, 221-22/231-32.) 
This unified totality is, of course, Dasein. Yet, 
the existential analytic of Dasein up to now [Dasein in its everydayness] cannot lay claim to primordiality. Its 
fore-having never included more than the inauthentic Being of Dasein, of Dasein as less than whole [unganzes]. 
If the interpretation of the Being of Dasein is to become primordial as a foundation for the development of the 
fundamental question of ontology, it will have to bring the Being of Dasein in its possible authenticity and 
wholeness [Ganzheit] existentially to light beforehand. (Heidegger, 223/233.) 
In short, the authentic ground phenomenology seeks is the unity of Dasein (the self-figuration of life as a unified 
world). 
90 Heidegger, Being and Time, 223/233. 
91 Indeed, when it does appear it is as an entirely ordinary (and certainly not phenomenological) term, equivalent 
to any kind of process (Vorgang), and precisely that which Heidegger sought to distinguish from Ereignis in his 
sense in WS. See, for example, Heidegger, 243/253. 
92 Heidegger seems to have a vague sense already at this point that the concentration of life onto the Selbstwelt 
is both “always there in factical life” (Heidegger, WS, 60.) and still to be understood as a possible way in which 
life can be “lived, experienced, and, correspondingly, even historically understood” (Heidegger, 59 emphasis 
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the power of SZ is precisely its laser focus on the point in everyday experience out of which we are 
able to refocus our phenomenological sights on our Being (lives) as a whole, the shift from everyday 
inauthenticity to phenomenological authenticity. 
This all-important experiential focal point, the loose thread of our daily life, is death. Or rather, 
the fact that we will die, that death looms as a permanent possibility. The possibility of death shows 
itself to be the singular experience of worldly life which inherently tends towards being understood 
first-personally (towards being ereignet and the unfolding of an eigentliches understanding of one’s life), 
and which acts as a kind of anchoring portal through which the plurality of everyday experiences in 
the patchwork of life can be stripped down to the bare ground of one’s mortality. The methodological 
necessity of a self-forming point of access to life (or to Being) identified already in WS is now given a 
further existential overlay; the philosophical practice of phenomenology shows itself to be more than 
the curious probing of the world: it is, rather, the pursuit of the most basic tendency of our existence. 
Phenomenology figures, through a self-justifying unity, the multitude of things we do, decisions we 
make, relations we maintain, as unified. Heidegger’s simple explanation for the claim that death is the 
methodological/existential focal point of life (“existence” in SZ) is that death is the only possibility in 
our lives that refuses to be fully made sense of by our particular socio-historical context.93 No matter 
 
removed.). It is the ontic fact that we live life always as our own and the ontological rarity of making that 
explicit. But in this earlier lecture there is no real development of the way this possibility, which permeates all 
experience, can be made manifest (or why it is generally clouded over). Instead, he offers observations like: 
At first this life is especially intensive, impulsive, in the various directions and spheres of activity, or in all of 
them. One gets wrapped up in something, is caught up [gefangen] in something (or en-snared [be-fangen]). Then, 
once again, everything simply passes by; one is thus not actually involved. Or once again: one is happy about 
life, lives with great hopes, gives oneself over to others. Life is a pleasure to live. Then once again its agony. 
[…] And in all of this living, one is, from time to time, there for oneself. (Heidegger, 32–33 translation altered for accuracy.) 
93 More deserves to be said here as the finitude of Dasein is one of the main existential columns upon which his 
entire project rests, one which has been misconstrued by most commentators. For our purposes, however, 
what remains undeniable about death, regardless of how exactly it is understood, is that it is meant to mark the 
“horizon” against which our lives come into focus as our own, as singularly ours to live, to own up to, to bring 
into sync with the rhythm of our life (all of this contained within the dense notion of Eigentlichkeit). Heidegger 
explicates this through five primary characteristics of the possibility of death, which really all express aspects of 
this Zugespitztheit on myself: 1) “death is the ownmost [eigenste] possibility of Dasein”, which simply restates the 
Ecstasy  Chaoulideer  78
  
how full and internally coherent my worldly relations of meaning are, that web will always remain 
unmoored if I do not position it against the horizon of my life as a unified whole — as finite. 
The homogeneity of the ground invoked in WS comes to make more sense now that all 
experiences are inscribed into a singular possibility: at every point at which the carpet is fastened to this 
ground it is through the same relation of a phenomenon to my finitude. The specificity and variability 
(facticity) of experiences (their worldliness) comes to be supported by an entirely a-factical and 
unchanging undercurrent that figures the “rhythm,” the underlying logic of life, through which any 
given experience achieves meaning. For all the ontic variation between my life, Vladimir Putin’s, and 
that of a medieval peasant, the ontological ground upon which those differences are structured 
remains the same: we are all finite beings who care what course our lives will take (we are “Dasein”) 
and thus share the phenomenal logic within which our worldliness is able to be inscribed. In the 
language of the WS, life understood “in itself” is not conditioned by anything other than itself, it does 
not rely on any logic to give form to its contents other than that which it contains within itself. 
Mortality, Heidegger insists, is the sole figure of our worldliness. 
* 
At this point, an absolutely decisive inversion has taken place. While the characterization of 
“life” in the WS was methodologically crucial as a pre-given unity, the wholeness of authenticity is 
quite clearly only a possibility to be pursued but never taken for granted, perhaps never achieved. The 
pressure of our finitude reminds us that the potential unity of life is something we must strive for, 
maintain, and seek to construe for ourselves. The difference shows itself in a change to Heidegger’s 
 
matter; 2) it is “nonrelational [unbezüglich],” severing one’s life explicitly from its usual socially adopted mode 
(more on this later); 3) it is “insuperable,” which reminds us that, as the ground of our Being, death lurks within 
every possibility of life — it is the absolute horizon and contour of life; and the twin attributes which express 
what it means for death to be this absolute horizon: 4) it is “certain” and thus there at all times behind everything 
we do, and 5) it is “indefinite” as to its when or where, which means that we can never bring death closer, never 
come to tame it or contain it within another practice (e.g. Heidegger, Being and Time, 252-54/263-66.). 
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use of “self,” a term which remained rather un-critical in WS, there simply invoking the intuitive first-
personality of life of which Heidegger is here so explicitly critical.94 
What is at stake in authenticity, in other words, is a matter all too familiar by now: the “who” 
of Dasein. This “who” is not to be assumed from the start but excavated by phenomenological analysis; 
mine-ness is not the guarantee of ownership over life with which we each enter the world, but the task 
of “finding” our I, our self, in our worldliness.95 To say that selfhood is something to be worked 
toward, to be pursued, is to suggest that though its possibility grounds the plurality of experiences of 
our everyday lives, working to establish such a ground is still a project within life. Does this imply that 
the homogenous ground of our Being is to be constructed out of the heterogeneity of the carpet of 
life itself? Where does one go looking for this hidden ground we are calling “self”? We know that it is 
hidden by the carpet, by the web of factical relations. These relations pretend to be self-sufficient — 
to be taken on by me (angeeignet) — but are in fact constructions of what Heidegger calls the “Man-
selbst,” the self defined by the norms and comfortable cohesion of everyday life (more on this below). 
But in what is it hidden? In what experiential content does the possibility of death and the move from 
the “Man-selbst” to the “ich-selbst” show itself as a possible mode of Being? The answer to this reveals 
the moment at which the project of selfhood clearly separates itself from the content of factical 
everyday life. It is worth quoting at length: 
 
94 For example: “The ontic obviousness of the statement that it is I who is in each case Dasein must not mislead 
us into supposing that the way for an ontological interpretation of what is thus “given” has been unmistakably 
prescribed. It is even questionable whether the ontic content of the above statement reaches the phenomenal 
content of everyday Dasein. It could be the case that the who of everyday Dasein is precisely not I myself [je ich 
selbst].” (Heidegger, 112/115.) 
95 “What if the fact that Dasein is so constituted that it is in each case mine were the reason for the fact that 
Dasein is, initially and for the most part, not itself? [...] The ‘I’ must be understood only in the sense of a 
noncommittal formal indication of something which perhaps reveals itself in the actual phenomenal context of 
Being as that being’s opposite. Then ‘not I’ by no means signifies something like a being which is essentially 
lacking ‘I-hood,’ but means a definite mode of Being of the ‘I’ itself; for example, having lost itself.” (Heidegger, 
113/115-16.) 
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The attestation [Bekundung] [of an authentic potentiality-of-Being [Seinkönnen] 
of Dasein] is to give us to understand an authentic potentiality-of-Being-one’s-self 
[Selbstseinkönnen]. With the expression “self,” we answered the question of the 
who of Dasein. The selfhood of Dasein was defined formally as a way of existing, 
that is, not as an objectively present being. I myself [Ich selbst] am not for the 
most part the who of Dasein, rather the they-self [Man-selbst] is. […] 
With the lostness in the they [das Man], the nearest, factical potentiality-of-
Being of Dasein — tasks, rules, standards, the urgency and scope of Being-in-
the-world as concerned and taking care [besorgend-fürsorgend] — has already been 
decided upon. The they has always already kept Dasein from taking hold of 
these possibilities-of-Being. The they even conceals the way it has silently 
disburdened Dasein of the explicit choice [Wahl] of these possibilities. It remains 
indefinite who is “really” [“eigentlich”] choosing. So Dasein is taken along by 
the no one [Niemand], without choice, and thus gets caught up in inauthenticity. 
This process can be reversed only in such a way that Dasein explicitly brings 
itself back to itself from its lostness in the they. But this bringing-back must 
have that kind of Being by the neglect of which Dasein has lost itself in 
inauthenticity. When Dasein thus brings itself back from the they, the they-self 
is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic Being-one’s-
self [Selbstsein]. This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing. But 
making up for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice—deciding for a 
potentiality-of-Being, and making this decision from one’s own self. In 
choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible, for the first time, its 
authentic potentiality-of-Being. 
But because Dasein is lost in the “they,” it must first find itself. In order to find 
itself at all, it must be “shown” to itself in its possible authenticity.96 
And, finally, how is it shown to itself? 
This potentiality is attested by that which, in the everyday self-interpretation 
of Dasein, is familiar to us as the “voice of conscience.”97 
In these decisive passages, Heidegger shifts our capacity to achieve an internal coherence of 
meaning into the existential register of choice. “Owning” one’s experiences of the world — something 
Heidegger claims is only possible against the ultimate horizon of death — is now clarified as a matter 
of electing the “tasks, rules, standards, the urgency and scope” (in essence, the norms through which 
we collectively figure our lives as ordered and coherent) of everyday experience for oneself. But the 
 
96 Heidegger, 257-58/267-68. 
97 Heidegger, 258/268. 
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power of everyday figuration lies not only in its making these choices for me, but in doing so such 
that I cannot choose them for myself. Thus, to so much as open the possibility of authenticity, the 
choice to choose the norms that govern everyday experience must be made. This first choice is, 
moreover, itself not possible until the possibility of “myself” is shown to me in my contented life as 
the they-self.  
Because Heidegger has defined the figurative order of everyday life in terms of the anonymity 
of the absence of choice (and so in opposition to self-elected orders of my own), this rupture of 
complacency is impossible from within the fabric of everyday life, and must be grounded in something else. 
To put it another way, “their” self (Man-selbst) is really the negation of selfhood in that its choices are 
made by no one in particular: what “one” does doesn’t grow out of the choice of any self, whether 
mine or someone else’s, but is a kind of floating, appropriable norm that absolves one of the need to 
consider selfhood at all. So where does the possibility of selfhood so much as emerge? Enter 
“conscience” and its piercing wake-up call. The pivot from inauthentic everydayness to authentic 
elected self-figuration begins with the “voice of conscience,” the magical disruptor of everyday 
normativity and the first awakening to the possibility of an alternative, a self grounded in the choices 
I make, the rhythm I avow and see as meaningful to my life: my self. 
We might reformulate the question posed above — In what is the ich-selbst hidden? — into the 
more direct question: Whose voice points us to the possibility of the ich-selbst? Were conscience to name 
the frailty of our everyday figures of meaningful coherence, then the ich-selbst would simply be a way 
(a “mode”) of organizing the rules and structures of the Man-selbst against the unifying pressure of 
finitude. But were conscience the irrepressible last vestige of the ich-selbst calling out through the 
anonymity of everyday experience, the possibility of my self would stand in opposition to that of “the 
they.” The passage above shows Heidegger unequivocally committed to the latter, cementing the 
oppositional polarity of my self’s “homogenous” Jemeinigkeit and “their” “motley” Weltlichkeit. Indeed, 
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as Heidegger goes on to describe this fortuitous conscience, it becomes clearer that, while everyday 
experience (inauthenticity) covers up the possibility of authenticity, it plays no substantive role in 
discovering its possibility, jeopardizing the purported constitutive worldliness of Dasein, regardless of 
its inauthenticity or authenticity: 
To what is Dasein summoned [by the call of conscience]? To one’s own self [das 
eigene Selbst]. Not to what Dasein is, can do, and takes care of in public Being-
with-one-another [öffentlichen Miteinander], not even to what has moved it, what 
it has pledged itself to, what it has let itself be involved with. Dasein that is 
understood in a worldly way for others and for itself is passed over in this call. 
The call to the self does not take the slightest notice of all this. Because only 
the self of the they-self is summoned and made to hear, the they collapses.98 
Heidegger tries to assure us that this collapse does not constitute a retreat into interiority or 
“inner life” cut off from the outside world, and that conscience calls solely upon “the self which is in 
no other way than Being-in-the-world.”99 But it isn’t clear what it means for Dasein to be defined by 
its Being-in-the-world when none of its everyday tendencies and motivations have any bearing on its 
ability to be a self. What seemed a merely formal ontological question of the figurative structure (or 
medium — a term we are slowly coming back to) within which everyday meaning could be inscribed, 
takes on a further ontic determination here. Heidegger defines the “how” of life, namely what kind of 
“self” one strives to be (i.e. whether ones strives to be a self at all), in terms of the “what” of life, 
namely the factical structures of worldliness that constitute the everyday experience of our lives, even 
if only negatively.100 
 
98 Heidegger, 262-63/273, translation amended. 
99 Heidegger, 263/273. 
100 Recall the idea in WS that life speaks in its own language and that motivations and tendencies do not come 
from the particular religious or historical forms which give meaning its form, but from life itself, from the “self” 
we might say in this context. The possibility of being a “self” takes up this same notion of the language life 
speaks to itself, or by itself: 
The motivation of tendencies and of new tendencies always comes out of lived life itself and the tendencies 
fulfill themselves again within life in and through its typical forms of progression. Not which particular 
religiosity and form of religion, not which particular worldview, not which particular artistic experience, in 
precisely this or that (accidental) historically motivated form, gives fulfillment to just this historically, 
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* 
Couldn’t Heidegger simply respond that the “they” of everyday life in all of its tendencies 
(“what has moved it”) and motivations (“what it has pledged itself to”) is simply an ontological mode 
of Being-in-the-world? That passing over our mode of everydayness in favor of that of avowed 
selfhood in no way empties life of its contents or refills it with commitments that align with this new 
self-understanding? That this mode simply comes to “own” (in this sense “choose”) the contents that 
already made up our lives and takes up a new relation to them through the fragility and inherent unity 
of our lives? That is, couldn’t the “Man-selbst” itself simply be an ontological “how” of life, not 
referring to anything factical in particular? Inauthenticity is, after all, like its counterpart, just a 
Seinsmodus, and so should only have a bearing on the way in which my worldliness is understood to 
be rooted and justified, not what my worldliness is made up of. 
Not only does Heidegger himself undercut such a response by undermining the clean 
separation of the ontic and the ontological that supports it,101 but the very notion that ontological 
modality could be separated from its ontic specificity should be suspect given that the ontological 
being in question (Dasein) is defined by its factical worldliness. Avoiding such a separation is, after all, 
what Heidegger himself took to be the difference between his phenomenology and the solipsism of 
more avowed existentialists who followed him: the deep worldliness of Heideggerian Dasein is 
supposed to prevent authenticity from being psychologized as some kind of resolve (or choice) I make 
 
morphologically motivated meaning, but rather that the fulfillment generally is of such a kind that it generally 
is something that actualized itself from out of its own forms, that life always addresses itself and answers itself in 
its own language, that structurally life does not need to untwist itself out of itself in order to maintain itself in 
its own meaning, that its structure suffices for itself. (Heidegger, WS, 42.) 
The self-formation of life is marked by the fact that it has its own rhythm, its own language, its own form out 
of which all motivations and tendencies of life are spun. Life understood as a “self” has no need to go searching 
outside of itself for the kind of unity and wholeness that phenomenology aims to bring out.  
101 Simply recall how he characterizes everydayness in the passage above: “what Dasein is, can do, and takes care 
of in everyday Being-with-one-another [öffentlichen Miteinander]” and even “what has moved it, what it has 
pledged itself to, what it has let itself be involved with.” 
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in a moment in which I stand entirely detached from my day-to-day involvement in the world, a 
privileged momentary stance from which the whole expanse of my actions come into focus as 
meaningful only if elected by me. This kind of psychologized authenticity — typified by the 
Kierkegaardian “Knight of Faith” whose distinction is entirely interior and thus cannot be 
differentiated from your average Joe by anything ontic — is marked by a sharp distinction between 
how one is understood by the public and how one understands oneself. In this case, the boundaries 
of in/authenticity are drawn from within the interiority of self-understanding to postulate the imagined 
bounds of the private inner from the public outer. Although Heidegger emphatically steers clear of 
such a psychological narrative of authenticity from the very outset, the axis of authenticity as it comes 
to concretion in the passages above (as a continuation of the method of WS) exposes the tendency of 
his ontology to endanger his phenomenology of the everyday in a different kind of manner: through 
impersonal formalization. 
Whose voice, then, calls upon us in this moment of awakening? The most honest answer is not 
that it is my voice, but simply the voice of “conscience.” There is nothing of “me” in this call other 
than the possibility of my individuation being announced. The great irony that confronted Lask 
returns: with the most rigorous attention to the particularity of life’s worldliness comes the tendency 
toward the formalization of that facticity and, with it, the sterilization of the object of analysis. 
In the name of understanding the carpet of my life, we have pulled it away and exposed the 
ground of life “in itself.” In fact, the very same nefarious impersonal particle, “es,” comes back to 
answer the question of who calls us to authenticity: 
When Dasein is summoned, is it not “there” in another way from that in which 
it does the calling? Is it perhaps the ownmost potentiality-of-Being that 
functions as the caller? 
The call is precisely something that we ourselves have neither planned, nor 
prepared for, nor willfully brought about. “It” calls [“Es” ruft], against our 
expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call without 
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doubt does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The 
call comes from me, and yet over me. 
The fact that the call is not explicitly brought about by me, but rather, “it” calls, 
does not justify looking for the caller in a being unlike Dasein. Dasein, after all, 
[in each case] always exists factically [Dasein existiert doch je immer faktisch].102 
Fair enough: it would indeed contravene everything Heidegger has said about the individualizing force 
of authenticity to locate its original irritant in someone else, let alone in no one and only in the nebulous 
“it.” But against the diffuse impersonal conscience of the “it,” Heidegger has only the crude 
ontological weapon of his “je,” the little distributive upon which the first-personality of the entire 
project rests. 
This “je” is under enormous pressure to do the careful work of invoking the particularity of 
Dasein’s entirely formal structure. In fact, Dasein is defined by it.103 The distributive actually already pops 
up with the first characterizations of an understanding of Being before Dasein is even introduced. Its 
recurrence throughout the text in the famous Heideggerian hallmark of facticity, “always already [je 
schon],” would be more accurately phrased “in each case already,”104 for the “je” is a way of bringing 
out both the generality (in every case) and the specificity (in each case) of existence. But how are we to 
understand this distribution? Heidegger insists that because “the Being which this being [Dasein] is 
concerned about in its Being is always my own [je meines],” “Dasein is never to be understood ontologically 
as a case and instance of a genus of beings objectively present. [...] In accordance with the character 
of always-Being-my-own-being [Jemeinigkeit], when we speak of Dasein, we must always use the personal 
 
102 Heidegger, Being and Time, 265/275, 265/276, emphasis added. Stambaugh has simply left the “je” out of the 
translation of this sentence entirely, rendering “je immer” simply as “always.” It is easy to miss the little “je,” and 
although it is meant to be the small yet mighty reminder that Dasein is, for all its seemingly formal generality, 
only possible as something first-personal, it is not clear that first-personality can simply be distributed so easily. 
103 The mantra is: “This being, which we ourselves in each case [je] are […] we formulate terminologically as 
Dasein.” (Heidegger, 7/7.)  
104 Though Heidegger himself sometimes forgets the “je” and simply writes “schon immer” where one might 
expect “je schon.” (E.g. Heidegger, 67/67, 236/245, 311/325.) 
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pronoun along with whatever we say: “I am,” “you are.”105 Once its distribution becomes a personal 
one (“je meines”), the innocuous “je” comes to form the factical backbone of ontology’s — and 
therefore Dasein’s — first-personality (as solidified in the term Je-meinigkeit). But within the “je” a 
tension is already pent up between particularity and generality that is not so easily dispensed with. 
Simply invoking a pronoun to accompany the “je” does not make it any clearer how particularity can 
be rooted in facticity if that particularity is distributed across all “cases” — “Daseins,” or however one 
tries to put it — in the same way. Without the notion of particularizing, or “individualizing,” as the 
iterating instantiation of some structure (as the genetic model would have it), it isn’t clear what sense 
of distribution is left at all. If mine-ness is a quality of my life that is meant to manifest itself in the 
factical particularities of my experience, in-each-case-mine-ness (Je-mein-igkeit) takes us away from this: it 
generalizes, equalizes, and perhaps most perniciously, suggests a vantage point from which “I am” 
and “you are” come to be seen as equivalent manifestations of a generic structure of meaning called 
Dasein. 
* 
Heidegger did not seem to take this as much of a threat to his project. The universality of 
Being “‘surpasses’ [‘übersteigt’] the universality of genus” because Being is transcendentally universal.106 
Heidegger’s ontology describes the structure of meaning that makes it possible for us to have the 
relation to the world that we do (namely the one which explicitly questions that meaning). This 
transcendental universality, just like that of the Kantian categories, must be unthinkable outside of 
experience and yet unconditioned by it. But Heideggerian selfhood is meant as the antidote to the a 
priori Kantian transcendental subject, to offer a path for a phenomenology of facticity that allows us 
to save philosophy by “leaping into the world at all.” The problem with transcendental universality is 
 
105 Heidegger, 42/42. 
106 Heidegger, 2/3. 
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precisely that its distributive individuation does not allow for first-personality in any factically rooted 
sense. To put the matter somewhat bluntly: the “je” that individualizes me and you and every other 
person (for this is how personhood would be defined) is not conditioned by socio-historical 
specificities but simply names the fact that there is such specificity. Each of us are, in each case, specific 
factical beings, but this is because we each live through the same ontological structure (Dasein) which, 
qua formal structure, is not factical. Just as in the WS, Heidegger forces himself to distinguish between 
life in its multiplicity and life “in itself,” the internal unity (homogeneity, no less!) of the latter 
grounding the specificity of the former. Selfhood again functions as a principle of unity against the 
horizon of which the plurality of worldly particularities can be figured as meaningful, coherent, unified. 
Though the “I” is not pre-given as in Kant but is a projected futural possibility, the possibility itself is 
pre-given, re-opening the same schism between selfhood and worldhood against which Heidegger 
positioned his entire philosophical method. We are approaching the crux of the matter. 
If the who of conscience is the bare possibility of my selfhood — the “I” that lurks latently in 
everyday experience as an “unfamiliar voice [fremde Stimme]” emergent from the “naked ‘that’ in the 
nothingness of the world”107 — then this first-personality is nothing more than the possibility of 
selfhood which we in each case are. The contradiction of transcendental facticity leaves first-personality 
entirely hollowed out: what makes me me is precisely what makes you you because the possibility of 
both is pre-given by the ontological structure of Dasein.  
The “Zugespitzheit” of Being-in-the-world on the possibility of selfhood against the horizon of 
death as it emerges in the call of (my) conscience raises the irrefutable difficulty facing Heidegger’s 
phenomenology: it is subservient to ontology. Already within the extant third of the project, the 
specter of fundamental ontology pushes the facticity of Dasein to its barest possible a priori 
 
107 Heidegger, 266/277, translation altered. 
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formalization, placing phenomenology squarely within the aims of ontology. The very thing that 
facticity sought to reintroduce to philosophy — the fullness and novelty of historical specificity — is 
ejected yet again. The only figure tethering Dasein to its facticity, ontology to phenomenology, is the 
pervasive “je” that distributes Being to our Being. It seeks to lead the ontological project into its 
phenomenological concretion in me. But this concretion is not an end but the means through which 
fundamental ontology can be accessed. While the fruitful and common way to read SZ is as an 
ontological approach to phenomenology, the methodological reality is that it implements 
phenomenology for the purposes of fundamental ontology.108 
It may seem as though I am simply trying to poke holes in Heidegger’s project wherever 
possible, scouring his text for moments of weakness and exposing the final faltering he himself seems 
to have been plenty aware of. That, in itself, would certainly be neither productive nor interesting (nor 
all that difficult). But instead of torpedoing his project, we have come to the precipice in his thinking 
that he himself identified as the ultimate matter of philosophy. We have the right to ask whether he 
in fact succeeds in leaping into the world, or whether he stumbles over his own eagerness. And if he 
does fall, as I argue he does, our task is to identify where and why, and whether we can make the leap 
he so meticulously prepared. 
Heidegger has, in some sense, successfully leapt into the world. By carefully resisting the 
reification of subjectivity at every turn, he manages to redirect phenomenality from a matter of 
knowledge to a matter of worldly life, bringing out a complex and powerful analysis of the way in 
 
108 E.g.: “Phenomenology is the way of access to, and the demonstrative manner of determination of, that which 
is to become the theme of ontology. Ontology is possible only as phenomenology.” (Heidegger, 33/35.) Or, “Ontology 
and phenomenology are not two different disciplines which among others belong to philosophy. Both terms 
characterize philosophy itself, its object and procedure. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology.” 
(Heidegger, 36/38.) 
Note that he does not say that “phenomenology is possible only as ontology” or that philosophy is “ontological 
phenomenology.” It is rather clear which serves the other. 
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which everything we experience and do is organized by its meaning (what he calls “care”), freeing 
philosophy from a multiplicity of false problems. To put it another way, Heidegger opens the way to 
thinking about phenomenality as medial, as a web of relations that can only be made sense of in terms 
of their coherent constitution of an entire world. And yet, the possibility of authenticity, which lurks 
in the backdrop throughout, casts a shadow over the analysis that threatens to collapse the factical 
multiplicity of everyday worldliness of the text’s first division into the unified homogeneity of the 
possibility of selfhood that becomes explicit in the second division. 
The moment in which the split of selfhood and worldhood is prefigured, however, comes not 
in the second division’s explication of authenticity, but at the moment when Heidegger could have 
developed his thinking in a direction that would have made such a diremption entirely unnecessary, 
indeed unthinkable. This moment is the brief chapter in which Heidegger ostensibly treats, but really 
precludes, sociality. Though it will require some further attention, there is an intuitive sense in which 
we can already say that sociality is that worldly fabric which, far from obscuring the possibility of 
selfhood, makes the plurality of first-personal relations to the world possible and sets the context 
within which the notion of taking responsibility for one’s life (“owning” it as the language of 
authenticity has it) first emerges as a possibility. We can figure particularities as coherently collected 
in a unified world, we might say, only because we collectively figure them. The very mediation of 
phenomenal specificity as worldliness is a social matter. 
Of course, Heidegger was not deaf to this; in a very limited sense, this is exactly the way in 
which his notion of sociality (“Mitsein”) works in SZ, though as a foil, not as a figure. Heidegger’s 
Mitsein describes our self-obscuring tendency towards anonymizing collectivity and shirking 
responsibility: thinking about how we live in a world inhabited and conditioned by others is, as I 
showed above, the pivotal point at which our Being-in-the-world announces itself,  in “conscience,” 
as ungrounded. 
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* 
A hypothesis to guide the final section of this chapter: the point at which the axis of 
in/authenticity becomes an irrevocable schism between Jemeinigkeit and Weltlichkeit is the point at 
which social collectivity is itself split into these two possibilities. By claiming that these are possibilities 
of selfhood (Man-selbst and ich-selbst), Heidegger tips the axis vertically and grounds the logic of 
worldliness in the possibility of first-personal focalization. To put a slightly finer point on this 
hypothesis: the point at which Heidegger trips on the radicality of his own project is with the (entirely 
unnecessary and unmotivated) assumption that everyday “public” being is alienated and anonymous, 
antagonistic to selfhood. Once that is assumed, phenomenology’s methodological necessity of 
grounding everyday experience is forced to turn to the projected possibility of private individuation, a 
ground whose possibility can only be found in itself (this self-sufficiency is precisely what is invoked 
with the notion of “privacy”). 
To resist existentially atomized selfhood requires that we develop a different notion of the 
self-organization of the social fabric of life, and that my Being-in-the-world is understood as essentially 
historical, social, factical: embodied. If factical experience is no longer simply the what of our self’s how, 
but is the medium whose particularities give form to the logic and rhythm of life itself, then we are on 
a path to conceiving of Dasein not as a transcendental structure of meaning which we “je” are, but as 
a description of what it means to be worldly, to appropriate, modify, and share the thick carpet of 
tending motivations through which I experience the world as I do. Personhood (the social ecstatic 
basis of first-personality, contra to “selfhood” which has been commandeered by atomizing 
individualism) is no less a project, a possibility, and a demand that I must navigate in the multiplicity 
of phenomena that make up my world. But this project is not a matter of resolve, retreat, self-
sufficiency, getting back to the work of my (domestic) life — of privacy in any sense — but of the 
difficult and unending work of owning and managing my participation in the fabric of my public and 
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social world. The temporal horizon of death unfolds into the spatio-temporal horizon of collective 
embodied experience, in which authenticity is a public and historically specific matter of shaping and 
shifting the contours of my world. What was a unity of selfhood made visible by ecstatic temporality 
will come to be the unity of my social world through the ecstatic spatio-temporality of my factical 
mediality — my embodiment. But enough hypothetical prophecy: let us take the final steps and turn 
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IV. Embodied Re-figuration of the World 
 
1. Anonymous Collectivity 
My claim is that Heidegger’s chance to avoid the opposition of mine-ness and worldliness, of 
authenticity and facticity, comes at the moment he turns to the fact that Dasein’s world is not simply 
structured by tools and objects but by other people. Being collective, whatever this ends up meaning, is 
the mode of understanding personhood that can either irrevocably sever it from its ecstatic facticity 
or open up its inherent embeddedness in and dependence on the lives of those “other people.” Indeed, 
how Heidegger understands the plurality manifest in these “others” shows itself to be not just the 
litmus test, but the reason, for the success or failure of his leap into the world. 
Heidegger begins promisingly enough, careful, of course, not to objectify these “others” for 
the same reason the “I” is not to refer to a pre-given subject, avoiding all the pitfalls of an aggregated, 
inducted, pointillistic sociality (which marks the “intersubjectivity” of so many egological 
philosophies). These others, far from foreign entities I come to recognize as of my kind through 
something shared, are, instead, an existential characterization of my own Being (the kind of self I am): 
“Others” does not mean everybody else but me — those from whom the I 
distinguishes itself. Others are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not 
distinguish oneself, those among whom one also is. This Being-there-too with 
them does not have the ontological character of being objectively present 
“with” them within a world. The “with” is of the character of Dasein, the “also” 
means the sameness of Being as circumspect, heedful [umsichtig-besorgendes] 
Being-in-the-world.109 
Far from referring to entities “out there” in contrast to my self “over here,” these others with whom 
I live in the world show themselves to me in a different fashion. “The structure of the worldliness of 
the world is such that others are not initially present [vorhanden] as free-floating subjects along with 
 
109 Heidegger, Being and Time, 115/118. 
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other things, but show themselves in the world in their particular environmental Being [umweltichen 
besonderen Sein] in terms of the things at hand [Zuhandenen] in that world.”110 The phenomenality of 
“others” is, then, not distinct from that of any other worldly phenomenon, but embedded within it. 
Being-with (Mitsein), the existential condition that permeates every feature of my life, no matter how 
alone or independent I claim to be, presses itself upon me within everything I do. Worldliness is always 
structured by those with whom I am in the world: “the world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt].”111 
This certainly sounds like a characterization of sociality as fundamental to our worldly 
existence. Might the structures within which phenomena are shaped by others provide a factical fabric 
of a shared world that is neither an unmoored contingent multitude of phenomena nor an abstracted 
and emptied pure self-relation? Might, in other words, the tight weave of collectivity provide the 
supportive discursive structure within which our ecstatic dispersal in the world is grounding; does the 
collectivity of our logos ground its own worldliness? This, it would seem, is the potential promise of 
grounding our orientation in the world (the meaning of every patchwork in the carpet of our lives) in 
our participation in a world inhabited by others. If phenomena are ordered by their location in 
geographic and historical (social) space, then factical specificity and ecstatic unity figure as the 
possibility of the other. If, in other words, the space within which the project of selfhood is possible 
is always a shared one, it is only possible as a worldly project. The path seems cleared to phenomenology’s 
successful figuration of a unified world out of factical particularity, yet this is not the way of 
fundamental ontology. 
The first sign that Heidegger had something else in mind is the superficiality of the 
inseparability of others from the phenomena of my world. The “others” are not just a structural 
determination of things in my world (Mitsein) but are themselves — though not objects (Vorhandenes) 
 
110 Heidegger, 120/124. 
111 Heidegger, 116/118. 
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or things of use (Zuhandenes) — also encounterable in my world (as Mitdasein). Others are not like a 
pen, a car, or an elevator, because they have a different ontological relation to me: they are themselves 
Dasein. While Heidegger called our immersion in inner-worldly things of use of the surrounding world 
(Umwelt) “taking care of” or “dealing with” (besorgen),112 our relation to other people of the with-world 
(Mitwelt) is “concern” (Fürsorge). While this terminology needn’t worry us here in any detail, the 
resurgence of the odd trio from the WS lecture should be clear enough. We deal with (besorgen) the 
things of our Umwelt and are concerned with (fürsorgen) the other people of our Mitwelt. Prefix-less, 
pure “Sorge” names our relation to the missing third: the Selbstwelt. Though this latter term is not used 
in SZ, and Heidegger does his best to claim that Sorge does not stand in opposition to but is the 
encompassing ground of the other two,113 we have already encountered this constellation and the 
priority it places (Zugespitzheit) on the world understood in terms of oneself. That care is meant to both 
ground and remain fully independent of our facticity becomes rather explicit in his characterization of 
the possibility of death: 
What is characteristic about authentic, existentially projected Being-toward-
death can thus be summarized as follows: anticipation reveals to Dasein its 
lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility to be 
itself, primarily unsupported by concern that takes care [besorgende 
 
112 Defined by the various modes in which we relate to useful things: “to have to do with something, to produce, 
order and take care of something, to use something, to give something up and let it get lost, to undertake, to 
accomplish, to find out, to ask about, to observe, to speak about, to determine...” (Heidegger, 57/56-57.) 
113 For example: “Since the Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-together-with things at hand could be 
taken in our previous analyses as taking care [Besorgen] of them, while being with the Dasein-with [Mitdasein] of 
others encountered within the world could be taken as concern [Fürsorge]. [...] Care not only characterizes 
existentiality, abstracted from facticity and falling prey, but encompasses the unity of these determinations of 
Being. Nor does care mean primarily and exclusively an isolated attitude of the ego toward itself. The expression 
“care for oneself,” following the analogy of taking care and concern, would be a tautology. Care cannot mean 
a special attitude toward the self, because the self is already characterized ontologically as Being-ahead-of-itself; 
but in this determination the other two structural moments of care, already-being-in… and being-together-
with, are co-posited.” (Heidegger, 186/193.) In this passage, Heidegger does his utmost to hold together two 
incommensurable claims: that all care is essentially unified in care for oneself, and that care for things or others 
(care in its facticity) leads to self-misunderstanding and must be entirely abstracted from in care as such. Care 
“encompasses the unity” of that from which it is abstracted. By now it should be clear that this is an 
unproductive tension. 
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Fürsorge], but to be itself in passionate, anxious freedom toward death, which 
is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.114 
Whatever facticity Heidegger is referring to, it is fully condensed upon the point of Dasein’s self-
relation, “freed” of its dispersal (i.e. rootedness) in the particularities of its world, facing itself as itself. 
A memory, at best, of facticity. The careful delimitation of the Mitwelt from Umwelt therefore 
foreshadows its eventual separability from the (Selbst-)Welt. 
Instead of establishing phenomenology’s sociality and securing the methodological fragility of 
philosophy’s logicity in collective discursive figuration of experience as a whole (language, to put it 
simply),115 our co-inhabitation of the world is reduced to a phenomenology of society, flattening the 
rich logos of collectivity to disordered anonymity.  
* 
The Mitwelt, far from supplying the discursive carpet in which my relation to my world is 
secured, far from establishing a structure within which my ability to make my world my own first 
emerges, is quickly cast into the heap of facticity that distracts us from the possibility of relating to 
our lives as our own. Heidegger’s Mitwelt simply intensifies the polarization of Weltlichkeit away from 
Jemeinigkeit. From the outset, after all, Heidegger positions Mitsein and Mitdasein as the ground for our 
everyday selfhood, useful for distinguishing that everyday self from my self: “in being absorbed [Aufgehen] 
 
114 Heidegger, 255/266, bold emphasis altered. 
115 This unpursued placement of phenomenology within the discursive situation of collectivity is, more or less, 
the path followed by Emmanuel Levinas in his inheritance of Heidegger’s failure to account for the sociality of 
phenomenology. Though there is a resonance between Levinas’ revival of the medium of language and my 
attempt here to rescue the internal order (universality) of collective facticity, Levinas’ project (like many of the 
French inheritors of Heidegger) was decidedly interested in a dyadic encounter with the Other. Thus, Levinas 
sought to ground the practice of philosophy in the ethical encounter of posing the Seinsfrage (or any other 
question) to another person, not in the figurative process of political and poetic representation. See: Levinas, 
Totality and Infinity. 
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in the world of taking care of things, that is, at the same time in Being-with toward others, Dasein is 
not itself.”116 
As of this point, therefore, Heidegger’s insights about the forms of sociality within which we 
live are damned to propping up his fear of alienation. The irony is that this actually frees Heidegger 
to make a rather pointed critique of the reification of collective figuration without realizing that he 
himself is defining it as such, leaving himself no option other than existential abstraction by pushing 
everything through the small Jemeinigkeit-funnel of anxiety in the face of mortality, erecting the false 
notion that there is a form of Mitsein that is not figured in terms of everydayness, one that is elective 
and freed of its facticity. This is, of course, the fantasy of a sociality freed of politics, a mode of 
association with others with no strings attached. The further irony is that his non-objective notion of 
Mitsein can be pushed in precisely the opposite direction to undermine his own fantasy of the 
possibility of being “unsupported by besorgende Fürsorge.” The question that Heidegger fails to pose 
critically at this moment is the very same one that guided his methodology throughout: who are “the 
others” through whom the phenomena of the world appear to me as motivated and tendentious?  
Because these “others” who constitute Dasein’s Being-with are, at root, a rhetorical 
externalization of oneself, a way to “cover over one’s own essential belonging to them,” these others 
don’t actually refer to anyone in particular, but to the “neuter,” nebulous “they” in whose pre-trodden 
tracks we walk. They “prescribe” our Being, asserting their “true dictatorship.”117 “We enjoy ourselves 
and have fun the way one enjoys oneself. We read, see and judge literature and art the way one sees and 
judges. But we also withdraw from the “great mass” the way one withdraws, we find “shocking” what 
 
116 Heidegger, Being and Time, 122/126. 
117 “Das Man” is simply the nominalization of the singular third-person impersonal: “man.” Though its direct 
translation is “one” (as in, “one doesn’t do that”), it carries none of the stilted formality that it does in English 
(hence, its frequent translation to “they”). “They” also carries the conspiratorial anonymity of das Man’s 
indeterminate personhood, pulling the strings of our lives behind the curtain and wielding a well disguised 
tyrannical force that we have to resist (as in, “‘they’ are out to get me”). 
Ecstasy  Chaoulideer  97
  
one finds shocking.”118 In short, the “choice” (and therefore the “choice to choose”) to which we are 
called in authenticity is made for us by this anonymous subject, the subject of tradition, habit, 
normalized and calcified behavior. To quash the pressing question Why? I simply tell myself, Well, that 
is simply what one does. By externalizing and reifying this “one” into an imagined agent responsible for 
this decision, we successfully disburden ourselves, or at least we feel disburdened, of the weight of 
choice. We are able to keep the anxiety and pressure of being responsible for our lives at bay by 
absolving ourselves of that responsibility and assuring ourselves that we have no real say in that matter: 
The they is everywhere, but in such a way that it has always already stolen away 
when Dasein presses for a decision. However, because the they presents every 
judgment and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of Dasein away 
from it. The they can, as it were, manage to have “them” constantly invoking 
it. It can most easily be responsible for everything because no one has to vouch 
for anything. The they always “did it,” and yet it can be said that “no one” did 
it. In the everydayness of Dasein, most things happen in such a way that we 
must say “no one did it.”119  
When pressed, we have no real answer to the “who” of this powerful they, or we hypostatize a person 
or people remote enough that the decision to do this and not that comes to us as though already made 
and is thus not really a decision at all. We make our own lives anonymous. 
Heidegger is diagnosing what is clearly a common, perhaps even essential, tendency of ours 
to shirk responsibility by erecting these pre-packaged modes of understanding our world, externalizing 
the burden of life by denying agency and yielding to the powers that be (even if those powers are of 
our own making). Instead of wondering how or why it is that our world is arranged the way that it is, 
understanding our own role or participation in continuously producing and reproducing the world, 
we treat it as something unified in advance, rigid, and therefore beyond our scope. The facticity of 
phenomena is simply the imprint of a pattern whose contingency has been obscured, no longer the 
 
118 Heidegger, Being and Time, 123/126-27, here using “one” for “Man” instead of “they” to translate the idiom. 
119 Heidegger, 124/127. 
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rich possibility of its own self-transformation. If we are to try to establish a sense of personhood with 
any agency or responsibility — with any freedom — it would certainly seem crucial to dismantle these 
reified forms of anonymous collectivity.  
But by hollowing out Being-with and separating its content from the project of grounding and 
justifying the particularities of life, Heidegger cannot himself distinguish hardened from plastic forms 
of collectivity, shared practice from anonymous custom, democracy from dictatorship. He defines 
“publicness” as this tendency towards reification, forcing himself to imagine Fürsorge for others as a 
preoccupation with how we differ from them.120 When sociality has been reduced to this kind of self-
differentiation (or its anonymizing failure), there is nothing left but antagonism and alienation when 
we give ourselves over to others. 
In a moment that might at first seem unusual for Heidegger (though the systematic reasons 
for this “oversight” are now clear), this ontic/psychological diagnosis does not uncover a neutral, 
structural ontological fact of our existence: instead of exploring the social fabric that allows for its 
own reification (and which is therefore not essentially so), Heidegger seems content to go along with 
the psychologized language of existentialism in which the “individual” subject either chooses or is 
chosen for, thereby essentializing what is a mere ontic instantiation of something much more 
fundamental. To return to my hypothesis above that the unifying fabric of sociality is rent the moment 
“public” life is condemned to alienation and anonymity, we now see that by conflating collective 
figuration of the world with its reification in anonymity, by conflating collective freedom with its 
alienation, Heidegger pits voluntarism (the ich-selbst) against dictatorship (the Man-selbst), leaving no 
space for the messy fact that the project of personhood is a matter of continuously participating in 
shaping a collective world, that social agency is the ongoing struggle to establish a world of meaning 
 
120 Whether, for example, “this difference is to be equalized, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind others 
and wants to catch up in relation to them.” (Heidegger, 122/126.) 
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through the phenomena that I figure with others. These imagined poles of selfhood are, therefore, twin 
fictions that grow out of an interpretation of worldliness that has forgotten that the logicity of life is 
nothing other than the socio-historical space I arrange with others. That is why facticity is not the 
illogical remainder of discursive order but the already-structured material through which the world 
appears as a world. 
We have, finally, arrived at the point at which Dasein’s ontological abstraction dissolves the 
social fabric through which it is woven into the world, forcing phenomenology to leap not into, but 
right through the world. Heidegger’s medial phenomenology was meant to do away with the reification 
borne of a philosophical subject that splits inner and outer, here and there, I and not-I. And yet, the 
ontological rift between the privacy of Dasein’s choosing to be a self for itself and the publicness in 
which this choice is dispersed and dissolved recreates precisely this separation, now under the 
modalities of inauthenticity and authenticity, Jemeinigkeit and Weltlichkeit. To return to the image of the 
carpet: our tendency to try to step outside of the fabric of life and achieve a position of self-sovereign 
externality (a “ground,” for example) is a protective reaction to the challenge of making meaning out 
of the particularities of the carpet with everyone else with whom we are bound by it. That slow and 
sometimes unpredictable project of (re)arranging the phenomena into new forms of coherence, new 
worldly unities through which the phenomena themselves appear transformed, is the project of 
personhood in a shared world. To condemn this embeddedness in the carpet of life as an anonymous 
disavowal of our agency is to invert our freedom for collective self-determination into a reactionary 
freedom from the determinations of others. 
Heidegger was right to align the possibility of freedom with the unification of the particulars 
of our lives into a single whole; but this wholeness, if it is to appear in its plasticity and potential to be 
transformed, can’t simply be the unity of phenomena (the world) focalized (zugespitzt) on the isolated 
first-person, but must the unity of that very personhood: its place in a social collective. Thus, the 
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potential for self and world to achieve unity through their own universalization is one and the same 
process of coming to recognize our lives as participating in the (re)production (the re-figuration, as I 
have been calling it) of our social world. For phenomenology to truly speak in the middle voice, then, 
is for it to articulate this reciprocal constitution of the factical particular and the ordered whole. Only 
by identifying the mechanisms of this dialectical formation can philosophy play a role in understanding 
and actualizing our participatory freedom. 
 
2. Ecstatic Embodiment: The Project of Collective Dasein 
We needn’t look far, then, for the clue to forging another path back to the world as such: it 
lies within Heidegger’s own analysis. Mediality, no longer threatening alienating dispersal but promising 
our capacity to construe the world as a whole, gains its final concretion in the undercurrent of his 
analysis of Being-with. While the middle voice began as the call to see the eventiveness (Ereignis) 
underlying all cognitive phenomenality (Erkenntnis), we now see that the mediality of phenomenology 
is much more fundamental and radical: I am the medium (the structuring material) whose 
particularities allow the world to take this form and not that, through whom relationships, buildings, 
habits, and every other infrastructural pattern of our social world is maintained, changed, preserved, 
and destroyed. A medium is not an empty form to be filled in by the material that courses through; 
nor am I a naked logic, rhythm, or principle through which phenomena resonate as unified. The 
structuring tendencies of my life are the material out of which my world is constituted, they are the 
rhythm of everything I do, build, avoid, and find myself involved in; I am my world in all of its 
particularities.121 To locate my “I” in the factical configuration of the relationships, projects, 
limitations, prejudices, promises, and expectations that makes up my life takes the burden off of the 
 
121 Not simply, as Heidegger suggests, my worldliness. (Heidegger, 65/65.) 
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overworked “je” and allows us to see our first-personality congeal in its specificity instead of 
instantiating itself in distributive formality. The possibility of my “I” both focalizes the plurality of the 
world in its potential unity (as my world) and generalizes my experience as participatory in a shared 
totality (as my world). The first step back toward the world comes with the shift from formalized 
selfhood to collective personhood; our mediality allows phenomenology to wrest the facticity of 
personal pronouns back for Dasein. 
If phenomenology no longer serves to differentiate selfhood from worldhood, but to loosen 
the reification of the world by making “bad forms of collectivity figures of its possibility,”122 Heidegger 
offers, again against the grain of his own project, a powerful figure to describe and analyze this 
reciprocal transformation of the particular and the collective. This figure is “ecstasy.” 
* 
As it appears in SZ, “ekstasis” is a term of the second division, emergent from discussions of 
authenticity and the possibility of the wholeness and unity of the self. Specifically, Heidegger 
introduces it to modify temporality. In SZ, therefore, the term does not simply mean being “outside 
oneself” as the mystical origins of the term might suggest, but the specifically temporal unity of past, 
future and present in their relation to my life.123 Ecstasy names the essentially non-objective nature of 
Dasein by insisting that it is not to be understood in terms of presence, but in terms of the horizons 
of past and future that coalesce in any engagement in the present. Far from a point on a timeline 
 
122 To anticipate poet Ben Lerner’s formulation of the problem as one of poetic representation. Chapter 3 will 
take this up in great detail. 
123 “Temporality is the primordial ‘outside of itself’ [‘Außer-sich’] in and for itself.” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 314/329.) 
Note that, unlike its mystical usage as a notion of self-dissolution in which experience stands outside of time (not 
unlike the Laskian immediacy of Hingabe), Heidegger turns to the term as fundamentally temporal, recognizing 
that our ecstatic immersion in the world creates non-identity, the injection of there into here, and therefore the 
possibility of unifying otherwise disparate elements around personhood. For a thorough discussion of the roots 
of Heidegger’s use of “ecstasy” (which he traces to Aristotle’s Physics), see David Farrell Krell, Ecstasy, 
Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to the Black Notebooks (SUNY Press, 2015), especially 11-36. 
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moving away from past and toward future points, ecstatic temporality brings out the co-constitution 
of past, future, and present in our existence. I live with past and future “horizons” against which and 
towards which I live. Tendency and motivation, the temporal indications of meaning that gave 
coherence to life in WS, emerge again here as “Geworfenheit” and “Entwurf,” or, more commonly, as 
the unified “geworfener Entwurf” (“thrown projection”). To say that temporality is not an objective index 
of change but is the structure through which my investment in the world is given its terms of possibility 
(the parameters and the goals, we might say) is to say that (ecstatic) temporality simply describes the 
way in which all worldliness is unified around the project of selfhood. Temporality is essentially a 
structure of Jemeinigkeit, a logic of the world that condenses along the axis of unified selfhood and 
orders the nebulous plurality of worldhood.124 Despite all that Heidegger does to distance himself 
from the Kantian premise that time is the form of inner intuition and space that of outer, the kernel 
of this division remains: ecstatic temporality is the structure that illuminates the unity of my private 
selfhood against the disunity and dispersion of the public world. 
It is no surprise, therefore, that when Heidegger returns to the question of Dasein’s existential 
spatiality towards the end of SZ, he simply infers from the logic of authenticity that “the specific 
spatiality of Dasein must be grounded in temporality.”125 If “space” is serve a phenomenological role, 
it certainly cannot refer to the Kantian form of outer intuition, a neutral container that provides absolute 
coordinates for positioning bodies within it. Space must refer to the structure by which phenomena 
are worldly. It, too, is a structure of Dasein. But where ecstatic temporality discloses the essential unity 
 
124 Of course, Heidegger insists on the “equiprimordiality” of past, future and present horizons of our ecstasy, 
but the fact that the future is given “priority in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality” 
(Heidegger, Being and Time, 314/329.) attests to the fact that it is the Zugespitzheit of life on the self in the 
possibility of death (the paradigmatic futural horizon) that truly gives unity to the ecstatic horizons. Temporality 
in SZ is, no matter how much one tries to qualify and hedge the matter, a possibility grounded in the priority 
of Jemeinigkeit over Weltlichkeit. 
125 Heidegger, 349/367. 
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of our lives by focalizing our worldly entanglement on the possibility of a private selfhood laid bare 
by our mortality, Heidegger’s spatiality (in-Sein) is never anything more than our dispersal and 
distraction (Zerstreutheit) in the world; far from offering new forms of unity, it is destined to entrench 
our inauthentic alienation. It is telling that Heidegger dismisses the spatial metaphors of ecstasy 
(“horizon,” being “out of oneself”) as our tendency to mistake our world for our worldliness, the ontic 
for the ontological. In other words, Heidegger grounds spatiality in temporality for precisely the same 
reason that he grounds worldhood in selfhood. 
However, by offering an interpretation of worldliness (Being-in) as sociality (Being-with) — 
by revealing that the structural relation of things of use is in fact in structure of collective negotiation 
— Heidegger leaves the phenomenological door open to the figure of ecstasy as neither exclusively 
spatial nor temporal but the basic “outside oneself” within which spatio-temporal coherence is 
possible. Indeed, the modes of differentiating and unifying the phenomena of the world according to 
their place within my life needn’t be split into “spatial” and “temporal” axes that are needlessly made 
orthogonal. Ecstasy is not, then, a philosophical figure of individuation but exactly the opposite: it 
reveals the fact that I am not to be found here, nearest to myself, shielded from the public space of 
external determination and influence, but that I am always there, caught up in this task, dealing with 
that issue, negotiating various expectations and possibilities. I am the being within whom proximity 
and distance, familiarity and foreignness, relevance and irrelevance can be so much as configured.126 
Again, because we are the medium of phenomenality, we are the structure (the “site”) through which 
 
126 Heidegger says as much when he characterizes Dasein as “Ent-fernung,” the distance (and therefore the 
bridging, navigating, and undoing of this distance) that emerges from our relation to phenomena. And yet, 
Heidegger sees in this formal structure of ours a tendency towards inauthenticity since we have “an essential 
tendency toward nearness” (Heidegger, 103/105.). Of course, I hope to have shown that the real response to 
this tendency toward calcification and familiarity is not a retreat into the private (for what could be nearer!) but 
an embrace of the relations of distance themselves. 
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relations and coherence across space and time are articulated; being outside oneself is the most basic 
way of expressing our mediality. 
The temporal privilege of ecstasy in SZ brings together several strands of our analysis. When 
Heidegger says that the caller and the called of the voice of conscience are both Dasein and yet are 
sharply distinguished, the “they” and the “self” of the everyday “they-self” are severed from one 
another by the caller. Entangled (verfallenes) worldly Dasein is called upon by its own “potentiality-of-
Being [Seinkönnen].” Dasein in its factical immersion is parsed from Dasein in its sheer possibility. What 
it is from what it could become. This is nothing more than a restatement of Dasein’s ecstatic character: 
Dasein is defined by what it is not (yet), by those relations of meaning whose past and future horizons 
give our lives momentum at every moment, possibility imbuing every actuality. But because Heidegger 
limits this modal difference between actuality and possibility to temporal difference, to the horizon of 
what is not yet against the present of what has already congealed into concretion (hence the ontological 
priority of the future), his language of potentiality places the freedom of fluidity against the alienation 
of concretion. If Dasein is what it is not yet, any particular configuration of the world poses a threat of 
reifying and fixing Dasein. As I argued above, assuming that all material arrangements of the present 
world pose an anti-temporal trap of “Verfallenheit” (entanglement, fallenness) that obscures the 
possibility of the “future” has consequences for any robust notion of sociality: the ecstatic structure 
of internal difference collapses on itself and, instead, encourages a retreat into the privacy of 
unhampered volition and away from the morass of public entanglement. 
Interestingly, this constitutive temporal difference that produces the dissonance of conscience 
also leads Heidegger into his only real discussion of (the possibility) of responsibility and the 
conditions of figuring individuality in terms of collectivity: ontological “Schuld” (guilt). Heidegger, in 
a now-familiar gesture, attempts to separate what he takes to be the vulgar, everyday notion of Schuld 
— having debts (Schulden) to another person and other forms of “making oneself responsible [schuldig]” 
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by living under certain laws, obligations, and forms of exchange — from our ontological 
Schuldigsein.127 This ontological guilt is nothing other than the fact of this modal gap between what 
we are and what we can become. Dasein’s possibilities are always laden with the “burden” of thrownness, 
limited and dragged down by their factical particularity, and so “Dasein constantly lags behind its 
possibilities” and “never [gains] power over [its] ownmost Being from the ground up.”128 This 
ontological guilt of always being indebted to and entangled in the affairs of others allows us to “make 
ourselves responsible” for this or that: Dasein’s ecstatic non-identity creates the ontological foundation 
for the many forms in which my own project of selfhood emerges from my facticity.129 
Despite this insight, Heidegger places this gap between possibility and actuality between what 
is expected of me by the fixed impositions of the “Man-selbst” and the projected possibilities of the 
“ich-selbst.”130 We are left with the age-old fiction that our freedom and responsibility arise out of our 
negotiation of limitation and volition, the demands of the masses and the whims of the self (even if 
Heidegger internalizes this ontologically into the theater of subjectivity). The “others” and the 
 
127 Heidegger, 269-71/280-82. 
128 Heidegger, 273/285. 
129 Indeed, these passages are the fodder for Iain Macdonald’s insistence that Adorno unfairly dismissed 
Heidegger as unable to conceive of non-identity within identity, and his claim that a nascent ethics can be found 
in this constitutive alterity of Dasein. Macdonald sees in these passages an undeveloped theory of the conditions 
for normativity: the essential modal gap in Dasein is not simply between what I am and what I can be, but 
between what “is and what ought to be.” And so, “without such a bifurcation or split, norm-based action would 
be impossible; again, it is only such a self-relation that can explain the difference between moral action (involving 
responsibility and guilt) and animal behavior.” (Iain Macdonald, “Ethics and Authenticity: Conscience and 
Non-Identity in Heidegger and Adorno, with a Glance at Hegel,” in Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions 
(Stanford University Press, 2008), 14, 18.) 
In a basic sense, this is irrefutable: normativity is not thinkable without the possibility of difference. Our capacity 
to carry responsibility (i.e. have legible agency) would seem to rest on this latent non-identity. But Macdonald 
assumes, following Heidegger, that this modal gap should be understood as a temporal gap, as a tension within 
Dasein that arises from its struggle to pursue its own future possibilities through the messy bog of “their” present 
constraints. 
130 Macdonald repeats this assumption: “The Self of Dasein is not a pure, point-like, self-identical Self; it is rather 
a self divided, pitted against itself (its they-self) as it sorts through its existentiell possibilities.” (Macdonald, 15.) 
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particular arrangement of the present world appear as obstacles to, facilitators of, and characters within 
this project of mine. To the degree that facticity is baked into my possibilities and my responsibility 
to myself is tethered to my responsibility to others, the relation is fundamentally antagonistic. Though 
my ontological Schuld is also manifest in terms of some particular social entanglement, it is clear that 
this is rooted in the more primordial self-responsibility of non-identity, which is explicitly not ecstatic 
in a social sense. 
The narrowness of this ontological Schuld leads to equally thin “vulgar” manifestations. While 
we might be able to wrest a strange kind of ethics out of this notion of being indebted to others, it is 
not clear that any kind of politics is possible on this basis.131 This is, of course, another manifestation 
of the weakness of Heidegger’s Mitsein: he simply cannot imagine that the differential tension of our 
existence might itself be a function of our sociality, that our ecstasy emerges from the generative 
friction of collectivity. Instead, his wilted Mitsein is reduced to the besorgende Fürsorge of thrown actuality 
that conditions the urges toward the not yet of the self, one pole of an internalized tension, not the 
material of the tension itself. If the glimmer of new forms of unity (the possibility of making a different 
world to come) emerges out of a difference between actuality and possibility, Heidegger’s sociality 
 
131 As Hannah Arendt trenchantly remarked of the destructive individuation of existential guilt: 
If since Kant the essence of man consisted in every single human being representing all of humanity and if 
since the French Revolution and the declaration of the rights of man it became integral to the concept of man 
that all of humanity could be debased or exalted in every individual, then the concept of Self is a concept of 
man that leaves the individual existing independent of humanity and representative of no one but himself — 
of nothing but his own nothingness. If Kant's categorical imperative insisted that every human act had to bear 
responsibility for all of humanity, then the experience of guilty nothingness insists on precisely the opposite: 
the destruction in every individual of the presence of all humanity. The Self in the form of conscience has taken 
the place of humanity, and being-a-Self has taken the place of being human. (Hannah Arendt, “What Is 
Existential Philosophy,” in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome 
Kohn, trans. Rita Kimber and Robert Kimber (1948; repr., New York: Schocken, 1994), 181.) 
For a detailed discussion of the problematic (even totalitarian) tendencies of placing individual guilt above 
collective responsibility, see chapter 2, in which I follow Hannah Arendt’s inversion of Heidegger’s analysis, 
saving the Heideggerian world from itself by ensuring its cogency as a public world. 
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seems to offer only the conservative inertia of the former and never the transformative momentum 
of the latter. 
If ecstasy is not, however, understood merely temporally, a different kind of existential gap 
emerges out of which an experiential unity, emergent from within the “actualities” of our social fabric, 
can grow. 
* 
What would it mean for the existential gap (between Being and Becoming, actuality and 
possibility) to itself be a function of social facticity, for the difference constitutive of our unity132 to be 
a description of sociality and not of our antagonism to it? Sociality would not be condemned to the 
mere negotiation of the tension between what I am and what I could become, and would itself be the 
web of “thrown projections” (factical possibilities) that I am becoming. What would it mean to say that 
I am not only collectively conditioned but that I am collective, that this is not an attribute, a product, a 
constraint of my Being but is simply the structure of entanglement (“Verfallenheit” now identical to, 
not merely an aspect of, “Sorge”) that constitutes the project of personhood? The “they-self” (not 
reified into anonymous autocracy but simply the forces of entanglement that make up my thrownness) 
needn’t be feared as the enemy of ecstasy, the conflation of possibility and actuality, but names the 
geographic and historical structure of worldly signification whose specificity always carries within it 
the possibility of being otherwise, even the tendency towards alteration, transformation, and 
reevaluation. Reproducing the world in a particular configuration does not necessarily obstruct its 
potential to change; it is, rather, the condition for the coherence of a unified world at all. Maintaining 
our social world is always already a way of transforming it. 
 
132 Or, in Macdonald’s Hegelian formulation: the “non-identity within identity.” 
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Mediality, collectively, sociality, ecstasy: are these all synonymous? For which material fact do 
they all serve as figures? What kind of social “medium” structures differences? Are we talking about 
language? Infrastructure? Practical identities? While those media of sociality are certainly woven into 
this medium, we are aiming to describe the coherent worldliness of first-personal facticity, the most basic 
way in which the fact of my own person is made visible in the project of life. Our first-personal 
worldliness is, at risk of speaking tautologically, our embodiment. 
If embodiment is, at root, the materiality of our Being-in, then any phenomenology grounded 
in selfhood must localize our existence in a particular, delimited object. Whether the brain, our flesh, 
our sensorium, or our home, these are all ways locate and delimit the “I” in space. Of course, these 
circumscribed subjectivities do not contain any existential gap within their own materiality since the 
subject is whole and pre-given in its where and what. Because of this, the problem looms that this 
Being-in isn’t yet in, so we concretize, make manifest, embody our “I” to address this. Our bodies 
become the intermediary through which our interior Being comes into contact with the public world, 
the convenient hybrid object that is both “I” and world (and yet not fully either).133 This body is a 
dual-aspect entity, thinkable as subjective and objective, as mine and foreign, the domain of my 
sovereignty and rights but also my vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the socio-historical world I am 
“in.” As Heidegger went to great lengths to show, this kind of em-bodiment of interior subjectivity is 
a non-starter for understanding oneself as existentially “in” the world; a physical within mixed with a 
psychological without does not constitute much of a step beyond the fissure between the material and 
ideal. Yet, as I have argued, Heidegger’s only strategy for avoiding this reification and interiorization 
of subjectivity was positing a formal difference of temporal ecstasy within the unity of the self, a 
 
133 Though in very different ways, both Schopenhauer and Husserl turned to the body to serve this kind of dual 
purpose; Schopenhauer connected the worlds of “will” and “representation” through our body’s aspectual 
access to both worlds while Husserl sought to establish an immersed subjectivity related but not reducible to 
its empirical existence by cleaving the body in its physicality (Körper) and its lived intentionality (Leib). 
Ecstasy  Chaoulideer  109
  
structure whose specific Being-in is constantly strained and is always trying to avoid understanding 
itself in terms of that entangled Being-in. In short, as I observed at the outset, there is simply no room 
in Heidegger’s phenomenology for Dasein to leap back into the world in its full factical particularity: it 
cannot be embodied. 
If we do not begin, however, with the notion that the potential unity (and therefore meaning) 
of our lives is a private matter, but is something constituted in the specifics of my public life — if we 
consider our embodiment ecstatically — these obstacles dissipate. The materiality of our body is no 
longer limited to a bounded physical entity with which I identify myself, nor is it a porous or hazily 
bounded object, or even the body that is that boundary between inside and out.134 To say that my 
embodiment is ecstatic means that the worldly material out of which I forge a sense of personhood is 
there, not here, it is public, contested, shared, and forever changing. It is, in other words, a body formed 
and re-formed collectively. If we are to call this a social body, it is far from the liberal agglomeration 
of a collective Leviathan; the “I” is not dissolved into a “we” through association, conjoinment, or 
yielding itself up to some higher order. My first-personality is already a social matter, already associative, 
reactive, committed, repulsed, impassioned by the relations I inhabit, that constitute me, and which I, 
in turn, (or rather, at the very same time) constitute.  
To insist on the inherent sociality of embodied experience is also to save Heidegger’s 
phenomenological method from its own undoing. Dasein — which Heidegger meticulously designed 
to pick out the way in which our first-personal particularity is “je schon immer” ordered, but which lapsed 
into a purely formal structure that distributively particularizes itself — finally appears as a mode of 
factical particularity that tends towards its own universalization as a collective structure shared with 
others. Dasein is, therefore, not a pre-given form to which we asymptotically strive but a historically 
 
134 As Helmuth Plessner’s “eccentric positionality” would have it. 
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and geographically situated collective project in which I realize my unifying and meaningful freedom 
by participating. Dasein is the philosophical name for our peculiar capacity to figure the tiniest thread of everyday 
banality in terms of the totality of the world. We aren’t passive observers of “it worlding,” but are the medium 
(the structured bodies of difference) through which we “world” ourselves.135 
* 
Freed from our fear of the dictatorship of the public as an essentially diffuse worldly medium 
within which we lose ourselves to the whims of others and confuse actuality for potentiality, 
phenomenology has no need to resist our worldly ecstasy with a “temporal” one, there is no urgency 
to gather ourselves up and shed the roots of our worldly entanglement in the carpet of life. 
Affirming embodied particularity, the rejection of which had fueled the anxiety underlying 
authenticity, does not, however, undermine Heidegger’s project of freeing ourselves from a naturalized 
and fixed self-understanding. Quite to the contrary, only by understanding our tendency to organize 
the specificity of our experience universally are we able to make sense of (and counteract) the 
problematic and alienating forms of our collectivity. Heidegger was very right to warn us of the danger 
of mistaking the actual for the possible, unity for absolute totality. Indeed, to say that we are medial 
beings for whom the structured fabric of life is constitutive intensifies the difficulty we face in finding 
our agency, our responsibility, our ownership of our world within the tangle of life. Far messier than 
achieving mineness by kicking away the crutches of worldliness, developing a sense of universal 
collectivity out of the inseparability of mineness and worldliness of ecstatic embodiment is a difficult, 
frustrating, and ongoing task, one which exceeds the horizons of my birth and my death. Far more 
 
135 In a rather circuitous way, I am reading Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as a first-personal description of Marx’s 
slippery idea of our “species-being.” Note that at the heart of Marx’s theory that humans define themselves in 
their “universalization” in every particular instance, is Marx’s insistence that the whole of the world functions 
as the “inorganic body” over which we labor and through which we transform ourselves (our organic bodies). 
See the introduction and chapter 3 for further discussion of this deep similitude. 
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challenging than retreating from alienating collectivity into the ease of individuality is to see in the 
disfigured world the trace of its possible transformation: for our experience of collectivity, however 
contorted and calcified, to always contain the seeds of a different world to come. Though all 
experience figures itself as worldly, phenomenology offers a mode of description and understanding 
through which that figuration comes into view as historical, changeable, and my own. By following 
the transformative potentiality of our ecstatic embodiment, phenomenology brings everyday 
experience back to life and frees the poetic mechanisms by which we rearrange the world; it does not 
simply “leap into the world at all” but allows us to leap, together, into a world to come. 
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I. Introduction: Fractured Politics 
 
This chapter asks what forms, if  any, poetic representation can take when the usual avenues 
of  political representation have been all but snuffed out. It asks, in other words, how we might imagine 
and configure alternative arrangements of  collective life when the dominant social totality maintains 
its hegemony precisely by obscuring the mechanisms by which it reproduces itself  and through which 
alternatives could be created. Can poetic rearrangement begin to loosen the authoritarian grip of  
certain deformations of  collectivity? Though the contemporary instantiation of  this problem is the 
global alienation manifest in our hapless and profoundly unequal response to our climate crisis,1 this 
chapter turns, not to our rising seas, but to a — I hope to show — structurally analogous form of  
political alienation, one which has the benefit of  being one of  the most thoroughly digested and 
theorized moments of  human existence: National Socialism. More specifically, I turn to the everyday 
reproduction of  Nazism in the life of  the ordinary “little man” in the moment and place of  its greatest 
consolidation, early 1940s Berlin, to ask whether even the most disfigured forms of  collectivity might 
contain the clues to their own reconfiguration. 
What do we gain if  we think of  Nazism not as a discrete political party, a fixed group of  
people, or a set of  convictions, but of  a particular configuration of  collectivity, a condition under 
which action is particularly difficult, responsibility shrouded in the binary of  guilt and innocence, and 
power hidden in the fable of  sovereignty and resistance? For one, its self-exacerbating alienation, 
which obscures the mechanisms of  its own undoing, emerges for the first time. How do we regain a 
sense of  action and potency under these conditions? How do we regain a sense of  political collectivity 
in which each individual is a potentially transformative participant? Though the tendency to tell the 
 
1 See chapter 3 and the introduction for more direct discussions of this problem as it appears in our poetics 
and politics today. 
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story of  Nazism in terms of  the authoritarian subjugation of  a people under the yolk of  evil is strong, 
it does little to explain its rise and popularity, its ostensible defeat, or its political afterlife in terms 
other than moral failure, international war, and psychological evil: in short, it leaves no space to 
understand Nazism as a fundamentally political configuration and corruption of  collective life. 
Insisting, instead, that Nazism was made possible by — and in turn compounded by — a particular 
deformation of  political mechanisms for representing the social world as a whole, opens the path to 
an internal understanding of  it as a form of  extreme alienation, what I will call the "domestication" 
of  politics.2 
* 
If  the previous chapter sought a philosophical vocabulary to articulate the inherent worldliness 
of  even the smallest scrap of  everyday life, to describe the reciprocal constitution of  social collectivity 
and individual personhood, this chapter tests that phenomenology by turning to collectivity at its most 
disfigured, totalizing, and seemingly irredeemable. It asks whether there are, in fact, circumstances in 
which the iron grip of  “das Man” is so unresponsive and unrepresentative of  the lives of  those it is 
meant to encapsulate that the only path toward freedom (in other words, the only form of  meaningful 
coherence) is isolated individuation. There is a certain irony to this gesture: while the previous chapter 
challenged Heidegger’s assumption that everyday social infrastructure couldn’t offer a logic of  
coherence adequate to the first-personality of  lived experience — that specific political forms could 
 
2 As I will argue below, it is imperative to distinguish the domestic as a familial space within a polity and the 
domestic as a paradigm for the political itself. Indeed, only when the polity as a whole is organized as though 
it were a colossal household (when it is domesticated) does “the domestic” appear in competition with and 
opposed to the political. 
(It is, in this sense, structurally analogous to the differentiation of the realms of natural necessity and human 
freedom. Only when we understand our shelter, our food, and our reproduction as inscribed within the 
universal processes of communal infrastructure, social metabolism, and the continuous production of a world, 
does the “natural” no longer stand in opposition to the “human,” but in a fruitful relation of a dialectic oriented 
toward sustainable freedom. See the introduction and chapter 3 for further discussion of the universalization 
of our material production of ourselves through the world.) 
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ever adequately figure the unity of  existence —, I propose to explore this in its limit case by turning 
to the very polity, the Third Reich, to which Heidegger pledged allegiance.  
Hannah Arendt, the theorist who serves as the guide to this chapter, is, therefore, relevant here 
for several coinciding reasons. Her reflections are not only indicative of  a certain kind of  inheritance 
of  the specter of  Nazism, but, more importantly for the purposes of  this inquiry, they work to 
carefully pry apart the registers of  political alienation and moral evil. Her inversion of  Heidegger is, 
then, indispensable to parsing the political register from its domestic obfuscation. Two adjacent 
distinctions of  hers, between the domestic (oikos) and the political (polis) on the one hand, and guilt 
(moral agency) and responsibility (political agency) on the other, clear the path for Nazism to so much 
as appear as a problem of  collective alienation as opposed to sheer force, subjugation, and violence. 
Though the two distinctions are intimately related, it is in the latter that her inheritance, and critique, 
of  Heidegger is most apparent. By grounding freedom in the continuous negotiation of  political 
difference through collective responsibility, she exposes the interiority of  Heidegger’s existential guilt 
as a thin derivative of  its socio-historical ground. 
Though her diagnosis makes room for an understanding of  action in the Third Reich that is 
neither dissolved in a historical-social functionalism nor overemphasized through a psychologized and 
atomized intentionalism, her own writing does not probe the shape of  this action in its particularity, 
nor does it illuminate the political space within which such a notion of  action might be possible. 
Because she separates the material and immaterial production of  collective life, her theoretical 
approach doesn’t wrestle with the poetic challenge of  fabricating the “web of  stories” that she so 
carefully articulates analytically. 
* 
To truly bring Nazism into view as a political disfiguration reproduced in everyday practice, I 
turn to a more overly poetic attempt to capture the strained collectivity in its manifestation in the 
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banalities of  ordinary Germans. It is, therefore, in the coherence and form of  a novel written just 
after the end of  the war that I hope to bring out one man’s attempt to make life in Nazi Germany 
legible as coherently political. The novel is Hans Fallada’s 1947 Jeder stirbt für sich allein (Every Man Dies 
Alone), a narrative, I hope to show, that is animated and structured by the oscillation between moral 
and political registers of  agency: now distinguishing, then collapsing the domestic and the political 
spheres, swinging from guilt, conscience, and the pursuit of  moral “decency” to responsibility, 
complicity, and the navigation of  political entanglement. It not only depicts but itself  performs the 
challenges of  figuring a discernible collective out of  the small moments of  everyday life forced into 
the margins by a totalizing logic of  tribalistic partisanship.  
The novel came into existence after Hans Fallada (Rudolph Ditzen’s lifelong pseudonym) was 
asked, shortly after the war, to write a novel based on extensive documents collected by the Gestapo 
on the attempted subversion of  the Nazi regime by a working-class couple (Otto and Elise Hampel). 
The request came from his new but intimate friend, Johannes Becher, who, at that time (late 1945), 
led the newly formed Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands, an association of  artists and 
intellectuals backed by the Soviet military. The Kulturbund was dedicated to the postwar anti-fascist 
national rebirth of  Germany and would go on to become an intellectual pillar of  socialist cultural self-
understanding in the GDR.3 Fallada, apparently uncomfortable with his own lack of  clear opposition 
to the Nazi regime4 and fearing that writing a novel of  this kind would appear as dishonest self-
 
3 Gerd Dietrich, “Kulturbund,” in Die Parteien Und Organisationen Der DDR: Ein Handbuch, ed. Gerd-Rüdiger 
Stephan et al. (Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag, 2002), 530–59. 
4 Fallada was, on the one hand, censored, imprisoned, and declared an anti-Nazi conspirator, and, on the other, 
was contracted to write Nazi propaganda and agreed to write a novel under plans laid out by Goebbels. Though 
this novel was never written and may very well simply have been a tactic for self-preservation while he wrote 
other, clearly subversive, texts, his novel Der Eiserne Gustav (published 1938) bears the blemish of having been 
commissioned as the basis for a Nazi propaganda film and. His breakout 1931 novel, Bauern, Bonzen, und Bomben, 
was hailed by the right and left alike, proving early on that his deceptively unmediated realism was open to 
highly divergent political readings. Fallada undoubtedly saw his own entanglement in Nazi Germany in an 
ambiguous light and was not eager to falsely smooth it out. See Peter Walther, Hans Fallada: Die Biographie 
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exculpation, declined.5 Only when it was made clear that the files told the story not of  a “purposeful 
communist resistant group”6 but of  the isolated attempt by a working-class couple to live under the 
harsh conditions of  Nazi Germany did Fallada agree to take it on. Thus, from the beginning, there 
was a certain tension between Fallada’s insistence on telling the murky and morally ambiguous stories 
of  Germany’s Kleinbürger and Becher’s clear-cut nation-building project that needed stories not of  the 
Mitläufer7 who were implicated in the widely declared collective guilt but of  those who had remained 
untarnished by twelve years of  fascism and on whose clear consciences a new Germany could grow.8 
The novel thus illuminates the messy and often terrifying political fabric constituted by 
relations of  responsibility, complicity, and differential empowerment that underlies isolated moments 
of  acute moral quandary and reflection. While Fallada’s narrative is, therefore, symptomatic of  the 
success with which Nazism buried and disrupted this fabric, it keeps one eye trained on the forms of  
 
(Berlin: Aufbau, 2017); Jenny Williams, More Lives Than One: A Biography of Hans Fallada (New York: Melville 
House, 2009). 
5 Heinz Willmann, another co-founder of the Kulturbund and close associate of Becher’s who was sent by Becher 
to convince Fallada to take on the project, gives a detailed account of this exchange in his memoir: Heinz 
Willmann, Steine klopft man mit dem Kopf: Lebenserinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1977), 302–5. 
6 Willmann, 303, my translation. 
7 Mitläufer, meaning “follower,” was cemented into common parlance by the Allied denazification proceedings 
in which it was the lowest of four categories of complicity in Nazi crimes into which Germans were sorted. See 
Allied Control Council, “Directive No. 38: The Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis, and Militarists 
and the Internment, Control, and Surveillance of Potentially Dangerous Germans.,” October 12, 1946, 
https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2307. I discuss the various notions of complicity 
used to make sense of Nazi hegemony and how they were shaped by denazification narratives below. 
8 This was particularly evident in the changes made to the manuscript by an editor, Paul Wiegler, after Fallada’s 
death, which smoothed over the political complexities of many of the characters that the publisher, Aufbau, 
hoped would be straightforward bastions of pure resistance. Only in 2011 did Aufbau publish a new edition of 
the novel that restored the full version originally submitted by Fallada in 1946. 
For a succinct account of the novel’s conception and the changes made by Wiegler, see Almut Giesecke’s 
“Nachwort” to the new Aufbau edition: Hans Fallada, Jeder Stirbt Für Sich Allein (1947; repr., Berlin: Aufbau, 
2011), 687–97. For a very thorough account, see Manfred Kuhnke, Verstrickt in die Zeiten: Anmerkungen zu den 
verwobenen Lebenslinien von Johannes R. Becher und Hans Fallada (Neubrandenburg: Federchen Verlag, 1999); as well 
as Manfred Kuhnke, ... ... dass ihr Tod nicht umsonst war!: Authentisches und Erfundenes in Hans Falladas letztem Roman 
(Neubrandenburg: Federchen Verlag, 1991), 12–17. 
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action that remained avowedly political in their internal dissidence and their modest effectivity, 
avoiding the post-war struggle between accusations of  collective guilt and counter-narratives of  
impotence and moral constancy. 
This oscillation between the moral and the political is, I argue, most apparent in the novel’s 
ambivalence toward the idea of  resistance. Resistance would, on the one hand, seem to be the very 
epitome of  effective dissidence and therefore of  political action under repressive regimes, reclaiming 
power by carving out a space from which to create countercurrents. But, in doing so, it in fact 
consolidates the very alienation it seeks to unseat: in resisting, individuals take a stand against (as the 
German Widerstand makes literal enough) the person, norm, institution, state, or whatever 
configuration of  the political fabric, without drawing on any power inherited from it, and thus tries to 
remain totally un-implicated and un-entangled in, for example, the nefarious machinations of  Nazi 
Germany (as Becher and the Kulturbund presumably imagined the Hampels’ case). If  resistance is 
internal, it is only tenuously or superficially so; to take a stand against someone or something is 
necessarily to try to separate and distance oneself  from it. For this very reason, the debates over the 
historiographical use of  the term and its various ideological underpinnings have been far-reaching and 
go to the very core of  interpretations of  Nazism (and the political) as such.9 
Jeder stirbt für sich allein is certainly a testament to the pressures of  post-war German rebuilding 
(both liberal and socialist) to tell a clean and forward-looking story of  the noble but powerless resistors 
to Nazism patiently awaiting a post-fascist Germany in which to flourish (the Kulturbund’s newly 
founded publishing house, Aufbau, certainly hadn’t chosen its name at random). But beneath these 
 
9 As historian Peter Hoffman put it in his work on the most high-profile moments of resistance during the 
Third Reich, “the relation between National Socialism and the Resistance is a key to comprehending the Nazi 
system.” (Peter Hoffmann, German resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 3; 
originally published as Peter Hoffman, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf Der Opposition Gegen Hitler 
(Munich: Piper, 1985).) 
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moments lies a much messier tale of  the enormous obstacles to daily life set, not by the colonizing 
force of  the Nazi Party, its leaders, or Hitler himself, but by the relations of  fear, distrust, and retreat 
in which all Germans found themselves caught. Fallada’s novel thus not only depicts, but is structured 
by the fabric of  relations in which life had no choice but to find its way and its meaning. It is this 
structure that separates it most essentially from the Gestapo files on which the plot is based — which 
separates its poetic force from criminological accounting.10 
The novel’s form, I suggest, allows for a completely different notion of  action that follows, 
not from the actualization of  an interior capacity (something like “agency” in the traditionally 
intentionalist, moral sense), but drawn from one's participation in the (re)arrangement of  collectivity, 
a highly unevenly distributed capacity despite its universality. Action becomes the navigation of  an 
already existent medium of  others' actions, and is thus fundamentally collective: action is always a form 
of  reaction, a way of  participating in the grand project of  casting our mundane lives as creative of  the 
world as such. It is because our lives are mediated by such a political fabric that it can be alienated, the 
mechanisms of  this figuration monopolized and obscured; but it is also by virtue of  this mediating 
fabric that its malleability can never be fully snuffed out. Even in the most totalizing forms of  
collectivity, Fallada’s narrative insists, there lie the small traces of  a different world to come. This 
chapter, then, seeks to uncover this faith — present even (or perhaps especially) in the ruins of  
Germany in 1946 — in the possibility of  poetic representation of  the world as a dynamic whole. 
  
 
10 There is some irony in the fact that the pointillistic entries in the Gestapo files may have served Becher and 
his nationalist needs better than the messier and ambivalent fabric-structure of the novel. 
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II. Widerstand: Moral or Political Dissidence? 
 
1. Domesticity Disrupted 
At that moment she grasped that this very first sentence was Otto’s absolute 
and irrevocable declaration of war […] war between, on the one side, the two 
of them, poor, small, insignificant workers who could be extinguished for just 
a word or two, and on the other, the Führer, the Party, the whole apparatus in 
all its power and glory, with three-fourths or even four-fifths of the German 
people behind it. And the two of them in this little room in Jablonski Strasse! 
[…]  
On the outside, nothing has changed. All is quiet around the Quangels. But 
inside, everything is different, they are at war…11 
 
Otto and Anna Quangel are, as always, sitting at home alone in near silence. The Second World 
War is raging at full pitch to the east and the west; lives are being taken every day in the military conflict 
where the old divisions of  nationality determine who one has to fear and under what banner one will 
find one’s untimely death. But this is not the war that has been kindled in the small German home of  
the Quangels. Theirs, we are told, cannot be detected on the “outside”: far from joining the fray — 
on either side — they have changed internally, becoming all the more isolated, all the more alone. If  
this scene, at the end of  the first section of  Fallada’s Jeder stirbt für sich allein, is a pivotal moment at 
which its protagonists, the Quangels, claim a thread of  agency in the increasingly self-destructive 
political fabric of  Nazi Germany, we must ask what kind of  agency this couple can be said to have. 
 
11 Hans Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, trans. Michael Hofmann (1947; repr., New York: Melville House, 2009), 
133; Fallada, Jeder Stirbt Für Sich Allein, 183–84. Future citations will reference both the English and the German 
pagination, e.g. “Every Man Dies Alone, 133/183-84.” 
All quotations are based on Michael Hofmann’s 2009 translation, which is the only English translation. Because 
of the stilted style of this translation and, more importantly, because it is based on an older edition of the 
German text (see footnote above), there are a number of omissions and misleading word choices that I will 
amend in the quotations and, for reasons of fluidity and practicality, will not explicitly mark unless they have 
particular significance. All errors are, thus, my own.  
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The Quangels might seem (and certainly took themselves to be) too powerless, too small, too atomistic 
to be a force adequate to the behemoth of  Nazism: can one even speak of  political action at the level 
of  the individual, let alone under the hegemony of  totalitarianism? More specifically, what kind of  
action (and adversary) does an “interior war” entail? What are the consequences of  a domestic conflict 
of  this kind? 
Whatever interiority marks this new unrest of theirs is not simply psychological but already, in 
its first glimmer, avowedly political: their war is against their own leader, against the ruling party of 
their state, against “three-fourths, even four-fifths of the German people.” Indeed, the power and 
terror of fascism is such that their war against the “Führer” cannot be contained to any fraction of the 
population but is necessarily a war against every German, regardless of social standing or party 
affiliation.12 In this sense, however, they are themselves among those against whom they must fight: 
their war is not directed against a clearly defined external entity, but against their own implication in 
“the whole apparatus in all its power and glory.” It is a war sparked by their own self-reckoning, 
recognizing their participation in a “whole” whose face they no longer recognize.  
But is this really a “war”? If war is a relation between two entities at their most acutely 
differentiated, a battle of colliding factions meeting at their boundaries, of purported good and evil, 
 
12 It is imperative not to conflate — as totalizing regimes always work to — partisanship and political 
entanglement as such. The delimitation of parties within the political sphere attempts to organize and 
institutionalize this pervasive entanglement by ideological likeness. Of course, once one party is able to edge 
out all the others, it would seem that there is, de facto, no space in which political action could form itself aside 
from within that particular partisan institution. As this novel suggests in painful detail, much of the power of 
the Nazi party came with the successful closure of a gap between party and political life as such. The true 
damage of this, however, is not the hegemony of a single party, but the marginalization of politics as such, 
carried out by the artificial homogeneity and unity of the party. One party rule is but a symptom of the deeper 
notion that the Nazi party was not only coextensive with German political life, but that the party was not 
actually to be understood politically at all, but nationally, ethnically, and charismatically. Nazism loomed as a 
form of political organization predicated on invented identity (with Hitler, first and foremost, and with other 
Nazis by way of one’s shared Führer) and not on the negotiation of difference, difficulty, and collective self-
determination. It was a form of politics that sought to suppress its rocky and heterogeneous political reality 
under the stable and homogenous veil of a partisan fiction. If Fallada’s novel is to be political at all, it must, I 
will argue, figure the relations of everyday life as constitutive of a collective founded on difference, not identity. 
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then the Quangels are encountering something much messier, much more personal, and, by the same 
token, entirely political. To put it another way, war is definitionally not political; it is the relation 
between entities at their barest self-identity, coming into conflict without any medium through which 
to negotiate and recognize their co-existence. War is, to put it simply, the rejection of human 
universality, putting tribalistic identity over the collectivity of humanity; it is the kind of relation that 
remains when we try to circumvent our inescapable political relations because they are inconvenient, 
difficult, or condemning — more on this below.13 One indication that the Quangels’ struggle is not 
straightforwardly bellicose, or even clearly oppositional, is that they are not, demographically speaking, 
obvious victims of Nazi ideology, nor members of an organized insurgency: they are “ordinary” 
working class Germans who voted for Hitler in 1933 and who are coming to recognize the gruesome 
apparatus in which they are complicit participants. For them to call this recognition “war” is, then, 
already a retreat from their own place within Nazism, an attempt to preserve their own purity; it is a 
self-protective simplification and reification of themselves and their Führer into the collision of self-
contained and fully distinct entities.14 
* 
This becomes all the clearer if we take a step back to ask how two “poor, small, insignificant” 
workers who voted for the NSDAP in 1933 find themselves declaring war with Hitler, with his party, 
with the Germans, and with, in some sense, themselves. How do the Quangels, who “kept to 
 
13 Needless to say, this notion of politics has little to do with the liberal notion of the mechanisms of contractual 
representation characteristic of the modern state. “Politics” as I use it here and throughout this chapter refers 
simply to the navigation and negotiation of plurality within the medium of an already extent unified collective. 
I will work out exactly what this entails and is differentiated from in greater detail below in discussing Hannah 
Arendt, to whom this approach is largely indebted. 
14 To be clear, that they voted for Hitler and are not demographically explicitly “outside” of Nazism makes the 
matter (both for them and for us as readers) much starker, but it will remain an open question to what degree 
anyone can, in a deep sense, said to have been totally disentangled from the political fabric of Nazi Germany 
without robbing them of their political agency as such. See the discussion below on Hannah Arendt and the 
conditions (and costs) of standing outside of a polity. 
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themselves” and only left the privacy of their home for work and other purposeful business, find 
themselves caught up in a political conflict that injects tension into their relation with everyone around 
them (indeed, as I will suggest, their relation to their city as a whole)? 
It begins, as does the novel itself, one week earlier with a letter they receive from the military 
informing them of their son’s death on the western front. This routine administrative announcement 
is presumably expected to be unproblematically assimilated into the narrative of sacrifice that the 
devotion of a family to the Fatherland requires, solidifying, if anything, a family’s sense of allegiance 
to their nation. The honor of dying for one’s nation, pro patria mori, is predicated on the identification of 
nation and family, as the patria of the fatherland makes clear enough: the honor hinges on one’s tribal 
identification with one’s nation via sacrifice.15 Instead, the letter the Quangels receive undermines the 
neat barrier they had tried to erect between the cultivated calm of their home and the turbulence of 
the world outside, forcing them to reckon with their complicity in their son’s death and the world as 
a whole. This escalates rather quickly: moments after Anna has read the letter with the news, Otto 
reaches to see the letter for himself, setting off a moment of confrontation perhaps neither had 
expected. Anna grabs the letter from him and 
furiously she rips the letter into scraps and shreds and fragments and she 
shouts into his face: “What do you even want to read that filth for, those 
common lies they always write? That he died a hero’s death for Führer and 
Fatherland? That he was an exemplary soldier and comrade? Do you want to 
hear that from them, when you know yourself that Ottochen liked nothing 
better than fiddling about with his radio kits, and that he cried when he was 
called away to be a soldier? How often he used to say to me when he was 
recruited that he would give his right hand to be able to get away from them? 
And now he’s supposed to be an exemplary soldier, and died a hero’s death? 
 
15 This goes both ways: some fathers in the novel begin to relate to their children as dispensable bodies to be 
fed, put to work, and sacrificed if need be. Soon after receiving the news of their son’s death, Otto bumps into 
a neighbor of his, Emil Barkhausen, who has already heard about his son. Barkhausen congratulates him on his 
loss: “As a father, you should be proud of such a sacrifice! […] If [my kids] all died at once in a bomb blast or 
something, I’d be proud of them.” (Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 21-22/25.) Clearly, Barkhausen is as little 
concerned about his kids as are the army generals. 
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Lies, all a pack of lies! But that’s what you get from your wretched war, you 
and your Führer!”16 
It is this “du und dein Führer” that initially puts Otto on the defensive, but soon dissolves the 
rigidity of the domestic wall he had erected between himself and Nazism, forcing him to somehow 
prove Anna’s identification wrong. His anger towards Anna reflects his own dawning recognition, not 
only that despite his silence and seclusion he had always been a political actor, but, even more 
disturbingly, that that agency was messy and made it difficult to separate himself from “his Führer” 
and his war. This charge, as much as his son’s death, haunts Otto for the week that he and his wife 
spend in almost complete silence and internal tumult, facing its partial truth over and over before 
resolving to respond to his own (problematic) agency by taking (corrective) action. It is during this 
week that the grief of losing his son, refracted through Anna’s comment,17 transforms itself into a 
political reckoning with his own entangled complicity. Not only do Otto and Anna refuse to see in 
the loss of their son a heroic moment in which their pride in, and allegiance to, their “Fatherland” is 
manifest, they are also unable to receive his murder as would pure victims who stand outside the 
perpetrating apparatus. It is their war, their Führer, their murder. 
 
 
16 Fallada, 12-13/14-15. 
17 His loss and his reckoning are not really separable: 
He was preoccupied by two thoughts, each in turn shoving the other aside: that he no longer had a son, and 
that Anna had said ‘You and your Führer.’ Quangel admitted to himself that he never loved the boy the way a 
father is supposed to love his son. From the time Ottochen was born, he had never seen anything in him but a 
nuisance and a distraction in his relationship with Anna. If he felt grief now, it was because he was thinking 
worriedly about Anna, how she would take the loss, what would now change between them. Anna had already 
said it: ‘You and your Führer!’ 
It wasn’t true. Hitler was not his Führer, or no more his Führer than Anna’s. (Fallada, 20/22.) 
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2. The Quangels Act 
But is their situation really so fraught; are their actions so hard to understand? The Quangels, 
at least, seem to understand and justify their own plans rather quickly. Anna, upon hearing Otto’s 
plans to write dissident postcards and secretly distribute them across the city, is at first disappointed 
by his proposal to wage a “dangerless war from the dark.” But Otto assures her that no matter how 
trivial their actions, “‘if they get wind of it, it’ll cost us our lives.’” She imagines them, caught, at the 
guillotine, but the danger does not deter her. Instead, the great peril of their small actions convinces 
her that Otto's plan may have some sense after all: “Otto might be right: whether their act was big or 
small, no one could risk more than their life. Each according to their strength and abilities, but the 
main thing was, one resisted.”18 As they imagine their dissidence, they grow increasingly excited by 
their newfound power, imagining the flood of postcards with which they and their followers would 
inundate Berlin: “we will slow the machines, we will depose the Führer, end the war…” Intoxicated 
by this fantasy, they are even proud: “What were they just now? Unknown entities; they had swarmed 
along with the big, dark swarm. And now they are totally alone, separate, elevated above the others, 
not to be mistaken for anyone else. They are so alone that it is ice cold around them.”19 Standing up 
and against the crowd, they are alone but empowered, powered not by their complicity, their place or 
role in Nazi Berlin, or by anything particular to them, but by the power everyone is born with and has 
equally: the power to sacrifice themselves. They are special only in their choice to wield this power, 
marked by their courage. They have gathered themselves behind the moral image of resistance.  
This is not just a flutter of fantasy on the part of the Quangels. As the back cover of the 
Aufbau edition announces, Jeder stirbt für sich allein is the story of the “resistance of the little people 
[Widerstand der kleinen Leute].” The English edition is proudly endorsed by Primo Levi with the words: 
 
18 Fallada, 132/182. 
19 Fallada, 135/188. 
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“The greatest book ever written about German resistance to the Nazis.” Fallada is himself rather direct 
about this when, in a brief foreward, he explains the prevalence of death and suffering in the novel by 
pointing out that it deals almost exclusively with people who “fought against the Hitler-regime,”20 
while he could just as well have explained the unfortunate endings met by the novel’s protagonists by 
noting their proximity to institutions and members of the Nazi party. 
Nor can this simply be chalked up to the editorial influence of Becher and the Kulturbund: 
already in an essay Fallada wrote in the months before writing the novel (which he did in a frenzied 
four weeks), he expresses the same excitement over the courageous resistance of the little Quangels 
against the impossibly imposing machinery of the state: 
This couple Quangel, two meaningless individuals [Einselwesen] in north Berlin, 
almost poor, without help, without any particular abilities, without 
attachments, take up the fight one day in 1940 against the tremendous 
[ungeheure] machinery of the Nazi state, and the grotesque occurs: the elephant 
is threatened by the mouse! […] 
Against this man in the dark, the entire tremendous apparatus of the Hitlerish 
state machinery was powerless.21 
In a rather programmatic ending to this essay, Fallada declares: “Their protest echoed unheard, they 
sacrificed their lives, seemingly for nothing, to a hopeless fight. But perhaps not entirely hopeless? 
Perhaps not entirely for nothing after all? […] I, the author of a yet to be written novel, hope that 
their fight, their suffering, their death was not entirely for nothing.”22 If the task of the novel is indeed 
to vindicate the lives of the Quangels, to show that their fight was not entirely meaningless, how would 
the idea of resistance furnish an answer? 
 
20 Fallada, my translation*/5. 
*Fallada’s opening note is not included in Hofmann’s translation. 
21 Hans Fallada, “Über den doch vorhandenen Widerstand der Deutschen gegen den Hitlerterror,” Aufbau 
Verlag 1, no. 3 (November 1945): 211–13, all translations are mine. 
22 Fallada, 218. 
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In a reading of the novel that takes up precisely this question, Berndt Springer suggests that, 
at its core, the novel investigates the “meaning of morally right yet futile acts.”23 It is, therefore, in 
response to this quandary that Springer sees the novel’s particular “literary truth” above and beyond 
the historical content of the Gestapo files on the Hampels: it establishes, he suggests, a portrait of the 
full breadth of the population of Berlin who were not necessarily involved in the arrest of the couple, 
but whose “denunciations and fear assured that their attempt to resist [Widerstandsversuch] ended 
completely unsuccessfully. […] To tell this story comes as an answer to the question of why this 
attempt to resist not only failed, but had to fail.”24 The novel’s literary truth lies, in Springer’s reading, 
less in the specifics of the Quangels’ story than in the broad social portrait of the political landscape 
crippled by fear and mistrust and which was structurally inhospitable to dissent. 
And yet, in addition to this “Milieustudie” that takes the novel’s characters in their collectivity 
(“Gesamtheit”), Springer insists that the novel also offers a truth in which the figures are considered in 
their “singularity.” Not only does it offer both, but it stages the “dialectic of rulers and ruled” by 
specifying and humanizing the types of actors ("Menschentypen") that are generally stereotypically flat 
and anonymous in their full “freedom to choose.”25 Set against the political milieu of fear, Springer 
sees the characters posing a particularly admirable psychological determination to act: “those who 
want to resist must overcome their fear. Moral conduct thereby becomes a question of courage.”26 In 
setting these two modes of agency against one another — the mass of people who collectively 
constitute a political whole that suffocates individual action, and the individuated characters who are 
 
23 Bernd F. W. Springer, “Ist Widerstand gegen eine Diktatur eine moralische Pflicht? Über-Leben und Sterben 
in Hans Falladas Roman: Jeder stirbt für sich allein,” Revista de Filología Alemana 20 (2012): 85, all translations 
are mine. 
24 Springer, 89. 
25 Springer, 89. 
26 Springer, 94. 
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able to wrest agency for themselves despite this — Springer reduces the novel’s truth of collectively 
constituted structural disempowerment (a quintessentially political problem) into a morality tale in 
which certain characters somehow free themselves from this milieu and courageously will themselves 
into the right, however ineffectively. Springer is left to conclude that the Quangels’ actions are 
meaningful simply in their exemplarity (“Vorbildfunktion”): “that there is something in a person that 
cannot be broken or corrupted, an unshakable good seed that withstands all seduction and 
intimidation, threat and violence. Which can withstand. At least in some few people who bear the cross 
in the name of all others.”27 The hopelessness of transforming their situation, in other words, 
underscores their courage, and their moral courage marks their total detachment from the collective 
reproduction of political life in Nazi Berlin. 
By celebrating the moralistic hope planted in the “good seed,” Springer not only reads the 
novel more or less exactly as Becher had planned,28 but psychologizes the very political milieu he had 
gestured toward, undermining any dialectic between the weak and the powerful outside the theater of 
retrospective judgement. Detached courage does nothing to better understand the rise, appeal, 
maintenance, complexity, and, most importantly, the internal heterogeneity of the political fabric of 
National Socialism. The material reproduction of Nazism isn’t a simple story of the domination of 
rulers over the ruled (categories that do nothing to explain their own creation), but of the dialectic 
between the collective milieu and each character in their singularity. If the novel fixes these aspects of 
individuality and collectivity into demographic labels, the milieu must remain the static backdrop, 
 
27 Springer, 99–100. 
28 Springer even suggests that Becher intentionally withheld the last Gestapo file (in which the Hampels are 
documented to have informed on one another in an attempt to save themselves) in order to allow Fallada to 
write a novel in which the Quangels remain morally upright and cogent. He goes so far as to say that the novel 
would have been unthinkable without its morally hopefully ending, one which Fallada must have preserved, 
even if knowingly against the historical facts, out of a “commitment to popular education” [“volkspädagogisches 
Engagement”]. (Springer, 101.) 
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separated from any particular character and destined to remain fixed until the end of the story. It is 
no surprise, then, that Springer assumes that the Quangels’ acts are doomed to be “unsuccessful” 
from the outset, precisely the assumption that Fallada postulated his novel would put into question. 
 
3. Alltagsgeschichte and Resistenz 
If their struggle is not a war, if their resistance is to go deeper than moral objection to Hitler 
and the other “rulers,” how are we to speak of the Quangels’ new commitment to dissident action? 
As Springer’s analysis makes abundantly clear, and as Fallada himself seemed to at least partially 
recognize, psychologizing their potency would both blunt any effectivity their struggle may have had 
and preclude their reckoning with their own complicity. If the novel painted the political landscape of 
Nazi Germany in the black and white binaries supporter/resistor, Nazi/anti-Nazi, fearful/courageous, 
ruler/ruled, replicating the neat opposition of warring states domestically, there would simply be no 
room for anyone like the Quangels to play a political role. They would be relegated to impotent, even 
if courageous, specks pulled along by the anonymous political current, domestic creatures with no 
public footprint, characters whose only choices lie in their private moral salvation or condemnation. 
Without any dialectical reciprocity between the political collectivity and its specific characters, the 
novel would be condemned to promote a propagandistic story of passive characters living out their 
lives against a backdrop of unchangeable totality. It would, in other words, carry over the alienation 
of political representation under Nazism into an inability to poetically represent the reproduction of 
Nazism in the everyday life of ordinary people (I will return to this below). At the heart of this 
predicament, then, is how the novel narratively re-constitutes a political milieu so thoroughly obscured 
by its own form; how can the novel revive the continued representational dialectic between the “little 
man” of everyday life and the iron grip of Nazi social order when the possibility of the latter is 
predicated on obfuscating its constitution by the former? 
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Drawing Nazism back into the poetic web of narratability is inseparable from the matter of 
folding Nazism back into the fabric of history. If the Quangels are reduced to merely symbolic figures 
of moral character, so, too, is Nazism explained away as an aberration of evil unconnected to the 
forms of collectivity before, around, and after (not to mention within) it. After the war, the question 
of how to represent National Socialism posed a real problem for historians, politicians, and virtually 
every German. This problem was, from the start, split by Germany’s own division into the liberal West 
and socialist East. While East German historians sought to develop a structural understanding of 
Nazism as an outgrowth of corporate interests, those in the West were much more likely to personify 
the regime in its most visible leaders.29 The former dismissed the totalitarian hierarchy of the regime 
as the marionette of capitalist forces, obscuring the mechanisms by which Nazi leadership did, in fact, 
attain an astonishing monopoly on power through the cultivation charismatic rule. This strictly 
structuralist approach, in other words, hid the means by which these ordinary men cultivated their 
own autocratic status and gained widespread popularity and support, leaving the very totalization of 
the Third Reich as a political entity of representation (however alienated) largely unexplored. The latter, 
on the other hand, tended to make sense of Nazism metonymically, mapping the burden of 
understanding an entire logic of collectivity onto a few individuals. In this approach, however, these 
“figures” tended to obscure their own figuration; Nazism was reduced and contained to the deranged 
psyches of certain party leaders (or some fervent base), replacing a complex historical and political 
phenomenon with a neat psychological one. By assuming the very personification of politics in the 
actions of a select few, this mode of representation simply reinforced the legitimacy of their charisma 
 
29 This is, of course, a great simplification. Though this was largely true in the years immediately after the war, 
the historiography became much more nuanced as it grew more distanced and the immediate need to explain 
it away faded. For an excellent overview of these debates over the personification of Nazism, particularly in 
Hitler himself, see Gerhard Schreiber, Hitler Interpretationen: 1923-1983 (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1984); as well as Ian Kershaw, Hitler (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2000), particularly the introduction. 
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instead of explaining its careful political construction. Neither approach, we might say, was able to tell 
the story of Nazism within the greater geography and history of human life. 
This chapter seeks to bring these strategies of figuration back into view and ask whether there 
are representational figures that maintain a dynamic view of the dialectical relation between individual 
and collective, the “little man” and the Führer, neither questioning their political monopolization nor 
naturalizing it. In such a representational mode, Nazism begins to seem a much more slippery, diffuse, 
and, most alarmingly, ordinary phenomenon, with deep, wide, and often hidden roots across the globe 
and continuing in new guises to the present moment. Though it is surely more troublesome and 
laborious, this gesture of placing Nazism back into the fabric of history also enables us to actually 
understand it for the first time (and to think strategically about how to work against such political 
Gesamtheits in the future). 
It took some thirty years after the war had ended for historians of the Third Reich to begin to 
seriously discuss the “historicization” of Nazism and its reintegration into the plane of "ordinary" 
history. Brought into the academic mainstream by an essay by historian Martin Broszat,30 this turn 
toward the methodological “normalization” of National Socialism followed a more general trend in 
German historiography toward what was termed Alltagsgeschichte, an approach to historical phenomena 
that insisted on a bottom-up attention to the institutions and material conditions of the commoner in 
his or her everyday life, an assertion of the “interdependence of society and politics.”31 Broszat 
explained the virtue of Alltagsgeschichte for an understanding of Nazism as follows: 
[Alltagsgeschichte] may also help to pave the way to a historiography of this era, 
which uses the national-socialistic subjects of these events not only as 
 
30 Martin Broszat, “Plädoyer für eine Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus,” Merkur 39, no. 5 (May 1, 1985): 
373–85. 
31 Martin Broszat, “Alltagsgeschichte der NS-Zeit,” in Alltagsgeschichte der NS-Zeit: neue Perspektive oder 
Trivialisierung? (Oldenbourg R. Verlag GmbH, 1984), 11–20; reprinted in Martin Broszat, Nach Hitler: der 
schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte : Beiträge von Martin Broszat (R. Oldenbourg, 1986). Citation from Broszat, 
136, all translations are mine. 
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monstrous figures and caricatures, but as understandable people. Without such 
premises, which have nothing to do with apology, it will be hardly possible to 
overcome the problematic “islandization” [“Verinselung”] of the Nazi era in our 
historical consciousness and to transform the increasingly unconvincing 
judgement of this past on solely moral grounds into historical hermeneutics.32 
Broszat’s assessment reads like an ecologists plea to understand organisms in terms of the material 
conditions and transformations of their habitats. The way we tell the story of figures both powerful 
and weak must remain animated by how we construe the collectivity within which their actions 
unfolded. Broszat was suggesting something as obvious as it was radical: one could configure Nazism 
with the same tools and materials as any other moment in history. 
This project of “overcoming” the moralized evaluation of the past through a careful and slow 
approach to the texture of everyday life is perhaps most clearly exemplified in Broszat’s monumental 
six-volume work, Bayern in der NS-Zeit,33 whose subtitle, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt (roughly, 
Domination and Society in Conflict) already points to this shift in focus from the homogenous forces of 
the “monstrous” high-level sovereigns to the more heterogenous and ambiguous activity of “society.” 
In this sense, the work may sound like a study of various forms of resistance meant to show that 
Nazism never had the full grip on those people that the Nazis’ own claim of Volksgemeinschaft claimed 
it did. The eponymous “conflict,” however, is not simply between one group, the “Herrschaft,” and 
another, “Gesellschaft” (ruler and ruled, as Springer suggested), since the very idea of the latter already 
subsumes the former and begins to undermine its monolithic hegemony. Instead, the material conflict 
between the multitude of historical actors reappears as a conflict between different notions of 
collectivity: totalitarian dominion and pluralistic sociality. As Broszat explained: 
Of additional concern was that the tendency to identify resistance [Widerstand] 
with martyrdom often corresponded to a false image of the Third Reich as a 
monolithic system of total power and domination, the image of totalitarianism, 
 
32 Broszat, “Alltagsgeschichte der NS-Zeit,” 139. 
33 Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich, and Anton Grossmann, eds., Bayern in der NS-Zeit., 6 vols. (Munich: 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1977–1983). 
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against which opposition was only possible by sacrificing and risking 
everything. Totalitarianism and martyrdom, in opposition [Widerstand] to each 
other, often represent the two main pillars of a historical image of this time 
that has hardly any basis in the experience [Erlebniswelt] of the younger 
generation anymore. Instead of facilitating a comprehensible, thoughtful 
acquisition of knowledge through history, this image instead promotes the 
naive strictness of a moralizing view of history and possibly, also, its uncritical 
projection onto the present.34 
Heroizing resistance by celebrating martyrdom and consolidating domination through its totalization 
function as two sides of the same moralizing coin that necessarily caricatures both, placing them 
beyond understanding and ensuring that their conflict doesn’t risk any cross-contamination: they stand 
against one another in opposition (im Widerstand). 
Attending to the fabric of everyday relations, on the other hand, undermines these dual myths 
of hegemonic totalitarianism and morally pure resistance, replacing them with “zones of conflict” 
(which Broszat loosely collects together as “society,” and which I am (anticipating the Arendtian 
analysis of political alienation that I explore below) describing as the heterogeneous fabric of political 
relationality). 
To signal this shift, Broszat recommended replacing the term Widerstand with Resistenz, the 
immunological and electromagnetic resonances of which invoke the slow diminishment or 
amplification of forces through the accumulation and coordination of small buffers, clogs, and 
reactions against the prevailing forces and tendencies within that system. While Widerstand is individual, 
isolatable, external, and morally grounded, Resistenz names collective, entangled, internal, and political 
acts. David stands against Goliath; members of a political community square off through the 
competing tendencies of collective reproduction in which they participate. Resistenz traces the power 
and the mutual reinforcement of acts of non-conformity as the paradigm for effective dissidence, 
 
34 Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich, and Anton Grossmann, eds., Bayern in der NS-Zeit. Band IV: Herrschaft und 
Gesellschaft im Konflikt: Teil C (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981), 693. 
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focusing on the power to preserve potent plurality and the health of the relations that function 
between those heterogenous actors who refuse to be silenced.35 
This demythologization of both the Nazi state and its resistance was, naturally, received by 
many historians of the time as a dangerous step in the direction of explaining away the horrors of the 
Nazi era and a symptom of a collective forgetting and banalization of the regime and its crimes, 
particularly its genocidal dimension.36 Of particular concern was the way that Broszat’s plea for 
historicization was coopted and used as cover by the right-wing historians Ernst Nolte and Andreas 
Hillgruber in the infamous Historikerstreit a few years later for precisely the kind of apology and 
exculpation Broszat had explicitly warned against in the passage above.37 Far from leading to 
normalization or exculpation, a historical understanding of Nazism as a social structure reproduced 
and consolidated (and therefore also challenged) by figures from every corner of the Gesellschaft allowed 
Nazism to be condemned as more than the mere expression of an inherent ideological evil; it was, 
therefore, not something to be forgotten in the dustbin of history (which was, largely, the position of 
the right-wing apologists, who thought it high time that the German people leave behind their guilt 
and move on). 
 
35 Broszat, Fröhlich, and Grossmann, 697–98. 
36 The most vocal and powerful critic was Saul Friedländer. See Saul Friedländer, “Some Reflections on the 
Historicization of National Socialism,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch Für Deutsche Geschichte 16 (1987): 310–24. See also his 
exchange with Broszat collected in Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, “Um Die ‘Historisierung Des 
Nationalsozialismus’. Ein Briefwechsel,” Viertelsjahrhefte Für Zeitgeschichte 36 (1988): 339–72. 
Also helpful here are the discussions from a symposium in 1983 held on the topic and published as Martin 
Broszat, Alltagsgeschichte Der NS-Zeit: Neue Perspektive Oder Trivialisierung, Kolloquien Des Instituts Für 
Zeitgeschichte. (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1984). 
37 The central texts of this debate are collected in Rudolf Augstein, Historikerstreit: die Dokumentation der Kontroverse 
um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung (München: R. Piper, 1989). 
For an excellent overview of the debate over Alltagsgeschichte in this context, see Ian Kershaw, The Nazi 
Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. (Bloomsbury, 2015), especially 253-62. 
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In a flare-up of this controversy in the 1990s, as research on the Nazi period began to 
consolidate itself around the Holocaust and the regime as a place of widespread crime, the same fear 
of normalizing Nazi violence as a step toward apology was amplified and set against the concern — 
by then a mainstream position promoted by the likes of Hans Mommsen, Jürgen Habermas, Richard 
J. Evans, and Ian Kershaw — of mythologizing the historical actors as a step toward simplification 
and an abandonment of true understanding.38 Christopher Browning, in his own bottom-up account 
of the “ordinary men” from one particular battalion who killed huge numbers of Jews in Poland, was 
well aware that whenever a history of everyday life “has been applied to the era of the Third Reich,” 
it has been taken as “an evasion – a way to shift attention from the unparalleled horrors of the Nazi 
regime’s genocidal policies to those mundane aspects of life that continued relatively undisturbed.” 
But, echoing the principle of Broszat’s work, he insisted that “it becomes an evasion, an attempt to 
‘normalize’ the Third Reich, only if it fails to confront the degree to which the criminal policies of the 
regime inescapably permeated everyday existence under the Nazis.”39 Browning’s attempt to make 
sense of the forces of history through the complex implications of the millions of “ordinary” and 
heterogenous Germans allows for the emergence of the unwieldy but essential question of the relation 
between the handful of infamous officials with whom Nazism is so often identified and the 70-odd 
million other Germans beside, despite, through, and because of whom, Nazism took the course that 
it did. 
 
38 Two texts came to represent this clash. Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and 
the Final Solution in Poland, and the highly publicized response from Daniel Goldhagen in his Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. Browning’s plea to understand the worst crimes of the war as 
committed by “ordinary men” in a particularly deranged bureaucratic and political context was met with 
Goldhagen’s attempt to paint the eruption of violence as the inevitable result of a long history of German anti-
Semitism and an evil unique to that history. Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 
and the Final Solution in Poland (1992; repr., New York: Harper Collins, 2017); Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Vintage Books, 1996). 
39 Browning, Ordinary Men, xvii. 
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This was precisely Broszat’s question: how to illuminate the zones of conflict within society 
that reflected the dissonance between the notions of Herrschaft and Gesellschaft and that formed the 
grotesque totality that was Nazism. But as the Holocaust became the focus of Nazi scholarship and 
storytelling (Browning himself speaking in the juridical language of “criminality,” built upon the 
individuation of action as opposed to its political entanglement), the pressure to acknowledge the 
singularity and the evil of those years was heightened, and any attempt to understand or explain 
smelled of apology. 
There is an impasse here that cannot be resolved by digging deeper in the archives, but which 
emerges from two fundamentally divergent ways of talking about action: the moral register of 
individuality, in which criminality and its categories of innocence and guilt have the final word, and 
the political register of collectivity, in which everything is understood in terms of its historical and 
social entanglement in the relational acts of others and is rooted in shared responsibility and the 
unevenness of power. If one wishes, together with Broszat and Browning, to understand how Nazism 
was possible — and therefore also the possibility of its return or perdurance in some form — one 
must move beyond the narrow juridical indictment of a handful of high-level officers and turn toward 
its permeation of, and constitution in, everyday existence. To do so, however, is not simply to widen 
the scope of one’s indictment and put every German on trial. Moving beyond the fable of the elephant 
and mouse, and towards an account of Nazism as a configuration of everyday life, requires a concerted 
shift from a moral into a thoroughly political register. Only then can the stories of the “little men” 
come to represent — poetically as much as politically — the greater tides of Gesellschaft. This, I argue, 
is the great achievement of Fallada’s novel. 
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III. The Collective Fabric of Action 
 
1. Arendt: Guilt and Responsibility 
In the wake of Germany’s vast institutional undertaking of slowly purging itself of guilt by 
indicting those citizens in whom Nazism was most clearly and intensely condensed and following the 
Allies' attempts to programmatically "denazify" Germans, we have retrospectively become 
comfortable with the juridico-moral paradigm of guilt that comes with the familiar questions: Did you 
murder civilians?; Did you harbor xenophobic or racist views?; Were you a cooperative and high ranking member of the 
NSDAP?; etc.40 This is a mode of thinking of individual implication in atomistic and moral terms, a 
discourse of rooting out the bad apples who had survived the war and on whose shoulders the great 
collective weight of genocide could be placed.41 
Refusing this moral language is, however, just as little a way of excusing or exculpating those 
who committed crimes as it is a straightforward indictment: it, instead, insists that understanding the 
possibility of a political apparatus in which atrocities are commonplace comes neither with the 
identification of evil intentions and tendencies in the individuals who most obviously represent that 
 
40 For decades, the courts served as the conveniently limited mechanism to bring those tied directly to criminal 
acts to justice, distancing both post-war German polities from their predecessor by implying that anyone not 
found guilty by the courts was innocent. The narrowness of this juridical scope has been slightly expanded since 
2011, when John Demjanjuk was deported from the United States back to Germany and found guilty, at the 
age of 91, of being an “accessory” to the murder of nearly 28,000 Jewish people at the Sobibor concentration 
camp. Since then, German prosecutors have frantically been trying to hold those involved administratively or 
otherwise in the Nazi genocide accountable. There is a dark comedy in the deep dissatisfaction that comes with 
handing down decades-long prison sentences on frail old men and women, some of whom have seemed less 
than aware of the proceeding or even died while awaiting trial. If nothing else, it indicates the total inadequacy 
of isolated cases of guilt to account for crimes of collectivity; whether they were a scapegoat or a brutal SS 
officer, one can hardly bring justice — let alone understanding — to the murder of thousands (as many of these 
recent cases have done) with the imprisonment of a few individuals. 
41 The elaborate typologies of culpability defined by the Allies are one trace of this. See, for example, the attempt 
to define “war criminals” and the rigid categories into which everyone had to be placeable for this to be possible: 
for example, Allied Control Council, “Directive No. 38: The Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis, 
and Militarists and the Internment, Control, and Surveillance of Potentially Dangerous Germans.” 
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system, nor in the notion that anyone acting within such a system is a mere cog in a suffocating 
hierarchy. Evil actions are explained neither by evil actors nor by non-actors. Indeed, to speak in the 
moral register of “evil” (and therefore of guilt) is to give up on explanation entirely, either by 
psychologistically rediscovering the evil in an individuated agent or by appealing to a structure in which 
evil is fully dissolved into faceless functioning. We either displace the enigma of an evil action onto 
that of an evil intention or we do away with the notion of action entirely.42 Thus, the kind of agential 
implication emergent from the “everyday stories” of society cannot be that of guilt (moral and 
individual), but must be that of responsibility (political and collective). 
If the predicament of the Quangels — the quintessential “ordinary” or “little” people about 
whom Fallada wrote so incessantly — is to guide us toward a dialectical understanding of Nazism 
suspended between hegemony and social struggle, the novel’s success hinges on sharply distinguishing 
these two modes of conceiving of action, particularly in their dissidence. The possibility of pure 
resistance (Widerstand) must be representationally challenged by other forms of effective dissidence 
that draw upon the (uneven) distribution of responsibility and power across social life instead of 
fleeing to an imagined moral neutrality. Though the novel draws (and muddies) this distinction in its 
own way, it does not do so particularly explicitly or programmatically. To see how and why the novel 
 
42 This was the crux of a debate in the late 1970s among historians, which foreshadowed the criticism Broszat 
and others faced several years later (though it was, in many ways, overcome by the latter’s synthesis of the rather 
dogmatic sides of this debate). The sides coalesced under the terms “functionalist” and “intentionalist,” analytic 
approaches to the Third Reich, which, one the one hand, took the structure of German bureaucracy to be the 
true locus of power and responsibility, and, on the other, pointed to the expressed intentions of Hitler and 
other avowed Nazis as the real actors. The debate, which came to a head at The Cumberland Lodge Conference 
of 1979, had historians of the left accusing those who stressed the pre-meditation and hierarchical coordination 
of the Holocaust — by focusing on Hitler’s early speeches and the pervasiveness of anti-Semitic and 
xenophobic ideology — of ignoring the institutional structures that so much as made those ideologies possible, 
and historians of the right accusing the structuralist analyses of normalizing or even apologizing for the 
Holocaust. For a clear account of this debate, see Timothy W. Mason, “Intention and Explanation: A Current 
Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism,” in Der Führerstaat: Mythos Und Realität, ed. Gerhard 
Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 21–40. See also Kershaw, The Nazi 
Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. 
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weaves them together and splits them apart, I will first clarify a distinction that I have let circulate 
somewhat freely up to this point: that between the political and the moral. Differentiating between 
the two, I will argue, is key not simply for a more thorough and nuanced calculus of justice, but to 
understand how Fallada was able to narratively represent Nazism through the banalities of the “little 
man’s” everyday life. How, in others words, Fallada was able to make the novelistic form adequate to 
the seemingly incomprehensible and extraordinary. Only by insisting on the narratability of those dark 
times, only by recovering the representational mechanisms mediating individual life and the form of 
collectivity, could Fallada discover hope in the apparent failure of an insignificant couple. 
* 
As I mentioned at the outset, I borrow this notion of “the political realm” as distinct from the 
morality of domestic rather directly from Hannah Arendt.43 Because her differentiation is primarily 
one between spheres of action, it is no coincidence that she must also draw a hard line between guilt 
and responsibility. It is to this latter distinction that I will turn first. 
Though she first formulated the difference programmatically in a well-known essay from 1945, 
“Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,”44 it is in a short piece from 1968 that she pinpoints 
the true kernel of the distinction.45 In this later essay, Arendt questions the adequacy of a phenomenon 
 
43 Arendt may, on the face of it, seem an odd figure to turn to here. She was, after all, the theoretical champion 
of the “totalitarian” interpretation of Nazism, one of the primary targets of Broszat’s critique. As I will argue, 
however, Arendt offers (though herself often collapses) a crucial distinction between, on the one hand, the 
structural “web” of collective totality and the atomistic domestic spheres of individuated tribalism, and, on the 
other, the historical disfiguration of collectivity into a totalizing (or totalitarian) totality and its democratic 
counterparts (which are, nevertheless, universal). Her diagnosis of Nazism as a totalitarian totality was precisely 
not to dismiss its functioning as mere “Herrschaft” but to understand it as a particular self-alienation of the 
fragile project of universal freedom. 
Arendt, as I will show, is also a crucial philosophical figure here due to her inheritance and inversion of 
Heidegger’s nascent collectivity, discussed in the first chapter. More on both of these points below. 
44 Hannah Arendt, “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: 
Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (1945; repr., New York: Schocken, 1994), 121–32. 
45 She presented this at a symposium of the American Philosophical Association in response to a paper by Joel 
Feinberg of the same title. It is available in an edited volume from about twenty years later: Hannah Arendt, 
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that Allied propaganda had weaseled into the public imagination and that had come to loom over 
Germany’s inheritance of the Third Reich: Kollektivschuld (collective guilt).46 The British and U.S. 
“reeducation” program to “de-nazify” Germany took many forms, making use of the newly available 
array of mass media to impress on as wide a portion of the population as possible two (contradictory) 
points: first, that they were complicit in the crimes of the regime and that they should feel guilt even 
for those crimes that they may not have been aware of, and second, that they should feel revulsion 
toward and distance themselves from the Nazi party and those very crimes and, instead, accept the 
Allied push toward liberalization. If the fear of apologizing for and forgetting the crimes of the Nazi 
period took Broszat’s approach to be a slippery slope toward collective exoneration, this declaration 
of collective guilt tried to have it both ways, insisting on the permeation of Nazism into the everyday 
lives of the entire population while remaining steadfast that Nazism, however diffuse, was 
unequivocally criminal and evil, an ideology that could simply be punished or purged out of existence.47 
At the crux of Arendt’s critique of Kollektivschuld is precisely her insistence that “guilt” is 
essentially a moral (and therefore individuated) term, whereas “responsibility” is able to capture the 
 
“Collective Responsibility,” in Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt, trans. J.W. 
Bernauer (1968; repr., Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 43–50. 
46 There is, of course, a contradiction internal to the very notion of “collective guilt,” for it universalizes an 
indictment that only works if it is able to distinguish the innocent from the guilty: collective guilt turned out 
not only to be impractical, but essentially unthinkable. (Hence the targeted trials of high-profile figures, see 
note above.) 
47 In a careful analysis of the notion of German guilt that recognized the “flatness” of a general declaration of 
collective guilt, Karl Jaspers tried to differentiate various modalities or levels of guilt. He identified four different 
kinds of implication or complicity conflated in the single term: what he called criminal guilt, political guilt, moral 
guilt, and metaphysical guilt. That he felt the need to divide them up in this way and carefully explain their 
differentiation and inter-dependence is testament to the inadequacy and unintelligibility of universalized and 
flattened guilt. See Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage: ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage (Zürich: Artemis-Verlag, 1947), 
particularly 31-33 and 55-65. 
Arendt, a student and close friend of Jaspers, is — though ostensibly responding to Joel Feinberg in this piece 
— undoubtedly writing with Jaspers’ book in mind, and with it, a rebuttal to the Heideggerian notion of 
existential guilt (see note below). 
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wide array of political entanglements that we are all implicated in but do not ourselves necessarily 
willfully commit:48 
there is such a thing as responsibility for things one has not done; one can be 
held liable for them. But there is no such thing as being or feeling guilty for 
things that happened without oneself actively participating in them. This is an 
important point, worth making loudly and clearly at a moment when so many 
good white liberals confess to guilt feelings with respect to the Negro question. 
I don't know how many precedents there are in history for such misplaced 
feelings, but I do know that in post-War Germany, where similar problems 
arose with respect to what had been done by the Hitler regime to Jews, the cry 
"We are all guilty" that at first hearing sounded so very noble and tempting has 
actually only served to exculpate to a considerable degree those who actually 
were guilty. Where all are guilty, nobody is. Guilt, unlike responsibility, always 
singles out; it is strictly personal. It refers to an act, not to intentions or 
potentialities. It is only in a metaphorical sense that we can say we feel guilty 
for the sins of our fathers or our people or mankind, in short, for deeds we 
have not done, although the course of events may well make us pay for them. 
And since sentiments of guilt, mens rea or bad conscience, the awareness of 
wrong doing, play such an important role in our legal and moral judgement, it 
may be wise to refrain from such metaphorical statements which, when taken 
literally, can only lead into a phony sentimentality in which all real issues are 
obscured.49 
Guilt, in short, cannot be a collective phenomenon, something one shares, inherits, or finds oneself 
implicated in. If this sounds like it actually limits our understanding of a phenomenon to those who 
carried it out most directly, that is because the narrowed notion of guilt clears the ground for an 
expanded notion of responsibility. Where guilt singles out, responsibility is essentially diffuse, public, 
and shared. To be responsible, I must belong to a collectivity “which no voluntary act of mine can 
dissolve.”50 Responsibility is political and not moral, historical and not voluntaristic; my implication in 
 
48 Her critique emerges, in fact, from her own philosophical inheritances and conflicts: in this case, her upending 
of Heidegger’s phenomenology and dialogue with Jaspers. Where Heidegger tried to show that Schuld (guilt) 
was the existential condition for our being vulnerable and incomplete (of which moral/legal guilt and economic 
debt are derivatives), Arendt argues that Verantwortung (responsibility) furnishes the socio-historical ground, our 
collective “thrownness” if we like, in which instances of individuated guilt can then be inscribed. Heidegger’s 
blindness to the priority of the political over the moral, though not treated in his ontology, infects the normative 
dimension of his project rather drastically. See chapter 1 for an extended discussion of this. 
49 Arendt, “Collective Responsibility,” 43. 
50 Arendt, 45. 
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something is definitionally not due to any kind of intention on my part, but, quite the contrary, due to 
my being an essentially political being whose life is conditioned by the actions of those that have come 
before me and that occur alongside me. It is something I am thrown into and must navigate: “In this 
sense, we are always held responsible for the sins of our fathers as we reap the rewards of their merits; 
but we are of course not guilty of their misdeeds, either morally or legally, nor can we ascribe their 
deeds to our own merits.”51 
Where guilt emerges only as a consequence of something one does,52 responsibility is 
something one is saddled with from birth and that — so long as one remains caught up in the web of 
practices, disagreements, dependencies, promises, etc. — one cannot escape. Though, for this very 
reason, the language of being burdened isn’t actually appropriate, for, as Arendt points out, this 
responsibility is nothing other than one’s status as political and one’s capacity to change the shape of 
that shared world through which one always acts. Arendt insinuates, I will argue, that responsibility is not 
opposed to but constitutes the possibility of freedom.53 Consequently, the cost of standing outside of this web 
of responsibility is total disempowerment and, with it, the loss of political personhood. Hence the 
tension inherent to the notion of resistance: to be excluded from a collective in which one could have 
responsibility, Arendt suggests, is to be severed both from its actuality and its possibility of being 
transformed. Without responsibility borne of participation in a collective, one cannot act at all, 
whether in dissent or affirmation.54 Thus, responsibility is not so much a consequence of our 
 
51 Arendt, 45. 
52 I will return, below, to the problematic consequences of holding onto any notion of guilt at all, as Arendt 
clearly tries to here. Because she merely distinguishes the two typologically, not only allowing them to co-exist 
but insisting that they must refer to different kinds of action, her account actually slides back quite close to 
Jaspers’ guilt typology. 
53 Just as freedom, as will become more explicit below, cannot be the liberal freedom from the constraints of 
others but the freedom to act out of those constraints to co-determine them with others. See chapters 1 and 3 
for analogous arguments in other contexts of (recon)figuring collectivity. 
54 The sad exceptions to which Arendt is here referring are the many stateless and fully disempowered people 
produced by the calamities of the twentieth century.* Far from admirable for their inviolable innocence and 
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intentionality, a way of carving up culpability, but is a structural fact of our being caught up in a 
historical and social world. And for this reason, responsibility is the condition for guilt; political 
relationality grounds moral individuation. 
This begins to illuminate the Quangels’ predicament. Arendt’s firm distinction sets off the 
unsettling realization that trying to alter one’s political fabric from an apolitical position, from a moral 
“island,” is not only contradictory — the attempt to take a stance from nowhere — but is an evasion 
of responsibility: with one hand, one tries to disavow one’s place in the very political fabric that, with 
the other, one claims to still be able to effectively resist. A conveniently heroic and irreproachable 
position. When dissidence puts on the moralistic cloak of Widerstand, neatly rending the political fabric 
in order to declare war, it forfeits every mechanism of change that such a fabric has built into it and 
exacerbates the gaps or blockages in that collectivity by severing its threads entirely. Far from 
addressing the political alienation (the totalizing totality) that an individual or part of a community 
may well face, a domestic war takes that alienation for granted and tries to rebuild a new political fabric 
around it.  
Arendt’s distinction between these modalities of action also specifies the figure that has played 
a central role in my reading thus far, but which I have yet to precisely define: the political “fabric.” 
 
 
lack of responsibility, they are, first and foremost, politically powerless. Just as they were robbed of a place in a 
political collective, they were robbed of their responsibility. As Arendt admits, for these extra-political people, 
only morality remains as a framework for action: “the marginal situation in which moral propositions become 
absolutely valid in the realm of politics is impotence. Powerlessness which always presupposes isolation is a 
valid excuse for doing nothing.” (Arendt, “Collective Responsibility,” 49.) 
*Of course, that one can so much as be stateless is a function of citizenship becoming bound to the narrowness 
and dogmatism of the nation-state. Exclusion and impotence in this sense, are built into a notion of the polity 
that has become confused with and stuck in geographic and identitarian boundaries. Responsibility is (like its 
counterpart, freedom), at root, universal. 
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2. The Fabrication of Stories 
Hannah Arendt’s distinction between individual guilt and collective responsibility does not 
simply separate different modalities of  blame or different degrees of  distributing complicity and 
power. The two imply fundamentally different notions of  action, and therefore of  social personhood. 
Because guilt singles out an actor separated from all relationality, it assumes that every act is authored 
by its actor in order to fully explain that act in isolation. Though this individuation is carried out in 
the name of  personalizing action, — putting a face to it by being clear about who “did it” — guilt 
does not actually identify who did it, but what was done: it is the act that is isolated and identified, not 
the person. 
This difference is neatly captured in the narrative difference between Fallada’s story of  the 
Quangels and the Gestapo’s account of  the Hampels. The Gestapo’s extensive file on the Hampels 
itemizes and describes their individual acts, stamping them with time and place to delimit them. The 
file is an excellent list of  what the Hampels did, but says nothing about who they were.55 Fallada’s novel, 
on the other hand, creates a completely different kind of  agential narrative, illuminating the fabric 
within which the Quangels’ actions are comprehensible as opposed to listing them. In doing so, Fallada 
skirts the question of  authorship entirely and thereby opens up the dynamic narrative field between 
characters and the world of  collectivity through which they attain personhood. As Arendt puts it in 
The Human Condition, if  we are to ask who someone is, and not simply what they are, we must understand 
them both as the subject of certain acts and as subject to the world, as “actor and sufferer,” a delicate 
combination for which no list of  characteristics or typological qualities could suffice. Who we are is 
something established only in the “flux” of  our relations to others and, in that sense, only as 
 
55 I have not myself gained access to these files. I rely entirely on Manfred Kuhnke’s excellent forensic 
reconstruction of the lives of the Hampels, their distortion in the Gestapo files, and Fallada’s fictionalization 
of those files: Kuhnke, ... ... dass ihr Tod nicht umsonst war! Updated as Manfred Kuhnke, Falladas letzter Roman: die 
wahre Geschichte (Friedland, Germany: Steffen Verlag, 2011). 
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participants in a social totality. This is never a settled matter, both because of  its temporal and its 
relational extension. Who we are, in short, is political.56  
This claim about political personhood is equally a claim about the structure of  the polity. If  
considered in its whoness, a polity cannot be the mere aggregation of  atomistic actions that happen to 
interpenetrate or impinge upon one another, nor a singular entity determined by a super-structural 
subject (whether society, the collective will, public opinion, or what Arendt simply refers to as 
“mankind”57). Instead, a community is political insofar as it offers a space in which individuals can be 
seen, and thus can act, as differentiated persons. This collectivity (or “public realm” as she often calls 
it) is the space in which we appear to one another as heterogeneous subjects who share a common world; 
persons don’t simply co-habitate, they co-constitute one another. To account for the structure of  such 
a pluralistic collectivity, Arendt offers a striking image: the “web of  human relationships.”58 This 
political web constitutes persons by configuring and holding together “life stories”: 
The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of human 
relationships which exists wherever men live together. The disclosure of the 
"who" through speech, and the setting of a new beginning through action, 
always fall into an already existing web where their immediate consequences 
can be felt. Together they start a new process which eventually emerges as the 
unique life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the life stories of all those 
with whom he comes into contact. It is because of this already existing web of 
human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that 
action almost never achieves its purpose […] Although everybody started his 
life by inserting himself into the human world through action and speech, 
nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. […] Somebody began 
it and is its subject in the twofold sense of the word, namely, its actor and 
sufferer, but nobody is its author.59 
 
56 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 181. 
57 Arendt, 184–85. 
58 Arendt, 183. 
59 Arendt, 184. 
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“Responsibility” names this particular social modality of  agency without authority, the weight of  
continuously navigating one’s entanglement in this narrative web. To be political is, then, to be 
responsible for what one does through one’s responsibility to what one is subjected to. It is to tell any 
story of  activity within the conditions of  reactivity. In place of  the authoritative individual, Arendt 
posits the political person. The pluralism of  this public realm, therefore, is precisely not the liberal 
allowance of  individual idiosyncrasies and preferences in a political container of  sufficient size and 
unobtrusiveness: the “conflicting wills and intentions” of  a polity are not ameliorated or tolerated, but 
can only so much as appear as different and coexistent within such a medium of  interdependency. 
* 
Strangely, Arendt insists on dividing the public realm into two distinct strata. The web is, she 
argues, on the one hand, material: it is “the human artifact” that “gathers us together” and lies between 
us, just “as a table is located between those who sit around it” and which, “like every in-between, 
relates and separates men at the same time.”60 But this material infrastructure, which she generally just 
calls the “world,” is the basis for a distinct immaterial relationality, a “subjective in-between.” It is, she 
contends, only within this immaterial web that actions properly disclose actors (as opposed to mere 
“producers”). In doing so, the relational “stories” of  which she speaks are reduced, at best, to mere 
metaphors: 
it is also because of this medium [the already existing web of human 
relationships], in which action alone is real, that it "produces" stories with or 
without intention as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things. These 
stories may then be recorded in documents and monuments, they may be 
visible in use objects or art works, they may be told and retold and worked into 
all kinds of material. They themselves, in their living reality, are of an altogether 
different nature than these reifications. They tell us more about their subjects, 
the "hero" in the center of each story, than any product of human hands ever 
 
60 Arendt, 52. 
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tells us about the master who produced it, and yet they are not products, 
properly speaking.61 
By prying the material and political apart, Arendt is forced to condemn the perdurance of  stories in 
anything concrete as merely documentary “reification.”62 But how, then, are we to understand the 
temporal and spatial extension of  action? With what is action laden if  not the material instantiations 
carried over from previous actions into the present? And with what substance can action carry political 
ramifications if  not those material and durable? What, in short, makes us essentially vulnerable to one 
another if  not our negotiation of  the world that we collective fabricate? And, conversely, how are we 
to understand the “table” of  artifacts around which we gather if  not as constituted and maintained by 
political action, created by and generative of  the stories of  those whose lives flowed through and 
shaped them? To distinguish the Arendtian possibilities of  relational plurality from her separation of  
them into the “world” of  physical infrastructure and the immaterial “web” of  social infrastructure, I 
 
61 Arendt, 184. 
62 This is the consequence of a general tendency on Arendt’s part to misread Marx and fear the conflation of 
work, labor, and action. This rigid typology creates the same problems for itself as does her firm separation of 
guilt and responsibility. I will discuss this more thoroughly below. 
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will reserve the term “fabric”63 for a medium that does not separate these layers and whose fabrication 
is constitutive of  its political effectivity.64  
Fabrication, understood as both production and action, material and social, cannot simply be 
the apolitical “work of  homo faber” that “consists in reification.”65 It must, instead, be the durable yet 
malleable infrastructure of  social relations, the collective signature of  our continuous manipulation 
of  inherited materials in order to mediate and make possible certain kinds of  political life. The 
courthouse is not simply the material vessel for the law, but a structure, which contains and displays a 
particular history and projects forward a certain set of  possibilities, expectations for others and 
ourselves, and responsibilities we must take; the electrical grid is not simply the material condition for 
energy consumption in urban life, but a way of  distributing possibilities and problems, a built pattern 
with momentum and inertia, the trace and possibility of  who we are and who we can be. Physical 
 
63 Even for Arendt’s own notion of immaterial collectivity, I would suggest that the figure of a woven fabric is 
better than that of a web. A web is the basic schema of all networked theories of social relations* and 
concomitant new materialisms that set themselves the task of bringing seemingly inert nodes of matter to life 
through animating relations or “assemblages.” The web becomes a way of bringing pre-given and contained 
units into relation and separates levels of analysis, separating the very structural and individual perspectives that 
it seeks to relate. A fabric contains no such clean points of intersection, but instead creates patterns out of the 
material of the threads themselves. This also helps to make clear why the Arendtian web cannot simply be a 
social layer of relationality superimposed onto the material world of relationality, but that the two must be 
understood as one and the same, and the web must itself be the material medium of political life. 
(Of course, both metaphors suffer from the same implication of being structured by a pre-determined pattern, 
whether that of nature or a craftsman. It is imperative to continuously demonstrate that this fabric is not pre-
patterned but is continuously woven by the many threads in their ongoing activity of (re)production.) 
* Often problematically traced back to Georg Simmel, particularly his “Die Kreuzung sozialer Kreise,” (Georg 
Simmel, “Die Kreuzung Sozialer Kreise,” in Soziologie: Untersuchungen Über Die Formen Der Vergesellschaftung (1908; 
repr., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013), 318–57.) — tellingly translated as “The Web of Group-Affiliations” 
— and much more fully with the rise of social network analysis in the 1970s and systems theory afterwards. 
More recently, the prevalence of this figure has expressed itself in the introduction and spread of Actor-
Network Theory (see, for example, Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
64 Though she herself lets the term slip at one point when describing the “‘products’ of action and speech” as 
constitutive of “the fabric of human relationships and affairs.” Arendt, The Human Condition, 94–95. 
65 Arendt, 139. 
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infrastructure is social infrastructure. It creates, carries, and shapes our stories just as much as our 
matter.66 
Far from the reification of  a fleeting story, the concerted creation of  stories through art(ifacts) 
— Fallada’s novel, in this case — is then itself  an essentially political act that thematizes the challenge 
of  being an actor and sufferer of  a particular collective world (whether or not the artwork understands 
itself  as such and works with or against this fact). Because Arendt takes this “documentation” to be 
essentially different in kind from the immaterial stories produced by action, she does not dwell with 
the difficulty of  how exactly an artwork could figure (let alone reconfigure) this fabric of  responsibility, 
how narrative might intervene in the process of  creating and recreating the medium of  collective life. 
How, for example, the rise of  fascism (or our continued self-destruction in the face of  ecological crisis, 
as I discuss in chapter 3) could be represented as the alienation of  this fabric; how narrative could not 
only representationally document the clogs, tears, and hidden paths of  a political infrastructure meant 
to obscure its own reproduction, but that its act of  representation might even, poetically, dissidently 
participate in (re)figuring that collective by disclosing its contingency and fabrication, indicating its 
potential to be rebuilt or even fully transformed. 
* 
 
66 For an extended discussion of the figurative power (and ideological threat) of infrastructure, see chapter 3. 
Though infrastructure remains undertheorized in literary, philosophical, and social theoretical discourses, 
interesting work is being done in anthropology that seeks to articulate a medium through which power is both 
asserted and contested, organized and de-centralized. See, for example, Nikhil Anand, “Pressure: The 
Politechnics of Water Supply in Mumbai.,” Cultural Anthropology : Journal of the Society for Cultural Anthropology 26, 
no. 4 (2011): 542–64; Hannah C Appel, “Walls and White Elephants: Oil Extraction, Responsibility, and 
Infrastructural Violence in Equatorial Guinea.,” Ethnography. 13, no. 4 (2012): 439–65; Latour, Reassembling the 
Social. For a fantastic overview of this work see Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure.,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology. 42 (2013): 327–43. 
It is not incidental that these studies turn to infrastructure both as structures of domination and as strategies for 
dissent. 
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Telling the story of  a life and its world from the point of  view of  guilt and innocence is rather 
straightforward: actions have authors, authors are authoritative over their intentions and wills, and so 
all that remains is to ask or interrogate those actors, to fill in the interior life that we assume has a 
direct correspondence to that which they have done (however that is arbitrarily bounded). As I 
suggested above, the Gestapo files collected on Otto and Elise Hampel do precisely this: they 
document the story of  the Hampels’ resistance (and therefore, in the eyes of  the Gestapo, their guilt), 
relying on a collection of  observations by investigators and interrogations of  the Hampels themselves, 
adjudicating their guilt based on this pointillistic narrative. The files tell the factual story of  what the 
Hampels were, based on a particular kind of  view of  what they did.67 
To bring their responsibility into view, however, and to tell the story of  who they were by 
illuminating the political fabric of  relations in which they lived, is a very different task to which a 
criminal investigator and judge are not adequate. It is here that the specific power of  Fallada’s narrative 
emerges. Where some, like Springer, have claimed that the novel paints a portrait of  the “milieu” of  
Berlin, a static backdrop not of  actions but of  pre-given norms and anonymous tendencies, I will 
argue that it attempts to bring the Quangels’ political fabric into view by slowly weaving a multitude 
of  threads together out of  which their life story is only able to congeal retrospectively. In doing so, 
the novel strives (though by no means always successfully) to entirely sidestep the moral question of  
the Quangels’ purity as members of  an innocent resistance, and instead to ask how Nazism was 
configured in everyday life, and how those very same actions might, in fact, have contained the hopeful 
traces of  a very different form of  collectivity.  
In this sense, Fallada’s novel traces, at its best, the difficult and confusing tangle of  relations 
that we call Nazi Germany and the attempt by one tiny knot of  that fabric to take responsibility for 
 
67 For yet another form of narration of their lives, one which exists somewhere between the investigative form 
of the files and the narrative fabric of Fallada’s, see Kuhnke, ... ... dass ihr Tod nicht umsonst war! 
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their implication in it. They do this by trying, however minutely, to change who they are by shifting 
their weight, tugging here, pushing there, adjusting and rearranging the political weave ever so slightly. 
In these moments, the novel charts the difficult and messy project of  living from within that fabric. It 
suggests that, even at its most totalizing, collectivity remains a contingent and fragile configuration of  individuals, forever 
open to being reconfigured and rebuilt, a task for poets as much as for craftsmen or politicians. At its worst, however, 
Fallada’s protagonists (and Fallada himself) hide from this uncomfortable view of  these atrocities, 
obscured by its own proximity and participation. In response, they attempt to run to a moral high 
ground from which to clarify matters, taking an apolitical view from nowhere. The novel constantly 
moves between these modes of  narrative, lapsing into exculpatory language when the attention to 
entanglement simply becomes too much to bear or too messy to represent. Any reading of  the novel, 
then, must track these moments and ask whether behind the points of  acute moralization there lies, 
in fact, a more ambiguous weave of  stories of  the incredibly difficult demands of  political life in early 
1940s Berlin. If  there is a struggle in the novel, then, it is not so much between dictators and martyrs, 
but between competing figurative logics of  its social coherence — a struggle between the closed 
totality of  Herrschaft and the dynamic contestation of  Gesellschaft. 
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IV. Islands of Impotence 
 
1. “Im namen des deutschen Volkes” 
This oscillation between political and moral registers of  action and the temptation of  a 
rhetoric of  resistance goes deeper than the historical context of  the novel’s conception between 
Becher and Fallada. As I suggested above, the structure of  the narrative itself  exhibits a similar 
ambivalence, moving back and forth between the language of  conscience and purity and that of  action 
and complicity, often blurring the line between them. Several pivotal scenes in particular bring this 
ambivalence into view and help to make the narrative and its political stakes clearer. For this, it is worth 
returning to a scene from the first pages of  the novel, shortly after Otto has learned of  his son’s death 
and before he and Anna have developed their plan of  action and declared war. 
Otto sets out to deliver the bad news to Trudel (his son’s soon to be fiancé). What begins as 
an excursion to deliver private news quickly transforms into something much further reaching and 
more precarious for them both. Having found her in a hallway of  the factory at which she works, 
Otto, about to break the news to her, notices a placard hanging directly behind her that reads: “In the 
name of  the German people,” followed by three names, “were sentenced to death by hanging for treason.”68 As 
Otto impulsively pulls her away, she, confused, sees the sign and lets out a sigh — a sigh of  “protest” 
against the sign, but also of  “indifference,” and turns back to their conversation. At that moment, 
however, Otto blurts out the news of  the younger Otto’s death. As Trudel turns to silently weep 
against the wall, she unwittingly places her head directly over the three names written on the sign. At 
that moment, 
a vision appears before him [Otto] of how one day a poster with his own name 
and Anna’s and Trudel’s might be put up on the wall. He shakes his head 
unhappily. He’s a simple worker, he just wants peace and quiet, nothing to do 
 
68 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 31/37-38.  
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with politics, and Anna just attends to the household, and a lovely girl like 
Trudel will surely have found herself a new boyfriend before long.... 
But the vision won’t go away. Our names on the walls, he thinks, completely 
confused now. And why not? Hanging on the gallows is no worse than being 
ripped apart by a shell, or dying from a bullet in the guts. All that doesn’t 
matter. The only thing that matters is this: I must find out what the deal with 
Hitler is [was es mit dem Hitler ist]. First everything seemed to be so good, and 
now suddenly all I see is oppression and hate and suffering, so much suffering 
[...] If so much as one person is suffering unjustly, and I can put an end to it, 
and the only reason I don’t is because I’m a coward and prefer peace and quiet, 
then… 
At this point, he doesn’t dare to think any further. He’s afraid, really afraid, of 
where a thought like that, taken to its conclusion, might lead. He might then 
have to change his whole life!69 
This is the first glimmer of  the domestic war he and Anna will soon declare, and it is already 
fraught with the contradiction of  simultaneous complicity and impotence that is endemic to resistance. 
The vision pulls in both directions, placing Otto on both sides of  the confrontation that the sign 
announces. He sees himself  as both victim and perpetrator: impotent as a victim of  the regime and 
complicit in belonging to “the German people” in whose name that very victimization is legitimized 
and carried out. But where it had seemed to Otto before that he had the option of  extricating himself  
from the struggle between the state and its dissidents, that his “peace and quiet” would safeguard him 
from the vulnerability of  victimhood and from becoming a perpetrator, the death of  his son closes 
the door to this flight. Being a simple worker, a quiet and “apolitical” man who has kept to his domestic 
affairs, can no longer keep him from being inscribed into both sides of  the “war”; this interior conflict 
is, after all, one which the Quangels must wage with themselves. It is now for Otto to decide: how far 
will he allow this vision of  his own political complicity and entanglement to go before he stops himself  
and tries to pull himself  back to his quiet and seemingly private household? The question is one for 
the novel as much as for Otto. 
 
69Fallada, 31/37-38. 
Fabrication  Chaoulideer 154 
* 
What seems a psychological drama within Otto is staged quite literally in the novel’s setting: 
the domestic interiority of  Otto and Anna’s conflict with Nazism is in no way figurative but actually 
a matter of  the house in which they live. Jablonskistraße 55, the townhouse in which they, and a 
number of  the novel’s other protagonists, live, is the site of  increasing conflict as the novel progresses. 
The novel transforms this ordinary domestic sphere from a space of  seeming private calm — good 
old-fashioned a-political life at home — into the concrete infrastructure of  chance encounters, refuge 
and murder, friendships and antagonisms. This begins on the very first page of  the novel with the 
aforementioned letter from the front delivered to their home by the mailwoman. The quiet of  their 
living room, penetrated by a bureaucratic letter, instantly becomes the site of  their political reckoning; 
once Otto recognizes that the very place to which he and Anna had tried to retreat is itself  inscribed 
into the machinations of  the collective fabric from which they have shied away, there is no real position 
of  stability to which they can retreat.70 Trudel, echoing the very question that rattled Otto out of  his 
vision, recognizes the threat of  this transformation and asks whether he “can carry on living as before, 
now that they’ve shot your Otto?” Otto (the senior), too afraid to admit the implications of  his vision 
to Trudel or himself, simply mutters “the French.” “‘The French!’ she shouts indignantly. ‘What sort 
of  excuse is that? Who invaded France? Who, Father?’’ The conflict that had seemed so distant, played 
out between foreign armies, now looms over their daily life, their relation to their neighbors, and the 
false quiet of  their home. 
But even more unsettling than the vulnerability laid bare by this placard, and which Otto 
presumably sensed as he tried to backpedal from his vision, is the total invisibility of  any obvious 
course of  action that would change the political fabric in which they find themselves trapped. Facing 
 
70 See below for a further discussion of the circulation of mail as one of the primary infrastructures (material 
and poetic) established by the novel to figure a sense of urban coherence. 
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his participation in the formation of  the very collectivity that led to his own son’s death, Otto squirms 
between impotence and resignation: “But what can we do? [...] There are so few of  us, and all those 
millions for him, and now, after the victory against France, there will be even more. We can do 
nothing!”71 In a swift about-face, Otto deflects the demand to change his life by rejecting the power 
briefly exposed by his complicity. Using this impotence as a springboard back to moral safety, he 
reasserts the externality of  the conflict, speaking again in terms of  the radical asymmetry between 
“us” and “them.” But this moral language of  exculpation is, of  course, precisely that which removed 
him from the political sphere of  conflict in the first place: far from following from his sense of  
powerlessness, it compounds it. Trudel’s reply brings out this tension between impotence and complicity 
even more starkly: 
“We can do plenty!” she whispers. We can vandalize the machines, we can 
work badly, work slowly, we can tear down their posters and put up others 
where we tell people the truth about how they are being cheated and lied to.” 
She drops her voice further: “But the main thing is that we remain different 
from them, that we never allow ourselves to be made into them, or start 
thinking as they do. Even if they conquer the whole world, we must refuse to 
become Nazis.” 
“And what will that accomplish Trudel?” asks Otto Quangel softly. “I don’t 
see the point.” 
“Father,” she replies, “when it began I didn’t understand that either, and I’m 
not sure I fully understand it now. But, you know, we’ve formed a secret 
communist cell in the factory, very small for now, three men and me. A man 
came to us and tried to explain it to me. He said we are like good seeds in a 
field of weeds. If it wasn’t for the good seeds, the whole field would be nothing 
but weeds. And the good seeds can spread their influence…”72 
This is, in one sense, exactly the story of  Widerstand that Becher and the Kulturbund wanted to 
tell: there can be a new, post-fascist Germany because there were always the scattered bulwarks of  
communist Germans who remained untainted by Nazism and who were simply waiting for the Allies 
 
71 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 32/39. 
72 Fallada, 32/39-40. 
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to weed out the fascists and allow communist Germany to grow in its place. To tell this story, it is 
actually advantageous to downplay the power that these “good seeds” had in order to emphasize their 
victimhood and thereby fully disentangle the good seeds from the bad. From this moralized point of  
view, the impotence to which the Quangels and Trudel seem condemned is actually a self-protective 
buffer against their domestic war, and furnishes a path toward their salvation as martyrs for the new 
nation; “even if  they conquer the whole world, we must refuse to become Nazis.” 
 
2. Bloody Fromm 
There is, incidentally, a character who more or less embodies this full retreat from the political 
to the moral and whose unwavering commitment to “Justice” is certainly not without a dark irony. 
Living just below the Quangels, Kammergerichtsrat Fromm (literally, Judge Pious) does not welcome 
the politicization of his domestic life, living in utter seclusion and almost entirely nocturnally so as to 
avoid crossing paths with others both outside and within the house. His name already suggests that 
he is more of a typological caricature than an active character, something of which he seems to not 
only be aware but even proud. Speaking to Frau Rosenthal, a widowed Jewish woman living on the 
top floor of the same building (and who finds herself taking shelter in his apartment after her’s has 
been broken into, another saga of the politicization of the house that I won’t go into here), he boasts: 
“all my professional life [...] I had a mistress [Herrin] whom I had to obey: one that rules over me, 
you, the world, even the world outside as presently constituted, and her name is Justice. I always 
believed in her, I made Justice the guiding light for everything I did.”73 
But the sentence before this — interestingly, and unsurprisingly, removed by Paul Wiegler 
(and therefore left out of the English edition as well, see note above) — puts his commitment to Lady 
 
73 Fallada, 75/96. 
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Justice in an entirely different light. Frau Rosenthal, concerned that she is putting Fromm in danger 
by hiding in his apartment, tries to decline his help and head back up to her apartment. Fromm 
responds chillingly: “Concerning the danger in which you are putting me, I have been in danger my 
entire professional life. I have always been a judge, and in certain circles one simply called me bloody 
Fromm or executioner Fromm. [...] I was always a quiet and gentle person, but fate decided that during 
my career I would decide or confirm twenty-one death sentences.”74 Fromm, clearly proud instead of 
ashamed, seems convinced that there is a north star of Justice that cuts through all political uncertainty 
and opinion, a moral compass totally unperturbed by the noise of political conditions. But his own 
confession exposes the danger of this expedient inversion of political uncertainty and moral 
absoluteness: the notion that any positive law and empirical judge is simply guided by the absolute 
norms of Justice is the pretense of dogmatic justification, the tyrannical fantasy of revealed pure 
morality. Justice, as incarnate in the hands of a judge, is a procedure, a practice, a form of navigating 
and constituting the norms of a political sphere through the contingent and historical body of law, 
and therefore always vulnerable to missteps, corruptions, and injustices. It is, in Arendt’s language, as 
much an act inscribed in the fabric of relations as any other, and must be held accountable for that. It 
is a form of collective social infrastructure as prone to scrutiny and change as any other. Were judges 
simply the earthly executors of Justice, we would need no procedure, no amendments, checks or 
appeals, no political relations at all, and could live under the unquestioned and unmediated tyranny of 
Lady Justice and her edicts. Fromm, far from offering such false angelic promise, is a discomforting 
reminder of the thoroughly political nature of any system of justice, its historical contingency, its reality 
as the institutionalized condensation of the heterogeneities of the political fabric that need constant 
attention and mediation. 
 
74 Fallada, my translation/96. 
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If he is a caricature of any kind, then, it is not that of a bastion of wise neutrality, a “good 
seed” gone dormant until the political conditions become favorable (hence the Kulturbund’s removal 
of Fromm’s dark backstory), but of a once-powerful functionary trying to scrub himself of the blood 
on his hands by an appeal to fate, Justice, and the belief that moral principles can and should override 
the ongoing mediation demanded by political life. Under this aspect at least, there is little to distinguish 
executioner Fromm from any powerful Nazi functionary, each seeing in the blood they spill and the 
censure they receive the unfortunate but untroubling by-products of the march toward what is Just.75 
 
3. A Failed Escape to the Countryside 
Trudel, however, is more ambivalent in her language: though she seems taken by the promise 
of  the hibernating good seeds, she recognizes, in the same breath, the many forms of  active subversion 
that she and Otto could, and must, perform. These acts point not to their separation from the Nazis, 
but to the power born of  their implication. If  there is a notion of  immunity at work here, it is not 
that of  a moral cloak between her and the Nazi regime, but of  immunizing the political fabric from 
forces coursing within: to protect institutions, practices, and relations from themselves. (In this sense, 
Trudel is appealing to the power, not of  Widerstand, but of  Resistenz.) That they can work badly or 
slowly is only possible and effective because they work in the service of  the Nazi war machine to begin 
 
75 Fromm is, however, not a mere caricature and is much more politically determinate than he would allow of 
himself. Despite dismissing the danger he is putting himself in, this and several other scenes show the lengths 
to which he goes to protect Frau Rosenthal from the drunk and belligerent SS teenagers living upstairs. It could 
be said, however, that his blind insistence on following Justice alone, the content of which remains unclear, of 
course, finally prevents him from really helping Rosenthal and from doing anything more than postponing her 
bitter end by sheltering her and trying to create an apolitical refuge from the conflict “outside.” 
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with.76 Their capacity for action does not follow from their distinction from the Nazis, but from the 
negotiation of  their implication in Nazi institutions, projects, and officials.77 
In the end, Trudel’s secret communist cell succumbs to the very alienation and fear (dis-
figuration) on which Nazism was built. Because the cell’s efficacy was rooted in manipulating and 
leveraging its members’ entanglement in Nazism to disrupt the fiction of  domestic homogeneity that 
defined Nazi ideology, the cell finally falters in the face of  this project and yields whatever power it 
might have had by retreating into the perceived safety of  isolation. In trying to distinguish themselves 
from the institutions, practices and neighbors they seek to change, they relegate themselves to the 
controlled arena of  partisan opposition (Widerstand), the register of  political identity and difference so 
carefully managed and defined by the Nazi party. In this, they play into the Nazi’s totalization by 
collapsing the public realm of  politics and the factional clash of  distinct parties; to speak solely in 
terms of  partisan difference allows political difference to be recast as ethnic, tribal, or even national 
(in this sense, moral) and, as such, intolerable. By playing political issues out in this bellicose arena of  
international and civil war, all opposition can be externalized, allowing Nazism to appear truly 
 
76 See, for example, Otto’s awareness of the economic gains he has enjoyed through Hitler’s reorganization of 
the industrial economy: “After being out of work for four years, in 1934 Quangel had become foreman in the 
big furniture factory, taking home forty marks a week. They had done pretty well on that. That was a result of 
the Führer, who brought the economy back into motion. They [Otto and Anna] had always agreed about that.” 
(Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 20*/22.) This economic incentive was enough to free him of political concern: 
“At the beginning of the war, the business was put on a war footing, and Quangel’s workshop was assigned to 
make large, heavy crates that it was thought were used to transport bombs. As far as Otto Quangel was 
concerned, he didn’t have the least interest in the destination and function of the crates; to him, this new, 
mindless labor was simply ridiculous. He was a craftsman.” (Fallada, 46/56-57.) Needless to say, Otto hid 
behind the purported neutrality of his work and actively overlooked its overt political reorientation. And so, he 
quietly went on building crates for Nazi bombs. 
*The English edition does not contain these last two sentences. See note above. 
77 The term “Nazi” is, of course, itself an equivocation here between the moral register of “evil” individuals 
from whom one wants to distance oneself, and Nazism as the name for the political configuration of relations 
in Germany at the time in which power was, however unequally, distributed across the unhealthy and 
uncoordinated fabric. Trudel and Otto may well be able to distinguish themselves from the former (despite 
having voted for the party in 1933) but whatever power they have to act with or against the grain of this fabric 
is evidence of their being a part of it in the latter sense. 
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hegemonic and free of  internal difference or strife. By naturalizing its own totality, it hides the figures 
by which everyday practice reproduces (and potentially dismantles) that form of  collective totality. For 
the communist cell to accept these terms of  action isolates and defangs them while contributing to 
the mythologization, homogenization, and validation of  the Nazi party;78 the hermetic survival of  the 
good seed totally obfuscates the need to cultivate the soil for it to actualize itself  and propagate. The 
dual fears of  physical harm and moral corruption force Trudel and her comrades to pull back from 
the world and seal themselves off  in hopes that a more hospitable future will be delivered by some 
benevolent agent external to the Nazi totality (thankfully, it was only ever a projected totality and did 
not take over the entire world!). Plans of  action are replaced with hopes of  survival, and attempts to 
expand the scope of  their action are aborted by the necessity of  secrecy. 
It is in the throes of  this retreat to partisan isolation that the cell finally implodes entirely. 
When the others find out that Trudel has mentioned the existence of  their group to Otto, they are 
blind to the possibility of  expanding their scope with new members and leveraging more power with 
an established workshop leader, and instead simply see a breach in their partisan wall. In a rash 
escalation in the name of  the cell’s self-preservation, the others decide that Trudel should either 
commit suicide or simply allow them to kill her. Though she runs away to the small town of  Erkner 
with another member (Karl Hergesell, her new lover) before they can carry this out, the next time 
Trudel reappears in the novel she is fleeing Berlin to start a new, hopefully quieter life in the 
countryside where she, five months pregnant, and Karl could live “only for the happiness of  their 
home” and where they thought they would remain out of  reach of  “the Party, and its demands.”79 
 
78 Recall Broszat’s critique of the dual mythologization of the Nazi Party and its antagonists by demonizing the 
former as totalitarian and heroizing the former as martyrs, homogenizing both and placing them beyond 
understanding. The rhetoric of partisanship participates in this externalization of the two poles and removes 
them from their common political context. (Broszat, Fröhlich, and Grossmann, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im 
Konflikt: Teil C, 1981, 693.) 
79 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 278*/375. 
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Trudel may have evaded death at the hands of  her cell, but at the cost of  any sense of  power and 
responsibility, and with that, any possibility of  collectivity. She has effectively (attempted) to render 
herself  stateless. The logic of  the cell has taught them, not unlike the domestication of  politics 
practiced by the Nazi party, that, without its protection, their lives can only be inward facing, 
domestically hermetic, blunted of  any political openness to their world. 
The tragedy of  this retreat, however, is not only the impotence of  those who hide behind it, 
but the false sense of  safety on which it relies. Fallada, who himself  fled to the countryside and knew 
the total permeation of  Nazism intimately, is quick to preempt the naiveté of  the Hergesells and their 
false identification of  Nazism with its urban administrative centers. As he ominously notes: “Like 
many city dwellers, they had made the painful discovery that recrimination, eavesdropping, and 
informing were ten times worse in the small towns than in the big city.”80 Far from a domain of  simple 
extra-political provincialism, Erkner is full of  families who, more concerned with their own self-
preservation than any kind of  sense of  community, are all too ready to inform on their neighbors to 
secure their standing in the eyes of  the Gestapo, a fear which only further consolidates the power that 
generates this fear to begin with. There simply is no private moral island on which Trudel and Karl 
can hide. 
* 
The veil of self-deception under which they have crept is abruptly lifted when Karl, running 
an errand back in Berlin, bumps into Grigoleit, the most dogmatic member of the communist cell, 
and the one who had pressed for Trudel’s self-elimination. Their encounter may be the most pointed 
case of this equivocation on the moral and political. 
 
*Not included in Hofmann’s translation. 
80 Fallada, 278/375. 
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What begins as an innocuous exchange of pleasantries quickly flares up when Grigoleit asks 
Karl what he “does” these days. Karl, whether intentionally deflecting or out of a newfound naiveté, 
tells him of his new job as an electrical engineer in a factory in Erkner. Grigoleit presses him: “No, I 
mean what are you really doing, Hergesell — for our future.” Karl, feeling a pang of “something like 
guilt” at this indictment, tries to justify his new life: “Look, Grigoleit, we’re a couple of young 
newlyweds and we live for ourselves. What is the world out there to do with us, them and their shitty 
war? We’re happy we’re having a child. You see, that’s something too, isn’t it, Grigoleit? If we try to 
remain decent [anständig], and try to make a decent human being out of our kid…” Grigoleit, unmoved, 
brags of his continued activities with the cell and its new members, to which Karl responds with the 
predictable skepticism of the fearful: “And you really think it’ll bring results? Your little bunch and 
this great machine [Ihr paar Männekens und diese Riesenmaschine]?…”81 Karl, focused on decency 
(Anständigkeit) and self-preservation, seems to be recycling the very same principle of the dormant 
seed that he presumably learned from the cell to now justify his inward turn toward maintaining the 
purity of his new family: his “future” lies is preserving himself through his child. Consequently, he 
must see Nazism as externalized, objectified, and enlarged, an unstoppable “Riesenmaschine.” By 
contrast, Grigoleit remains committed to a markedly different relation to the future, and therefore to 
the German people: 
“First of  all, we’re not a little bunch, as you put it. Every decent [anständige] German, 
and there are still two or three million of  them, will make common cause with us. 
They just need to overcome their fear. At the moment, their fear of  the future the 
Nazis are creating is still less than their fear of  the present.”82 
 
81 Fallada, 284/383. Note the echo of Fallada’s insistence, cited above, in his preparatory essay that “Against 
this man in the dark, the entire tremendous apparatus of the Hitlerish state machinery was powerless.” 
82 Fallada, 284/383-84. 
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While Karl’s fear of his present circumstances entirely shapes his imagination of the future, Grigoleit 
notes the sharp distinction between fear of the present and for the future. Where fear of the present 
is always a fear of some thing, something external, something more powerful, fear for the future is a 
concern for “our future,” a concern for the fragilities of the political world born of the fact that one 
is inextricably bound up in it with others. 
Against Karl’s fearful isolation, then, Grigoleit is after the constitution of collectivity in the 
face of its vulnerability. And yet, his collective is an imagined one, made up not of those who are 
interwoven in a fabric of action, but by their shared interior uprightness: they are defined not by what 
they do, but by being “anständig” of all things! Though Grigoleit is trying to expose Karl’s prioritization 
of domesticity as thinly veiled selfishness, he does so by appealing to moral imperatives that 
hyperbolize his point; it is no coincidence that Grigoleit’s indictment arouses shame and guilt in Karl 
as opposed to a renewed sense of power and responsibility: 
“Second, my dear chap, you ought to know that it doesn’t matter if there’s a 
handful of you against many of them. Once you’ve seen that a cause is true 
[wahrhaftig], you’re obliged to fight for it. Whether you ever live to see success, 
or the person who steps into your shoes does, it doesn’t matter. I can’t very 
well sit on my hands and say, Well, they may be a bad lot, but what business is 
it of mine?” 
“Yes,” said Hergesell. “But you’re not married; you don’t have to look after 
your wife and child…” 
“Oh, you go to hell!” shouted Grigoleit, manifestly disgusted. “Enough of that 
sentimental twaddle of yours! You don’t believe a word of it anyway! Wife and 
child! You idiot, it doesn’t seem to have occurred to you that I could have 
gotten married twenty times over, if starting a family had been my intention in 
life! But it’s not, see! I say what right [Recht] do I have to any personal happiness 
while there’s room for such unhappiness on this earth!”83 
Grigoleit, the novel’s most doctrinaire communist representative, is clearly well attuned to the 
consequences of privatizing one’s “business.” But he falls prey to his own dogmatism: his notion of 
 
83 Fallada, 284/384. 
Fabrication  Chaoulideer 164 
political action is tied to a complete renunciation of domesticity, to the notion that having a family — 
indeed, the enjoyment of anything “personal” — is incompatible with a commitment to political 
change. The notion that one has no “right” to domestic well-being while others are suffering simply 
reinstates the moral paradigm in which there is no contradiction or impossibility seen in the 
coexistence of personal happiness and communal unhappiness, only a lamentable inequality resisted 
by a moral imperative for the equal distribution of the good. So long as the family and the polity 
remain parallel domains that stand in competition for resources and commitment, only moral 
exhortation can mediate between them. Because of this, Grigoleit’s exposure of Karl’s family life to 
its political ramifications is absolute, and the relation between Karl and Germany he construes is that 
of total identity: 
“We have drifted apart!” murmured Karl Hergesell, half sadly, “My happiness 
doesn’t cost anyone else a thing.” 
“But it does! You’re stealing it! You’re robbing mothers of their sons, wives of 
their husbands, girlfriends of their boyfriends, as long as you tolerate 
thousands being shot every day and don’t lift a finger to stop the killing. You 
know all that perfectly well, and it strikes me that you’re almost worse than 
real dyed-in-the-wool Nazis. They’re too stupid to know what crimes they’re 
committing. But you do, and you don’t do anything against it! Aren’t you worse 
than the Nazis? Of course you are!” 
“Here’s the station, not a minute too soon,” said Hergesell as he set down the 
heavy case. “I don’t have to listen to your abuse anymore. If we’d spent any 
more time together, you would have told me it wasn’t Hitler but Hergesell who 
actually started the whole war!” 
“And so you did! In an extended sense, of course. In a broader sense, your 
apathy made it possible…” 
Now Hergesell could contain himself no longer: he started to laugh, and even 
the grim Grigoleit broke into a grin when he looked into that laughing face.84 
This moment, an echo of the earlier accusatory identification of Otto and “his” war in Anna’s “du und 
dein Führer,” again contains a thoroughly political call to responsibility veiled in an indictment of 
 
84 Fallada, 284-85/384-85. 
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complete moral guilt. The empowering potential of Grigoleit’s politicization of Karl’s domesticity is 
lost in his total dissolution of the private at the hands of the political. Erkner certainly seems to 
substantiate Grigoleit’s diagnosis of the dangers of misdirected fear: in place of a communal world 
mediated by vulnerability and mutual determination guided by a concern for a shared future, a polity 
that acknowledges and sustains subjectivity in its relationality, Erkner is little more than a pointillistic 
collection of homes turned inward and related only by suspicion and a competition for survival, by a 
fear, in other words, of one another and the world from which they shrink back. 
But Grigoleit’s appeal sounds more like a call for courage in the face of this fear, a resolute 
setting aside of personal concerns for public good, a call which has particularly minimal traction in a 
community where the notion of a public sphere it itself the source of fear. It is no surprise that Karl 
finally just laughs him off. What Grigoleit doesn’t say to Karl, but which the novel goes on to make 
all too clear, is that the political vacuum compounded by their dormancy may erect a kind of moral 
shield (Grigoleit “bravely” standing on one side, Karl cowering on the other), but it won’t protect 
them from the brute fact of their political entanglement, nor does it empower them to legislate over 
their future. In short, it does nothing to convey the rather simple point that within their fear of their 
world lies buried a deeper fear for its future. This is the political fact in its purest form: Karl and 
Trudel’s future is not only not in opposition to, or contingently inseparable from, but is defined by the 
future of Erkner and all of Germany. 
 
4. Angst 
The fears of Karl and so many others that restrain their political aspirations to the mere 
preservation of conscience are, of course, far from unfounded. Nazism has made life, for everyone, 
significantly more precarious, relationships more treacherous, futures more uncertain. Hardly a page 
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goes by without this pervasive fear being invoked,85 and the novel abounds in violence and 
intimidation that is undeniably terrifying. It hangs thick in the air and everyone uses it to make sense 
of the failure of German political life from whatever side they happen to approach it: it explains 
complicity as much as inaction, it testifies to guilt just as it much as unthinking herdishness, it suggests 
obedience of ordinary Germans to Nazism as well as any friction between the two, and perhaps above 
all, it characterizes a mistrust between friends, colleagues and total strangers. 
There is a pent-up fear mediating almost every relation in the novel that is in some way frail 
or damaged (which characterizes most, if not all relations in it). As the cases of Judge Fromm and the 
Hergesells make painfully clear (albeit in very different ways), common to many of these relations of 
fear is the attempt to externalize it and flee from it. That this flight is largely unsuccessful is not so 
much a feature of the reach or pervasiveness of the monstrosity they have to fear, as though the 
Riesenmaschine had tendrils long enough to reach inside every home and every psyche. This is, again, 
the kind of mythological totalization of Nazism that stokes this fear to begin with and consolidates 
the power of those who claim to represent this monstrous collectivity. On the contrary, no one is 
immune to this fear,86 just as there is no internally coherent, monolithic political beast roaming the 
German lands and terrorizing its helpless innocent civilians. To return to Grigoleit’s remark, the 
problem is not the power of the object of this fear but that the fear itself compounds itself and 
precludes a concern for the future in which relations could regain their cohesion in the face of shared 
futural possibilities. 
This fear (Angst), then, is pervasive not because of the reach of its object, but because of the 
condition of its subjects. It shouldn’t be understood in terms of its object at all, but as the 
 
85 I mean this more or less literally: in the novel of under 700 pages, the word Angst appears over 300 times. 
86 See the discussion below of the novel’s most prominent Nazi official, Inspector Escherich, and his eventual 
succumbing to the very forces of paranoia and surveillance for which he was responsible. 
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manifestation of an inner friction, of a tension that is manifest in each and every German and whose 
resolution cannot be war, however courageous. Indeed, Angst can just as well be translated as 
“anxiety.” If fear emerges from the encounter of two distinct and unequal powers, anxiety mediates 
the conflicts between what is possible and what is actual, between the world one finds oneself in now 
and the world one imagines in the future. To put this in an Arendtian idiom, fear functions in a moral 
register of unmediated war between individuated agents, while anxiety brings into view the frailty and 
contingency of the political world in which action is already understood in terms of the possibilities 
and impossibilities afforded by that world, the difficulty of mediating differences. Fear is predicated 
on the separation and antagonism (Widerstand) of individuals from one another, while anxiety grows 
out of the urgency of maintaining a shared world and negotiating the inherent pluralism and instability 
of such a world. 
In the case of the Hergesells, this collapse of anxiety into sheer fear is particularly tragic as it 
silences the productive and empowering agency that working in a wartime factory had aroused in 
them, precipitating their descent into inaction and hopeless self-protection. The problem is not that 
they live with a bad conscience in Erkner, as Grigoleit would have it, but that the political 
entanglements that defined them in Berlin cannot be exorcized and simply grow stronger if repressed. 
If bearing the weight and uncertainty of this anxiety is the challenge of life in Berlin at this 
moment, the question remains where the Quangels lie in relation to this retreat from political anxiety 
into familial, private, moralizing fear. 
This escape to a position of imagined political neutrality to wash their hands of the chaos 
outside their window, is, in some sense, exactly how Otto and Anna had tried to live through the Third 
Reich up to the point where the novel begins and the letter from the front disrupts their domestic 
complacency. Otto, Fallada writes repeatedly, had never thought himself a political person. Reclusive 
and private to the utmost, he had always preferred to focus on his work and pursue safety and quiet 
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over anything public that could jeopardize the comparative normality that he and Anna had managed 
to construct for themselves. And though this is the novel’s pre-history, and their lives are irrevocably 
altered (and the novel opened) with the arrival of the letter from the front, the Quangels don’t exactly 
take to the streets and agitate. They remain reclusive, asocial, and highly attuned to the dangers of 
their world throughout the novel, with much of the drama (as noted above) taking place within their 
own building, even their own living room. Does the novel, then, simply juxtapose these modalities of 
action? Does it combine them? How do these modalities of action figure in Fallada’s Berlin? 
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V. Domesticated Politics 
 
It may still seem largely voluntaristic or arbitrary why this character or that, and indeed the 
novel itself, "chooses" to understand themselves and their world politically or morally. To get at the 
context in which moralization seems the only option, or in which relations of responsibility are able 
to disclose themselves, the particular form of alienation, which I called the "domestication” of politics 
above, must first be clarified in its particular strategy of disfiguration. This particular form of political 
disturbance begins to address the pressing, and as of yet unaddressed, question of the specificity of 
Nazism in this inquiry, and paces the way to a reading of the novel’s formal fabric into which the 
scenes of acute reckoning and bounded agency presented above can be woven. Doing so circumvents 
the paradigm of Widerstand, freeing Fallada to develop characters that are both actors and sufferers of 
their world and to represent the banal strands of everyday Resistenz as figurative of the novel’s world 
as a whole. 
Several (related) questions emerge at this point that deserve to be treated head on. First, what 
kind of  distinction is at work between the domestic and the political? Are they adjacent physical 
spaces? Competing institutional realms? Opposed hermeneutic approaches to action? Historical 
moments of  social development? Are they to be understood typologically at all or is their difference 
itself  political, suggesting two different ways approaches to the division itself ? And second, to what 
degree is the relation between the political and the domestic brought into view by Fallada’s novel 
specific to Nazism? Is political alienation an essential condition of  being political or is it a historical 
wrinkle in a wider trajectory of  political possibilities? Fundamentally at issue in these questions is 
whether the political is itself  essentially a condition of  alienation and, though it may sound a bit 
peculiar, whether the domestic is essentially domesticated. 
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The snippets from the novel presented above already go some distance in addressing these 
Arendtian questions. In each of  the scenes given here, the possibility of  moral existence is negotiated in 
positional or locational terms. The premise of  the good seed lies in its separability from the soil; Fromm 
hides at home in hopes that his physical invisibility will assure a political one; the Hergesells flee the 
countryside assuming that Nazism could be located in the administrative buildings and prominent 
representatives of  the party in Berlin; and, of  course, the Quangels have long assumed that their quiet 
living room, empty of  political material or people, is itself  immune to the forces outside. Whether by 
taking a stand, staking out a moral position, or choosing to be alone, distinguishing oneself  from “the 
others” or from “the state” seems always a matter of  spatial separation. The very possibility of  moral 
action in these moments looks to be a matter of  the persistence and coherence of  the private sphere 
under the suffocating conditions of  the Nazi public sphere. If  this were right, the possibility of  
resistance would be a matter of  the rivalry between parallel domains; this hope would not emerge 
from within a contested and malleable collectivity but would stand on faith in the durability of  the 
domestic realm, a durability promised by the distinct neutrality and apolitical nature of  the domestic. 
Dissident action understood in terms of  this total separation of  the political and the domestic 
becomes a matter of  the perdurance of  private action long after the political realm has been taken 
over and snuffed out by Nazi rule. 
Fallada himself  seems to suggest precisely this relation of  the private and public as distinct 
and competing domains, even spatially separable ones, when describing the Hergesells’ plight in 
Erkner: 
[Trudel and Karl] suffered greatly under the atmosphere of hate they were 
obliged to live in at Erkner. But they told themselves that it didn’t concern 
them and that nothing could happen to them, as they were doing nothing 
against the State. “Thoughts are free,” they said—but they ought to have 
known that in this State not even thoughts were free. 
So, increasingly, they took refuge in their happiness as husband and wife. They 
were like a pair of lovers clasped together in a flood, with waves and currents, 
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collapsing houses and drowning cattle all around them, still believing they 
would escape the general devastation by the power of their love. They had not 
yet understood that there was no such thing as a private life in this wartime 
Germany. No amount of pulling oneself back could change the fact that every 
German belonged to the generality [Allgemeinheit] of Germans and had to suffer 
[miterleiden] the German fate — just as more and more bombs were falling 
indiscriminately on the just and unjust alike.87 
Here, Nazism seems an atmospheric phenomenon, a climatic force that sweeps up and consumes 
everything in its path by sheer force. And so, the great private powers of  love and thought brace 
themselves against the rising tides of  fear, hatred, and anxiety. Though the island of  their love fails to 
withstand the flood of  Nazism, they drown as do the cattle and houses: in total innocence.  
The inevitable politicization of  private life – even private thought – that marks the lives of  
Judge Fromm, the Quangels, the Hergesells and so many others in the novel would, then, be 
attributable to the totalitarian colonization of  even the most removed and insignificant homes and 
relationships by the powerful machinery of  the “State.” The devastating and invading flood of  Nazism 
suggests that while the distinction between the private domain of  morality and the public arena of  
politics might be tenable in a healthy polity, the illness of  the Nazi regime is marked precisely by its 
elimination of  the distinction and the total breach of  privacy by the overbearing forces of  the party. 
Read in this way, the novel responds to the two questions posed above by insisting on the 
spatial separability of  the home and the polity. Moral quandaries of  what is just can only be answered 
in a private space, shielded from the forces of  political coercion, fortified by the private conditions of  
love, self-reflection, and intimacy; as we would put it in the contemporary idiom: in a space of  
authenticity. Political issues, then, play out in the external arena of  diplomacy, compromise, and 
ideology. The public and private must be typologically distinct and can (and should) exist in parallel. 
But in the Nazi State, “not even thoughts were free,” and “there was no such thing as a private life in 
 
87 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 278/376. 
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this wartime Germany.” The particularity of  Nazism is, in this reading, its cannibalization of  the 
private sphere: the politicization of  the domestic. 
This diagnosis of  Nazism is itself  expressed from the domestic vantage point: it raises the 
question of  what happens to the domestic realm, in answer to which it observes that it has been 
infected by an alien domain, the political. The peculiar consequence of  this interpretation is that the 
force of  politicization is understood morally: the forceful invasion of  one space by another is the 
mechanism of  negotiating differences morally (in a political vacuum). In this sense, to preserve the 
sharp separation of  the private and the political is to assume the primacy of  the private and to ground 
the difference between them in terms of  the apolitical logic of  the private sphere. 
There are, however, the traces of  another reading of  the novel in this passage. To say that “no 
amount of  pulling oneself  back could change the fact that every German belonged to the generality 
[Allgemeinheit] of  Germans and had to suffer [miterleiden] the German fate” could itself  be a claim, not 
about the specificity of  Nazism, but of  the nature of  political life as such.88 Indeed, the notion that 
everyone belongs to their “generality” is an ahistorical and nearly tautological formulation of  what it 
is to be a political animal at all. To say that fate is not an individual matter but a communal one has 
nothing to do with Nazism. If  the language of  authenticity — predicated precisely on moralistic 
individuation and its promise of  a personal, private, just fate — is exposed for its apolitical naiveté, 
the specificity of  Nazism doesn’t seem to lie in its politicization of  the private. Indeed, the clean 
separability of  the two realms begins to seem a false, even dangerous, evasion of  collective life. Trudel 
and Karl’s sinking island of  love (their Verinselung, we might say) is, then, not so innocent as it may 
have seemed, but condemned by its disempowerment, willful naiveté, and anxious paralysis in the face 
of  its collective future and fate. 
 
88 Recall Arendt’s language of the subject as actor and sufferer of the world. 
Fabrication  Chaoulideer 173 
It is my claim that underneath these isolated scenes of  moral reckoning that seem to create 
chains of  individuated fate, there lies a much more intricate narrative fabric of  communal relations 
that places each and every German — each and every act — within the generality of  collective life. The 
fabric reconstitutes the threads of  political responsibility and power in order to poetically figure the 
mechanism between part and whole, individual and collective, which Nazism sought to dis-figure so 
carefully. The novel reclaims, then, the coherence of  a multitude of  spaces that had seemed private, 
marginal, isolated, and unconnected, weaving a single narrative world within which each character is 
able to place itself  within its Allgemeinheit, perhaps even to glimpse their dialectical relation to its 
transformation. 
Read in this way, Fallada tries to address Nazism as a political form masquerading as a partisan 
or tribal one: his novel attempts to unearth the everyday practices in Berlin’s public sphere through 
which these identitarian celebrations of  blood, soil, and the elimination of  difference could purport 
to stand on their own ground. The novel shows, then, that Nazism consolidated its power and 
suppressed dissidence not by politicizing the purity of  the domestic but by domesticating the plurality of  
the political. Nazism didn’t invent or impose the experience of  Allgemeinheit but controlled and 
naturalized it, maintaining a monopoly on the political processes through which individuals collectively 
figured themselves as belonging to a coherent whole.  
* 
It is worth noting, and briefly exploring, the fact that Arendt’s own analysis of  the relation 
between the political and the domestic is riddled with ambiguity on precisely these two questions of  
clean separability and historical specificity. Though her 1968 essay on collective responsibility and her 
analysis of  the “web of  stories” that constitute political activity are, as I hope to have shown, excellent 
analytic spaces for articulating the reciprocal constitution of  actor and collective world, Arendt is 
infamously drawn into a multitude of  rigid typologies that seem to neatly slice stratifications of  
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practices, spaces, and objects out of  the universalizing web on which her thought rests. Most 
infamously, her distinction between labor, work, and action often seems to tip into total separation 
and typologization.89 This typology reappears in her notorious distinction between the public and the 
private, both of  which are contrasted with the modern and problematic “rise of  the social.” It is the 
relation of  these three terms that interests me here and which both clarifies and confuses the notion 
I have been developing of  Nazism as the domestication of  the political. 
At their most basic level, the three terms refer to different configurations of  human 
collectivity. Very simply, the private (manifest in the household, or oikos) is marked by the maintenance 
of  life by carrying out “natural functions”: most quintessentially, nourishment and birth. The domestic 
sphere, Arendt argues, is thus the space of  necessity in which members of  a community are solely 
organized around the “natural” forces of  violence and sovereignty: “the whole concept of  rule and 
being ruled, of  government and power in the sense in which we understand them as well as the 
regulated order attending them, was felt [by the Greeks] to be prepolitical and to belong in the private 
rather than the public sphere.”90 The private sphere, in Broszat’s idiom, is formed around Herrschaft. 
The public sphere (manifest in the polis), by contrast, knows only “equals,” and is mediated by the 
possibility of  freedom as opposed to the necessities of  natural life. Thus, taking up the old Aristotelian 
distinction between despotic and political rule, Arendt insists that to be in the public sphere of  political 
negotiation is not simply to be free from necessity or the violence of  rule (for the despot is as unfree 
 
89 For critiques of these hard distinctions, see Richard J. Bernstein, “Rethinking the Social and the Political,” 
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 11, no. 1 (1986): 111–30; Peter Fuss, “Hannah Arendt’s Conception of Political 
Community,” Idealistic Studies 3, no. 3 (September 1973): 252–65; Jürgen Habermas, “Hannah Arendt’s 
Communications Concept of Power,” Social Research 44, no. 1 (Spring 1977): 3–24; Hanna Pitkin, “Justice: On 
Relating Private and Public,” Political Theory 9, no. 3 (1981): 327–52. 
For an excellent overview of these issues as emergent from a “phenomenological essentialism,” as well as 
interpretive paths forward, see Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), particularly Chapter 5. 
90 Arendt, The Human Condition, 32. 
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as is the peasant),91 but to be free for the possibilities of  action afforded by the inherent equality of  
citizens.92 The public sphere is shaped by the collective configuration and reconfiguration of  
Gesellschaft. Lastly, “the collective of  families economically organized into the facsimile of  one super-
human family is what we call ‘society’,” “whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of  by a gigantic, 
nation-wide administration of  housekeeping.”93 Society, we might say, is Herrschaft scaled up and 
disguised to appear as Gesellschaft. But the three don’t simply form a clean taxonomic trio. As Arendt 
puts it: 
The distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to 
the household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct, separate 
entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state; but the emergence of the 
social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively 
new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern 
age and which found its political form in the nation-state.94 
If  this is right, there isn’t so much one tripartite distinction as two different dyadic ones: first, 
the fundamental differentiation of  the public and the private as a constitutive aspects of  human 
plurality, and second, the historically specific, and rather recent, emergence of  the social that 
differentiates itself  by a particular distortion of  the first distinction. Surely, then, the dyad private-
public is primary while the emergence of  the social is derivative and therefore (negatively) normatively 
charged. Although much ink has been spilt over the question of  Arendt’s ambivalent modernism and 
nostalgia for the Greek polis, that is not our concern here. Whatever Arendt’s position on the Greek 
polis, its primary analytic function is to help expose the modern nation-state’s conflation of  necessity 
and freedom, the sovereignty of  the domestic realm and the negotiated pluralism of  the political. 
More specifically, Arendt’s analysis of  the emergence of  the social against the backdrop of  the oikos 
 
91 See Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 1277b, 1325a. 
92 See Arendt, The Human Condition, 13, 30–32. 
93 Arendt, 28–29. 
94 Arendt, 28. 
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and the polis traces “back modern world alienation, its twofold flight from the earth into the universe 
and from the world into the self, to its origins.”95 
A critique of  nationalized politics should not, then, impel us to return to a city-state founded 
on slaveholding households. But does it not suggest that some sort of  renewed delineation of  the 
public and the private spheres is needed? That to peel back the confusion and alienation of  
socialization requires that we cordon off  life’s natural functions from those actions that mediate the 
common world of  freedom? This would accord with the initial reading of  the image of  the flood I 
discussed above in which it seemed that the derangement of  Nazism stemmed from a political tide 
(here, the “social”) so strong that it washed out all possibility of  distinguishing private spaces from 
the forces of  the public. This would imply that modern sociality is fundamentally the encroachment 
of  the political into the private – the politicization of  domesticity. 96 
But, for the reasons already given above, this is simply not a coherent narrative of  alienation. 
To say that the flourishing of  a polity rests in some kind of  balance between two distinct spheres, and 
that each must be protected from the tendencies of  the other, is to place them at odds as though they 
were themselves competing modes of  management and activity. It is, to reiterate, a domestication of  
the distinction between the two, and casts our “social” alienation as a problem to be understood, not 
politically, but by the very management typical of  the nation-state. (For this reason, it is equally 
 
95 Arendt, 6. 
96 Arendt repeatedly suggests as much by lamenting the loss of a private sphere that could provide shelter from 
the glare of the space of appearance. This is most marked in passages such as: “The most elementary meaning 
of the two realms [the public and the private] indicates that there are things that need to be hidden and others 
that need to be displayed publicly if they are to exist at all,” (Arendt, 73.) or “A life spent entirely in public, in 
the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow. […] The only efficient way to guarantee the darkness 
of what needs to be hidden against the light of publicity is private property, a privately owned place to hide in.” 
(Arendt, 71.) 
This conservative thread in her thinking, which continuously leads her distinctions to become full-fledged 
separations, is unfortunate and confusing but in no way inherent to (and, as I have tried to show, actually 
antithetical to) her radical analysis of “the political.” For a thorough discussion of this tendency, see Benhabib, 
The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. 
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incoherent to speak, in the reverse, of  alienation as the encroachment of  the private into the political. 
The problem of  sociality is that it treats these two modalities of  collective organization as realms or 
discrete “spaces” that abut and vie for supremacy.) 
What, then, is this alienation? Arendt offers an answer in her very definition of  the social: it is 
the replacement of  the city-state with the nation-state, the replacement of  a collective political 
infrastructure with that of  a “super-human family” defined by affinity, homogeneity, and subjugation. 
It is to replace the commonality of  collective self-determination with the commonality of  a shared 
ruler; the replacement of  the collective navigation of  differences within the equitable web of  action 
with the tribalistic attempt at survival and the assertion of  identity. Our alienation is thus the 
perversion of  the political into a colossal household. It is, quite simply, the domestication of  politics. Such 
domestication (which is confused and undermined by the nomenclature of  “socialization”) is an 
essentially political process: no force, no act of  war or compulsion could bring this about since it is a 
change in the configuration of  a polity, not a household. 
This further clarifies why Arendt’s separation of  the material “world” of  artifacts from the 
immaterial “web” of  action is incoherent. To treat these as distinct realms of  human plurality is to 
open the door to the analytic counterpart to the very political alienation her notion of  sociality takes 
such pains to describe. To suggest that Karl and Trudel’s plight is a function of  an imbalance between 
their private domesticity and the political forces around them would be to diagnose Nazism as a 
politicized tribe or family (as a “social” force in Arendt’s sense), when that understanding is precisely 
the deception and propaganda behind which Nazism was able to consolidate itself  to begin with. To 
break this cycle of  social norms naturalizing themselves as essential pillars of  a national community 
requires that one first recognize that the management and fabrication of  the material world is always 
already a political process that mediates action. To put this in yet another Arendtian idiom (confusing 
because she uses the term “world” in The Human Condition to refer to (at least) two very different 
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things): if  we are to understand our “flight from the earth” and our flight from “the world” as one 
and the same process of  alienation, it is imperative to recognize the domestication of  politics as a 
disruption of  our management of  the material world (the “earth”) just as much as it is a distortion of  
our negotiation of  the immaterial world (the “world”). Those worlds are one and the same. The private 
and the public are themselves only intelligible as logics of  political order. 
It is by this very same reasoning that guilt and responsibility cannot refer to different domains 
of  accountability but can only be different logics of  collectivity. The notion of  responsibility therefore 
grounds the possibility of  thinking in terms of  guilt.97 So, too, do the pressures of  political coexistence 
and the challenges of  plurality produce the possibility of  thinking and acting in terms of  sovereignty, 
affinity, race, and homogeneity. 
If  everything (including the private) is, in this sense, political,98 what remains of  the domestic 
sphere? If  it is not, as Arendt would like it to be, a “reliable hiding place from the common public 
world,”99 what are these very real spaces and how does one describe what happens there? Is there a 
way to differentiate the importance of  domestic spaces from the dangers of  a domesticating logic? 
Arendt actually seems to provide the beginnings of  an answer when she notes: 
the fences inclosing private property and insuring the limitations of each 
household, the territorial boundaries which protect and make possible the 
physical identity of a people, and the laws which protect and make possible its 
physical existence, are of such great importance to the stability of human 
 
97 See the discussion above and chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of the consequences of the Heideggerian 
focalization of authenticity on guilt and its individuation. 
98 Though this is not the place to do so, one could also reexamine the arguments over whether the “personal is 
political” by disambiguating the various meanings of those two terms. That the very same phrase could have 
been used, for example, to argue that feminist struggles for reproductive rights are, contrary to their initial 
dismissal, essential to any project of collective freedom and to argue that certain decisions about one’s body or 
beliefs should remain outside the sphere of generalized legislation, simply demonstrates how slippery these 
terms are and how important it is not to equivocate on them. For a succinct (though by no means complete or 
definitive) foray into the shifting terms of these debates over the past half-century of feminist theory and 
activism, see Megan Behrent, “The Personal and the Political: Literature and Feminism,” International Socialist 
Review, no. 92 (2016): 39–64. 
99 Arendt, The Human Condition, 71. 
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affairs precisely because no such limiting and protecting principles rise out of 
the activities going on in the realm of human affairs itself.100 
Here, she actually seems acutely aware of  the logical priority of  the political order, and that the 
“physical” importance of  the private spheres that are inscribed within a polity must themselves be 
political in the sense that they exist only as carefully maintained constructions within the unbounded 
medium of  non-identitarian life. 
What Arendt seems unable to admit in this passage, however, is that the “boundless” 
“medium” of  political activity is by no means unarticulated; she seems stuck with an image of  the 
political in which the equality of  the web of  action is so universal that it contains no internal means 
of  organization, division, or identification, necessitating the inscription of  private terrains into this 
undifferentiated field to create demarcated territories. But why the need to create rigid boundaries? 
Was the hallmark of  the “socialization” of  humanity in modernity not the rigidly bounded nation-
state? Arendt, in fact, goes out of  her way to insist that the polis 
is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people 
as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between 
people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. 
“Wherever you go, you will be a polis”: these famous words became not merely 
the watchword of Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that 
action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its 
proper location almost any time and anywhere.101 
The freedom made possible by political life is necessarily universalizing: the Allgemeinheit that it 
configures out of  the most banal and provincial scrap of  everyday activity is, necessarily, total.102 
The fact that the political, an unfinished and always shifting fabric of  relational actions, may 
not be organized by its outer limits and boundaries does not, however, prevent it from being organized 
 
100 Arendt, 191. 
101 Arendt, 198. Though this passage could also be read as the reassertion of the immateriality of the political, 
which would yet again undermine the point. 
102 The limitation of Karl and Trudel’s collective belonging to the German generalization of their lives is, then, 
already an indication of the nationalization (and domestication) of their political sensibility. 
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at all. Quite the contrary: far from the violent and primitive organization of  the nation-state that must 
impose boundaries in order create some semblance of  a polity (it is structured, after all, around the 
negative freedom from others), the political fabric is nothing other than the “constellation” of  spaces 
of  appearance that are created, maintained, and shifted by the ongoing activity of  those who live in 
and through it. Political action is thus inherently spatializing103 in that it establishes a medium through 
which differences are arranged in their mutual participation in a single world. It does not function like 
a force that is fully sovereign over a predetermined domain, but it is a vulnerable and diffuse way of  
navigating relations with others: of  being an actor and a sufferer. It is peculiar that Arendt doesn’t 
allow for this inherent differentiation and configuration of  collective space given the way she develops 
this notion of  boundlessness just several sentences earlier: 
Because the actor always moves among and in relation to other acting beings, 
he is never merely a “doer” but always and at the same time a sufferer. To do 
and to suffer are like opposite sides of the same coin, and the story that an act 
initiates is composed of its consequent deeds and sufferings. These 
consequences are boundless, because action, though it may proceed from 
nowhere, so to speak, acts into a medium where every reaction becomes a 
chain reaction and where every process is the cause of new processes. […] This 
boundlessness is characteristic not of political action alone, in the narrower 
sense of the word, as though the boundlessness of human interrelatedness 
were only the result of the boundless multitude of people involved, which 
could be escaped by resigning oneself to action within a limited, graspable 
framework of circumstances; the smallest act in the most limited circumstances 
bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes 
one word, suffices to change every constellation.104 
To speak of  politics as an ever-shifting constellation of  actions that continuously redefines the 
its collectivity as a whole is to have entirely given up the notion of  a subject’s well-being defined in 
 
103 Which should not be conflated with localizing. There is nothing essential or permanent about the material 
landscape of a certain political configuration, but that in no way obviates its concrete spatiality at any given 
time. Indeed, the spatial concretion of politics is one way of expressing its durability and coherence over space 
and time, as well as its malleability. (See chapter 3 for an extensive discussion of the uneven and combined 
geography of political life, and its tendency toward alienation through localization.) 
104 Arendt, The Human Condition, 190.  
Fabrication  Chaoulideer 181 
terms of  privacy, protection, hiddenness, or any kind of  defense against an invasive sovereignty 
(whether from within or without the bounds of  an oikos). Just as a polity is not strictly localizable, 
neither are the actions of  any member delimitable within some portion of  the polity. To depart 
somewhat from Arendt’s image — so focused on the pure originality (what she calls “natality”) of  
action that she seems to think that every action must originate out of  nothing and reverberate infinitely 
(as though one could speak of  a future without a past) — we can instead speak of  action as itself  
being the shift in a certain “framework of  circumstances,” action itself  taking shape in the tiny, though 
far-reaching, re-constellations of  the fabric into which it is woven. 
To return to the figure of  the previous chapter,105 this structured boundlessness of  action is 
its ecstatic quality: constituted by the very shifts to the medium of  which it is a part, possible only within 
a certain kind of  space of  structured differences, action no longer names a localized event but 
describes its constant reconfiguration of  the political medium. If  we are to speak of  domestic spaces 
in a mode that is not domesticating, then their walls must be seen as partitions within a wider political 
infrastructure as opposed to its basic building block. Similarly, their promise as sites of  enclosed refuge 
must be seen as a flight from their reality as rooms, homes, and nations ecstatically inscribed within a 
universal Allgemeinheit. 
This is not to say that there are not forms of  collectivity in which boundless action is 
considered a sufficiently threatening challenge to the regnant constellation that reconfiguration is 
made taboo, hidden, and even made to seem impossible. Indeed, because the political weave is an 
active project and not an ideal form, a space of  negotiating heterogeneity and not ironing it out, 
 
105 Arendt, clearly responding to Heidegger’s flattened notion of “Mitsein,” is, functionally, articulating a notion 
of social facticity: she is explaining the possibility of novelty, caprice, and freedom through the fact of its always 
already being structured by its place within the larger collective project. Though, as I note above, she often tilts 
“natality” back into an act of “initiation,” seemingly forgetting her own maxim that we are not the authors of 
our own actions, thereby needlessly obscuring the historicity of novelty. See chapter 1 for an extended 
discussion of Heidegger’s fraught attempt to unify facticity and logicity in his phenomenology. 
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polities will always be marked by the irony that the very differences that constitute their unity often 
tend toward their consolidation and intensification as opposed to fluctuation and mediation. Political 
freedom is a fragile project that tends towards its own alienated frustration. Because the fabric of  
political life is not an ideal immaterial given but a very practical material contingency, it is both the 
space of  freedom (the possibility of  equality) and, contra Arendt, a space of  perpetual inequality. This 
is neither a bug nor a feature, it is simply what it means for politics to be an ongoing project of  
negotiating difference collectively. What it does not mean is that in the face of  this inequality we should 
abandon the mechanisms of  mediation and erect fortresses of  interior robustness (as, for example, in 
liberal discourses of  inalienable “rights”). No declaration of  rights could loosen Nazi hegemony and 
pave the way towards transformation from within.106 
Fallada’s Berlin, a polity in which the desire to find refuge from the deadly glare of  the public 
sphere could not be more pervasive, may seem an unlikely place to find clues about a commitment to 
unbounded political action. Karl and Trudel certainly try to wall themselves in, and we have already 
seen ample scenes that hover on the edge of  fleeing the political for the false safety of  the moral. But 
this may well be a feature of  the mode of  reading I have kept to thus far, focusing on exemplary 
scenes of  condensed activity. If, however, we are to take seriously that the fabrication of  a story is 
nothing other than the fabric of  the world that it continuously configures, then our reading of  the 
novel must instead be attuned to the threads that weave through the novel, that tug on one another 
and incrementally alter the spaces in which the novel can move forward. To attend to Fallada’s novel 
in this manner is to give it a chance as a thoroughly political story. 
 
106 Hence the creation of an international tribunal to consider human rights violations. Of course, in the post-
war aftermath as the U.S. basked in perceived global heroism, interventionist salvation seemed an 
unproblematic mechanism for correcting the course of totalizing collectivities from without. Though this is not 
the appropriate moment to delve into these issues, it should go without saying that this moralizing saviorism 
has shown itself to be a thin guise for economic imperialism that exacerbates rather than ameliorates these 
incarnations of political disfiguration; “foreign” policy is as incoherent a solution to political ills as are 
intensifications of the “domestic.”  
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VI. Fallada’s Fabrication 
 
1. Jablonskistraße 55 
As the scenes of  resistance described above make all too evident, when Fallada’s characters 
fail to break free from their political entanglements to a space of  moral refuge it is not for any kind 
of  corruption or lack of  trying. Instead, Fallada’s Berlin weaves them tightly enough into a shared 
world that such a flight becomes unthinkable, un-narratable. But where many stories turn toward 
schools, churches, courts, marketplaces, and other public institutions to root their protagonists in a 
world of  which they are both actor and sufferer, Fallada’s Berlin exists in the wreckage of  these spaces 
of  political infrastructure. The Nazi domestication of  political life banishes action from its usual 
media, pushing the novel into new spaces where action is more muted, less direct. 
For this reason, most of  the novel takes place in living rooms, hallways, small offices, jail cells, 
empty streets, staircases, and other marginal spaces seemingly cordoned off  from the political. But 
these are not respites from the action, narrative eddies that produce psychological depth, inner 
turmoil, or any other domestic buildup for a political sprint to the next interior space for recharging 
and reflection. To map a novel of  this kind would require two elements: nodes of  contained and 
controlled interiority, whether of  individual people or relatively static groups, whose inner drama, so 
to speak, springs out into lines of  (inter)action, “plot,” which in turn tie all such nodes together. This 
would be the novelistic equivalent of  a web of  stories in the strict sense: private nodes that provide 
the shelter from (and form the material substrate for) the immaterial glare of  public interaction. The 
unity of  this narrative configuration remains external to its material, an imposed or retroactive 
coherence added to a psychological pointillism. Whether or not any story really has this structure is 
questionable, but my contention here will be limited to Fallada’s novel: namely, that its domestic spaces 
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are themselves ecstatic: they contain the threads of  their interrelation and thus always exceed the 
boundaries they seem to be defined by. 
This ecstatic domesticity makes itself  apparent, on one level, by the constant presence of  those 
who are not where they are meant to be. The definition of  a private space is not simply its boundedness 
but its exclusion: it is always for some and not for others. This carving up of  space according to 
predefined economic, ethnic, historical, and even aesthetic factors is what (ostensibly) lends the private 
realm its shield against the total openness and democracy of  public space. It is this spatial logic that 
the novel systematically unsettles, not least by the fact that its living rooms, offices, and workplaces 
are in a constant state of  disruption by those who are not expected or welcome. These transgressions 
of  spatial boundaries disclose the deep disturbances to planned action to which every character is 
subject. The novel is full of  commitments and resolutions, but just as full of  messy entanglements in 
the lives of  others that either compromise or fully derail those moments of  agential clarity. Between 
these points of  reflectivity in which characters declare a change to the course of  their lives by sheer 
conviction, willing themselves onto a new path through a psychological or moral reckoning,107 there 
lie the many encounters that weave threads of  mutual implication: threads of  knowledge, debt, 
commitment, fear, and trust. 
* 
In the week of Otto Quangel’s inner drama following Anna’s accusation, “du und dein Führer,” 
while carefully calculating what to do next, another drama unfolds within his own apartment building, 
the decidedly un-calculated consequences of which end up making the decision for him. Though most 
of what follows happens inside the building, under the cover of night, and outside any clear legal 
 
107 And there are plenty of such moments. Beyond the scenes described above, more or less every character 
goes through these moments. Perhaps the most extreme, even comical, is the repeated failure of Enno Kluge 
to find his way back to economic stability, employment, and general normalcy. (See Fallada, Every Man Dies 
Alone, 90/115, 206/281, 206/285-86, 221/302.) 
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purview, the forces at work are undeniably political. The building’s stairwell, connecting the four 
apartments, becomes an opaque public space in which unplanned encounters have profound 
consequences. The apartments themselves are not the mere domiciles of four adjacent families, but a 
contested channel through which power is mediated and manipulated in very different ways. This is 
perhaps most apparent on the top floor where a Jewish couple, the Rosenthals, have been forced to 
live since being evicted from their previous home. 
Actually, Frau Rosenthal has lived in the apartment alone ever since her husband was abducted 
by the Gestapo. She is the only Jewish resident of Jablonskistraße 55 and everyone is well aware that 
this greatly weakens any legal barrier to breaking in and pillaging her belongings, in effect opening her 
apartment to anyone who cares to enter and claim it for themselves. And sure enough, the first and 
only time the novel finds its way into her apartment is through the late-night thieving escapade of two 
opportunistic and desperate neighbors, Enno Kluge and Emil Barkhausen. 
In the afternoon, Emil Barkhausen (a resident of a cellar-level apartment in the back of the 
courtyard, not the front of the house in which the Quangels, the Persickes (an SS family), Judge 
Fromm, and Frau Rosenthal live)108 stops by to see whether he can find his way into Frau Rosenthal’s 
apartment. Standing at the top of the stairs, waiting to see if she will answer the door, Barkhausen gets 
unexpected company in the form of Baldur Persicke, the eldest and most audacious son of the SS 
family. Though neither Barkhausen nor we as readers find out what business Baldur has up there, he 
assumes the position of sovereignty and chases Barkhausen away. We can only imagine that Baldur 
wants to keep the spoils for himself, and as Barkhausen comes to realize this, he changes tone and 
tries to appeal to their shared aim. Baldur seems to see an opportunity as well and orders him down 
 
108 One cannot help but read the floor-levels of the building as a dark trace of a social hierarchy of the past. 
Frau Rosenthal’s elevation above all the others is both a mark of her great wealth and the literal height from 
which she falls to her death. 
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into his apartment, presumably to strike up some kind of deal. Barkhausen leaves with twenty marks 
and a light step. Beyond this curious new alliance (if that’s indeed what it is), a third party has inserted 
herself into the action on the stairs: Anna Quangel, for reasons she herself cannot name since she 
generally follows her husband’s manner of ignoring the neighbors, had cracked her front door and 
overheard the entire exchange between Barkhausen and Baldur. She finds herself quite agitated 
afterward, with grand and not obviously related thoughts running through her head: “They aren’t 
going to have killed my son without consequences. I can also be different [Anderssein]…”109 Though 
she isn’t sure what she even means by this “Anderssein,” it is clear that by slowly inserting herself in the 
lives of her neighbors she is recognizing that she was always implicated in their lives, not least by her 
son who was sent to war by the very animus and belligerence that Baldur and Barkhausen embody. 
When we return to the house that evening, again with Barkhausen, he has his friend Enno in 
tow. This time they avoid confrontation on the stairs and slink unchallenged into the apartment full 
of Rosenthal’s belongings but apparently empty of her. We later realize that she is hiding in the 
Quangels’ bedroom, presumably brought there by Anna during the afternoon to protect her from 
precisely this return visit. 
The notion that a home can be a hiding place, a refuge from the political fray outside, has been 
amply undermined by the novel as we have already seen, and though Anna may still view it this way 
(we never learn the details) it is undeniable that in opening up their home to Frau Rosenthal they are 
not simply enlarging their refuge but accepting that it is both a matter of privilege and contingency to 
have rooms that are not under constant threat and that they are thus under a certain kind of obligation 
to put that security in jeopardy for those who lack such a space. This is, we might say, the Quangels’ 
 
109 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, my translation*/33. 
*Though these are included in Hofmann’s translation, his rendition hides the ambiguity of the “they” and totally 
skips over her glimpse of potential transformation. 
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first deliberate political act of the novel, the first moment in which they (in this case, solely Anna) 
respond to the complicity they carry in the death of their own son through a new appreciation of the 
responsibility they carry for the vulnerability of Frau Rosenthal. It isn’t clear that this act is exactly 
intended as such or that Anna has fully considered its consequences — Otto is clearly still very 
resistant to any involvement in the affairs of others. Upon returning home that evening and seeing 
the lights on in Rosenthal’s apartment, Otto takes note and immediately recognizes that “there’s 
something wrong!” But just as he wonders what could be going on in the lives of those above him, he 
quells this curiosity with a predictable rejoinder, “But what’s it to do with me? I want nothing to do 
with those people. I live for myself [alone]. With Anna. [Just] the two of us.”110 
Yet Otto hesitates in front of his door. The indictment, “du und dein Führer,” somehow thwarts 
the simple mantra by which he had hitherto separated himself from the concerns of others and keeps 
him in the stairwell from which he can see the light and hear the harsh voices spilling out from 
Rosenthal’s open door. At this moment, a small but forceful hand, that of Judge Fromm, as Otto soon 
realizes, turns him toward the staircase and asks him to go ahead, assuring him that he will follow 
shortly. Otto does not hesitate and ascends the stairs to insert himself in a situation he does not know 
the contours of and with even less sense of what he is to do. It turns out he is to do very little, hardly 
anything other than stand in the doorway and appear on the scene. By that point, the scene has become 
rather chaotic: Enno and Barkhausen have discovered Rosenthal’s liquor cabinet and are clinging to 
consciousness; Baldur Persicke, joined by his two younger brothers and bumbling father, all also rather 
inebriated, have just entered the apartment much to Barkhausen’s chagrin. They’ve had just enough 
time to give Enno and Barkhausen a few unnecessary punches and to start gathering up a few suitcases 
of Rosenthal’s possessions to take with them, their father stumbling into the bathroom. Otto walks in 
 
110 Fallada, 63/79. 
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on this chaos, a convoluted tangle of entitlements, fears, and desires created by this unlikely 
constellation of figures with varying (and rapidly changing) degrees of economic, physical, and legal 
power. All in the vacuum of the presence of Frau Rosenthal and any kind of institutional mediation 
of her apartment. And yet, in the wake of the forms of political mediation these figures and we readers 
are accustomed to, a new kind relational medium is established by rather simple means. Otto simply 
stares at Baldur, and Fromm soon appears from the other side of the room, casually but deliberately 
taking inventory of everything in the apartment and reminding the Persickes of the “honor” they could 
carry if they took responsibility for the case and turned Enno and Barkhausen in. 
Without any threat, without any kind of forced inversion of power, Fromm and Otto simply 
change the conditions of the situation sufficiently to push the Persicke’s calculus in a new direction. 
Anna has opened her home to Frau Rosenthal, and Fromm and Otto have managed to give the 
impression that there still are other subjects in Rosenthal’s apartment to whom one must be 
answerable. It is in this sense that Otto and Fromm take action: not as executors of a particular 
profession or social station, not as representatives of a moral alternative, not even rhetorically (Otto 
hardly says a word) or by way of reflection or intention (Otto, recall, is literally pushed into the room). 
Instead, it is by their sheer presence, by inserting themselves into the fray and forcing the others to 
recognize that even if they are not answerable to the police or the law in other forms, they remain 
answerable to their neighbors. This is both an assertion of power by forcing another’s actions to 
conform with one’s presence, as well as an extension of vulnerability. Otto and Fromm are now, 
however minutely and blindly, asserting themselves as actors in the house, threads of coherent 
responsibility that all others must at least take account of. In short, Otto and Fromm have introduced 
threads of Resistenz, acts that reconfigure and strengthen the damaged fabric on which the 
opportunistic thieves sought to capitalize. (It must be said that precisely because of the limitations of 
their power and the openness of their homes thanks to which they can take Rosenthal in in the first 
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place, Rosenthal cannot be saved so simply. There are simply too many forces coursing through Berlin, 
through their building. and through their homes that seek to ferret out and punish Rosenthal for being 
Jewish, and Otto and Fromm for daring to act politically. Rosenthal hides in Fromm’s apartment for 
a week after Otto kicks her out, but after consuming a large number of sleeping pills in hopes that she 
will fall asleep during the day and catch a glimpse of the nocturnal Fromm to exchange so much as a 
word with another person, she begins to hallucinate the return of her husband and leaves Fromm’s 
apartment only to collide with Baldur on the stairs. Within two hours she has fallen from her fourth-
floor window after tussling with an executioner from the Gestapo. Fromm and Otto simply do not 
have that much weight to throw.) 
This chaotic night and its aftershocks fall during the period of silence during which Anna and 
Otto are mulling over their complicity in their son’s death. They are well aware that something is 
changing in their relationship to their world, but their language lags behind their actions. As we have 
already seen, out of simplicity, out of fear, and perhaps out of a righteousness that is not difficult to 
imagine, their response to their apolitical past is entirely moral. They declare war against their Führer 
and his followers, they pursue decency (the veneration of Anständigkeit could form another study of 
this novel), and they double down on their fear of the outside world as they come to recognize the 
vulnerability they have always already had and the increased danger they will face as they begin to 
resist. In a telling moment, as Quangel and Fromm are walking down the stairs from Rosenthal’s 
apartment, Fromm offers to take in Frau Rosenthal if Otto has any trouble “because of her.” Otto 
protests, even if only performatively: “What do I care about Frau Rosenthal? I barely know her.”111 
This only intensifies when Otto discovers that Anna has allowed Rosenthal to hide in their bedroom: 
“I don’t want anything unsafe, and above all I don’t want to be dragged into 
other people’s unsafe business [Geschichten]. If it’s to be my head on the block, 
I want to know what it’s doing there, and that I’m not sticking it out because 
 
111 Fallada, 66/84. 
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of some stupid things that other people have done, but because I did 
something that I wanted to do. I’m not saying that I’m not going to do 
anything. But if I do anything, I’ll only do it alone with you, and with no one 
else” […] 
He knows he will get his way. Tomorrow morning, the flat will be clean again, 
and Anna will give in. No more wild business. And just himself. Only him!112 
This desperate attempt to keep his home “clean” of any outside influences, to imagine that he and 
Anna can safely lie in wait behind their domestic fortress and step out to act at the moment of their 
choosing, this domestication of his own agency belies the very intervention he had taken part in just 
minutes earlier. The paradoxical desire to act on the world without suffering it in any way is a clear 
symptom of the alienation that hangs thick in the air of the Quangels’ home as much as anywhere 
else. And yet, within this murky city there are innumerable moments of action, consequence, 
community, trust, and betrayal, and all the ripples that these relations generate. 
This is perhaps what makes Fallada’s novel so interesting. Weaving a narrative fabric is nothing 
unusual, and its intelligibility is a function of its everyday familiarity. Encountering your neighbor, 
entering some facet of their lives as a member of their community to whom they are accountable and 
to whom they can in turn appeal, participating in norms, bending them, breaking them, and recreating 
them — this is the unremarkable stuff of everyday life. Where Fallada’s Berlin becomes of real 
curiosity is in the persistence of these mundane acts of political fabrication as the maintenance of a 
shared world under conditions that so forcefully contort and strangle them. Thus, the events in Frau 
Rosenthal’s apartment are both totally ordinary and familiar and simultaneously unimaginable and 
horrific. As the material conditions of a polity become ever more intolerant and dangerous, so, too, 
do the lines between political action and moral self-preservation become harder and harder to discern, 
making the mundane and everyday appear heroic and unusual. 
 
112 Fallada, 69/87, translation altered for accuracy. 
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The fear that pervades almost every interaction actively muffles the productive political anxiety 
that could push against it. Fear, as explored above, is the ultimate agent of political suffocation and of 
the blind reproduction of the status quo. The ecstatic structure of life becomes a liability and, 
whenever possible, is buried under the comfort of strict boundaries of control and self-limitation. 
Accepting the sovereignty of others over oneself comes to seem a small price to pay for the sovereignty 
one can imagine to have over oneself. 
But against this bleak landscape glimmers the defiant hope of pluralism, the inextinguishable 
ecstasy of social life, and the ineliminable fact of the contingent and therefore protean fabrication of 
collectivity. Fallada’s hope lies in the potential of transformative anxiety buried within every instance 
of alienating fear. Fallada has hope that even Nazi Berlin could be reconfigured anew. That hope 
begins in the viability of poetic representation of a coherent whole at a time when the political 
mechanisms of that representation seemed lost. 
 
2. The Post 
To trace all the threads that emerge from this one night at Rosenthal’s apartment would require 
that we read through the minutiae of the entire novel, which is obviously not the task here. And 
although it would run counter to the notion of the novelistic fabric to speak of exemplary scenes or 
tropes that act as keys to the entire novel (recall the deceptively isolated scenes of Widerstand above), 
there is something like a through-line, a central figure that illuminates this difficult navigation of 
political action under the conditions of its own persecution. Perhaps more precisely, a figure that 
clearly transforms the fabric structure of the novel from mere static backdrop (a “milieu”) to the 
dynamic medium of action itself. 
This strand of the narrative medium is the post. How does a novel even find its way into the 
protected intimacy of households, the contested sites of crime, the offices of the Gestapo, and even 
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prisons in which the “little people” of Berlin die, how does a novel gain entry to these spaces at a time 
when they are so carefully guarded and try so hard to seal themselves off from prying eyes like our 
own and from stories that would weave them back into the greater public world? In Fallada’s case, the 
answer is simple, and it begins with a character we have not yet discussed but with whom the novel 
both begins and ends: Eva Kluge. The novel begins: 
The postwoman Eva Kluge slowly climbs the steps of Jablonskistraße 55. She 
is slow not so much because of her tiring route, but because she has one of 
those letters in her bag that she hates to deliver, and which she must now, in 
just two steps, deliver to the Quangels.113 
Before she does so, she delivers a party newspaper to the Persickes, the father of whom we get a quick 
introduction to thanks to Eva’s daily, even if narrow, experience of him. We also learn of the 
Rosenthals before turning back to the Quangels to deliver the fateful message. It is through Eva that 
the novel is able to find its point of entry — and its ending, though I won’t discuss that here — into 
the lives of our protagonists. However frail and seemingly insignificant, the residents of 
Jablonskistraße 55 are all tethered to one medium of information and communication equally: the 
German postal service. In their case, Eva Kluge. 
And as I have already detailed, this dreaded letter from the front with the news of Ottochen’s 
death is the irritant that sets off the machinations of the entire novel, spreading to the lives of dozens 
of people all over Berlin and with highly divergent and perhaps unexpected effects. If the scope of the 
novel’s fabric had to be defined in some way, one could simply say: the novel concerns itself with and 
only with the threads of action that are tangled up in this one letter. The letter, to use the spatial 
language from above, pierces the domestic complacency of the Quangels’ home, the ecstatic 
ramifications of which are seen across the city. 
 
113 Fallada, 9/9. 
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These ramifications take many forms (the scene in Rosenthal’s apartment, for example), but 
one of the most concrete threads of action to emanate from the Quangels’ politicized domesticity are 
the postcards that they themselves send out into the nooks and crannies of Berlin. After stewing for 
that long week, Otto resolves to react to the letter by disseminating letters of his own, leaving 
postcards once a week or so in stairwells across Berlin. This plan has a clear logic to it: the Quangels’ 
response to Eva’s delivery is to multiply and disseminate the message through an ad hoc postal web 
of their own. 
Mother! The Führer has murdered my son. Mother! The Führer will murder 
your sons too, he will not stop till he has brought sorrow to every home in the 
world.114 
These are the words of their first postcard. The tactic behind it could not be more apparent: 
to translate the dissonance and anxiety they have felt since receiving their own letter into the lives of 
others; to awaken them to the self-destruction at the root of their allegiance to the regime. The 
Quangels are plenty aware that these postcards will be received by everyone principally with fear. The 
question is whether this fear of the postcard will be able to translate itself into fear for their future: 
into animating anxiety. 
The path of this first postcard is rather short but not without its ripples. Otto drops it in a 
stairwell as planned and it is soon discovered by Max Harteisen, an actor whose recent falling out with 
Goebbels has left him out of work, disenchanted with the promises of National Socialism, and fearful 
for his future. Max has just left a meeting with his old friend and lawyer, Erwin Toll, who had just 
assured him that they were totally alone in the room, that the door was padded and locked and that 
they could “speak openly together.” Upon finding the card in the stairwell, Max enters a panic, fearing 
someone has seen him picking up the card. He begins to wonder if Goebbels has set him up and 
 
114 Fallada, 132/183, 134/185. 
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whether someone hasn’t been following him the past few days. Not knowing what else to do, Max 
brings the dangerous thing back to Toll’s office. In a frenzy to protect himself, Max suggests Toll tear 
it up and put in the trashcan.  
“Much too dangerous, my dear fellow! It would just take the office boy or 
some nosy cleaning woman turning it up, and I’d be in it up to my neck!” 
“Burn it, then!” 
“You forget we have central heating here!” 
“Take a match, and burn it over your ashtray. No one would ever know.” 
“You would know.” 
Pale-faced, they stared at each other. They were old friends, going back to 
school days, but now fear had come between them, and fear had brought 
mistrust with it. They eyed one another silently.115 
Though the moment passes and they hand the card off to the law office’s political commissioner, the 
power of the card is undeniable. The fragility of Max’s relation to Goebbels and Nazi favorability 
more generally is suddenly visible in his oldest friendship. This fear, not yet a developed anxiety about 
his own commitments to the world and his opportunistic work with high-ranking Nazis, still manages 
to dislodge the notion that any space, however well sealed, and any relationship, however old and 
intimate, is safe from the volatility of the political world. Dismissing the writer of the postcard as a 
terroristic madman endangering others, Max asks, “And for what? What is he actually saying? Nothing 
that each one of us doesn’t already know! He must be a madman!”116 But it isn’t clear that Max already 
fully understood his own vulnerability as a function of his complicity. Toll had, just moments earlier, 
derided him for speaking of Goebbels as “my Minister” in the same breath as he complained of the 
consequences of falling out of favor with him. Max has clearly only thought about his decisions from 
 
115 Fallada, 150/206. 
116 Fallada, 151/207. 
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the point of view of their most proximate effects, and has thus not thought about his future or about 
others; he has not had the capacity to understand himself and his actions politically. With this card in 
his hand, Max is confronted with the bitter truth that his decisions and his affiliations are both highly 
consequential and quite contingent on factors that are out of his control. This truth certainly manifests 
itself as fear, even fear of his best friend, but a fear that might nudge Max further toward understanding 
the collective and futural consequences of his commitments. Though the novel doesn’t follow Max 
long enough to see if this fear becomes an effective anxiety — and that may well be because it does 
not — the postcard has at least disturbed the complacent and childish selfishness of Max’s self-
understanding. Holding the card in his hand, Max sees himself under the shadow of presumed guilt 
that seems so pervasive as to be almost ontological. Whether Max is able to levy that guilt into political 
accountability, into responsibility, is a question for another novel. 
German, don’t forget! It began with the Anschluss of Austria. The Sudetenland 
and Czechoslovakia followed. Poland was attacked, Belgium, Holland…117 
The second postcard that the novel follows has a remarkably similar initial reception. Otto 
slips it into the mail slot of a doctor’s office to be found minutes later by its receptionist in the hallway. 
She immediately brings it to the doctor and claims to have seen a suspicious man in the waiting room 
go to the bathroom moments before the card appeared. This poor suspect is none other than Enno 
Kluge, Barkhausen’s accomplice (and the postwoman Eva Kluge’s burdensome husband), who the 
receptionist already resents for repeatedly sneaking into the bathroom to smoke a cigarette. And yet 
it is the doctor who, sitting there with the card in his hand, finds himself in the position not just of 
the current possessor but potentially of the suspected author of the card; his whole life flashes before 
his eyes from the vantage point of guilt to the regime: 
Really, this card was the final straw. Now the police were on their way, perhaps 
he would find himself under suspicion, they would search the premises, and 
 
117 Fallada, 179/246-47. 
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even if it turned out that their suspicion was wrong, they would still find, in 
the servant’s room at the back… 
The doctor stood up, he at least had to warn her… 
And sat down again. How could he come under suspicion? And even if they 
found her, she was his housekeeper, which was what it said on her papers. It 
had all been thought about and talked through a hundred times, ever since that 
time over a year ago when he had had to divorce his wife, a Jew — under 
pressure from the Nazis. He had done it principally in response to her pleas, 
to keep the children safe. Later on, after changing his address, he had installed 
her as his “housekeeper,” with false papers. Really, nothing could happen, she 
didn’t even look especially Jewish… 
That damned card! Why it had to involve him, of all people! But probably that 
was how it was: whoever it came to, it would create panic and fear. In these 
times everyone had something to hide! 
Perhaps that was precisely the purpose of the card, to provoke panic and fear? 
Perhaps such cards were a fiendish device, to be distributed among suspicious 
individuals, to see how they reacted? Perhaps he had been under surveillance 
for a long time already, and this was just a further means to monitor his 
response? 
At any rate, he had behaved correctly. Five minutes after the card was found, 
he had got in touch with the police. And he was even able to come up with a 
suspect, perhaps some poor devil who had nothing to do with the affair. Well, 
it wasn’t his problem, he had to get himself clear if he could! The main thing 
was that the doctor was spared.118 
Receiving the card has little to do with receiving any kind of information, little to do with the Quangels 
communicating anything in particular (the cards hardly seem to be read for the specifics of their 
message). Instead, the very existence of the card and its rather simple provocation brings out the 
feeling of universal guilt on which the regime maintains its power. The fear is a stark reminder that a 
small postcard is all that lies between survival and the gallows. 
In the case of the doctor, and possibly also Max Harteisen, this fear has been made so strong 
that the cards may simply exacerbate their sense of powerlessness and political paralysis. Not only do 
the recipients not join the ranks of an underground card writing resistance, but, for some of them, 
 
118 Fallada, 173/237-38. 
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contact with the cards is fatal: the terrified and confused Enno Kluge is eventually killed as a result of 
his entanglement in the card’s discovery. As the cards trickle up the ladder of power, however, 
eventually landing in the hands of the Gestapo, their effect is markedly different. Fear of punishment 
slowly turns into curiosity, excitement, and in some cases irritation with the bother of finding the 
disseminator. The great irony is that in the hands of those who are inoculated from the initial fearful 
paralysis, there is space and time for a different and perhaps more consequential entanglement with 
the card to develop. This is most clear in the case of the Gestapo official charged with tracking the 
card writer down, Inspector Escherich. It is in the novel’s most prominent Nazi official, I will argue, 
that Fallada expresses his greatest hope in the political plasticity of even the most totalizing totality. 
 
3. Inspector Escherich 
Inspector Escherich is perhaps the quintessential bourgeois functionary in whom Arendt sees 
the dangerous replacement of civic concerns with sheer professionalization, the kind of man that 
Himmler relied on to carry out the Nazi agenda. As Arendt describes this “modern man of the 
masses”: 
He has driven the dichotomy between private and public functions, of family 
and occupation, so far that he can no longer find in his own person any 
connection between the two. When his occupation forces him to murder 
people he does not regard himself as a murderer because he has not done it 
out of inclination but in his professional capacity. Out of sheer passion he 
would never do harm to a fly.119 
It would be difficult to describe Escherich more succinctly. As Fallada makes clear, Escherich is a 
“hunter,” a “lover of the chase. It was in his blood. Others hunted wild boar; he hunted humans. The 
fact that the boar or the human had to die at the end of the chase—that didn’t move him at all. It was 
 
119 Arendt, “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” 130. 
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foreordained for the boar to die like this, as it was for humans if they wrote such postcards.”120 
Escherich shields himself from the fact that sheer caprice separates those who are condemned to fall 
within his crosshairs from those who are spared: rumor, fear, and the whimsies of his superiors dictate 
this fateful separation of the hunters from the hunted. He shields himself from the ugly fact that he is 
carrying out his party’s dirty work by cloaking it in the language of fate, professionalism and even 
justice (note the echo of Judge Fromm’s self-exculpation). 
And so, even within the logic of his profession, quite apart from its dissonance with his life as 
a passionate and vulnerable citizen, there is a deep contradiction. For a hunter to do his job, the 
principle by which prey is separated from everything (or everyone) else must be apparent. And yet, as 
Escherich himself laments: 
These Germans were a disgrace! With the greatest war in history being waged 
to assure them of a happy future, they persisted in their ingratitude. There was 
a bad smell wherever you stuck your nose. Inspector Escherich was firmly 
convinced that he would find a knot of secrecy and deceit in well-nigh every 
German home. Almost no one had a clean conscience—of course with the 
exception of Party members. And he knew better than to institute the sort of 
search he had conducted at Fräulein Schönlein’s at any Party member’s 
home.121 
How is Escherich to hunt the guilty when everyone is guilty? 122 This not only compromises the ethical 
pretense of Escherich’s job, but disrupts the mechanics by which he sniffs people out. Once the first 
handful of the Quangels’ postcards have landed on his desk and no clear leads have offered 
themselves, Escherich gets a visit from his boss, Herr Obergruppenführer Prall. Prall is not a detective, 
is uninterested in the art of the hunt, and as a high-ranking party functionary, is primarily interested 
in maintaining his status by capturing and punishing those who have violated his or his party’s 
 
120 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 165/226. 
121 Fallada, 263/358. 
122 Recall Arendt’s warning: “Where all are guilty, nobody is.” (Arendt, “Collective Responsibility,” 43.) 
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sensibilities. Prall, impatient to find the postcard writer, wonders whether any residents of the houses 
in which the cards were found were at all “suspicious”: 
“Suspicions? Suspicions beyond suspicions! There’s suspicion everywhere 
nowadays. But there’s nothing informing it beyond a little anger toward a 
neighbor, a bit of snooping, eagerness to come forward with an accusation. 
No, out of that we’ll get no leads.” 
“And the people bringing them in? All beyond suspicion themselves?” 
“Beyond suspicion?” Escherich twisted his mouth. “Good God, 
Obergruppenführer, no one is beyond suspicion these days.” And, with a 
hurried glance at the face of his superior, “Or everyone is.”123 
This is a problem, as we have come to see, less with the disgraceful Germans than with the 
notion of guilt itself. All that remains is the superficial and capricious distinction between those within 
the Party and those without. A moralized political difference that Escherich masks as an ethical or 
juridical one for his own peace of mind and for the satisfaction of his superiors: Prall is so steeped in 
the dogmas of his own partisan ranks that he does not even fully realize that what they have come to 
call suspicion and guilt is a paper-thin artifice concealing the completely opaque tangle of accusations, 
fears, and vendettas with which the Gestapo is flooded. 
The frailty of this artifice is broken by the moments in which this contradiction is brought to 
the fore. It is in exposing this contradiction that the Quangels’ actions are perhaps most potent. 
Already in the exchange with Prall above, Escherich is forced to come in contact with the deeply 
partisan logic that makes his work nearly impossible. Escherich certainly fancies himself the smarter, 
more nuanced, and more professional of the two, separating himself and his work from the crude 
agendas of those that employ and heckle him, but this separation is tenuous, and as Prall becomes 
more and more impatient with Escherich’s hunt, Escherich loses the space in which to disentangle his 
 
123 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 163/224. 
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tactics from the crude demands of the Nazi party. The postcards bring Escherich just a little too 
close.124 
The doctor does end up using Enno Kluge as the scapegoat for the postcard that has landed 
in his office, and Enno is taken to Escherich for interrogation. Though Escherich immediately realizes 
that Enno is far too fearful and confused to be the man he is after, the pressure from Prall to produce 
the evidence of some kind of lead compels him to at least carry out the pretense of pursuing someone. 
After a long back and forth during which Escherich assures Enno of the insignificance of the postcard, 
he convinces Enno to sign a confession of having placed it in the doctor’s office, assuring him that it 
is just a formality that will have no repercussions and as thanks for which Escherich will go to his boss 
in the factory where he is supposed to work and make it clear that Enno is to be paid whether he 
shows up for work or not. Escherich lets Enno run free (though under the watch of two Gestapo 
shadows) and Escherich goes to report to Prall. With this strange exchange of favors (or so it has been 
billed to Enno), the Quangels’ card continues its path into the lives of many more unwitting Berliners, 
propelled by this unlikely new relationship and the mounting tension that it carries. 
Almost immediately, things do not go as planned for either of them. Hours later, Escherich 
gets a call that his shadows have lost Enno in the crowds of the subway. In the week that follows, 
Escherich falls into a frenzy searching for Enno (though he is well aware he has nothing to do with 
the postcards), a desperation that leads him to all those with whom Enno has managed to entangle 
himself. First, Eva Kluge’s neighbor, Frau Gesch, is intimidated by Escherich and forced to watch 
over the Kluges’ now empty apartment (Eva has fled to the country) should Enno return to it; next, 
 
124 Already during Prall’s first visit, the pressure to resolve the case of the postcards reveals the political caprice 
that has kept them (Escherich, Prall, and every other member of the Party) on the side of the hunters and not 
the hunted. Though Prall’s warning that Escherich’s cocksure patience could, were it to fall into Himmler’s 
hands, land them both in the concentration camp, does not seem to ruffle Escherich, it is an early warning that 
his complacent professionalism has consequences not just for his political prey but also for himself. 
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Escherich goes to the factory where Enno is supposed to work and does, in fact, hold up a version of 
his side of the bargain, ordering them to ignore any absence of Enno’s, but mostly just asserts his 
power to forcefully collect any information he can on Enno; the barkeeps at the locales where Enno 
is a known regular are charged with reporting any sighting of Enno (Escherich later finds out that one 
of them chose not to do so, a moment of dissidence, no matter how peripheral and minor, that is sure 
to carry its consequences); when Emil Barkhausen comes to Escherich to complain about the 
Persickes yet again, Escherich redirects him by promising him five hundred Marks for finding Enno; 
Barkhausen quickly finds Enno with Frau Hete Häberle, a pet store owner who has taken Enno in to 
shelter him from the Gestapo, and not only extorts her of two thousand Marks, but uses his son, 
Kuno-Dieter, to watch over Enno and Hete until Escherich is able to come to the scene and collect 
him; Hete, who has caught wind of the impending danger, sends Enno to stay with a friend of her’s, 
Frau Schönlein, but Kuno-Dieter follows him there, allowing Barkhausen to end the chase and call 
Escherich in. All of these lives, in various ways and to different degrees, find themselves compromised, 
pursued, and caught in a dizzying net of distrust that is spun between Enno and Escherich. In all of 
this, the postcard brings latent relations of fear to the surface, forcing neighbors, sons, friends, and 
lovers to face the frailty of those connections under the pressures of their domesticated polity. 
More than anyone else, however, it is Escherich who is ensnared in his own trap. In his case, 
the postcards have brought the relationship with his own superiors, which had seemed 
straightforwardly professional, into sharp relief as tenuous and even compromising. The tension 
between knowing that he is hunting the wrong person and the mounting threat embodied in the 
increasingly impatient and violent Prall pushes him toward something his profession had not 
demanded of him before: self-justification. A part of him even comes to believe that Enno does have 
something to do with the postcards after all. But this shallow self-deception is not enough to wipe 
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away the fear. As Escherich leaves his office to pick up Enno from Frau Schönlein’s apartment, he 
grabs a pistol from his desk, pauses, and 
takes a last look around. Something odd happens: without meaning to, he 
makes a sort of salute to the room, he bids goodbye to his office. So long… A 
dark presentiment, a feeling he’s almost ashamed of, that he won’t see the 
office in quite the same way again. Till now, he was an official, someone who 
hunted human beings in the same way you might sell stamps: diligent, 
methodical, by the book. 
But when he gets back to this room later tonight, or maybe even early 
tomorrow morning, he might not be the same official. He will have something 
on his conscience, something he won’t be able to forget. Something he alone 
knows, but all the worse for that: he will know it, and he will never be able to 
exonerate himself [freisprechen].125 
Escherich’s dispassionate shell of professional alienation is finally cracked. He already knows that he 
will have to sacrifice Enno that night to save himself from the consequences of intentionally creating 
a false lead. But it is too late: not only is Enno’s fate sealed (Escherich does, in fact, convince him that 
night that the SS believe his confession, that all is lost, and that his only path to freedom from their 
torture is suicide; Enno accepts and uses the pistol Escherich brought along to end his poor life), but 
so, too, has Escherich walked himself into a “dead end” from which no sacrifice will keep him. His 
stint as a dispassionate hunter is over: he has willfully killed a weak and confused man to cover up his 
inability to catch his real prey and to ward off the ugly forces from above. It is those forces from 
above, Prall and his fellow Party functionaries, that destroy the very pretense of apolitical 
professionalism and hierarchy on which their authority and agenda depends, the charade of his 
freedom finally exposed. 
Though Enno and Escherich could not be more clearly asymmetrical in their institutional and 
physical power, they come to be bound by the same false confession and all of its consequences. To 
be a hunter, a member of the Party, an SS officer, one who acts without fear of repercussions, is to be 
 
125 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 256-57/349. 
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separated from one’s prey. The fearful little Enno Kluge is the one to show Escherich that every actor 
is both doer and sufferer. Already in the moment that Escherich reports having let Enno go free to Prall, 
Prall loses his temper and torments Escherich “just as a couple of hours ago he himself had tormented 
the skinny Kluge.”126 The strength of the threads of action that ensure that everyone must also be 
subject to as much as the subject of their actions is made all the more apparent, even heavy handedly 
so, by Fallada in the moment that Prall, almost a year after the fiasco with Enno, finally runs out of 
patience with Escherich. After a meeting that Escherich thought would end with congratulations for 
solving various other cases, Prall rapidly turns on Escherich and has him dragged to his office by two 
SS guards, referring to him as a “prisoner,” and beating him like one. As the SS guards then take him 
to the basement cell where is to be kept, Escherich realizes that he is being dragged down the very 
same hallway and thrown down the very same steps that he had so lightly thrown Barkhausen down 
just a year before. Even after he is called back up months later, his replacement equally disgraced and 
imprisoned in his place, Escherich never regains the confidence of the hunter dispassionately aloof of 
his prey: “Escherich once felt very secure. He once thought nothing could happen to him. He worked 
on the assumption that he was completely different from everyone else. And Escherich has had to 
give up these little self-deceptions. It happened basically in the few seconds after the SS man Dobat 
smashed him in the face and he became acquainted with fear.”127  
The strange recapitulation of Escherich’s victims’ lives in his own descent into fear ends where 
it must: with Escherich’s own death. We jump now to the final portion of the novel in which Otto 
and Anna are finally caught and taken to the Gestapo. But the encounter to which Escherich had 
looked forward for two full years does not end in the satisfaction of catching an elusive criminal. After 
some resistance, Otto admits to having written the postcards. Escherich asks if he knows that harsh 
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sentencing and possibly death will face him. “‘Yes, I know what I’ve done. And I hope you, too, know 
what you’re doing Inspector?’ ‘What am I doing?’ ‘You’re working for a murderer, delivering new 
victims to him. You do it for money; perhaps you don’t even believe in the man. No, I’m certain you 
don’t believe in him. Just for money…’”128 That night, Escherich is forced to celebrate Otto’s capture 
with Prall and other higher-ups. After plenty of Armagnac and shouting, Prall and his comrades drag 
Escherich with them back to Otto’s cell for some fun. They wake him up, jeer, pour their drinks and 
break their glasses over his head, demanding Escherich to do the same. It takes Escherich four 
faltering attempts to break his glass. All the while, Escherich has the feeling that Otto is staring directly 
at him through the streams of blood and Armagnac, saying: “So this is the just cause for which you 
murder! These are your henchmen! This is how you all are. You know very well what you’re doing. 
But I will die for committing crimes that I did not commit, and you will live—so much for the justice 
of your cause!”129 
Facing Otto, the fear of his superiors becomes shame, horror, and a deep anxiety about the 
work he always treated so dispassionately. Escherich cannot flee from the political reality of his work 
and from the fact that all this time his relative power and protection did not immunize him from being 
subject to the world of suffering, persecution, fear, and death that he helped shape. Long before being 
hit over the head with the reciprocity and entanglement of action by his own SS man Dobat, thrown 
down his own stairs and locked in his own cell, Escherich had been, however repressively, prey to the 
Gestapo for whom he considered himself the hunter. And though this closure of the karmic cycle, to 
speak moralistically, instills plenty of fear in Escherich, confronting him with something like the 
mantra “no one is free from the Gestapo,” it takes the Quangels and their quiet ecstatic power to 
bring him to see the true damage and depravity of his actions. 
 
128 Fallada, my translation/501-2. 
129 Fallada, 379/503, translation altered for accuracy. 
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Escherich has a map of Berlin on the wall of his office with little red pins stuck in at every 
point where a card had been found. What had seemed a collection of dots, endpoints of the movement 
of an unknown criminal, becomes a map of the dizzying fabric of places, people, institutions, and 
events into which Escherich had inserted himself, instilled fear, manipulated civilians, thrown the 
enormous weight of the Gestapo, and altered the very landscape of the city to match his needs. The 
Quangels’ postcards are thus as much ecstatic appendages of their political potency, weaving lives 
together haphazardly and mostly blindly, as they are a medium through which Escherich exercises his 
power, hides the responsibility he carries, and (finally unsuccessfully) protects himself against the 
fragile fabric he himself is undermining. This pent-up responsibility, so neglected and so toxic, so 
totally alienated from the power he wielded, is clearly too much for him: Escherich returns to his 
office and shoots himself with, we are to presume, the same pistol he had pressed into Enno’s hand a 
year earlier. 
* 
We return, then, to the tempting question with which we began: were the Quangels successful 
or did they live and act in vain? Berndt Springer’s moralistic reading would have it that they were 
politically impotent but that they did not act in vain since they managed to preserve their moral 
decency (Anständigkeit), reminding us “that there is something in a person that cannot be broken or 
corrupted, an unshakable good seed that withstands all seduction, intimidation, threatening and 
violence.”130 Plenty of figures in the novel seem to think something more or less the same. If, as Anna 
and Otto had imagined at the outset, their postcard writing aimed at arousing a group of fellow 
dissidents, writing postcards of their own and starting a revolutionary movement that could even 
 
130 Springer, “Ist Widerstand gegen eine Diktatur eine moralische Pflicht?,” 99. 
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topple the regime,131 then it is indeed difficult to say that the Quangels achieved their goal. Separated 
from each other in the Gestapo prison, they die, as the novel’s title promises, entirely alone. 
But what of Fallada’s hope at the end of his early essay on the case of the Hampels/Quangels? 
Their protest echoed unheard, they sacrificed their lives, seemingly for 
nothing, to a hopeless fight. But perhaps not entirely hopeless? Perhaps not 
entirely for nothing after all? […] I, the author of a yet to be written novel, 
hope that their fight, their suffering, their death was not entirely for nothing.132 
The Hampels, as we know them from their Gestapo files, seem to have fallen short of their 
imagination of dissidence: coordinated mass resistance that would imperil the regime. They die, at 
best, with the consolation prize for “Most Anständig.” Do the Quangels, in the hands of Fallada, fare 
any better? As I have tried to show, the criteria for effective dissident action are totally different within 
the political landscape of the novel than they are in the Gestapo’s narrative of legal combat along 
moralistic lines. The Quangels are relieved of their role in the war against the state, the Nazi party, 
their neighbors, even themselves. In place of this clash of opposing forces in which they can only 
appear, to use Escherich’s language, as isolated and impotent mosquitos nipping at an unperturbed 
elephant, they serve the unlikely function of illuminating and reconfiguring the relations of complicity, 
trust, fear, and responsibility that course through Berlin. 
Though they remain rather isolated and almost entirely unaware of their ecstatic entanglement, 
the wide circulation of their postcards forms the central mechanism of the novel’s fabrication of a 
political world. Their postcards weave innumerable lives together, exposing the city’s hidden political 
infrastructure.133 To make sense of the psychology of any particular figure, let alone their relation to 
 
131 Fallada, Every Man Dies Alone, 135/187-88. 
132 Fallada, “Über den doch vorhandenen Widerstand der Deutschen gegen den Hitlerterror,” 218. 
133 The Quangels’ distribution of these cards reveals that even a system as apparently hegemonic and centralized 
as the postal system is, in fact, always made up of a multitude of channels, both “official” and not, and that any 
participation in it is a continuous process of contesting the structure as a whole. 
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others, requires an elaborate and always unfinished story of their entanglement in the past and future 
actions of others and the shifting fabric of responsibilities and commitments that this creates: they 
must be figurable as participants in a coherent world. Through the flow of their ecstatic postcards, 
Fallada is able to bring into view the world that unifies the likes of Enno and Escherich. They are 
bound, not by the application of rules or a common despotic Herr, and they do not appear as instances 
of a type, representatives of an institution, or expressions of an idiosyncratic disposition. Both Enno 
and Escherich come to be intelligible in terms of the agential threads that are constituted by a single 
world of action whose consequences they suffer and whose possibilities they can take advantage of. 
Their differences are figured within the same collectivity. 
This is what makes the Quangels potent: not, as they thought, as instigators of a new 
movement, rebels sowing the seeds of resistance, but as occasions to reveal (to poetically create, in fact) 
the continued political reality and possibilities of life in Berlin under the most inhospitable conditions, 
a reminder that dissidence is possible at every level and that action remains open and necessary 
regardless of the totalizing alienation that nearly snuffs it out. In this sense, the Quangels are 
remarkable for being narratable; they enable a story in which Nazism can appear as the fabricated 
polity that it is, in which dissidence is therefore always possible and the future both demands 
immediate attention and shows itself to be contested and open. If the novel makes a political claim it 
is this: beneath the fear, death, and partisan monopoly of everyday reproduction, there perdures a single, 
collective, and protean fabric within which everyone plays a role in preserving and potentially changing the medium of 
political life. 
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I. Introduction: Alienated Eating 
 
Ben welcomed the Occupy protester, famished and filthy after a week of camping out in the 
Financial District’s Zuccotti Park, back into the luxurious fold of private domesticity. While the 
protester washed himself and his clothes, Ben prepared a stir fry that “was destined to be a meal of 
prodigious blandness.” Though he had happily consumed innumerable meals labored over by friends 
and family, Ben suddenly realized that this was the first meal he could remember preparing for anyone, 
ever. 
I would like to say my recognition of this asymmetry led me to meditate […] 
on the pleasure I was taking in cooking for my fellow man as he bathed, but I 
was aware at that point of no pleasure. I would like to say that, as the protester 
finished his shower, I was disturbed by the contradiction between my avowed 
political materialism and my inexperience with this brand of making, of poiesis, 
but I could dodge or dampen that contradiction via my hatred of Brooklyn’s 
boutique biopolitics, in which spending obscene sums and endless hours on 
stylized food preparation somehow enabled the conflation of self-care and 
political radicalism. Moreover, what did it mean to say that Aaron or Alena 
had prepared those meals for me, when the ingredients were grown and picked 
and packaged and transported by others in a system of great majesty and 
murderous stupidity?1 
This scene, one of many ironic crescendos in Ben Lerner’s recent work of autofiction, 10:04: A Novel, 
weaves together a variety of manifestations of urban, middle-class estrangement. Ben, a newly 
successful writer, has stayed firmly on the receiving side of the kitchen counter his entire life. This is 
not simply due to his heady, urban, male existence, but out of an open celebration of his ineptitude as 
“endearing clumsiness.” While an uneven distribution of culinary labor may leave Ben estranged from 
yet another “brand of making,” it exposes a more fundamental separation of active labor and receptive 
consumption that no number of stir fries could ever mend: the alienation of eating under globalized 
agriculture. 
 
1 Lerner, 10:04, 46–47. 
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While Ben’s distance from the kitchen may be a lifestyle choice over which he can 
performatively agonize, the dislocation of his dinners from their global circulation through fields, 
packing plants, distribution centers, and landfills is anything but a matter of individual will. As Ben 
resentfully acknowledges, one can (ostensibly) smooth over the domestic manifestation of this 
imbalance of production and consumption by merging one’s roles as cook and eater. This is why farm-
to-table meals, farmer’s markets, food coops, and laborious culinary DIY projects are billed as salves 
for bourgeois guilt as much as opportunities for gastronomic pleasure. “Foodies,” however, have not 
closed the political gap between the forces that shape agricultural production and those that condition 
the consumption of food any more than the much larger number of people forced to carry out 
domestic food labor by cultural or economic pressures. The rift between farming, logistics, and waste 
management, on the one hand, and supermarkets, restaurants, and home-cooked meals on the other, 
is inextricable from an agricultural system founded on profit. It isn’t so much that Ben is an 
inexperienced cook, then, but that his meals are socially, geographically, and economically dependent 
on people, places, and incentives that are inherently hidden from him.2 This scene, therefore, stages 
the tension that animates much of the novel: what kinds of political action are available to the lone 
urbanite? What kind of “making,” of poiesis, can Ben, the isolated and cerebral consumer, turn to, not 
simply to dabble in production, but to create some form of legible community out of the fissured 
landscape of his world? 
 
2 Even when one or two of these relational modalities seem to cohere, they are strategically severed by the 
other. Pineapple pickers in Hawaii and the Philippines may occupy similar socio-economic positions or even 
work for the same company, but are prevented from forming a collective union or otherwise creating collective 
consciousness by the physical distance that separates them; likewise, the landfill just out of olfactory reach may 
only be known, and certainly only ever visited, by the few who either work there or find themselves culling 
through others’ waste for survival; it is no coincidence that the restocking area of the grocery store, just steps 
away from the clean, bright isles, is hidden from view and remains a mysterious place of potentially endless 
bounty to the consumer wondering if the very thing they want may be waiting “in the back.” Such situations in 
which relations of labor are strategically hidden from themselves define the fractured world of global capitalism, 
though, as I will argue, it is particularly egregious and literal in the world of contemporary agriculture. 
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If that is indeed the driving question of the novel, Lerner’s aesthetic project is traversing 
conceptually well-trodden ground. That this system of “great majesty and murderous stupidity” is 
marked precisely by the increasing alienation of the conditions of production from the experience of 
consumption has become a unifying diagnosis among humanists and social scientists of many stripes, 
who invariably tie it to the notion that our contemporary moment is defined by the process of 
globalization. As literary critic Ursula Heise points out, the wide range of theoretical articulations of 
“globalization” is unified by the question of “what cultural and political role attachments to different 
kinds of space might play.”3 These theorizations approach the purportedly free circulation of 
commodities, practices, information, and people, first and foremost, as a disruption in the geography of 
our lives.4 Not only have local and regional forms of identity been swept up in a global market of 
frenzied exchange, but the nation-state, the spatio-political entity that had organized modern life and 
tyrannically sought to iron out local internal difference, has suddenly come to seem a potential site of 
resistance against the new, larger, hegemon: multinational corporations and their cultural imperialism. 
Theories of globalization, then, attempt to show that this scrambled geography is always a matter of 
political reorganization and a potential challenge to traditional forms of sovereignty and 
representation. 
Ben’s helpless domesticity stages this coincidence of two seemingly distinct forms of 
alienation: the geographic dislocation of the small- from the large-scale and the social rift between private 
consumption and the collective (re)production of our world.5 In this chapter, I argue that this poetic 
 
3 Heise, Sense of Place, 4. 
4 This was, for example, precisely what Fredric Jameson argued set modernism apart from “postmodernism”: 
“we now inhabit the synchronic rather than the diachronic, and I think it is at least empirically arguable that 
our daily life, our psychic experience, our cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather 
than by categories of time, as in the preceding period of high modernism.” (Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, 
The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 16.) 
5 I should note the multiple points of contact this chapter’s argument has with Michel de Certeau’s well-known 
phenomenology of everyday urban life, if only to partly explain Certeau’s relegation to a few footnotes in this 
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project — making the geography of globalized agriculture legible — sets Lerner’s novel apart from 
the usual eco-literary attempts to reterritorialize experience. Building on Caleb Klaces’ recent 
observation that 10:04 is “interested not only in representing climate change, but in representing what 
kinds of challenges climate change poses for literary representation,”6 I suggest that a particular kind 
of poetic production of collectivity could, in fact, be politically radical. Several claims follow from this 
reading. If the alienation of globalized consumption is fundamentally a problem of spatial 
fragmentation and disorientation — situating the comforts of everyday life in the urban West within 
the world of rampant inequality and outsourcing —, then the ecological crises that we so often 
approach technocratically are, at root, problems of representation. Anthropogenic climate change, an 
extreme symptom of this uneven globalization, revives classic problems of aesthetic mediation 
between particular and general, material and abstract, part and whole, as the key obstacle to collective 
action and an equitable universal politics. Eco-literature, therefore, is neither a genre category nor does 
it simply name the literary thematization of “natural,” phenomena: it is a formal category that ties 
 
chapter. Certeau’s primary concern is to recuperate the residual potentiality for resistance and dissidence in the 
practices of everyday life that appear fully disciplined and ordered by our rationalized systems of production. 
In so doing, Certeau works to salvage a “poetic,” “devious,” and forever “hidden” notion of “consumption” 
from its reduction to mere passivity. We don’t, for example, simply passively consume television, but we “make” 
and “do” things with those images that just as often undermine them as they do easily assimilate them. (Michel 
de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (1980; repr., Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), xii.) As I will argue below, however, these blind modes of dissent remain, for Certeau, definitionally 
fragmented, immediate, and local, forever fixed to an immediate phenomenology of the small-scale and 
opposed to the unification of re-producing the world as a whole. Though these moments of consumption may 
outmaneuver the regimes of production that try to regulate them, it is unclear what kind of poetic activity they 
could achieve if they melt the moment they enter the visibility of representation.  
6 Caleb Klaces, “Ben Lerner’s 10:04 and Climate Change,” Textual Practice, 2020, 2. My reading tracks with 
Klaces’ in many ways, particularly in framing Lerner’s novel as an intervention in the aesthetic disruptions 
manifest in climate change and therefore approaching it as a formal problem of representation. Klaces, however, 
follows Amitav Ghosh in spatializing this aesthetic tension through the figure of foreground and background 
(see note below), suggesting that Lerner inverts and abandons the novel’s traditional claim to realism, and 
leaving the political possibilities of the novel unclear at best. I will return to Klaces’ reading as the specific 
spatiality of Lerner’s poetics becomes clearer. 
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current material crises to old problems of representation, world-making, and the poetic production of 
space. I articulate this line of argument through two complementary aspects. 
On the one hand, I propose that we understand the isolation of consumption from production 
as a symptom of the alienation of a single process: the active re-creation of our world. By shifting the 
narrative (and the geography) from that of the linear commodity chain bookended by the active, 
productive farmer and the passive, consumptive eater to that of the collective world continuously 
reproduced and transformed, in which each of us is passive and active, determined and determining, 
social and material, the alienation of our food system becomes legible as a rift in our labor as such: a 
rift in the way that we re-produce our entire world. Though this attention to the geography of 
consumption (as opposed to the history of production) may seem to transgress the traditional Marxian 
framework, I suggest that the most powerful figure to describe this rift is one developed by Marx 
himself: that of our “metabolic” relation to the world. To re-describe eating metabolically (as opposed 
to consumptively) offers a dialectical description in which all stages of agricultural labor are visible as 
moments in a single process of actively reproducing our world. Moreover, it begins to articulate a 
politics of eating (and transformative labor more generally) grounded in the slow and collective 
process of reshaping our world, taking the place of our regnant neoliberal faith in aggregated passive 
demand. As the literal and metaphorical aspects of the term suggest, metabolism makes sense of the 
degradation of our material world and the inequality of our social world in terms of a single rift in our 
collective reproduction (what Marx called the “social metabolism”) of the “whole of nature.” 
The alienation of labor is, therefore, not simply manifest in the mutual degradation of town 
and country but is only comprehensible within the global geography of capitalism. In this sense, the 
metabolic relation maps individual experiences of production and consumption onto the global 
geography of capitalism. This rift in our social organization has more than purely aesthetic 
consequences or manifestations: it is itself essentially a problem of the dynamic relation between the 
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materiality of individual activity and the structural whole on which it depends and which it 
continuously re-produces: it is a problem, quite simply, of representation.  
This formulation already begins to pivot toward the second aspect of this chapter’s argument, 
namely that poetic creation offers a mode of world-making through which this rift can be rendered 
visible and successfully critiqued. I propose to read Ben’s agricultural alienation as symptomatic of 
this rift in the metabolic reproduction of his world. The “brand of making” that Ben finds himself 
wanting for would not, then, cleanly unify the spheres of production and consumption in the comfort 
of his own home, but would fashion a world in which the metabolic exchange between creation and 
utilization, between phenomenological experience and global forces of economy and culture, could 
be coherently represented as modes of transforming — working over (“bearbeiten”), as Marx put it — 
a single world. 
Whereas Marx understood metabolism as the social and material locus of alienated labor and 
the opportunity for a unified communitarian mode of production,7 there is also, I suggest, a metabolic 
poetics. As the geography of consumption and production becomes increasingly abstracted and 
fragmented, capitalism offers increasingly impoverished and destructive representations of the unity 
of our world. To so much as imagine the possibility of collective consciousness and the organization 
of universal struggle requires radically new modes of representation that transparently and 
democratically mediate between — metabolize — material particularity and abstract totality. Only with 
such an aesthetic could one work to “reproduce the whole of nature” in such a way as to situate 
everyday experience within the global circulation of labor and reveal the inseparability of material and 
 
7 “Freedom, in this sphere [of civilization], can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, 
govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead 
of being dominated by it as a blind power.” (Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 3, trans. 
David Fernbach (1894; repr., New York: Penguin, 1992), 959.) 
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social alienation.8 The social circulation of labor through agriculture and eating, though by no means 
the only avenue for such a project, offers itself as both the most universal and the most literal 
instantiation of the global metabolism of the world in everyday life.  
While Ben laments his distance from production and confronts what appears to be his political 
impotence, Lerner pursues a kind of poiesis that could re-describe consumption not simply as an 
instance of production but as the metabolic creation and recreation of the entire world under the 
limitations imposed by it. The novel is littered with scenes of pseudo-political activity that seem to 
critique the possibility of Ben acting politically, but the novel itself accomplishes a representation of 
the structural political alienation to furnish the ground upon which a collective political consciousness 
could be built. If 10:04 is an instance of “world literature,” it is not one defined by its thematic reach 
or the exploration of spaces that had once seemed peripheral to the traditional Western novel,9 but as 
a poetic medium through which the worldliness of globalized life can be represented. It is poetic 
production as world-making. 
Analogously, although the novel is bookended by hurricanes Irene and Sandy and the specter 
of these storms leaves a shadow over the entire book, I will argue that these extreme weather events 
offer only superficial geographies of unity. If the novel is a paradigmatic example of “environmental 
literature,” it is not because it includes unusually bad weather; in fact, the hurricanes, I argue, 
 
8 For this reason, metabolic poetics offers a model for literary representations of ecological crisis that are firmly 
rooted in social critique and the global geography of our unsustainable reproduction of the world. Building upon 
the work of Ursula Heise, I hope to show that a truly environmental literature (and politics) is rooted, not in 
the reclamation of localities or the neat closure of commodity chains in small producer-consumer cooperatives, 
but in the navigation of the single environment — our collective and only world — that we have so unevenly 
and ineptly shaped. As I hope to show, a lot rides on how that unified geography is described: globe, planet, 
earth, world, and a variety of other spatial figures offer themselves. Each of these figures of totality lead to 
markedly different politics. 
9 In this sense, I would propose Lerner’s novel as an attempt at world literature in the critical geographic 
tradition of “combined and uneven development.” For a wonderfully clear differentiation of world literature in 
this sense from those emergent from multicultural comparative studies or from postcolonial theory, see 
Warwick Research Collective, Combined and Uneven Development: Towards a New Theory of World-Literature 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015), 1–48.  
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representationally undermine themselves, contesting the use of big climatological events to construct 
community or to capture the fundamental challenges of climate crisis.10 Instead, the novel responds 
to the political challenges of climate change by representing the globalization of unsustainable and 
unequal production through the alienation of urban consumption. By producing a poetic medium 
through which these appear as aspects of a single social geography, Lerner’s novel reminds us that the 
“environment” of ecological crises and the “world” of uneven globalization are one and the same. 
Whether Lerner succeeds in this brand of world-making will remain an open question, but the very 
reorientation of literature toward the representational challenges of our uneven geography is, I think, 
worthy of consideration in and of itself. 
  
 
10 Environmental literature is increasingly defined as a distinct genre (as evidenced by the recent rise of the term 
“cli-fi”). Though this definition may be shaped variously by its protagonists (often non-human), its plot (filled 
with severe weather events), its ethics (largely dystopian and anti-modernist), or its spatio-temporality (cosmic 
and/or geologically expansive), a common thread of this new wave of eco-fiction is its animation of the natural 
backdrop against which novels had hitherto uncritically taken place. Speculating on the reasons behind climate 
change’s banishment to genre fiction, novelist and critic Amitav Ghosh captures the key premise of these calls 
to normalize extra-human events and characters in mainstream literature. Ghosh does not blame an inadequate 
understanding of climate change for this, but accuses the modern novel for being too tied to the “the probable” 
and “the everyday.” The problem, Ghosh seems to be saying, is not that we are too fixated on the climatological 
symptoms of radical inequality and geographic fragmentation, but that literature (specifically, the modern novel) 
is predicated on the mimetic recreation of a believable series of events. Setting aside the fact that extreme 
weather has littered fiction from its very inception, and ignoring the fact that we are much less likely to believe 
in the existence of global structures of inequality and arbitrary division than we are in the weather that we can’t 
help but experience for ourselves, Ghosh is, I think, making the case for the modern novel’s peculiar ability to 
represent the challenge posed by anthropogenic climate change. By translating the improbable, the occasional, 
the unbelievable, into the rhythms and patterns of everyday life, the novel is able to re-present the erratic 
symptoms of climate change in terms of the everyday world that has caused it. In a formulation oddly prescient 
of the argument of this chapter, Ghosh proclaims that this is the “irony of the ‘realist’ novel,” though I will 
suggest that this irony increases its veracity as opposed to concealing it. Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement: 
Climate Change and the Unthinkable (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 15–24. 
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II. The Geography of Irony and Sincerity 
 
1. Tentacular Experience 
If Ben’s encounter with the Occupy protester marks the moment in which Ben comes to 
realize his political impotence, how, exactly, does the novel diagnose this passivity? As the passage 
suggests, Ben blames the “asymmetry” between his consumption and others’ production. While the 
protestor has found a way to leverage his participation in American capitalism to challenge the very 
core of the global economy, Ben can’t so much as cook his own dinner. Contrary to his friends’ foodie 
fantasies, however, this isn’t a function of Ben’s laziness or complacent position at the end of the food 
chain, a product of not integrating creative labor into his receptive consumption. Instead, I will argue, 
the entire first section of the novel builds toward Ben’s realization that his passivity as a consumer 
reflects his deeper inability to form community. Whereas the protestor has joined a political collective 
through the strategic occupation of space, Ben’s meal is fully displaced from its circulation through 
the world of agriculture. Instead of situating him in a social system of continuous and active 
reproduction, eating reminds him of his dislocation from the world around him, inciting a crisis of the 
very intelligibility of his surroundings. In what follows, I trace the complexifying spatiality of scenes 
of consumption, each of which stage the impotence Ben experiences because of his inability to fully 
place himself in a social world. Behind these moments of ironic self-deprecation, I suggest, lie sincere 
narrative attempts (thematized by Ben’s actions, but staged by Lerner’s narrative) to create an 
alternative social map of the globe.11 
 
11 Or, as Ben puts it after his encounter with the protester, to redirect his desire to be needed and “let it branch 
out horizontally into the possibility of a transpersonal revolutionary subject in the present and construct a world 
in which moments can be something other than the elements of profit.” (Lerner, 10:04, 47.) Though already in 
this formulation, the sincerity of this project is tinged by its ironic recycling of leftist jargon. This alloy of ironic 
sincerity, or sincerity posed within a fragile ironic frame, is a key poetic motif that I return to below. 
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Ben’s fraught ingestion begins in the very first line of the novel. The story opens with a familiar 
literary prologue: Ben celebrating the advance he has received on his next novel, thereby staging the 
conception of the very book we hold in our hands. He and his agent walk along New York’s High 
Line, still digesting the “baby octopuses the chef had literally massaged to death.” The little mollusks 
seem to have gone down with some discomfort, perhaps channeling the more general unease Ben 
feels about capitalizing on his poetry. Ben works through the standard reflections of a remorseful 
carnivore, squaring the pleasure of those “impossibly tender little things” with his cursory awareness 
of their intelligence and complexity. But this detached concern of the ethical consumer is quickly 
supplanted by a very different indigestion, one born of his physical assimilation of the octopi as 
opposed to their moral autonomy. In a moment of near transmogrification, Ben’s perceptive (even 
proprioceptive) boundaries rapidly expand before being cut short by a different kind of narrative 
zoom, the return of the ironic framing: 
We sat and watched the traffic and I am kidding and I am not kidding when I 
say that I intuited an alien intelligence, felt subject to a succession of images, 
sensations, memories, and affects that did not, properly speaking, belong to 
me: the ability to perceive polarized light; a conflation of taste and touch as 
salt was rubbed into the suction cups; a terror localized in my extremities, 
bypassing the brain completely. I was saying these things out loud to the agent, 
who was inhaling and exhaling smoke, and we were laughing.12 
We might be inclined to say that this tentacular perception gives Ben, the protagonist, a kind of ecstatic 
experience of the world through an imaginative embodiment of another being, a perspectival shift or 
blurring of eater and eaten that is only broken off by the sobering irony in which even the most 
transporting experience can just as soon be deflated by retroactively placing it within the mouth of a 
protagonist overcome by cliché. These narrative poles of irony and sincerity may do more, however, 
than stand in opposition. Already in these opening lines, the tonal shift between the impersonal — 
 
12 Lerner, 3–4. 
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perhaps even public — sensorium of Ben’s extended embodiment and the interiority and reflexivity 
of his meta-fictional protagonist laughing off that very mystical experience provides the narrative with 
a bridge, however tenuous and undeveloped at this early point, between radically different narrative 
scales. 
This push and pull between earnest realism and postmodern irony continues throughout the 
novel: this proprioceptive flicker is but the first of many imaginative probes into the global contours 
of everyday life that Lerner continuously advances and then retracts, dancing between cynical 
mundanity and naive imagination. Indeed, Lerner anticipates this in the lines that follow. Speculating 
on what will organize the novel he must now write — and which we must now read — Ben tells his 
agent: 
“I’ll project myself into several futures simultaneously,” I should have said, “a 
minor tremor in my hand; I’ll work my way from irony to sincerity in the 
sinking city, a would-be Whitman of the vulnerable grid.”13 
If read attentively, this passage (like many others) prefigures the novel as a whole.14 I will, therefore, 
take some time to work through each part of it. 
Formally speaking, oscillation between irony and sincerity describes the relationship in 10:04 
between the author, Lerner, and the protagonist/narrator, Ben, as much as it does the tone of the 
narration itself. This slippery bond between a historically bounded writer and the poetically flexible 
narrator allows the novel to thematize the challenges and the possibilities of a poetic imagination that 
straddles otherwise disparate perspectival positions. If irony and sincerity do not simply refer to 
 
13 Lerner, 4. 
14 This is far from incidental. Because the novel, as I will argue, turns to poetic representation to establish new 
“figures of collectivity,” it is only fitting that it should replicate this attempt within its own unity. This is yet 
another feature of its auto-fictional strategy: it constantly experiments with tropes, phrases, images, and patterns 
that attempt to capture the shape of the entire novel. Its passages, in other words, constantly try to pre-figure, 
re-figure, and con-figure the novel’s own coherence. Though I won’t explore this systematically, I will, 
indirectly, develop this aspect of the novel’s self-figuration throughout this chapter. 
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practiced distance, on the one hand, and vulnerable transparency, on the other, but are rather twin 
poetic strategies for moving between perspectival scales and thereby achieving a form of 
representation neither simply remote nor intimate but trained on the integration of the two, Lerner is 
promising something rather specific here. This oscillation (at its strongest, a dialectic), I will argue, lies 
at the core of this novel, and is not a postmodern gimmick of an endless series of false authorial 
bottoms exposed one after the other, but is a rather sober process of using the old tools of realism to 
chart poetic maps adequate to our sinking cities.  
 
2. Twin Representational Challenges 
This project makes all the more sense when we recognize that, in the passage above, Lerner is 
clearly positioning his novel at the juncture of two contemporary representational challenges, both of 
which involve a new sensitivity to scale. First, Lerner is affirming the increasing sense that the 
interiority, relativity, and political blindness of postmodern aesthetics has become untenable, even 
dangerous — a sentiment that gained steam in the 1990s and greatly accelerated (especially in the 
United States) after 9/11, as writers like Don DeLillo, David Foster Wallace, and Richard Powers 
worked to resurrect faith in the veracity of fiction and its ability to grasp the contours of the shared 
world outside of closed interiority. Critics have tied this trend to an attempt to revive fiction’s stable 
hold on public truth, dubbing this post-post-modernism the “New Sincerity.”15 Second is the challenge 
 
15 The term was first introduced by Adam Kelly who drew on Lionel Trilling’s distinction between the inherently 
public truth communicated by sincerity and the private self-expression of authenticity: Adam Kelly, “David 
Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in American Fiction,” in Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays, ed. 
David Hering (Los Angeles: Sideshow Media Group Press, 2010), 131–46. This New Sincerity, Kelly suggests, 
is evident in a generation of writers who sought an alternative to the spiraling “hermeneutics of suspicion,” 
characteristic of postmodern irony, that aimed toward a truth buried in the depths of authenticity. In contrast, 
writers like Wallace sought to resurrect an “awareness of the public self,” though not in the mode of a nostalgic 
return but by navigating the bald superficiality of new media in which “truth may be uncannily on the surface.” 
(Kelly, 133, 138.) See Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
It is worth noting that this repudiation of authenticity is, at least indirectly, a way of wresting a publicly 
constituted form of self-truth from the grip of Heideggerian individualism. See chapter 1 for an extensive 
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posed by the “sinking city,” a clear reference to the rapidly changing landscape of social life due to 
anthropogenic global warming. As the now prevalent neologism “the Anthropocene” suggests, one 
of the crises raised by this climatological specter is methodological: if geological and historical time 
are no longer distinguishable, then the very basis on which stories of human life have defined 
themselves against the glacial temporality of the earth is now jeopardized.16 This poses a 
representational challenge to literature as much as to history: if each human life is now clearly 
implicated in a tangle of processes that span the geography and the history of the earth, how can one 
tell a coherent story adequate to those dizzying scales? Both the attack on the World Trade Centers 
and increasingly violent weather patterns17 indicate that even the most encompassing of cities, New 
York, is no longer intelligible independent of a history and geography that far precedes and exceeds 
it.18 
 
reading of the possibilities and shortcomings of Heidegger’s development of “authenticity” (Eigentlichkeit) and 
its political consequences. 
16 Though the term “Anthropocene” was first proposed by atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen and marine 
biologist Eugene Stoermer (Paul J. Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer, “The ‘Anthropocene,’” IGBP [The 
International Geosphere—Biosphere Programme] Newsletter 41 (2000): 17.), it was historian Dipesh Chakrabarty who 
first observed the dramatic consequences for the human and social sciences of this collapse of temporal scales 
in his now classic essay: Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History.” See the introduction for a discussion of 
Chakrabarty in this context. 
17 Though the geography of consumption (and its literalization in eating) is, I suggest, the strongest 
environmental strand of the novel, the disruptions to daily experience brought about by these climatological 
events will take on tangential importance in my reading of certain scenes. For a more direct reading of the 
novel’s narrative use of weather, see Ben De Bruyn, “Realism 4°: Objects, Weather and Infrastructure in Ben 
Lerner’s 10:04,” Textual Practices 31, no. 5 (2017): 951–71. 
18 A number of scholars have responded to this challenge by calling for a “scaled up” literature that could etch 
human stories onto the expanse of deep geological time. Wai Chee Dimock, for example, has provided a 
sustained re-reading of American fiction as world literature by inserting the geographic and historical specificity 
of “America” into what she calls “deep time.” (Wai Chee Dimock, Through Other Continents: American Literature 
Across Deep Time (Princeton University Press, 2008).) For the argument that literature should take up a truly 
geological scale of millions of years, see Mark McGurl, “The New Cultural Geology,” Twentieth Century Literature 
57, no. 3/4 (2011): 380–90. See the introduction for a discussion of the “deep ecology” on which many of these 
gestures are based. 
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While these global threats to the paradigmatic organization of modern everyday life, the 
metropolis, are easily assimilated into the large-scale narratives of both climatologists and foreign 
policy hawks, the challenge to the representation of human life only emerges when trying to situate 
the minutiae of first-personal experience within this new geography. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has put 
it, this newly attained magnitude of human agency at the world scale “requires us to bring together 
intellectual formations that are somewhat in tension with each other: the planetary and the global; 
deep and recorded history; species thinking and critiques of capital.”19 It is, therefore, only in finding 
new ways to bridge these narrative modalities that climatological, agricultural, geo-political, and other 
such paradigmatic crises become visible as the ugly faces of neoliberalism’s individuating geography. 
These two representational challenges, manifest in the explosion of New York’s social geography onto 
the world as a whole, demand that literature make concrete and intuitable the otherwise abstract 
machinations of capitalism at a global scale. 
As will become clear later in this chapter, taking on these twin challenges is precisely what 
makes 10:04 such a powerful novelistic response to the climate crisis. At its best, Lerner’s text 
redefines the scope of everyday experience, rebuilding a map of globalized life out of the fractured 
provincialism of New York. In this sense, it works toward the kind of aesthetic that eco-critic Ursula 
Heise has described as a turn away from a static and narrow “sense of place” — attachment to a 
particular locale — (to which we might add a dilated “sense of geology”) and toward a dynamic “sense 
of planet — a sense of how political, economic, technological, social, cultural, and ecological networks 
shape daily routines.”20 To put the novel’s aesthetic project in another idiom, one suggested by Fredric 
Jameson, this multi-scalar representation offers the aesthetic grounds for a truly global political 
 
19 Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History,” 213. 
20 Heise, Sense of Place, 55. 
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movement in so far as it “maps” “existential data (the empirical position of the subject) [onto] unlived, 
abstract, conceptions of the geographic totality.”21 
 
3. “Figuring the Global” 
That this formal project of charting the embeddedness of a single narrative perspective in far-
flung global realities should be situated in the “vulnerable grid” of New York is, then, only fitting. The 
city’s electrical grid is, of course, physically threatened by the strengthening hurricanes. But the image 
of the “grid” is more than the geometric description of infrastructure: it is the apex of neutral and 
abstract spatial coordinates onto which the largest and most complex social systems can be easily 
mapped.22 At a very specific scale, New York does exhibit highly regular griddedness: Manhattan’s 
street layout may be one of the most iconic symbols of planned urban life, giving a densely dynamic 
social space a sense of intentional order and a(n aerial) perspective from which all the city’s social and 
geographic unevenness comes to seem perfectly smoothed over.23 By belying the true complexity and 
inequality of the city, the grid image promises everyone in the city an easy set of coordinates through 
which to perceive municipal unity and within which to orient their daily lives; the grid asserts a liberal 
 
21 Jameson, Postmodernism, 52. 
22 As Jameson puts it, the “logic of the grid” reorganizes the “older sacred and heterogeneous space into 
geometrical and Cartesian homogeneity, a space of infinite equivalence and extension,” facilitating the endless 
chains of exchange and the universal equivalency of wage labor necessary for market capitalism. (Fredric 
Jameson, “Cognitive Mapping,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson (London: Macmillan 
Education UK, 1988), 349.) Though he associates the grid with the earliest stage of capitalism, the emergence 
of monopoly and, eventually, multinational capitalism has only exacerbated this abstraction and 
homogenization of space. 
23 It isn’t incidental that Thomas Edison’s initial patents of the electrical grid began as superimpositions on the 
gridded geometry of New York City (whose grand 1811 street plan was about to be unveiled). For an excellent 
account of the history of the electrical grid and a critical exploration of its metaphorics, see Michael Warner, 
“On the Grid (and Off)” (Paper presented at the 2017-2018 Tanner Lecture Series on Human Values at UC 
Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, 2018), https://tannerlectures.berkeley.edu/2017-2018-lecture-series/. 
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ideology of even universality as much as it facilitates movement.24 More specifically, it uses the 
abstraction of a particular scale and piece of urban design to hypostatize the aspirational notion of 
social equality via homogenous geography.25 
While the well-functioning grid suggests an even geometry of immaterial connectivity, this 
infrastructure, once threatened, reveals the highly uneven geography manifest in the material that mediates 
our social life. Thus, when the flow of electricity is jeopardized, the messy networks of infrastructural 
media that actually bind our world together suddenly come into view. It is only fitting, then, that as 
hurricane Irene comes bearing down on New York, Ben begins to experience his urban environs as 
belonging to a new kind of whole: 
From a million media, most of them handheld, awareness of the storm seeped 
into the city, entering the architecture and the stout-bodied passerines, 
inflecting traffic patterns and the “improved sycamores,” so called because 
they’re hybridized for urban living. I mean the city was becoming one 
organism, constituting itself in relation to a threat viewable from space, an 
aerial sea monster with a single centered eye around which tentacular rain 
bands swirled. There were myriad apps to track it, the Doppler color-coded to 
indicate the intensity of precipitation […] 
 
24 As Warner puts it, “the metaphor of the grid allows this vast field of connection to be perceived as a unity.” 
(Warner, 14.) 
25 Warner, building on Lisa Parks’ and John Durham Peters’ work on the inherent concealment of 
infrastructure, ties the strategic obfuscation of the electrical grid (and thus our convenient ignorance of our 
energy sources, usage, and disposal as well) to the abstracted geometry of griddedness: 
The idea of a network subtracts the need to be conscious of underlying geography. Power circulates, as far as 
most of us can tell, in abstract geometry. The grid has its own geography, but also its own anti-geography, so 
to speak; it is inherently deterritorializing. Now you see it, now you don’t. One could imagine a map of all the 
oddly shaped parcels of land that have stanchions, transformers, or cables on them—the junked-up interstices 
between things we actually notice. But when one imagines the grid it has less to do with these actual spaces 
than with immaterial schematics and whole territories. 
The metaphor of “the grid” is especially apt, from this point of view, because it is a two-dimensional schematic 
realized in three-dimensional material structures. It is an extreme case of abstract space superimposed on the 
built environment, a “concrete abstraction” as Henri Lefebvre put it. (Warner, 12–13.) 
For Parks on “infrastructural concealment” and Durham Peters on this abstracted ethic of “infrastructuralism,” 
see Lisa Parks, “Technostruggles and the Satellite Dish: A Populist Approach to Infrastructure,” in Cultural 
Technologies: The Shaping of Culture in Media and Society, ed. Göran Bolin (London: Routledge, 2012), 64–84; John 
Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2015), 30–38. 
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Because every conversation you overheard in line or on the street or train 
began to share a theme, it was soon one common conversation you could join, 
removing the conventional partitions from social space; riding the N train to 
Whole Foods in Union Square, I found myself swapping surge level 
predictions with a Hasidic Jew and a West Indian nurse in purple scrubs.26 
In place of a city unified by a pre-given geometry imposed by planners, utility companies, and political 
aspirations, the specter of a shared crisis weaves together the otherwise private snippets of 
conversation and movements of daily life into a fragile whole. The octopus returns again, now going 
far beyond the sheer dissolution of proprioceptive boundaries, instead offering a tentacular pattern 
through which the minutiae of daily life could be organized into a representation of the planet. 
 
Figure 1: Faber and Faber's cover for 10:04 
But does this aerial view of New York (depicted on the novel’s cover – see above) not further 
localize the city, clearly bounding it and offering a superficial camaraderie drummed up by disaster? 
Has New York’s suddenly planetary significance, centered on the weather radar and framed by the eye 
 
26 Lerner, 10:04, 17. 
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of the storm, actually closed it off from the world and entrenched its already strong tendency toward 
provincialism? Bruce Robbins, reflecting on the aesthetic challenge amplified by 9/11 (as encapsulated 
by the opening line of Don DeLillo’s Falling Man: “it was not a street anymore but a world”), expresses 
exactly this quandary in a passage that could just as well have been written in response to this scene 
from 10:04: 
The street is what most novels take for their subject most of the time. It is by 
watching society at street level, so to speak, that the novel reader’s sense of 
identity and relationship has mainly been formed. Most novels do not train our 
eyes to look very high or very low, or for that matter very far away; they do 
not encourage us to look at superstructures, or infrastructures, or the 
structuring force of the world capitalist system. There are notable exceptions 
[…] but as a rule, worldliness is not natural to the novel. This does not 
immediately change after 9/11. Like the protagonist in a suddenly darkened 
street that has been struck from above and from far away, the post-9/11 novel 
is first of all disoriented. If we can say that, like the street, the novel takes on 
the attributes of a world, the first meaning of this statement would have to be 
(this is how I understand Heidegger’s sense of worlding) that the event has 
created its own unique local surround, a restricted time/space that replaces 
and cancels out any abstract planetary coordinates. In this sense the worlding 
of the novel would leave it less worldly rather than more.27 
Robbins’ distinction here between worldliness and what we might call localization28 is 
incredibly important. To say that the street, a city, or any locale takes on the attributes of an entire 
world — to suggest that it is a unified and closed geography — does not open the local onto its 
entanglement in the structures that extend far beyond its spatio-temporal limits, but entrenches the 
 
27 Bruce Robbins, “The Worlding of the American Novel,” in The Cambridge History of the American Novel, ed. 
Leonard Cassuto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1097. 
28 Though Robbins’ point does not rely on his reading of Heidegger’s notion of world, it confuses matters to 
use “world” synonymously with “environment,” both because it entirely misses the point of Heidegger’s 
analysis and creates a seeming tension where there isn’t one. See chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of 
Heidegger’s development of “world” as an explicit departure from spatial organization according to proximity. 
Though Robbins is right that Heidegger does not use the term to denote a general container of things near and 
far, it is just as little a term for one’s immediate or “restricted” environs, a notion for which German has the 
conveniently literal “Umwelt.” Indeed, the radicality (and final shortcoming) of Heidegger’s phenomenology is 
that the extensiveness of his phenomenological world is not spatial, but existential. Space, in the sense of 
distance, is derivative of the arrangements of meaning (what we might call social geography) that shape our 
world. It is, therefore, inappropriate to the Heideggerian notion of world to ask “how far” it extends, or whether 
a certain planetary coordinate is contained within it. 
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provincial notion that a place of sufficient power and planning (paradigmatically, New York City) 
could function like a complete world. In one sense, this is precisely what hurricane Irene accomplishes 
in 10:04: it offers a sufficiently abstracted point of view (the aerial radar of the storm) from which 
New York could not only be significant enough to be “viewable from space,” but could be contained 
enough to be neatly circumscribed by the storm’s eye.29 
Ben’s mundane everyday is mapped onto a grand scale, but to what effect? No one actually 
sees the world through the eye of the storm; the Doppler radar’s entirely abstract geometry 
metaphorically maps by describing one scale of experience in terms of another.30 This zooming tool, 
or scalar toggle, gives Ben a convenient way to make sense of the strengthening winds, panicked 
murmurs, and new patterns of conversation and movement. And yet, in doing so, it obscures all 
understanding of the relation between Ben’s everyday experience and the enormous threat of the storm: 
the very technology that now tracks the winds, the modes of transportation that Ben and others take 
to stock up on supplies, and all the overlapping grids of infrastructure that are now under threat are 
themselves, at least obliquely, responsible for the storm and its highly disparate impact on the 
neighborhoods of New York. The Doppler not only obscures the material relation between the 
vulnerability and the culpability of the grid through which Ben moves, but also hides the dependency 
 
29 While metaphysical notions of worldwide interconnectedness have been traded at least since Heraclitus 
speculated that the “kosmos” was reducible to manifestations of a single element (fire), it was only in the late 
1960s with the release of the first satellite images taken of the earth from space that the physical unity of the 
globe could be represented so plainly. The iconic Blue Marble image from 1972 became the visual backdrop of 
the environmental movement, representing the beauty and magnitude of “Mother Earth” as much as its 
fragility. The irony of using an image whose scale strategically obfuscates human inhabitation to advance a 
movement decrying human-induced catastrophe is a symptom of simply magnifying localist traits of unity, 
harmony, and purity to a global scale. Ursula Heise traces the afterlife of these images in the proliferation of 
“allegories of connectedness” that take a holistic view of globalization, from Marshall McLuhan’s notion of the 
“global village” to James Lovelock’s “Gaia” theory (Heise, Sense of Place, 22–28.)  
30 Michel de Certeau described this hasty totalization of abstract space in his well-known phenomenology of 
urban life. Looking over New York from the top of the World Trade Center, Certeau contrasts the “panoptic” 
viewpoint from which the city appears a neat and rational whole to the “microbe-like” practices whose 
“swarming activity” continuously resists and undermines the totalizing and disciplining administration of the 
city as a concept. Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 96. 
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of the threat posed by the storm on the resiliency of that infrastructure.31 To put it bluntly: the dams, 
roofs, generators, and private jets to high ground do not uniformly (or arbitrarily) distribute the storm’s 
damage, a reality invisible from space.32 
If Ben’s organic intuition of municipal holism is a political non-starter, is the project of 
“mapping” experience also a naive dead-end? As defined by Jameson above, the project of mapping 
“existential data (the empirical position of the subject) [onto] unlived, abstract, conceptions of the 
geographic totality” seems to promote precisely this problematic transposition of life onto abstract 
coordinates.33 How, then, to represent the interconnected geography of the globalized world without 
erasing the heterogeneous social geography whose injustice fuels that very globalization? To put it in 
slightly different terms, if life at street level has been disoriented, how might we recuperate a sense of 
 
31 This echoes the problem discussed in chapter 2 of the separation of material from political infrastructure. 
Hannah Arendt’s attempt to cleave the “immaterial” web of social relations from the physical world of objects 
on which it depends is, as I argue there, theoretically incoherent, and obscures the constant tendency of the 
political sphere — defined by the possibility of equality — to alienate itself in inequalities. The unevenness of 
political life remains entirely obscure until the material and political projects of universal freedom are 
understood together. 
32 Poet M. NourbeSe Philip has put this rather pointedly in her recent critique of the supposedly democratizing 
pervasiveness of the COVID-19 pandemic. As she puts it: “if we were truly ‘in this together,’ we wouldn’t be 
in ‘this’ at all.” (M. NourbeSe Philip, “Are We Really In This Together? With M. NourbeSe Philip,” The PEN 
Pod, April 9, 2020.) (Thank you to Cecilia Sebastian for pointing me to this wonderfully succinct formulation.) 
This contravenes the patently false and yet continuously repeated phrase of “[choose your natural phenomenon] 
doesn’t see class/race/geography/power.” This is simply the other side of the false holism buttressed by the 
Doppler’s abstraction from the unevenness of social life that created and, in turn, is exacerbated by these 
phenomena. For an excellent critique of this false universality of environmentalist ideology, see Ramachandra 
Guha and Juan Martínez Alier, Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South (London: Earthscan 
Publications, 1997). For a classic analysis of the production of natural space as a strategy for consolidating 
liberal capitalism, see Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space (1984; repr., 
London: University of Georgia Press, 2008). I return to Neil Smith at length below. 
33 It is telling that Jameson borrows the term from the rationalist urban planner Kevin Lynch, whose 1950s 
vision of the dis-alienated city was anything but democratic or materially grounded. As Robert Shields points 
out: “The notion of communal 'cognitive maps' occludes [the] diversity of thought and person. In brief, 
'cognitive mapping' summarises a monological vision of the popular imagination and the cultural role of myth 
from the authoritative viewpoint of modernist regimes of bureaucratic urban planning and administration which 
is difficult to simply 'cleanse' from the phrase.” (Robert Shields, “Social Science and Postmodern Spatialisations: 
Jameson’s Aesthetic of Cognitive Mapping,” in Postmodernism and the Social Sciences, ed. Joe Doherty, Elspeth 
Graham, and Mo Malek (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1992), 42.) 
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coherence without simply assuming spatial unity at another, larger, scale? As I have suggested, the 
danger (and contradiction) of unity achieved through aerial abstraction is that it tries to stabilize one 
scale of experience with recourse to a second scale, even though the latter is constituted by the 
former.34 
 
4. Metaphorization and Abstract Space 
The problem, which Jameson himself acknowledged,35 is that the spatiality of this map is 
strictly metaphorical. Critical geographer Neil Smith articulates this problem very clearly: “metaphor is 
inherently juxtapositional; it reveals one truth by asserting it as another. If we are to get beyond the 
reassertion of space, then, in search of rapprochement between the spatial and social, it will be 
necessary to fill in the conceptual abyss between metaphorical and material space.”36 Smith, drawing 
upon Henri Lefebvre’s sweeping analysis of capitalism’s abstraction of space, reminds us that this 
metaphorization of special terms (“boundary,” “sphere,” territory,” “globe,” “scale,” etc.) lies at the 
heart of the modern rationalization of injustice and violence. Spatial figures come to organize every 
aspect of modern life, but as the uncritical ground against which the machinations of history unfold 
instead of as dynamic tools of analysis. Space has become “dominant but dead,”37 following a “general 
 
34 Heise is quick to point out the contradictions of the satellite image’s constructed unity: it offers “an 
antitechnological rhetoric relying on an image produced by advanced technology, an at least partially 
antiscientific discourse recurring to scientific insight to convey its message about the state of the world, and an 
emphasis on interconnectedness that was variously used to demonstrate the planet’s fragility or its resilience to 
human interference.” (Heise, Sense of Place, 24.) 
35 “’Cognitive mapping,’” he readily admitted, “was never anything other than a code word for ‘class 
consciousness.’” (Fredric Jameson, “Marxism and Postmodernism,” New Left Review, no. 176 (1989): 44.) 
36 Smith, Uneven Development, 224. 
37 Smith, 226. 
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metaphorization which, applied to the historical and cumulative spheres, transfers them into that space 
where violence is cloaked in rationality and a rationality of unification is used to justify violence.”38 
We can now better formulate the challenges that Jameson sought to navigate with his notion 
of “mapping” and the reason that literature may be in a privileged position to negotiate them. Behind 
the task of reorienting, in Robbins’ terms, life on the street in terms of the (infra)structures of 
capitalism, lies the more general problem of how to mediate between, to put it crudely, distinct levels 
of phenomena. The question, as Ben himself reflects, is how to “figure the global” without reinforcing 
the gridded abstraction responsible for the very social disorientation in question. How, instead, might 
we “fill in the conceptual abyss” between them? Are irony and sincerity, then, perhaps not so much 
tied to particular spatial scales as to different strategies for relating scales? Or perhaps different, or even 
complementary, strategies for producing spatial coherence? If fiction performs, as its primary 
representational experiment, the challenge that all language takes up — how to achieve successful 
reference to the material truth of our world — then metaphor, irony, and other linguistic tropes are not simply 
linguistic embellishments but attempts to (re)establish a relation of truth to the world. They might all, in this sense, 
contain the possibilities of both realism and obfuscation. But if sincerity simply names the poetic 
project of establishing truth through fiction, it isn’t opposed to (or even an alternative to) irony at all. 
We face a slight proliferation and muddying of concepts at this point; before returning to Lerner’s 
text, I will digress somewhat further to pin down a few of these key poetic terms. 
* 
Metaphor, as Smith and Lefebvre see it, simply passes the burden of explanation of a 
phenomenon onto another perspective. In the case of the metaphorization of space under capitalism, 
however, that perspectival shift takes on the specific character of abstraction, displacing the 
 
38 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (1974; repr., Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 
282. 
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heterogeneity of material space with an ideology of even unity, thereby obscuring the act of 
metaphorization itself. Smith, writing in the early 1980s and responding to poststructuralism’s strained 
relation to language, aligns this development in economic history with disciplinary biases, suggesting 
that, contrary to geography’s attention to spatial materiality, this abstraction is inherent to the literary 
metaphorization of space.39 More important than the contemporary influence of poststructuralist 
concerns over language’s ability to easily refer to the material world, was surely Lefebvre’s privileging 
of embodied experience over its sublimation in language. Lefebvre, rejecting the Saussurean notion 
that the “meta” of metaphor, metonymy, and other linguistic figures indicates a second-order of 
language, returns to the Nietzschean premise that all language is metaphorical in its basic transposition 
of fleshy experience into signs.40 “Metaphor and metonymy are not figures of speech,” Lefebvre 
concludes, but acts that “decode” and “dissolve” space through the metamorphosis of the body.41 
And yet, if figuration is not simply a linguistic flourish but a basic act that links embodied 
experience to other moments in space and time, it is hardly dispensable. The wholesale rejection of 
 
39 For example: 
For those of us trained in geography, the materiality of space (socially as well as physically 
constituted) is such a central assumption […] that it goes virtually unchallenged. This is by no 
means to exclude alternative understandings of space, but rather to highlight the priority 
accorded material space. For those trained in social and especially literary theory, however, 
space intervenes largely as metaphor. It is not that material space ceases to exist in these 
discourses; rather its materiality is, for them, so unproblematic (absolute space) that it raises 
few if any worthwhile questions. The interesting questions emerge instead from a gamut of 
personal, psychological, social, and conceptual ‘spaces’—arenas, realms, contexts, fields, 
conjectures—in which the dramas of human thought and interpersonal relationships are 
played out. (Smith, Uneven Development, 222–23.) 
40 Certeau offers a strikingly similar critique of the reduction of sensory life to conceptual clarity, suggesting 
that the very premise of the “urbanistic ratio” lies in its “transformation of the urban fact into the concept of the 
city.” (Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 94.) This contrast is, at root, between the contradictions of bodily 
experience and the rationalization of sight; Certeau suggests that life at the street level is characterized by “tactile 
apprehension and kinesthetic appropriation,” while its reduction to pure spectatorship follows the “lust to be 
a viewpoint and nothing more,” leading to the panoptic totalization from abstracted elevation. (Certeau, 97, 
92.)  
41 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 137–40. 
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unification, organization, or “mapping” of lived spatiality is as incoherent a goal as it would be 
counterproductive to resisting the deadening of abstraction. (This is, as Heise points out, the allure, 
the confusion, and the danger of fetishizing a “sense of place” in response to the homogenizing 
violence of globalization.) Just as Nietzsche had done a century before him, Lefebvre quickly concedes 
that, far from a retreat into mute physicalism, the necessary challenge to fixed and naturalized 
metaphorization is language in another form: its pluralization and free play — what he calls the 
inventiveness of “language in action.”42 Lefebvre, a trained Marxist committed to universal liberation, 
is acutely aware that any resistance to the abstraction of capitalist space must offer its own kind of 
spatial unification and organization. In fact, the specific problem with the capitalistic spatiality of the 
“globe,” Lefebvre argues, is that it asserts sovereignty over otherwise disparate spaces only by devising 
a hierarchy of newly fragmented spaces (as, for example, in the crude division of nations into various 
stages of “development”).43 
The problem, then, isn’t unification or even abstraction as such, but a unity that overwrites 
the material heterogeneity that it is meant to make sense of.44 The unification of space begins to 
rationalize violence when it employs metaphors that are devised to obscure their metaphoricity and 
mask the link back to their material referent. Far from establishing a representational bridge between 
 
42 Lefebvre, 138–39. 
43 Lefebvre, 282. 
44 It is here that Certeau’s analysis of urban alienation falls short of offering a clear politics of resistance. Certeau 
takes issue with the very project of making the city “readable” or “knowable”: the resistance of daily practice 
that he continuously extolls exists “below the thresholds at which visibility begins,” made up of bodies that 
“follow the thicks and thins of an urban ‘text’ they write without being able to read it. These practitioners make 
use of space that cannot be seen; their knowledge of them is as blind as that of lovers in each other’s arms.” 
(Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 92, 93.) 
It comes as no surprise, then, that Certeau conflates “geometric” and “geographic” constructions of space; to 
him, both smack of figurative maps that deviate from the immediacy of practice. As a consequence, he is forced 
to maintain that these networks of everyday practice that resist and subvert the regularization of rationalized 
urbanism remain “daily and indefinitely” outside any kind of representation. (Certeau, 93.) 
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material and metaphorical spatiality, the capitalist “globe” organizes social space in one direction only, 
continuously abstracting, fragmenting, and stratifying space, smoothing over any material resistance 
that could challenge its sovereignty. The hurricane, as seen on the radar, doesn’t simply take the 
perspectival position of an unmarked globe, but glides neatly over the clean geometric delineation of 
city, state, and national boundaries. Despite Ben’s romantic intuition of an organic unity to the city (a 
unity which, at the very least, would require a bi-directional relation of matter and form), New York’s 
unity is, at that moment, constructed by sublimating the millions of frantic people, each receiving and 
responding to the threat differently, into a single, impersonal terrain. If this one-directional abstraction 
compounds the disorientation it seeks to address, to what alternative modes of “figuring the global” 
does Ben have access? 
* 
Though Smith and Lefebvre allow us to diagnose the representational challenge Ben faces as 
the erasure of material difference through metaphorical homogenization, they don’t offer much in the 
way of representational alternatives for literary imagination. For this, we might briefly borrow the 
conceptual precision and dexterity of another theorist of the spatiality of linguistic figuration, Kenneth 
Burke (through whom I will return to Lerner). Burke, like Lefebvre and Nietzsche, sees in the basic 
figures of language more than descriptive embellishments: they are, in his mind, fundamental strategies 
for discovering truth. Burke identifies four distinct, though complementary, tropes: metaphor, 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. Each of them asserts, as he puts it, a form of “poetic realism.” 45 
Beyond the mere correlation offered by their scientific counterparts, these poetic devices lay claim to 
truth by establishing coherence through spatial translations. Far from deviations from the materiality 
 
45 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (1945; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 503. 
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of our world, then, these devices each, in their own way, increase the reality of phenomena by 
enriching the dimensionality of the world in which they are placed. 
Metaphorization, if understood as a poetic device for establishing reality, seems a much more 
innocuous and mundane tool through which we simply “consider A from the point of view of B.” 
This perspectival shift need not involve any kind of zooming out from or simplification of an original 
embodied experience.46 Nor does it undermine the veracity of the phenomenon (as it does in the case 
of scientific realism, for which perspectival plurality threatens a problematic relativism); quite the 
contrary, poetic realism increases “in proportion to the variety of perspectives from which [a 
phenomenon] can with justice be perceived.”47 Metaphorization establishes reality by translating 
horizontally, we might say, between views of one and the same world. Though it does loosen a 
phenomenon from its material specificity by translating laterally, it need not abstract or homogenize 
the space it establishes through vertical translation: it does not, necessarily, zoom between scales. 
If we follow Burke’s typology, then, Ben’s vision of the storm as a cephalopodic organism, a 
clear attempt at translating his life on the street into a massively scaled up aerial view of the city, isn’t 
really metaphorization at all. Recall, however, how Ben comes to that image: 
From a million media, most of them handheld, awareness of the storm seeped 
into the city […] There were myriad apps to track it […] 
The reality of the storm is only intuitable through the accumulation of countless media. Though Ben 
doesn’t specify — and it’s entirely possible that a single radar image or emergency message is blasted 
 
46 That isn’t quite right. Despite Burke’s insistence on the primacy of poetic reality, he hasn’t entirely overcome 
the Nietzschean myth of language’s corporeal origins. “Language,” he notes, “develops by metaphorical 
extension, in borrowing words from the realm of the corporeal, visible, tangible; then in the course of time, the 
original corporeal reference is forgotten, and only the incorporeal, metaphorical extension survives.” (Burke, 
506.) And yet, Burke seems to be referring only to the calcified metaphors of everyday “scientific realism,” 
which have lost their ability to translate in both directions. “Poets,” by contrast, “regain the original relation, in 
reverse, by a ‘metaphorical extension’ back from the intangible into the tangible equivalent.” This reverse 
movement, as we will see, is what he calls “metonymy.” (Burke, 506.) 
47 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 503; 504. 
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onto every person’s smartphone or TV —, to say that awareness “seeped in” suggests that the storm’s 
presence is gathering diffusely and horizontally. How, then, does Ben translate this perspectival collage 
of media across the city into the brief glimpse of aerial unity? Through what kind of spatial unity, in 
other words, does this pluralization of perspectives actually increase the storm’s tangible reality? Far 
from the mere aggregation or abstract triangulation of these media, the “awareness of the storm” 
appears as organized and present in the very material infrastructure of life at the street level. Ben 
notices this growing awareness 
entering the architecture and the stout-bodied passerines, inflecting traffic 
patterns and the “improved sycamores,” […] I mean the city was becoming 
one organism, constituting itself in relation to a threat viewable from space. 
Instead of moving from the material toward the abstract, the storm acts as a principle of unity through 
which the alterations of everyday life come to make sense as patterns belonging to a single (changing) 
world. 
For Ben to intuit the city as organic does not, as Neil Smith feared, posit or presuppose its 
unity through the ideological erasure of its material parts; rather, it asserts a bi-directional translatability 
between whole and part. It is, to return to Burke’s typology, the integration of metaphor and metonymy 
through synecdoche. While metaphorization allows Ben to re-describe the phones, conversations, and 
TV screens around him as media for the communication of a single phenomenon, the storm is able 
to manifest itself through the material minutiae of everyday life via its metonymic translation into 
tangible particulars. Whereas scientific knowledge concretizes abstract phenomena through reduction, 
Burke argues that the metonymic translation of the general or abstract into the particular and corporeal 
is rooted in the poetic knowledge that “human relations require actions, which are dramatizations.”48 If 
the pluralization of metaphor or the concretization of metonymy were to work in isolation, they would 
 
48 Burke, 506. 
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spiral into relativism or fall into reductionism, respectively. For these translations to remain visible as 
acts, they must facilitate coherence in both directions as an ongoing process, or “drama.” This 
“relationship of convertibility” is nothing other than synecdoche. In a rudimentary sense, Burke points 
out, synecdoche is synonymous with any instance of representation: all works of fiction (or, for that 
matter, works of art) are synecdochic in so far as elements within the work claim to “‘stand in’ for 
corresponding relations outside it.” Similarly, all societies are organized in some way around the 
premise that certain individuals may represent the will of the people as a whole. But if we consider 
representation not simply as substitution but as a mechanism for translating neatly between social 
spaces, synecdoche appears a figure through which we mediate between part and the whole, the 
material and the abstract, the street and the world, in both directions; it suddenly furnishes the 
coordination of pluralization and concretization.49 It starts to seem like precisely the kind of 
production of space that Lefebvre called for: unified yet heterogeneous, a vehicle for collective class 
consciousness that would build upon and not erase differences among people. 
* 
Though she describes this reductive concretization in terms of allegory, Ursula Heise 
articulates this problem, specifically as it arises in environmental aesthetics, in strikingly similar terms: 
The rhetorical figure that predominated in the textual as well as visual 
representations of Planet Earth that surfaced in the 1960s and 1970s was 
undoubtedly allegory, broadly understood as the figuration of abstract 
concepts and connections by means of a concrete image. […] these 
representations relied on summarizing the abstract complexity of global 
systems in relatively simple and concrete images that foregrounded synthesis, 
holism and connectedness. The efficacy of these tropes depended not only on 
their neglect of political and cultural heterogeneity […] but also on a 
conception of global ecology as harmonious, balanced, and self-regenerating.50 
 
49 Burke, 507–9. 
50 Heise, Sense of Place, 63. 
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Heise clearly looks to go beyond this representational reduction to achieve planetary unity without 
overwriting internal heterogeneities. But by turning to aesthetic forms like collage and montage, she 
remains in the additive idiom of multiplying and juxtaposing scales and perspectives, an aesthetic 
without any clear sense of the single geography to which they all contribute.51 Though this kind of de-
centralized aesthetic may facilitate smooth translation between parts, it isn’t clear what kind of unity 
it could be productive of. It is one thing to depict an intricate web of linkages within a static or pre-given 
whole; it is another to represent those elements as mutually generative of the very horizon of unity 
against which they are intelligible as parts. The aesthetic challenge is not simply to discover or posit 
the right kind of synecdochic unity, but to describe the reciprocal process by which a problematic 
form of unity could be re-worked and re-produced into a democratic and transformative one. This is, 
as I will suggest below, nothing other than the final element of Burke’s typology: dialectical irony. 
 
5. “Bad Forms of Collectivity” 
Ben’s position as an alienated consumer, it is now apparent, is not lacking for global 
imagination, but is trapped within impoverished and abstracted figures of the global, in which 
consumption can only appear as a passive part of a totality over which it has no productive power. It 
isn’t lost on Ben that there is a “system of great majesty and murderous stupidity”; he readily intuits 
 
51 The political symptom of this aesthetic approach is her celebration of “cosmopolitanism,” without fully 
determining what kind of collectivity this world citizenship would entail. The term, in and of itself, offers little 
political specificity other than its aspiration toward universality: it can appeal to visions of utopian collectivity 
that range from Kantian ethical imperatives that furnish the basis for rights-based commonality, to Smithian 
economic celebration of liberal capitalism and citizenship of the world market, to Marxist appeals to the shared 
subjectivity of the international proletariat. Heise draws upon more recent revivals of the term in the work of 
Ulrich Beck, Martha Nussbaum, and Anthony Giddens, particularly with the notion of the “risk society,” in 
which global citizenship it created in the face of shared vulnerabilities. Though, as Beck’s famous line that 
“poverty is hierarchical, smog is democratic” indicates, the utopian fantasy at work here is as liable to erase the 
unevenness of vulnerability to risk as other modes of organizing global community. Though Beck hopefully 
asserts that “risks display an equalizing effect,” the geography of ecological vulnerability has shown that to be 
hopelessly naive. See Heise, 119–59; Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter 
(London: SAGE, 1992), 36. 
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the mess of New York as a cleanly unified meteorological octopus. This problematic totality comes to 
a telling, if somewhat humorous, head as Ben tries to explain a motley collection of anxieties to 
Roberto, a young boy that he has been tutoring. Roberto tells Ben of his recent dreams that meld his 
confused — though not entirely unwarranted — fears of a coming ice age, faraway dictators, a 
recurrence of 9/11, and memories of his traumatic escape from El Salvador. In response, Ben, far 
from offering a neat accounting of the globe in which these anxieties could be placed and allayed, is 
himself overtaken by the crude yet overpowering vision of global calamity gestating in Roberto’s 
dreams. He experiences 
an increasingly frequent vertiginous sensation like a transient but thorough 
agnosia in which the object in my hand, this time a green pair of safety scissors, 
ceases to be a familiar tool and becomes an alien artifact, thereby estranging 
the hand itself, a condition brought on by the intuition of spatial and temporal 
collapse, or paradoxically, an overwhelming sense of its sudden integration, as 
when a Ugandan warlord appears via YouTube in an undocumented 
Salvadorean child’s Brooklyn-based dream of a future wrecked by dramatically 
changing weather patterns and an imperial juridical system that dooms him to 
statelessness; Roberto, like me, tended to figure the global apocalyptically.52 
The scissors are not defamiliarized because they break, nor because they are removed from a 
proximate sphere of work.53 Far from a problem of functionality, Ben’s scissors lose their familiarity 
because they both do and don’t succeed in disclosing the spatial and temporal relations in which they 
are made and used. Their functionality and familiarity go unchallenged so long as they appear in a 
context of cutting paper, being on sale at the office supply store, posing a danger if used improperly, 
 
52 Lerner, 10:04, 13–14. 
53 Though this may be reminiscent of the classic Heideggerian broken hammer, note the radically different 
everyday geography underlying this scene. In Heidegger’s account of everyday defamiliarization, the totality that 
comes into view is not infinite but discrete and specific: the totality of one’s life. Because first-personality is the 
frame for everything else in Heidegger’s phenomenology, there is always a built-in stop to the spiraling zoom 
triggered by crises of meaning. To put it another way, there is only one scale at which meaning (i.e. coherent 
unity) is possible for Heidegger, and that is the scale of first-personality — the horizons erected by “my life.” 
Needless to say, an aesthetics grounded in the bi-directional relation between phenomenology and worldliness 
cannot rest on this kind of absolute frame for organizing experience. See chapter 1 for an extended discussion 
of Heidegger’s phenomenological discovery and disfiguration of worldly coherence. 
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etc. But as soon as the coherence of those relations is threatened, the intelligibility of the scissors is 
put into jeopardy. This “collapse” of space and time, however, does not simply come from a narrowing 
field of intuition or the rupture of a proximate life-world, but through an overwhelming integration 
of these at a global scale: whereas consuming the octopi had caused Ben to collapse into an 
intensification of proprioceptive particulars, this agnosic disorientation moves in the opposite 
direction toward a dizzying view of global totality. When an everyday object ramifies itself out into 
every corner of the globe equally and indiscriminately, it signifies just as little as when its raw materiality 
erases its functionality: to haphazardly bring Robert Kony, climate change, and immigration policy 
together in a pair of safety scissors can only exacerbate alienation’s isolation and passivity; Ben and 
Roberto are left to grasp for coherence without any meaningful figurative tools to produce it. Total 
global integration via global conspiracy is simply the other side of siloed isolation.54 
It is here that we return to the fractured geography of alienated consumption and where a 
reciprocity of part and whole offers itself as a potential alternative for poetic realism. If, as I suggested 
at the outset, Lerner’s signal achievement in diagnosing the representational challenge posed by 
climate change is shifting our focus from severe weather events to the isolation of consumption from 
the dispersed geography of production, we might rearticulate the political passivity Ben finds himself 
confronted with as he cooks for the protester. The problem is, quite simply, that the act of eating has 
been severed from its world. In the maps of global unity readily available to Ben — grids, “free” 
marketplaces, aerial radars, “world-wide” webs of information technology, YouTube conspiracy — 
consumption figures as an isolated part with only a passive relation to the whole. In this neoliberal 
individualism, the only relation between consumption and the spheres of production (farming, 
logistics, waste management, land policy, seed ownership, crop subsidy, and so on), is purchasing 
 
54 Jameson astutely notes that conspiracy theories are simply “degraded attempt[s] […] to think the impossible 
totality of the contemporary world system.” (Jameson, Postmodernism, 38.)  
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power. By reducing the consumer’s representation in the world of agriculture to the weight of their 
wallets, eating is shielded from its dependency upon and production of the world of agriculture.55 The 
fractured geography of globalized agriculture has reduced eating to a private matter of gastronomic 
pleasure and caloric accounting, conveniently occluding the vast web of relations through which that 
experience is mediated.  
As Ben makes his way to the grocery store to stock up in anticipation of potential shortages 
after the storm, he experiences another instance of sudden global integration, this time neither 
conspiratorial nor aerially abstract, organized instead around the concrete circulation of an everyday 
object. Surrounded by frantic fellow preppers and alarmingly empty shelves, everything appears just a 
little different, a little less familiar. Because the threat of the storm suddenly makes Ben “viscerally 
aware of both the miracle and insanity of the mundane economy,” he chances upon one of the store’s 
last cans of instant coffee as if striking upon some kind of treasure. 
I held the red plastic container, one of the last three on the shelf, held it like 
the marvel that it was: the seeds inside the purple fruits of coffee plants had 
been harvested on Andean slopes and roasted and ground and soaked and then 
dehydrated at a factory in Medellín and vacuum-sealed and flown to JFK and 
then driven upstate in bulk to Pearl River for repackaging and then transported 
back by truck to the store where I now stood reading the label. It was as if the 
social relations that produced the object in my hand began to glow within it as 
they were threatened, stirred inside their packaging, lending it a certain aura —
the majesty and murderous stupidity of that organization of time and space 
 
55 As many critics have noted, the alienation of eating — most obvious in the wealthy and urban, but equally, 
if not more nefariously, present for the poor and rural — is a direct consequence of the reduction of political 
participation to consumerism, the shadow of political potency remaining in a globalist geography devoid of any 
relationality between consuming and producing our world. Armed with this critical geography, the 
contradictions of the locavore movement are all too clear: in the face of the perceived placelessness of 
globalized agriculture, celebrating food systems for their geographic proximity gives up on the possibility of 
universal collectivity or a system of agriculture that serves everyone, and instead rests content with the 
microcosms of backyard, garden, or “foodshed.” Recent movements that foreground “food justice” and “food 
sovereignty” have highlighted the convenient elitism and exclusivity of this kind of backyard provincialism. See, 
for example: Julie Guthman, Agrarian Dreams: The Paradox of Organic Farming in California, 1st ed. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004); Alison Hope Alkon, “Food Justice and the Challenge to Neoliberalism,” 
Gastronomica 14, no. 2 (2014): 27–40; Raj Patel, “Food Sovereignty,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 3 (2009): 
663–706; Chad Lavin, “Pollanated Politics, or, the Neoliberal’s Dilemma,” Politics and Culture 2 (2009): 57–67. 
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and fuel and labor becoming visible in the commodity itself now that planes 
were grounded and the highways were starting to close.56 
Has Ben managed to extract something like a synecdochic map out of this otherwise 
unremarkable tub of beans? The coffee glows with its own commodity history, puncturing the closed 
economy of the grocery store with a long horizontal chain of metaphorical translations between 
otherwise scattered scenes of labor and exchange. The disorder threatened by the storm discloses, it 
seems, forms of globalization other than sheer abstraction, instead integrating the sad scene of his 
consumption into a multitude of spaces of production. And although Ben manages to couple himself 
onto this grand chain of production, he remains the only link that does not reciprocally shape the 
entire world of social relations organized around that coffee. As the consumptive endpoint of this 
linear series of translations, Ben remains passive, powerless to do anything other than accept or reject 
the commodity delivered to him. He has, in other words, mapped out a materially specific and 
geographically uneven world out of his act of consumption, but has no role in that world to change 
it; Ben may be a more enlightened consumer, but is no more a contributing member to his political 
community than before. To use one of Lefebvre’s distinctions, Ben has succeeding in relating his 
purchase to spaces of production, but has not managed to represent his consumption as participating 
in the production of space.57 
 
56 Lerner, 10:04, 19. 
57 It comes as no surprise, then, that as soon as the hurricane has fizzled (it passes almost unnoticed in its 
anticlimactic landing), the estrangement that had fueled Ben’s new attunement to the global agricultural 
economy fades along with it. The coffee is “no longer a little different from itself, no longer an emissary from 
a world to come.” Without the specter of the storm, the synecdochic translation between strangers and the city 
as a social whole, between commodities and their global supply chains, vanishes. Moreover, “because those 
moments had been enabled by a future that had never arrived, they could not be remembered from this future 
that, at and as the present, had obtained; they’d faded from the photograph.” (Lerner, 24.) Here, the novel’s 
two recurring intertextual references collide to remind us of the fraught temporality of any reciprocal — 
dialectical — production of space: Walter Benjamin’s infamous Angel of History, propelled by a windy storm 
with its back to the future, warns us that the construction of a coherent “world to come” is only intelligible 
retrospectively, while Marty McFly’s unintentional revision of the present through his blind meddling in the 
past (in Back to the Future — a cheap, though remarkably incisive, pun) underscores the dependency of the future 
on the interrelations of minutiae in the present. 
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To represent Ben’s consumption as truly participatory in — productive of — the global supply 
chains in which he finds himself entangled requires more than bi-directional synecdoche: it requires a 
dynamic relation between parts and their whole. It requires, in other words, a production of space 
clearly situated in historical time. This dialectical representation of totality is, aesthetically speaking, 
nothing other than dramatic irony. As Burke puts it, irony names the moment at which a plurality of 
terms relate in such a way as to “produce a development which uses all the terms.” Burke is careful to 
distinguish this “classical irony” from the particular form cultivated by the romantics, in which the 
opposition of elements doesn’t further the development of poetic reality but is an “aesthetic 
opposition to cultural philistinism,” placing the artist “outside of and superior to the role he was 
rejecting.”58 Though this relativism of perspectives is a perpetual temptation of ironic dialectic, its 
classic form, Burke insists, strengthens the poetic claim to a singular reality by arranging the aesthetic 
terms “in an orderly parliamentary development,” in which each perspectival element is “neither true 
nor false, but contributory.”59 
If we read Lerner’s pledge to move from irony to sincerity in Burke’s terms (as a commitment 
to a dialectical figuration of consumption aimed toward the poetic development of a coherent world), 
the novel’s project suddenly becomes much clearer. Sincerity no longer invokes a tenuous revival of 
some kind of pre-ironic naiveté from the ruins of modernity’s aesthetic fragmentation; instead, it 
simply asserts faith in the ability of poetic language to establish a democratic form of representation 
through the continuous development of spatial figuration. The very notion of consumption, however, 
resists this: its passivity refuses participation in this process of spatial (re)production, tending toward 
 
For an extended reading of Lerner’s use of these two textual references, especially as they relate to the 
temporality of the novel’s political imagination, see Pieter Vermeulen, “How Should a Person Be 
(Transpersonal)? Ben Lerner, Roberto Esposito, and the Biopolitics of the Future,” Political Theory 45, no. 5 
(2017): 659–81. 
58 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 512, 514. 
59 Burke, 513. 
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the interiority of authenticity more than the publicity of sincerity.60 Consumption, so long as it is the 
receptive “taking in” without any active “giving out,” remains a one-directional affair, a piece of a 
whole to which it will never contribute.61 Consumption is, of course, only one of many ways to 
describe the practice of assimilating and receiving the world, one which emerges from the long chain 
of globalized production. Ever since biologists, chemists, and philosophers realized that humans 
fundamentally alter the world around them, however, a different term has circulated, one which is 




60 As noted above, this notion of sincerity as a commitment to a publicly constituted reality and authenticity as 
a modern privatization of self-truth, is developed at length in Lionel Trilling’s excellent genealogy: Trilling, 
Sincerity and Authenticity. See, also, chapter 1 for a discussion of the clash of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and 
worldliness (Weltlichkeit) in Heidegger’s work in particular. 
61 There is, in this sense, something fundamentally incoherent in Certeau’s re-description of consumption as 
resistant to the very forces of capitalist production that create and control it: even the most dissident and 
“devious” consumption lacks a participatory or re-productive character so long as it stands outside the 
representation sphere of relationality. For consumption, in other words, to truly be productive, it cannot do so 
in a purely local or physiological way: it must participate in a total re-production of the world. 
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III. Metabolic Poetics 
 
1. Laboring over the “Whole of Nature” 
It is no accident that the theorists of “combined and uneven” worldliness that I have gathered 
here — Smith, Lefebvre, Burke (though only partially), Jameson, and (indirectly) Heise62 — all situate 
their thinking within the larger Marxist problematic of marshalling attention to material particularity 
toward universal collectivity. 
Though Marxist critique has generally prioritized (as did Marx himself) a diachronic historical 
analysis of political economy over a synchronic geographic one,63 the tools for a spatial articulation of 
 
62 Burke, far from an orthodox Marxist (or, for that matter, orthodox anything), was nevertheless deeply 
intertwined in the problems raised by literary and cultural Marxists, particularly in the 1930s. He maintained 
that his idiosyncratic aesthetics, which he later termed “Dramatism,” was essentially the union of Marxist and 
Freudian rhetoric. In particular, Burke’s eventual integration of aesthetics and practice led to the redirection of 
literary critique toward cultural and social phenomena (as evidenced by his typology of tropes). For a more 
detailed discussion of Burke’s fraught inheritance of Marxist aesthetics, see Paul Jay, “Kenneth Burke and the 
Motives of Rhetoric,” American Literary History 1, no. 3 (1989): 535–53. 
Heise relies on leftist critiques of both globalism and reactionary localism to articulate the social-geographic 
problem inherent to most forms of eco-fiction and -criticism. And yet, she freely blends the diagnoses offered 
by figures like Jameson and Harvey across ideological and political lines. Although this makes for rich and 
dexterous aesthetic hermeneutics, it blunts the practical import of her aesthetic critique (as evidenced by the 
ambiguity of her use of “planetary” and “cosmopolitan,” adjectives that reach toward a liberalist embrace of a 
mosaic of difference as much as toward a strategy for universal self-determination). Though she may not direct 
her critique toward collective consciousness and revolution, Heise certainly offers a diagnosis in which the 
representational challenges raised by anthropogenic climate change are matters of social organization, 
challenging environmental aesthetics to recognize the inherent linkage between the unevenness and integration 
of capitalist geography. 
63 Though this prioritization of temporality over spatiality far exceeds the history of Western Marxism. As 
Michel Foucault, himself heavily reliant on spatial metaphors to capture the articulation and contestation of 
power, mused: “A critique could be carried out of this devaluation of space that has prevailed for generations. 
Did it start with Bergson or before? Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. 
Time, on the contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic.” (Michel Foucault, “Questions on Geography,” 
in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (1976; repr., New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 70.) Edward Soja has attempted precisely such a genealogical critique: see 
Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989). 
Georg Lukács made an analogous argument with regard to nature. In what came to be a foundational sentiment 
for Western Marxism, Lukács insisted that dialectical analysis be 
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political alienation are particularly rich thanks to Marx’s fixation on the relation between the spheres 
of production and consumption. Indeed, David Harvey, who (together with Neil Smith and a number 
of other urbanists and geographers) has argued for a “historical-geographical materialism,” has 
suggested that the geography of social structures and the recognition of the plasticity of that geography 
have been clear at least since Marx first described the globalization of the capitalist market.64 Not only 
does the reification of labor in tradable commodities create a global market by allowing for the infinite 
circulation of goods across immense spaces that are otherwise heterogeneous — nowhere clearer than 
in the universal exchangeability and mobility of money —, but spatial reconfigurations (in this case, 
frantic globalization) offer capitalism a temporary resolution to its fatal contradictions.65 Capitalism’s 
continuous acceleration of labor, circulation, and cycles of demand, Harvey argues, are only possible 
through “long-term investments” in “elaborate and stable infrastructures for production, 
consumption, exchange, communication, and the like,” which not only enable increased production 
but also absorb the constant crisis of overproduction generated by this very frenzy.66 
And yet, despite the obvious spatiality of Marx’s and Engel’s radical suggestion that the new 
“world market” would enable an international class consciousness otherwise unimaginable, the 
tendency toward historicism has obfuscated the spatial re-organization at the heart of Marx’s analysis 
 
limited here to the realms of history and society. The misunderstandings that arise from 
Engels’ account of dialectics can in the main be put down to the fact that Engels—following 
Hegel’s mistaken lead—extended the method to apply also to nature. However, the crucial 
determinants of dialectics—the interaction of subject and object, the unity of theory and 
practice, the historical changes in the reality underlying the categories as the root cause of 
changes in thought, etc.—are absent from our knowledge of nature.” (Georg Lukács, History 
and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (1923; repr., Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 
1971), 24. 
64 See, for example, his classic work: David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1973). 
65 David Harvey, “Globalization in Question,” Rethinking Marxism 8, no. 4 (December 1, 1995): 2. 
66 Harvey, 6. 
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of alienated labor. If this is partly because, as Harvey suggests, space seems to resist dialectical analysis 
and tend toward its own reification, that would seem to largely be attributable to a geographic 
sensibility that is itself reified from the outset. Indeed, it was Marx himself that developed one of the 
most dialectically suggestive figures of the rift between production and consumption in terms as much 
geographic as historical: that of a rift in our “social metabolism.” 
* 
The environmental crises of the early nineteenth-century (among others, population 
explosion, urban pollution, and rapid soil degradation) began to put into question the notion that 
nature was a static material substrate for the dynamics of social activity. Because of this, the fragile 
relation between the capitalist modes of industrial production and the resources on which they relied 
became of increasing concern to both industrialists and their critics. Marx, following on the work of 
agricultural chemists, particularly that of Justus von Liebig, became increasingly aware that the 
exploitation of labor and the exploitation of the soil were inseparable aspects of capitalist production.67 
These twin processes, Marx argued, were not only coincident symptoms of the same 
industrialization of agriculture and manufacturing, but were only possible through one another. As 
early as 1844, Marx had argued that human freedom lies not in contemplation but in the particular 
way that human labor works (“bearbeitet”) the material word. Unlike the animal that builds a nest or 
digs a hole, human being, Marx argued, is distinguished by the practical fact that it does not simply 
 
67 John Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett have written extensively on the centrality of Marx’s theory of 
environmental degradation to his dialectical method and, in particular, on the agricultural foundation of Marx’s 
unification of his materialist conception of history and of nature. See Paul Burkett, Marx and Nature: A Red and 
Green Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Foster, Marx’s Ecology, 141–77; and, in particular, John 
Bellamy Foster, The Robbery of Nature: Capitalism and the Ecological Rift (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2020), 
35–63, 104–29.  
Metabolism  Chaoulideer 247 
manipulate nature here and there, but “produces universally”; animals “produce only themselves, 
while man reproduces the whole of nature.”68 This universality, which Marx called our “species-being,” 
manifests itself in practice in that universality which makes the whole of nature 
his inorganic body, 1) as a direct means of life and 2) as the matter, the object, 
and the tool of his life activity. […] Man lives from nature, i.e. nature is his body, 
and he must maintain a continuing dialogue [beständigem Prozeß] with it if he is 
not to die.”69 
This continuous reproduction of the entirety of nature as an “objective world” does not simply ensure 
the survival of human being, but realizes its freedom to recreate itself. Because of this, the alienation 
of labor is manifest in the disruption of this reciprocal dependency and reproduction of human life 
and its material world; nature is “taken from him.”70 
Of course, Marx didn’t mean that every house we build or every meal we eat creates some 
kind of butterfly effect that rewrites the face of the entire globe. Our “universality” isn’t, in other 
words, a matter of the scale or scope of human labor. In an oft-cited passage clarifying the particularity 
of human labor from that of any other animal, Marx insisted that even the worst builder is superior 
to the most industrious bee in that they build the structure in their head before in substance.71 Any 
instance of labor, in other words, is representationally embedded in an idea of the “whole of nature.” 
The “working over” of nature in any one moment, to use the figurative language we have developed, 
is synecdochally related to the entirety of nature. Moreover, this exchange between the human body 
and its “inorganic body” is enabled by the possibility of change: “Through this movement [the human] 
acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.”72 
 
68 Marx, Early Writings, 329. 
69 Marx, 328. 
70 Marx, 329. 
71 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (1967; repr., New York: Penguin 
Books, 1990), 284. 
72 Marx, 283. 
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Neither part nor whole have a pre-given form toward which they work: labor is free precisely because 
any moment of it is inscribed within a totality that is forever changing. Labor is inscribed within an 
ongoing drama of change, contributing to a collective dialectical history through the reciprocal 
transformation of part and whole. 
 
2. A Material and Metaphorical Rift 
The dialectics of labor’s transformation of material and human nature became even clearer in 
Marx’s later writings. There, he re-described this bodily metaphor of human being’s reproduction of 
nature in the more precise and dialectical image of “metabolism” (“Stoffwechsel”). In this figure, labor 
is not simply the process of re-working or re-producing the natural world in the fixed image of man, 
but expresses a circulatory exchange of material that is both self-regulating and self-transforming. In 
the early nineteenth century, metabolism was an increasingly common concept used to describe the 
systematic exchange between a particular element of life and its material surroundings, whether at the 
cellular, organismic, or ecological level.73 Labor understood as “social metabolism,” as Marx came to 
call it, was thus always inextricable from its physiological reference (in particular, to digestion and 
respiration).74 More importantly, the physiological valence of the term provided a normative yet 
material basis on which to describe human labor as both transformative of nature and inscribed within 
it. The stakes of this are great: our freedom to transform the world around us is not a freedom from 
the conditions of nature but, to the contrary, a freedom to actualize our universal self-understanding 
 
73 See Foster, Marx’s Ecology, 141–77. For a brief but revealing history of the development of both “metabolism” 
and “circulation” as scientific concepts articulated in response to urbanization, see Erik Swyngedouw, 
“Metabolic Urbanization: The Making of Cyborg Cities,” in In the Nature of Cities: Urban Political Ecology and the 
Politics of Urban Metabolism, ed. Nik Heynen, Maria Kaika, and Erik Swyngedouw (London: Taylor & Francis, 
2006), 21–31. 
74 See, for example, Marx, Capital, Vol 1, 198–200. For a detailed analysis of Marx’s transformation of natural 
scientific theories of metabolic disruption into a general theory of socio-natural alienation, see Foster, Marx’s 
Ecology, 155–63. 
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through our particular material limitations. Expressed in the other direction, metabolic freedom is not 
simply a material exchange, a local reciprocity, but is the participation in the continuous re-production of the 
world as a whole. 
The immense power behind this notion of labor also exposes its fragility. Because metabolism 
inscribes the ideality of freedom into the specific material conditions of labor, that freedom is 
historically contingent. Metabolism was, therefore, analytically essential for Marx not only to articulate 
the material unity of man and nature but also the potential for them to become alienated from one 
another. 
This alienation, though it disrupts the futurity of freedom, is manifest in the spatiality of labor 
under capitalism.75 By showing that this alienation takes the form of a “metabolic rift” between society 
and nature, Marx was also able to tie the historical specificity of capitalist production to geographic 
reconfigurations in our working over of the material world, particularly in the industrialization of 
agriculture. Von Liebig had already tied the rapid depletion of the soil to the spatial separation of 
agricultural production and consumption through urbanization,76 an observation that became central 
to Marx’s critique of the land-ownership and land-use underpinning industrialization. In his critique 
of the market pressures exerted on agriculture by the privatization of farmland, Marx argued: 
Large landed property reduces the agricultural population to an ever decreasing 
minimum and confronts it with an ever growing industrial population 
crammed together in large towns; in this way it produces conditions that 
provoke an irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism, 
a metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself [die einen unheilbaren Riß 
hervorrufen in dem Zusammenhang des gesellschaftlichen und durch die Naturgesetze des 
Lebens vorgeschriebnen Stoffwechsels]. The result of this is a squandering of the 
 
75 Metabolism, as Eric Swyngedouw has put it, integrates discrete moments across historical time as much as 
geographical space: because it is a “process of transformation-in-movement,” it “is a historical process, it has a 
time arrow.” (Swyngedouw, “Metabolic Urbanization,” 24, 26.) 
76 As Liebig put it, “if it were practicable to collect, without the least loss, all the solid and fluid excrements of 
the inhabitants of towns, and to return to each farmer the portion arising from produce originally supplied by 
him to the town, the productiveness of his land might be maintained almost unimpaired for ages to come.” 
(Justus von Liebig, The Natural Laws of Husbandry, ed. John Blyth (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1863), 261.) 
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vitality of the soil, which is carried by trade far beyond the bounds of a single 
country. (Liebig.)77 
This metabolic description of production and its alienation is both social and literal; more 
precisely, it is both figurative and material.78 In the agricultural circulation of nutrients through soil, 
farmer, distributor, consumer, and disposer, the seemingly local physiological exchange between the 
human body and its natural “inorganic body” is, in fact, inseparable from the universal metabolism of 
the “whole of nature.” For human activity to transform its world, we must be able to represent its 
physical localization in any given action as participating in a single process of reproducing the entire 
world. Because the freedom of labor, according to Marx, is not traceable to the material content of 
that labor or to a state of mind while performing it, its alienation is, similarly, not simply a material 
matter of a physiological imbalance, nor even localizable to the mutual degradation of urban and rural. 
The “rift” is in our collective nature, our “species-being” as Marx puts it; it is a breakdown in the very 
capacity for our labor to figuratively universalize itself. Metabolism is thus a materialist description of human 
labor as dialectically regulated (and therefore fragile) world-making. Because this poiesis always re-makes its world 
both materially and figuratively, (free) labor projects the possibility of a different world to come by 
representationally enacting the relation between the particular and the whole. 
* 
Though Marx was primarily concerned with the alienation of labor through industrialized 
production, the metabolic potentiality (and alienation) of labor has become increasingly visible in the 
isolation and de-politicization of consumption. The fragmentation and deadening of consumption 
 
77 Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, 949. 
78 Swyngedouw expresses this nicely: “historical-geographical materialism could mobilize the concept of 
metabolism, neither as just an organic analogy to the social order […] nor as a mere metaphor to be transposed 
onto society, but as the very foundation of and lasting condition for the social.” (Swyngedouw, “Metabolic 
Urbanization,” 22.) 
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does not, then, lie in its passive opposition to the imagined liveliness of production: both find 
themselves internally severed from their participation in changing the world around them. 
We may, then, finally be able to understand Ben’s insecurity around the Occupy protester. The 
irksome “asymmetry” Ben recognizes while preparing his tasteless stir-fry cannot arise out of a sheer 
imbalance between his roles as consumer and producer, a passivity born of distance from cooking or 
growing his own food. Indeed, Ben suppresses the contradiction between his “avowed political 
materialism and [his] inexperience with this brand of making” by reminding himself how much worse 
their superficial reintegration in self-righteous “boutique biopolitics” is. Tracing one’s coffee back to 
the plantation where it was grown may ease one’s conscience by offering a more “informed” or 
“ethical” consumerism, but it does nothing to reclaim one’s consumption of the coffee as participation 
in an ongoing process of collective (re)making of the world as such. The allure of reducing “food 
miles” with a locavore diet or of recreating the entire food system in the microcosm of one’s backyard 
rests on the conflation of the material satisfaction of production with the situation of labor within a 
universal politics of collective transformation.79 The “brand of making” to which Ben feels inadequate 
has less to do with the materiality of his labor (making his own food) than with its figurative mapping 
(making sense of his participation in the world).  
This metabolic rift not only isolates Ben geographically from the world in which he lives, but 
severs his actions from their temporal projection of a different future. This expresses itself somewhat 
humorously in the moment that Ben’s desire to participate in producing his world — his desire to feel 
“depended upon” — is redirected toward a sudden longing for a child. But Ben catches himself, 
 
79 By giving up on any sort of universally emancipatory agricultural project, these movements not only reduce 
the collective dialectics of our public world to the private self-containment of domestic life, but, in so doing, 
reduce political action to moral self-preservation. As Chad Lavin has recently put it, they “trade a politicization 
of consumption for a consumerist politics.” (Chad Lavin, Eating Anxiety: The Perils of Food Politics (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 113.) See chapter 2 for an extended discussion of this reduction of politics 
to ethics via the containment of public life to private domesticity. 
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realizing how absurd and inadequate it is to replace the poiesis of collectivity with the self-reproduction 
of offspring: 
Then I recoiled at the thought, wanted one not at all. So this is how it works, 
I said to myself, as if I’d caught an ideological mechanism in flagrante delicto: 
you let a young man committed to anticapitalist struggle shower in the 
overpriced apartment that you rent and, while making a meal you prepare to 
eat in common, your thoughts lead you inexorably to the desire to reproduce 
your own genetic material within some version of a bourgeois household, that 
almost caricatural transvaluation of values lubricated by wine and song. Your 
gesture of briefly placing a tiny part of the domestic—your bathroom—into 
the commons leads you to redescribe the possibility of collective politics as the 
private drama of the family. All of this in the time it took to prepare an Andean 
chenopod.80 
Ben, Lerner assures us here, is not so naive as to allow himself such an easy victory. The danger of 
consumer politics, as Ben recognizes, is the easy substitution of a balanced domestic economy for a 
fractured and unequal global geography, a metonymic substitution of the proximate for the whole 
without any sense of reciprocal translatability into universality. So what is the alternative? Ben muses 
on: 
What you need to do is harness the self-love you are hypostatizing as offspring, 
as the next generation of you, and let it branch out horizontally into the 
possibility of a transpersonal revolutionary subject in the present and construct 
a world in which moments can be something other than the elements of 
profit.81 
Though not yet in an idiom with which Ben can make much of anything, Lerner gives us a flicker of 
the novel’s poetic project: redirecting the one-directional inwardness of consumption toward the 
“horizontal” figuration of collectivity (a process, we have seen, of metaphor). This communal 
construction of a world could provide an alternative map of the whole through which the specificity 
of any given moment could reappear as an element of something other than the static abstractions of 
capitalist totality. 
 
80 Lerner, 10:04, 47. 
81 Lerner, 47. 
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In what follows, I will argue that the rest of the novel describes — and performs — this 
“transpersonality” through the metabolic circulation and refiguration of language. Moreover, fiction 
(in this case, poiesis is, paradigmatically, prose) offers a way of rearranging this social infrastructure, 
illuminating the plurality of possible future worlds so as to remind us of the plasticity of the present 
moment. Ben, as he later describes the dialectical irony of this rearrangement, works “to become one 
of the artists who momentarily made bad forms of collectivity figures of its possibility, a 
proprioceptive flicker in advance of the communal body.”82 
 
3. The Transpersonal Present 
The first section of the novel, in which this political challenge is articulated as an essentially 
aesthetic problem, concludes with a scene that begins to establish this representational potentiality of 
fiction. Ben and his close friend Alex go to see a portion of Christian Marclay’s looped 24-hour video 
installation, The Clock.83 The piece is made up of hundreds of film clips, each of which contains a shot 
of a clock or reference to the time of day, edited and synchronized to play out in real, local time. It 
functions, in others words, as a literal as well as a figurative clock. Though the time is its only ostensible 
organizing principle, patterns of behavior and genre emerge that span the decades and languages of 
the original footage: “Marclay had formed a supergenre that made visible our collective, unconscious 
sense of the rhythms of the day—when we expect to kill or fall in love or clean ourselves or eat or 
fuck or check our watch and yawn.” Unifying these emergent circadian patterns, the unusually neat 
unit of the 24-hour day leaves Ben struggling “to resist the will to integration” instead of piecing 
together coherence.84 At first glance, the film seems to suggest that what so readily unifies these scenes 
 
82 Lerner, 108–9. 
83 Christian Marclay, The Clock, Video Installation, 2010. 
84 Lerner, 10:04, 53. 
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(indeed, all film — all fiction, even!) is the simple fact that they all take place within the easy ordering 
of clock time. Any scrap of fiction, in other words, can, minimally, be placed by its location in time: a 
cyclical whole so simple and complete that it readily assimilates any particular instance of fiction, no 
matter its status. If that were the poetic reality of The Clock, it would — as Ben had heard others 
describe it — “obliterate the distance between art and life, fantasy and reality.” And yet, precisely 
because Ben finds himself primarily working against the overwhelming integration of the footage, he 
experiences quite the opposite: 
while the duration of a real minute and The Clock’s minute were mathematically 
indistinguishable, they were nevertheless minutes from different worlds. [...] 
As I made and unmade a variety of overlapping narratives out of its found 
footage, I felt acutely how many different days could be built out of a day, felt 
more possibility than determinism, the utopian glimmer of fiction.85 
As an experiment in the organization of disparate snippets of life, the film performs two, 
seemingly antithetical, gestures of poetic production at once. It unifies hundreds of otherwise 
unrelated filmic snippets around the neutral passing of time, arranging life across the globe and history 
around the standardized ticking of the clock. But the poetic license that so easily combines all of these 
films through the apparent simultaneity of time also exposes the contingency of this arrangement, 
challenging the viewer to imagine the virtually endless possibilities of poetic order fashioned out of 
the vast material of everyday life (or, in this case, the archive of filmic footage).86 The Clock uses one 
 
85 Lerner, 54. 
86 The fact that the piece has no set beginning or end already points to the endless variability of narratives 
available within Marclay’s particular selection of scenes. Ben and Alex walk in at 11:37pm (despite having hoped 
to make it at 10:04 for the eponymous scene from Back to the Future) at which point the “tension of imminent 
midnight was palpable, the twenty-three and a half hours of film that preceded us building inexorably to that 
climax.” But this neat organization is undermined just after the clock strikes midnight, as the film cuts to a girl 
waking up. “The entire preceding twenty-four hours might have been the child’s dream, a storm that never 
happened, just one of many ways The Clock can be integrated into an overarching narrative.” (Lerner, 52–53.) 
Not only could the day have been built out of entirely different footage, but this very selection and arrangement 
of clips offers an entirely different day depending on when you begin and end. Indeed, the idea that it stops at 
a certain moment and then starts over from the beginning — at midnight, say — doesn’t seem to hold up: 
scenes from “later” in the day change the way “earlier” scenes will appear later on in one’s viewing experience. 
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of the many pre-given modes of abstract unification offered by capitalist standardization (the 24-hour 
day)87 to expose the seams of its own construction. With unity always already given at the outset, 
poetic production is free to illuminate the figurative translations created by mere selection and 
juxtaposition. The artwork’s emphasis is not on fictionalizing, on postulating an alternative world-order 
in which every person, thing, and act cleanly fits into a single logic, but rather on poetics, on showing 
“how many different days [can] be built out of a day.” 
Far from offering an alternate reality, then, fiction rearranges by reviving the acts of figurative 
translation that stitch together our world as it is now, thereby releasing the immense plurality of other 
possible stories that could have been told. If poetic realism has the power to construct a “world to 
come,” it does not do so by positing a complete and singular map out of nothing. Rather, it levies the 
calcification and hypostatization of a particular arrangement of the world as it is against itself, 
imploding hegemonic unity into its constitutive pieces: the reciprocally transformative relations of part 
and whole. This immanent poetic critique is — to make good on Lerner’s initial promise — what it is 
to “project [oneself] into multiple futures simultaneously,” the “vulnerable grid” of the “sinking city” 
ironically leading toward a firmer grasp of New York’s uneven yet combined geography. 
This reinforces the point that literature needn’t (perhaps can’t) speculatively posit an alternative 
universe in another space or time so much as expose the plasticity and plurality of the present world. 
“Cli-fi,” if there is to be such a thing, is, therefore, not a genre description of stories that present 
remote utopias or proximate dystopias but a formal strategy for the ironic critique of our rapidly self-annihilating 
 
Ben stays only for a few hours, returning in the weeks that follow for a chunk here and there. For all of these 
reasons, the piece continuously points to the plurality of wholes (days) to which the clips contribute. 
87 The temporal analog to the spatiality of the grid, the clock is inseparable from the imperial and economic 
history of capitalist discipline. The field of scholarship on the social history of the standardization of time is 
vast and incredibly rich; for a historical overview of the specific entwinement of temporal standardization and 
the exploitation of labor, see Jonathan Martineau, Time, Capitalism and Alienation: A Socio-Historical Inquiry into the 
Making of Modern Time (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2015). 
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organization of the world. Pieter Vermeulen has made a similar argument in his reading of Lerner’s novel, 
arguing that the political project of “transpersonality” redirects any attention on the future toward its 
nascent potentiality in the present. Vermeulen insists that the novel’s incessant metafiction does not 
“expose fiction as pure artifice or expose reality as an imaginative construct; instead, and in marked 
contrast to more familiar postmodern deployments of metafiction,” these reflexive moments “serve 
to assert the irreducible actuality of the reality that the novel describes.” If the novel constructs 
something like a “transpersonal connection” to come, he concludes, this poetic future “is less the 
triumphant transformation of the present than a continuation of an already fully meaningful 
present.”88 Unlike the critical distance between fact and fiction opened by the relativity of postmodern 
(or romantic) irony, Lerner’s irony sets off a dialectical transformation immanent to our (present) world. 
Author and narrator relate as do the clock and The Clock: they are ways of arranging the very same 
world, the latter pluralizing and performing figurative translation through its friction with the former.89 
The possibility of transformation lies in the reconfiguration of “bad forms of collectivity.” To use 
Lefebvre’s phrase, the artwork intervenes in the arrangement of reality by putting “language into 
action.”  
 
4. Prosodic Community 
As the novel unfolds, it is not only in language but as language that the novel’s world is 
metabolically re-configured. Recall, for example, that as the radar imposed its own unifying image, the 
storm’s presence manifested itself at the street level in the “common conversation” quickly 
establishing itself in every subway car or grocery line. Every New Yorker was suddenly an armchair 
 
88 Vermeulen, “How Should a Person Be (Transpersonal)?,” 667, 676, 675. 
89 Lerner suggests as much in another moment of self-interpretation ventriloquized by Ben towards the end: “I 
resolved to dilate my story not into a novel about literary fraudulence, about fabricating the past, but into an 
actual present alive with multiple futures.” (Lerner, 10:04, 194.) 
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meteorologist, “swapping surge level predictions” with strangers, everyone adopting and contributing 
to a shared lingo with which to understand the looming threat. 
When asked to give a speech telling the story of his beginnings as a writer, Ben returns to his 
earliest memories of this kind of collective discourse as his first true experience of poetry. Perhaps to 
expose the humorous contingency of this “projection back into the past” to “write the fiction of 
[one’s] origins” as a writer, Ben fixates on Ronald Reagan’s address to the nation following the 
televised explosion of the Challenger spacecraft. The speech entranced the young Ben, “entered [his] 
body as much as [his] mind,” and “simultaneously comforted and stirred” him with the awareness that 
“all across America those rhythms were working in millions of other bodies too.”90 However 
meaningless the content of Reagan’s speech, these echoing words offered a shared way of assimilating 
the horror of the accident to the nation’s unhampered march forward; it reintegrated an otherwise 
senseless phenomenon into the robust framework of Reagan’s America. The young Ben marveled at 
“the way the transpersonality of prosody constituted a community: poets were the unacknowledged 
legislators of the world, it seemed to me.”91 Despite the absurdity of Ben projecting his beginnings as 
a poet back onto the dissimulating and self-serving assurances of Ronald Reagan, it captures the 
immense power and potentiality of crafted language to not only make sense of otherwise unintelligible 
moments but to make community. Reagan’s true (abuse of) power, in other words, lay in setting the 
terms through which every individual’s shock and grief could be reconfigured as the participation in 
national mourning and perseverance. His political representation of each and every constituent was 
enacted in his poetic representation of their participation in “America.” 
There is a deeper sense in which Reagan’s speech performed the poetic constitution of 
community, one which revives the reciprocity and continuous transformation of circulating discourse. 
 
90 Lerner, 111, 112. 
91 Lerner, 112–13. 
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Reagan, Ben reminds his audience, did not pen the speech himself. Peggy Noonan, the author of many 
of his most famous phrases, wrote it. Not only was Reagan ventriloquizing language crafted by 
Noonan, but she herself lifted some of its most memorable lines from a poem, “High Flight,” by a 
young pilot who died, much like those aboard the Challenger, while flying (though he, John Gillespie 
Magee, in combat in the second World War). And Magee’s poem, Ben goes on, “was either a work of 
collage or an act of plagiarism”: much of it traceable back to an anthology, Icarus, of poems about 
flight. This, Ben readily admits, is simply what he learned from Wikipedia (its own form of 
“transpersonal” expertise), and the web of poetic repurposing surely stretches as far back as one would 
like to follow it. The speech, far from an authorial dictum conceived on high and passively received 
by its listeners, is itself the rearrangement of circulating words, a way of re-figuring those phrases to 
constitute a new whole within which they could appear necessary and new. Regan was simply 
metabolizing the language available to him in order to re-figure a national failure as a moment neatly 
inscribed within his vision for the country. Ben notes other “modes of recycling” that moved through 
the bodies and out the mouths of those reckoning with the image of the explosion. Among the kids 
at his school, a repertoire of jokes quickly established itself, each repurposing some element of the 
tragedy and its coverage to make light — make sense — of it. “The Challenger joke cycle, which seemed 
to exist without our parents knowing, was my first experience of a kind of sinister transpersonal syntax 
existent in the collective unconscious, a shadow language to Reagan’s official narrative processing of 
the national tragedy.”92 
Here, we return to starkly different modes in which language can circulate. It can, as Nietzsche 
and Lefebvre feared, simply be repeated, solidifying the framework of meaning that its particular 
figuration happens to have established and disguising its own history, its contingency, its mutability. 
 
92 Lerner, 115. 
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We can be, and often — perhaps mostly — are, simply consumers of pre-given language. Those who 
linguistically rearrange the world may be its “unacknowledged legislators,” but that does not make its 
community democratic. As Ben makes clear, Magee’s poem, Reagan’s speech, and the crude jokes at 
school were not exemplary, interesting, funny, or admirable. But, Ben wonders at the conclusion of 
his speech, 
I wonder if we can think of them as bad forms of collectivity that can serve as 
figures of its real possibility: prosody and grammar as the stuff out of which 
we build a social world, a way of organizing meaning and time that belongs to 
nobody in particular but courses through us all.93 
* 
What, then, is the relationship between this poetic figuration and the inherent freedom of all 
human labor? What, in other words, is the place of aesthetic representation in the political project of 
collective freedom? Is language expressive of, paradigmatic of, or a distillation of all forms of human 
labor? To pose the question this way is to invite the division of the material and figurative, first-order 
and second-order back in. The very force of a dialectical understanding of language is that its 
materiality contains the dynamism for its own transformation: the community that it relies on and 
fosters is one that must continuously make and re-make itself. It is an artificial framework for 
organization that creates the conditions for its own transformation. This combination of material 
durability and figurative malleability means that we don’t simply assert or will new social worlds, but, 
as Lerner repeats: we “build” them. Poetic representation is a matter of social construction in the most 
literal sense: through it we build the infrastructure through which and upon which all activity is 
possible. 
Not only does language mediate our social life in its materiality, it moves through us: we embody 
it. As noted above, the Marxian notion of metabolic exchange is a way of describing the relationship 
 
93 Lerner, 116. 
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between our materiality (our body) and the materiality of our world. By describing labor as metabolic, 
Marx was able to show that the materiality of labor was precisely what gave it its potential to transform 
the whole of our world; by describing poetry (in the broad sense of poiesis) as metabolic, we suggest, 
analogously, that our consumption of language is always a transformative embodiment of the entirety 
of our social infrastructure. 
Lerner describes this malleable materiality of his “brand of making” better than I can. In a 
rather remarkable passage, Lerner (or is it Ben?) digests two earlier scenes (his proprioceptive 
dissolution while looking out over traffic from the High Line and his later intuition of an abstracted 
aerial unity in the face of the storm) and, we might say, re-figures the bad forms of collectivity that 
they had offered. Those moments converge here, coming into a transformative dialectical friction, 
ironizing one another in a material re-description of the poetic figuration of collectivity: 
I breathed in the night air that was or was not laced with anachronistic 
blossoms and felt the small thrill I always felt to a lesser or greater degree when 
I looked at Manhattan’s skyline and the innumerable illuminated windows and 
the liquid sapphire and ruby of traffic on the FDR Drive and the present 
absence of the towers. It was a thrill that only built space produced in me, 
never the natural world, and only when there was an incommensurability of 
scale — the human dimension of the windows tiny from such a distance 
combining but not dissolving into the larger architecture of the skyline that 
was the expression, the material signature, of a collective person who didn’t 
yet exist, a still-uninhabited second person plural to whom all the arts, even in 
their most intimate registers, were nevertheless addressed. Only an urban 
experience of the sublime was available to me because only then was the 
greatness beyond calculation the intuition of community. Bundled debt, trace 
amounts of antidepressants in the municipal water, the vast arterial network of 
traffic, changing weather patterns of increasing severity—whenever I looked 
at Manhattan from Whitman’s side of the river I resolved to become one of 
the artists who momentarily made bad forms of collectivity figures of its 
possibility, a proprioceptive flicker in advance of the communal body. What I 
felt when I tried to take in the skyline—and instead was taken in by it—was a 
fullness indistinguishable from being emptied, my personality dissolving into 
a personhood so abstract that every atom belonging to me as good belonged 
to Noor, the fiction of the world rearranging itself around her.94 
 
94 Lerner, 108–9. 




Although metaphorization may disguise itself as absolute truth, representation may forget its 
own popular mandate, and the poetic formation of community may serve to rob each participant of 
their own capacity to contribute and transform their shared discursive fabric, the poetic basis of 
community can never be entirely erased. Precisely because a social world is founded on shared 
representation, even its most calcified and authoritarian instantiation can be reclaimed, repurposed, 
and returned to its figurative fluidity. This poetic hope with which Ben concludes is the poetic 
expression of Marx’s own political hope. While Marx saw that labor within a framework of capitalist 
wealth circulated without any ability to change that particular arrangement of meaning, he insisted on 
the possibility (the necessity, even) that static circulation would always have to break back out into 
transformative metabolism. “Bad forms of collectivity,” precisely because of their reliance on the 
continuous reproduction of representations of unity, serve as the figurative material for the possibility 
of new, potentially more democratic, more poetic, collectivities. We will always embody language 
metabolically, reusing and repurposing our social infrastructure, figuring ourselves collectively in the 
medium through which universal freedom remains forever possible. 
 
 
   




Aho, Kevin. Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body. Albany: SUNY Press, 2009. 
Alkon, Alison Hope. “Food Justice and the Challenge to Neoliberalism.” Gastronomica 14, no. 2 
(2014): 27–40. 
Allied Control Council. “Directive No. 38: The Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis, and 
Militarists and the Internment, Control, and Surveillance of Potentially Dangerous 
Germans.,” October 12, 1946. https://ghdi.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2307. 
Anand, Nikhil. “Pressure: The Politechnics of Water Supply in Mumbai.” Cultural Anthropology : 
Journal of the Society for Cultural Anthropology 26, no. 4 (2011): 542–64. 
Appel, Hannah C. “Walls and White Elephants: Oil Extraction, Responsibility, and Infrastructural 
Violence in Equatorial Guinea.” Ethnography. 13, no. 4 (2012): 439–65. 
Arendt, Hannah. “Collective Responsibility.” In Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of 
Hannah Arendt, translated by J.W. Bernauer, 43–50. 1968. Reprint, Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987. 
———. “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility.” In Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: 
Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, edited by Jerome Kohn, 121–32. 1945. Reprint, New 
York: Schocken, 1994. 
———. The Human Condition. 1958. Reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
———. “What Is Existential Philosophy.” In Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and 
Totalitarianism, edited by Jerome Kohn, translated by Rita Kimber and Robert Kimber, 163–
87. 1948. Reprint, New York: Schocken, 1994. 
Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. 
Augstein, Rudolf. Historikerstreit: die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der 
nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung. München: R. Piper, 1989. 
Beck, Ulrich. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Translated by Mark Ritter. London: SAGE, 1992. 
Behrent, Megan. “The Personal and the Political: Literature and Feminism.” International Socialist 
Review, no. 92 (2016): 39–64. 
Benhabib, Seyla. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2003. 
Bernstein, Richard J. “Rethinking the Social and the Political.” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 11, 
no. 1 (1986): 111–30. 
Broszat, Martin. “Alltagsgeschichte der NS-Zeit.” In Alltagsgeschichte der NS-Zeit: neue Perspektive oder 
Trivialisierung?, 11–20. Oldenbourg R. Verlag GmbH, 1984. 
———. Alltagsgeschichte Der NS-Zeit: Neue Perspektive Oder Trivialisierung. Kolloquien Des Instituts Für 
Zeitgeschichte. München: R. Oldenbourg, 1984. 
———. Nach Hitler: der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte : Beiträge von Martin Broszat. R. 
Oldenbourg, 1986. 
  Chaoulideer 263 
———. “Plädoyer für eine Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus.” Merkur 39, no. 5 (May 1, 1985): 
373–85. 
Broszat, Martin, and Saul Friedländer. “Um Die ‘Historisierung Des Nationalsozialismus’. Ein 
Briefwechsel.” Viertelsjahrhefte Für Zeitgeschichte 36 (1988): 339–72. 
Broszat, Martin, Elke Fröhlich, and Anton Grossmann, eds. Bayern in der NS-Zeit. 6 vols. Munich: 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1977–1983. 
———, eds. Bayern in der NS-Zeit. Band IV: Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt: Teil C. Munich: 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981. 
Browning, Christopher R. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. 
1992. Reprint, New York: Harper Collins, 2017. 
Buell, Lawrence. The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and Literary Imagination. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2009. 
Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. 1945. Reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 
Burkett, Paul. Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. 
———. “Nature in Marx Reconsidered: A Silver Anniversary Assessment of Alfred Schmidt’s 
‘Concept of Nature in Marx.’” Organization & Environment 10, no. 2 (1997): 164–83. 
Campbell, Scott M. The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language. Fordham 
University Press, 2012. 
Cerbone, David R. “Heidegger and Dasein’s ‘Bodily Nature’: What Is the Hidden Problematic?” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8, no. 2 (January 2000): 209–30. 
Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven Rendall. 1980. Reprint, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. “The Climate of History: Four Theses.” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009): 197–
222. 
Ciocan, Cristian. “Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Embodiment in the Zollikon Seminars.” 
Continental Philosophy Review 48, no. 4 (2015): 463–78. 
Cosmus, Oliver. “Die Leiblichkeit im Denken Heideggers.” In Die erscheinende Welt: Festschrift fiir Klaus 
Held, edited by Heinrich Hüni and Peter Trawny, 71–86. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002. 
Crowe, Benjamin D. “Resoluteness in the Middle Voice: On the Ethical Dimensions of Heidegger’s 
Being and Time.” Philosophy Today 45, no. 3 (2001): 225–41. 
Crowell, Steven Galt. Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental 
Phenomenology. Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001. 
Crutzen, Paul J., and Eugene Stoermer. “The ‘Anthropocene.’” IGBP [The International Geosphere—
Biosphere Programme] Newsletter 41 (2000): 17. 
De Bruyn, Ben. “Realism 4°: Objects, Weather and Infrastructure in Ben Lerner’s 10:04.” Textual 
Practices 31, no. 5 (2017): 951–71. 
Derrida, Jacques. “Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference.” Research in Phenomenology 13 
(1983): 65–83. 
Dietrich, Gerd. “Kulturbund.” In Die Parteien Und Organisationen Der DDR: Ein Handbuch, edited by 
Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, Andreas Herbst, Christine Krauss, Daniel Küchenmeister, and 
Detlef Nakath, 530–59. Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag, 2002. 
  Chaoulideer 264 
Dimock, Wai Chee. Through Other Continents: American Literature Across Deep Time. Princeton 
University Press, 2008. 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I. MIT 
Press, 1991. 
Durham Peters, John. The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
Fabbianelli, Faustino, and Sebastian Luft, eds. Husserl Und Die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie: Husserl 
and Classical German Philosophy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2014. 
Fallada, Hans. Every Man Dies Alone. Translated by Michael Hofmann. 1947. Reprint, New York: 
Melville House, 2009. 
———. Jeder Stirbt Für Sich Allein. 1947. Reprint, Berlin: Aufbau, 2011. 
———. “Über den doch vorhandenen Widerstand der Deutschen gegen den Hitlerterror.” Aufbau 
Verlag 1, no. 3 (November 1945): 211–18. 
Foster, John Bellamy. Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000. 
———. The Robbery of Nature: Capitalism and the Ecological Rift. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
2020. 
Foucault, Michel. “Questions on Geography.” In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977, edited and translated by Colin Gordon, 63–77. 1976. Reprint, New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980. 
Friedländer, Saul. “Some Reflections on the Historicization of National Socialism.” Tel Aviver 
Jahrbuch Für Deutsche Geschichte 16 (1987): 310–24. 
Fuss, Peter. “Hannah Arendt’s Conception of Political Community.” Idealistic Studies 3, no. 3 
(September 1973): 252–65. 
Ghosh, Amitav. The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016. 
Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1996. 
Gonda, Jan. “Reflections on the Indo-European Medium I.” Lingua 9 (1961): 30–67. 
———. “Reflections on the Indo-European Medium II.” Lingua 9 (1961): 175–93. 
Großheim, Michael. Von Georg Simmel zu Martin Heidegger: Philosophie zwischen Leben und Existenz. 
Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991. 
Guha, Ramachandra, and Juan Martínez Alier. Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South. 
London: Earthscan Publications, 1997. 
Guthman, Julie. Agrarian Dreams: The Paradox of Organic Farming in California. 1st ed. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004. 
Habermas, Jürgen. “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power.” Social Research 44, no. 1 
(Spring 1977): 3–24. 
Harvey, David. “Globalization in Question.” Rethinking Marxism 8, no. 4 (December 1, 1995): 1–17. 
———. Social Justice and the City. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 
Haugeland, John. Dasein Disclosed. Harvard University Press, 2013. 
  Chaoulideer 265 
Heidegger, Martin. Basic Problems of Phenomenology: Winter Semester 1919/1920. Translated by Scott M. 
Campbell. Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 
———. Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. 1927. Reprint, Albany: SUNY Press, 2010. 
———. Gesamtausgabe 56/57: Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie: frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen Kriegsnotsemester 
1919 und Sommersemester 1919. V. Klostermann, 1987. 
———. Gesamtausgabe I: Frühe Schriften. V. Klostermann, 1976. 
———. Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20). V. Klostermann, 1993. 
———. Sein und Zeit. 1927. Reprint, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2006. 
———. Towards the Definition of Philosophy. Translated by Ted Sadler. London: Continuum, 2008. 
Heise, Ursula K. Sense of Place and Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagination of the Global. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Hoffman, Peter. Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf Der Opposition Gegen Hitler. Munich: Piper, 
1985. 
Hoffmann, Peter. German resistance to Hitler. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988. 
Husserl, Edmund. Ideen Zu Einer Reinen Phänomenologie Und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: 
Phänomenologische Untersuchungen Zur Konstitution. Husserliana, Band IV. 1912. Reprint, Marly 
Biemel, 1991. 
———. Logische Untersuchungen. 1900. Reprint, Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2009. 
Jameson, Fredric. “Cognitive Mapping.” In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary 
Nelson, 347–57. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1988. 
———. “Marxism and Postmodernism.” New Left Review, no. 176 (1989): 31–45. 
———. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991. 
Jaspers, Karl. Die Schuldfrage: ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage. Zürich: Artemis-Verlag, 1947. 
Jay, Paul. “Kenneth Burke and the Motives of Rhetoric.” American Literary History 1, no. 3 (1989): 
535–53. 
Kelly, Adam. “David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in American Fiction.” In Consider David 
Foster Wallace: Critical Essays, edited by David Hering, 131–46. Los Angeles: Sideshow Media 
Group Press, 2010. 
Kern, Iso. Husserl und Kant: eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus. 
1964. Reprint, Heidelberg: Springer, 2011. 
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2000. 
———. The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. Bloomsbury, 2015. 
Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time. University of California Press, 1995. 
———. “Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask.” Man and World 28, no. 3 
(1995): 197–240. 
Klaces, Caleb. “Ben Lerner’s 10:04 and Climate Change.” Textual Practice, 2020, 1–15. 
Krell, David Farrell. Daimon Life : Heidegger and Life-Philosophy. Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University 
Press, 1992. 
———. Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to the Black Notebooks. SUNY Press, 2015. 
Kuhnke, Manfred. ... ... dass ihr Tod nicht umsonst war!: Authentisches und Erfundenes in Hans Falladas 
letztem Roman. Neubrandenburg: Federchen Verlag, 1991. 
  Chaoulideer 266 
———. Falladas letzter Roman: die wahre Geschichte. Friedland, Germany: Steffen Verlag, 2011. 
———. Verstrickt in die Zeiten: Anmerkungen zu den verwobenen Lebenslinien von Johannes R. Becher und 
Hans Fallada. Neubrandenburg: Federchen Verlag, 1999. 
Larkin, Brian. “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure.” Annual Review of Anthropology. 42 (2013): 
327–43. 
Lask, Emil. Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre: eine Studie über den Herrschaftsbereich der 
logischen Form. Edited by Friedrich Kaulbach. 1911. Reprint, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993. 
Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
Lavin, Chad. Eating Anxiety: The Perils of Food Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2013. 
———. “Pollanated Politics, or, the Neoliberal’s Dilemma.” Politics and Culture 2 (2009): 57–67. 
Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. 1974. Reprint, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. 
Lerner, Ben. 10:04: A Novel. New York: Faber & Faber, 2014. 
Levinas, Emannuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. 1961. 
Reprint, Springer, 2012. 
Liebig, Justus von. The Natural Laws of Husbandry. Edited by John Blyth. New York: D. Appleton and 
Co., 1863. 
Lukács, Georg. History and Class Consciousness. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. 1923. Reprint, 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1971. 
Macdonald, Iain. “Ethics and Authenticity: Conscience and Non-Identity in Heidegger and Adorno, 
with a Glance at Hegel.” In Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions, 6–21. Stanford 
University Press, 2008. 
MacKinnon, Danny, and Kate Driscoll Derickson. “From Resilience to Resourcefulness: A Critique 
of Resilience Policy and Activism.” Progress in Human Geography 37, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 253–
70. 
Marclay, Christian. The Clock. 2010. Video Installation. 
Martineau, Jonathan. Time, Capitalism and Alienation: A Socio-Historical Inquiry into the Making of Modern 
Time. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2015. 
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1. Translated by Ben Fowkes. 1967. 
Reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1990. 
———. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 3. Translated by David Fernbach. 1894. 
Reprint, New York: Penguin, 1992. 
———. Early Writings. Translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton. 1844. Reprint, New 
York: Penguin, 1992. 
Mason, Timothy W. “Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of 
National Socialism.” In Der Führerstaat: Mythos Und Realität, edited by Gerhard Hirschfeld and 
Lothar Kettenacker, 21–40. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981. 
McGurl, Mark. “The New Cultural Geology.” Twentieth Century Literature 57, no. 3/4 (2011): 380–90. 
  Chaoulideer 267 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Donald Landes. 1945. Reprint, 
New York: Routledge, 2012. 
Misch, Georg. Lebensphilosophie Und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung Der Diltheyschen Richtung Mit 
Heidegger Und Husserl. Bonn: F. Cohen Verlag, 1930. 
Nielsen, Cathrin. “Pathos Und Leiblichkeit. Heidegger in Den ‘Zollikoner Seminaren.’” 
Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2003, 149–69. 
Overgaard, Søren. “Heidegger on Embodiment.” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 35, no. 2 
(January 1, 2004): 116–31. 
Parks, Lisa. “Technostruggles and the Satellite Dish: A Populist Approach to Infrastructure.” In 
Cultural Technologies: The Shaping of Culture in Media and Society, edited by Göran Bolin, 64–84. 
London: Routledge, 2012. 
Patel, Raj. “Food Sovereignty.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 3 (2009): 663–706. 
Philip, M. NourbeSe. “Are We Really In This Together? With M. NourbeSe Philip.” The PEN Pod, 
April 9, 2020. 
Pitkin, Hanna. “Justice: On Relating Private and Public.” Political Theory 9, no. 3 (1981): 327–52. 
Plessner, Helmut. Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie. 
1928. Reprint, De Gruyter, 2019. 
Purdy, Jedediah. After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2015. 
Robbins, Bruce. “The Worlding of the American Novel.” In The Cambridge History of the American 
Novel, edited by Leonard Cassuto, 1096–1106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel 
Estella Barnes. 1943. Reprint, Routledge, 2003. 
Schmidt, Alfred. Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx. 1962. Reprint, Hamburg: Europäische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1993. 
Schreiber, Gerhard. Hitler Interpretationen: 1923-1983. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984. 
Sessions, George. “Deep Ecology, New Conservation, and the Anthropocene Worldview.” The 
Trumpeter 30, no. 2 (2014): 106–14. 
Shields, Robert. “Social Science and Postmodern Spatialisations: Jameson’s Aesthetic of Cognitive 
Mapping.” In Postmodernism and the Social Sciences, edited by Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham, and 
Mo Malek, 39–56. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1992. 
Simmel, Georg. “Die Kreuzung Sozialer Kreise.” In Soziologie: Untersuchungen Über Die Formen Der 
Vergesellschaftung, 318–57. 1908. Reprint, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013. 
Smith, Neil. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space. 1984. Reprint, London: 
University of Georgia Press, 2008. 
Soja, Edward W. Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: Verso, 
1989. 
Springer, Bernd F. W. “Ist Widerstand gegen eine Diktatur eine moralische Pflicht? Über-Leben und 
Sterben in Hans Falladas Roman: Jeder stirbt für sich allein.” Revista de Filología Alemana 20 
(2012): 83–102. 
  Chaoulideer 268 
Swyngedouw, Erik. “Metabolic Urbanization: The Making of Cyborg Cities.” In In the Nature of 
Cities: Urban Political Ecology and the Politics of Urban Metabolism, edited by Nik Heynen, Maria 
Kaika, and Erik Swyngedouw, 20–39. London: Taylor & Francis, 2006. 
Trilling, Lionel. Sincerity and Authenticity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972. 
Vermeulen, Pieter. “How Should a Person Be (Transpersonal)? Ben Lerner, Roberto Esposito, and 
the Biopolitics of the Future.” Political Theory 45, no. 5 (2017): 659–81. 
Walther, Peter. Hans Fallada: Die Biographie. Berlin: Aufbau, 2017. 
Ward, Barbara. Spaceship Earth. Columbia University Press, 1966. 
Warner, Michael. “On the Grid (and Off).” Berkeley, CA, 2018. 
https://tannerlectures.berkeley.edu/2017-2018-lecture-series/. 
Warwick Research Collective. Combined and Uneven Development: Towards a New Theory of World-
Literature. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015. 
Williams, Jenny. More Lives Than One: A Biography of Hans Fallada. New York: Melville House, 2009. 
Willmann, Heinz. Steine klopft man mit dem Kopf: Lebenserinnerungen. Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1977. 
Žižek, Slavoj. Living in the End Times. London: Verso, 2011. 
 
ProQuest Number: 
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality and completeness of this reproduction is dependent on the quality  
and completeness of the copy made available to ProQuest. 
Distributed by ProQuest LLC (        ). 
Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author unless otherwise noted. 
This work may be used in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons license 
or other rights statement, as indicated in the copyright statement or in the metadata  
associated with this work. Unless otherwise specified in the copyright statement  
or the metadata, all rights are reserved by the copyright holder. 
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, 
United States Code and other applicable copyright laws. 
Microform Edition where available © ProQuest LLC. No reproduction or digitization  
of the Microform Edition is authorized without permission of ProQuest LLC. 
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 USA 
28321127
2021
